Mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause : A comparative study of political change at the communal, regional and global levels by Kirisci, K.
Kirisci, K. (1986). Mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause : A comparative study of political 
change at the communal, regional and global levels. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University 
London) 
City Research Online
Original citation: Kirisci, K. (1986). Mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause : A 
comparative study of political change at the communal, regional and global levels. (Unpublished 
Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/8286/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE 
A Comparative Study of Political Change at the Communal, 
Regional and Global Levels 
BY 
KEMAL KIRISCI 
THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE 
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
THE CITY UNIVERSITY 
DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE 
JUNE 1986 
CONTENTS 
LIST OF CONTENTS I 
LIST OF TABLES V 
LIST OF FIGURES MD DIAGRAMS VII 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS VIII 
ABSTRACT IX 
CHAPTER 1: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE RESEARCH 1 
PROBLEM 
1.1 The history of the origins of the Palestinian 1 
Question 
1.2 The Research Problem 11 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 16 
Endnotes 21 
CHAPTER 2: ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR A THEORETICAL 28 
FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING MOBILISATION OF 
SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AT 
THE GLOBAL LEVEL 
2.1 Paradigms as a source of guidance for selecting 28 
and tackling research problems 
2.2 Paradigms in the study of International 28 
Relations 
2.3 The Research Problem and the Global Politics 32 
Paradigm 
Endnotes 44 
CHAPTER 3: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 50 
3.1 Introduction 50 
3.2 Agenda Politics 50 
3.3 The Model 61 
Endnotes 74 
I 
CHAPTER 4: MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT AT THE PALESTINIAN 81 
LEVEL 
4.1 Introduction 81 
4.2 The Emergence of the Palestinian Resistance 84 
Movements 
4.3 The Hobilisation Process 91 
Endnotes 115 
CHAPTER 5: THE ARAB GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL 122 
5.1 Introduction 122 
5.2 The Mobilisation process 123 
Endnotes 150 
CHAPTER 6: MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT AMONGST THIRD 156 
WORLD REGIONAL AND POLITICAL GROUPINGS 
6.1 Introduction 156 
6.2 Conducive Environment 157 
6.3 Cognitive and Bargain Linkages 164 
6.4 Accessibility 175 
6.5 Growth of Support 182 
6.6 Conclusion 196 
Endnotes 198 
CHAPTER 7: MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE 206 
PALESTINIAN CAUSE AMONGST EAST AND WEST 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
7.1 Introduction 206 
7.2 Conducive Environment 209 
7.3 Cognitive and other Linkages 220 
7.4 Accessibility 237 
7.5 Growth of Support 253 
7.6 Conclusion 271 
Endnotes 274 
II 
CHAPTER 8: MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT AT THE UN LEVEL 290 
8.1 Introduction 290 
8.2 Conducive Environment 291 
8.3 Accessibility 302 
8.4 Cognitive Linkages 309 
8.5 Growth of Support 314 
8.6 Conclusion 330 
Endnotes 332 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 346 
9.1 Introduction 346 
9.2 Interactive Nature of the "Growth of support 346 
9.3 Convergence of Issue Positions 352 
9.4 Dynamic Nature of the Growth of Support, the 360 
Role of Feedback Processes 
9.5 Reconsidering the Hobilisation Process Hodel 365 
9.6 Some Limitations of this Study 369 
Endnotes 371 
APPENDICES 
I- Operationalising the concept of 'political 374 
support' for the palestinian cause 
11- Anti-colonialism and the Palestinian ｉｳｳｵ･ｾ＠ A 396 
Quantitative Analysis of the Linkages between 
Anti-colonialism and the Palestinian Issue 
111- List of Countries by Regional and Political 
Groups 
VI- Codebook for file on Agreement Scores 
V- PLO Organisational Chart 
VI- List of PNC Meetings 
VII- The Status of the PLO Representation Abroad 
VIII-The PLO in the UN system 
III 
420 
425 
436 
437 
440 
455 
BIBLIOGRAPHY: Theory and Methodology 
Books 
Articles 
BIBLIOGRAPHY: Substantive 
Books 
Articles 
Documents and Other Sources 
IV 
457 
460 
465 
470 
476 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 Distribution of votes on the Partition 9 
Plan by Regional Groupings 
Table 1.2 Expansion of Israeli Diplomatic 14 
Representation Abroad between 1951-1967 
Table 4.1 Estimated Distribution of Palestinians 83 
for 1977 
Table 4.2 Matrix of Access Routes to the 105 
Palestinians 
Table 5.1 Access Routes to Arab Governments 134 
Table 6.1 Level of Average Anti-colonial Voting 168 
Scores for Groups 
Table 6.2 Distribution of Highly Anti-colonial and 172 
Pro-Palestinian Votes in each Group 
across Three Sessions 
Table 6.3 Access Routes to Third World Governments 176 
Table 6.4 PLO Offices by Third World Regional and 181 
Political Groupings 
Table 6.5 Distribution of Non-Aligned Support 187 
Table 6.6 Distribution of African Support for the 190 
Palestinian Cause 
Table 6.7 Distribution of Islamic Support at the 
24th Session by ICO and Sub-Group 
Membership 
Table 6.8 Distribution of Latin American Support 
Table 7.1 Access Routes to European Agendas 
Table 7.2 Distribution of Support Across Sessions 
for Countries Outside the EC 
Table 8.1 Change in the Distribution of United 
Nations Memebership Distribution by 
Regions between 1945-1980 
Tahle 8.2 Geographical Distribution of Vice-
Presidents before and after Resolution 
1990 (XVIII) 
Table 8.3 Distribution of ｾＱ｡ｩｮ＠ Committee 
ChairManships before and after 
Resolution 1990 (XVIII) 
v 
192 
194 
238 
264 
292 
294 
294 
Table 8.4 Number of Countries Sponsoring PLO's 
Participation in the Work of the 
Special Political Committee 
Table 8.S Distribution of Support by Regional 
Groupings at the 24th Session 
Table 8.6 Distribution of Support by Regional 
Groupings at the 26th Session 
Table 8.7 Distribution of Support by Regional 
Groupings at the 27th Session 
Table 8.8 Distribution of Support by Regional 
Groupings across the 29th and 35th 
Sessions 
Table Al.l Distribution of Roll-calls by Sessions 
and by Sub-issues 
Table Al.2 Distribution of Weights by Period and 
by Issues 
Table A2.1 Correlation coefficients for Voting on 
colonial between General Assembly 
Sessions 
30S 
320 
320 
320 
329 
382 
387 
400 
Table A2.2 Distribution of Support by Groups at 402 
the 24th Sessions 
Table A2.3 Distribution of Support by Groups at 402 
the 29th Session 
Table A2.4 Distribution of Support by Groups at 402 
the 3Sth Session 
Table A2.5 Relationship between Voting on colonial 404 
matters and on the Palestinian Question 
Table A2.6 Propotion of anti-colonial (first rows) 411 
and pro-Palestinian (second rows) votes 
in each group across three Sessions 
Table A7.1 Distribution of PLO Offices by Regions 4S0 
VI 
LIST OF FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS 
Figure 3.1 The Composition of the Global Agenda 
Figure 3.2 Model for Studying the Mobilisation of 
Support for the Palestinian Cause 
Diagram 8.1 The UN System as it relates to the 
Palestinian Problem 
Diagram 9.1 Growth of Support Across Different 
Levels Represented as Multi Step-
Function. 
Diagram 9.2 Convergence of Issue Positions on the 
Palestinian Question 
Figure A2.1 Scattergram of Voting on the 
Palestinian Question (down) by 
Colonial Matters (across) at the 
24th Session 
Figure A2.2 Scattergram of Voting on the 
Palestinian Question (down) by 
Colonial Matters (across) at the 
35th Session 
Figure A2.3 Frequency Distribution of Countries 
Voting the Same Way 
Figure A2.4 Cluster-Blocs on the Palestinian 
Question at the 24th Session 
Figure A2.5 Cluster-Blocs on Colonial Matters 
at the 24th Session 
Figure A2.6 Cluster-Blocs on the Palestinian 
Question at the 35th Session 
Figure A2.7 Cluster-Blocs on Colonial Matters 
at the 35th Session 
VII 
60 
62 
328 
347 
359 
407 
408 
409 
415 
416 
417 
418 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The research and writing of a thesis is a long, arduous 
process. However, it is never a lonely one, for, during the 
years of preparation, many people contribute in ways that 
not only make the task lighter but also enhance the final 
res u It. ｾＱ＠ any h a ve he I p ed and sup po r ted me d uri ng the pas t 
six years and to all of them I shall always be deeply 
grateful. Space precludes me from naming them all 
indivudually, but ｴｨ･ｲ･ｾｭ･＠ to whom I must convey my 
special thanks. To Mrs R. AI-Fattal (Khalidi) and Dr. B. 
Hammad for the insight they have given me into the 
decision-making process of the United Nations, an insight I 
could never have gained solely from the records of the UN; 
to Pat F4¥quhar, the librarian at the United Nations in 
London, in particular for patiently guiding me through the 
wealth of UN documentation in the initial stages of my 
thesis; to Rauf Obeid and Vedat Kirisci for the seminar 
they organised for me at the University of Texas, Dallas, 
during which the idea of constructing an index of support 
germinated; to the Institute of Jewish Affairs for allowing 
the generous and friendly use of their library; to the 
Council for the Advancement of Arab and British 
Understanding for the use of their library facilities; to 
the City University library, in particular to Sheila, for 
their help; to Doreen Schlesinger and the secreterial team 
for their help and support; to my parents for their 
patience and support during the past six years; and, 
finally, to my supervisor, Dr. Peter Willetts, for the 
generous support, advice and friendship he has given me and 
from which I have greatly benefitted. 
VIII 
ABSTRACT 
Those who study world politics are divided between the 
traditional Realist paradigm, which depicts an 
international political system dominated by states involved 
in a 'power struggle' in pursuit of their 'national 
interest', and an emergent approach that includes in the 
analysis a wider range of political actors and defines the 
nature of politics very differently.The latter approach 
sees the central process of world politics as being the 
mobilisation of support in respect to the composition of 
the global political agenda and contest over the various 
issue positions. This thesis examines the Palestinian 
Question as a case study of a mobilisation process, that 
involved a non-state actor playing a crucial role in 
introducing to the global agenda an issue previously of low 
salience to other actors. 
The Palestinian Question throughout the 1950s and 1960s was 
treated on the global political agenda as a by-product of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was perceived as a 'refugee 
problem', the solution of which was envisaged within an 
overall settlement of the A.rab-Israeli conflict. Yet, 
within less than a decade of the re-appearance of an 
indigenous Palestinian national movement a significant 
section of the international political system changed its 
attitude towards the Palestinian problem. It was not any 
more perceived simply as a 'refugee problem' but one of 
'self-determination' . 
In this thesis the analysis of the mobilisation process 
that brought the Palestinian issue to the forefront of the 
world political agenda is guided by a dynamic model applied 
to four different levels of analysis. The first level is 
constituted by the Palestinian community. Then there is the 
Arab governmental level. The third level is made up of 
various regional groupings, such as the Non-Aligned, the 
Latin Americans, the European Community and the East 
Europeans. The final level is the global one, represented 
by the United Nations political system. The analysis 
reveals the dynamic and interactive nature of the 
mobilisation process across different levels of analysis 
and the way in which the different positions held on the 
Palestinian issue have converged towards a relatively 
common stand. 
I X 
CHAPTER 1 
A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.1 The history of the origins of the Palestinian Question. 
A lot has been written and said about the origins and the 
historv of the Palestinian question. Kayyali Palestine A 
Modern Historyl and Sykes Cross Roads to Israe1 2 are 
excellent books that give an account of historical 
developments from Arab and Jewish point of views, 
respectively. Ovendale The Origins of the Arab Israeli 
Wars 3 , on the other hand is a more balanced historical 
study of the emergence of the Palestinian Question. It is 
difficult to exhaust the literature on this topic but some 
other prominent works investigating the history as well as 
various narrower aspects of the problem are; Khalidi, Prom 
Heaven to Conquest4 , Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine5 , 
Davis, The Evasive Peace 6 and Bethell, The Palestinian 
Triangle. 7 
In this chapter our purpose is twofold. Firstly, we shall 
give a brief account of some of the major historical 
developments that appear to constitute the origins and 
background of the Palestinian Question. Secondly, from this 
summary analysis we shall derive and introduce the research 
problem that this thesis intends to study. 
The historical background of the Palestinian Question will 
be studied with particular attention to politics at the 
international level. The turn of this century seems to form 
a natural starting point. It was then that the world saw 
the birth of Zionism and Zionist efforts to rally world 
support for a 'Jewish homeland'. The chapter will stress 
particularly these energetic efforts to mobilise 
international support towards the establishment of a 
'Jewish homeland' and contrast it with the unsuccessful 
Arab counter efforts. The chapter will also note how 
1 
Zionist goals were achieved within half a century while the 
Arabs and Palestinians found themselves in total disarray 
at the end of this period. It is in reference to this 
historical background that the gradual re-emergence of the 
Palestinian Question in late 1960s from relative 
obscurity to the forefront of world politics becomes 
puzzling. It is this puzzlement that will constitute the 
basis of our research problem and our efforts to explain 
°t 8 1 • 
1.1.1 The Origins of the Palestinian Question 
The origins of the Palestinian problem lie in the 
persecution of Jewish populations in modern times and a 
growing realisation on the part of Jewish intellectuals, 
particularly from Eastern Europe, of the need to respond to 
this challenge. In the late l880s, this response to what 
was referred to as the 'Jewish problem' started to 
transform itself into Jewish nationalism. Jewish 
nationalism, often referred to as Zionism, saw the solution 
of the 'Jewish problem' in settling the Jewish people on a 
piece of land to be governed by Jewish people. This idea 
appears first to have been articulated in a concrete manner 
by T. Herzl in 1896. In his famous pamphlet Der Judenstaat, 
Herzl saw the solution of the Jewish problem in the 
colonisation of a territory, that with the support of a 
. European power would be converted into a Jewish state. 9 
Herzl's idea of a Jewish state together with the need to 
secure international support was taken up and endorsed by 
the First Zionist Congress in August 1897. 10 Herzl, in an 
effort to bring about the creation of a Jewish state, set 
out to gain the support of leaders as diverse as Abdul 
Hamid, the then Ottoman Sultan, Kaiser Wilhelm and Czar 
Nicholas. ll The reluctance of these leaders to lend their 
support in any concrete manner turned Herzl towards 
British help. However, to his dismay early British offers 
of territory in East Africa was not well received by 
2 
Zionist circ1es.12 This opposition was reflected in a July 
1905 decision of the Zionist movement to refuse offers 
outside Pa1estine. 13 The need to accomodate to divisions 14 
within the various politically active Jewish communities, 
as well as to fears expressed about Arab rights in 
Palestine, led the Zionist Congress in 1911 to replace 
their earlier goal of a state by "a publicly recognised 
legally secured horne in Palestine".l5 
This reconsidered Zionist position was taken up by Weizmann 
with the British. The British government's attitude, as a 
resu1 t of 'both external and internal considerations, became 
favourable to the idea of a Jewish homeland and culminated 
in the adoption of the Balfour Dec1aration.16 It was this 
Declaration issued on November 2, 1917 that became the 
first British public recognition and support for the Jewish 
claim for a homeland in Palestine. When the British took 
over responsibility for Palestine under a League of Nations 
Mandate, this recognition became an international 
commitment. The revised British draft Mandate approved by 
the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922 stated 
that "The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the 
country under such political, administrative and economic 
conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish 
national home ..... 1 7 
The Zionists did not limit their efforts simply to 
receiving British support and ensuring the inclusion of the 
provisions for a 'Jewish homeland' in the draft r1andate. An 
international campaign directed towards the League of 
Nations was initiated during the period preceding the 
League Council's decision on the terms of the Mandate. The 
intensity of this campaign is evidenced in the roughly 350 
telegrams sent by Jewish organisations from all around the 
world calling for the ratification of the Mandate with the 
Balfour Declaration. IS These efforts far outweighed the 
modest Arab and Palestinian efforts against the Mandatel9 
as well as the Vatican's objections to "the privileged and 
3 
preponderating position" given to the Jewish people in the 
Mandate. 20 
In accordance with the term of the Mandate Britain 
facilitated Jewish immigration into Palestine and the 
development of a Jewish community. However, as a result of 
mounting discontent amongst the Palestinian Arabs and the 
changing international climate, Britain began to revise her 
position. This revision in policy became particularly 
evident between 1936 and 1939. 21 The Royal Commission, 
which was set up in response to Palestinian Arab 
disturbances directed against British rule during the 
summer of 1936, recommended the abandonment of the Mandate 
and the division of Palestine into three parts, a Jewish 
state, an Arab state and a British mandatory zone including 
Jerusalem. 22 The negative Palestinian Arab reaction led to 
increased violence in Palestine. Britain after having 
suppresed this violence was forced to abandon the Peel 
partition scheme and instead tried to reconcile all parties 
involved through two conferences in London. 23 The failure 
of these efforts coupled by the changing strategic-military 
and political considerations brought about by the 
approaching war 24 led the British government to declare 
that it had no intentions of making Palestine a Jewish 
state. 25 
Britain's policy towards the Jewish homeland had never been 
one of great stability and continuity and did not always 
represent a unified stance. British commitments to Arab 
nationalism together with the continuous tension between 
the British executive in Palestine and the Foreign Office 
in London complicated this policy and at times made it 
incoherent, culminating in various conflicting 
declarations. Although Churchill's speech in June 1922 
reiterated the government's commitment to the Mandate 
provisions and the 'Jewish homeland', by the late 1920s the 
Passfield White Paper, issued as a result of Arab 
disturbances urged restrictions on Jewish immigration and 
4 
land sales to Jews. 26 This new statement was bitterly 
denounced by the Zionists as a violation of the Mandate and 
in 1931 the government had to respond to these pressures in 
the form of the Macdonald letter assuring Britain's 
commitment to the terms of the Mandate. 27 
However, the marked departure as stated in the 1939 White 
Paper from Britain's earlier commitments to a 'Jewish 
homeland' precipitated two major changes in Zionist 
politics. The first change came about in respect to 
politics within Palestine. The use of violence to achieve a 
Jewish state became increasingly central to the Zionist 
movement. Apart from a lull, brought about as a result of 
an Axis military threat to the Middle East, during the 
major part of the Second World War, this violence continued 
unabated until 1948. The second change was at the 
international level. The Zionists took this change in 
Britain's policy towards Palestine to the Permanent Mandate 
Commission and succeeded in getting a decision critical of 
the British government. 28 Equipped with the support of the 
Permanent Mandate Commission they sought to get the British 
government to reconsider the White Paper. Although 
Churchill sympathised with the Zionist demand 29 the 
government did not change its position and instead in 1940 
announced that they remained committed to their policy laid 
down in May 1939. 30 These developments led the Zionist 
groups to conclude that they could no more depend on the 
British Government as a protector and sponsor. Hence, a 
second important period of mobilisation of support at the 
international level was initiated. These efforts were 
directed primarily towards the US government and the 
American Jewry.31 
The US government had endorsed the British mandate in 1922 
on the condition that Britain did nothing prejudicing the 
rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine. As late as 
May 1943 President Roosevelt had assured Ibn-Saud that "no 
decisions altering the basic situation of Palestine should 
5 
be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and 
Jews".32 However, this situation changed very drastically 
during the period preceding the establishment of Israel. 
The World Zionist Organisation having succeeded in gaining 
the support of the American Jewry in May 1942, in the form 
of the Biltmore programme, embarked on an intense period of 
lobbying in the US domestic political scene. 33 
These efforts in 1944 culminated in the tabling of draft 
resolutions in the Congress calling for unrestricted Jewish 
immigration and the establishment of a Jewish 
commonwealth. 34 Although these resolutions were never 
adopted because of intense War Department objections that 
such resolutions would incite violence in Palestine and 
undermine US war efforts, it did not prevent the question 
of a Jewish Palestine from becoming an important item on 
the agendas of the Presidential election campaigns of both 
Democrats and Republicans. 35 The election campaigns and the 
growing public awareness about the Holocaust was 
successfully used by the Jewish politicans to strengthen 
the linkage between the solution of the 'Jewish refugee 
problem' and the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in 
Palestine. 36 One concrete example of Zionist efforts to 
mobilise American support for their cause was reflected in 
a July 1945 petition widely supported by the Governors of 
the states and many members of the Congress calling on 
President Truman to lend formal governmental support for a 
Jewish Palestine. 37 However, President Truman in the face 
of strong State Department and British opposition 
ｯＮＮ｣ＮｾｉａﾣＧ･ｳｴ＠ ｉＮｉ｜ｾ＠
reluctantly resisted ｾ＠ ｡｀ｾｾｩｳ･＠ to domestic pressure until 
just prior to the UN vote on the Partition Plan "when he 
yielded to Jewish pressure and instructed the US delegation 
. f h h' d .. t " 38 to assure the attaInment 0 t e two-t Ir s maJorl y . 
In contrast to Zionist political successes, particularly at 
the international level, the Palestinian Arabs were in 
disarray. Although, the Arab uprising in Palestine between 
1936 and 1939 played an important role in getting the 
6 
British government to change its policy towards Palestine, 
it also precipitated such a fierce reaction that the 
backbone of the Palestinian Arab political structure was 
broken. 39 This situation left the Palestinian Arab 
community at a disadvantage at two levels. At the local 
level as a result of the suppression they experienced, they 
lacked the political and administrative institutions that 
the Jewish community possessed. 40 Similarly, at the 
international level they lacked a well organised movement 
with access to major governments. Hence they were unable to 
match the Zionist success in gaining the support of the US 
government. 41 To make matters worse, while the Zi9nist 
managed to mobilise a government which was to play a very 
central and important role in the drawing up of the post-
war order, some prominent local Arab political leaders 
associated themselves with the Nazis in Germany in the hope 
of receiving Axis support to achieve independence. 42 
The only politically favourable development for the 
Palestinian Arabs carne at the regional level. The Arab 
states with the support of the British government met in 
Alexandria in September 1944 and, amongst others, adopted a 
resolution in support of the independence of Palestinian 
Arabs. In March 1945 this was followed by the inclusion of 
a Palestinian annex to the Covenant of the newly founded 
Arab League. This provided for the possibilty of seating a 
Palestinian representative at the Arab League Council 
meetings. 43 It is possible that it was as a result of Arab 
League lobbying that Zionist efforts to achieve 
representation at the San Fransisco conference were 
thwarted. 44 However, this almost simple procedural success 
achieved by the Palestinian Arabs did not change the course 
of events in the coming years in any significant way. 
1.1.2. The problem reaches United Nations 
In the aftermath of the Second World War the Zionists were 
in complete conflict with the British authorities in 
7 
Palestine. The Jewish population had increased from 83,790 
in 1922 to 554,329 in 1945 45 to constitute an adequate 
demographic change in Palestine for the zionists to make a 
formal bid for a Jewish state. In August 1946 in Paris the 
Jewish Agency proposed a plan demanding a Jewish state in 
an available area of Palestine. 46 These developments, 
together with·· domestic pressures and military exhaustion 
caused by the Second World War, led the British government 
in February 1947 to decide to place the Palestinian problem 
before the United Nations General Assembly. 
Britain's decision to refer the Palestinian Question to the 
United Nations precipitated intense political activity in 
both the Arab and Zionist camps. The Arab League at the 
start of the Special Session of the General Assembly on 
Palestine, in April 1947, tried to place "The termination 
of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its 
independence" as an additional agenda item. 47 The 
Zionists, on their, part requested the right to be heard by 
the Assembly and lobbied extensively in an attempt to link 
the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe to the Palestinian 
problem. 48 
Despite forceful Arab arguments, the General Committee of 
the Assembly rejected the Arab proposal for the inclusion 
of an additional item on the agenda of the Special 
Session. 49 Symbolicaly, the Zionists request faired much 
better. The Jewish Agency was granted the right to address 
the Assembly, setting a precedent for non-governmental 
organisations to participate in the work of the ASSemb1y.50 
Although this decision opened the possibility for the 
Palestinian Arabs to put their case to the Assembly too, 
this was achieved only after a dispute arising from an Arab 
procedural protest over the unequal treatement of the cases 
for representation was settled. 51 Probably the greatest 
achivement for the Zionists was the adoPtion of an amended 
US draft resolution authorising the United Nations Special 
Commission on Palestine to conduct investigations anywhere 
8 
it considered necessary.52 The Special Session Resolution 
106 (S-l), 15 May 1947 opened the possibility for United 
Nations Special Committee on Palestine visits to refugee 
camps in Europe and hence the potential of linking the 
Jewish refugee problem to the future of Palestine. 
1.1.2.1. The Partition Plan 
The UNSCOP, as a result of its investigations presented its 
report to the General Assembly at the end of August. 
Accordingly, the report declared the mandate unworkable 
and presented two competing plans for Palestine's 
independence. 53 These two plans precipitated intense Arab 
and Zionist efforts to gain support for their respective 
positions before the final Assembly decision. However, the 
General Assembly, as a result of effective Zionist 
lobbying, 54 mostly relying on an exploitation of the 
Holocaust and the Jewish refuge problem in Europe,55 
coupled with US pressure56 on particularly small states 
and the Soviet decision to support the partition plan,S7 
adopted Resolution 181 (II), on 29 November 1947, which 
recommended the establishment of a Jewish state and an Arab 
state with an economic union between them. 
W.European 
E.European 
L.American 
Africa 
Asia 
Arabs 
TOTAL 
YES 
12 
5 
14 
1 
1 
33 
ABSTAIN 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
10 
NO 
2 
1 
4 
6 
13 (10 Islamic) 
TABLE 1.1: Distribution of votes on the Partition Plan 
by regional groupings 
As Table 1.1 suggests the Partition Plan, favoured by the 
Zionists, received practically the full support of 
all delegations belonging to the Western Europe, Eastern 
9 
Europe and Latin American groups. One could argue that the 
10 delegations that abstained lent implicit support to the 
resolution by allowing a bare two-thirds majority to hold. 
The Arabs, on the other hand, were joined by only six other 
countries four of them with significant Muslim populations. 
1.1.2.2. The establishment of Israel 
The UN decision to endorse the establishment of a Jewish 
state brought the Zionists one important step closer to the 
realisation of a half-century goal. However, for the 
Zionists there still remained two major obstacles - the 
withdrawal of Britain from Palestine and the opposition of 
the Arabs to the Partition Plan. The first obstacle after 
all did not constitute a serious problem. The British 
government had not given its full support for the Partition 
Plan. Yet, this did not prevent the government from 
announcing that it would terminate its responsibilities in 
Palestine on 14 May 1948. The second problem, on the other 
hand, proved to be more challenging. After decades of 
efforts to mobilise political support at the international 
level the Zionists this time responded to the challenge by 
channeling their military capabilities against the Arabs. 
The Arabs throughout their efforts to prevent the adoption 
of the Partition Resolution had made it clear that they 
would regard such a decision as illegal and would resist it 
by all means. 58 Having lost the political battle at the 
international level the Arabs took the struggle to the 
military plain. First Arab irregulars came to the support 
of the Palestinian Arabs during late 1947, followed by the 
regular Arab armies after the departure of Britain from 
Palestine. However, this military struggle 59 by the Arabs 
did not prevent the proclamation and the early 
consolidation of Israel. When in early 1949 armistices 
between the belligerents were finallY signed 60 the Arabs 
had not only failed to stop the partition of Palestine but 
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were now facing a Jewish state that was 21% larger than the 
UN Par tit ion PIa n had en vis aged and m 0 ret han hal f a 
million Palestinian Arabs had been displaced. 61 
1.2. The Research Problem 
In just about 50 years the Zionist movement had succeeded 
to resolve Herzl's 'Jewish Question' by establishing 
Israel. The ability of the Zionist movement to mobilise not 
only the Jewish people but a variety of actors in the 
international political system played a central role in the 
est a b 1 ish men t of Is rae 1. T his is well de m 0 n s t rat ed i n the 
various Zionist groups skill in lobbying and pressure-group 
politics transcending state boundaries. They worked 
closely with the British government and mobilised various 
groups to their cause during the 1920s and most of the 
1930s. They continued their alliance with Britain as long 
as it served their interests. Once the protection and 
assistance of Britain for Jewish immigration and the Jewish 
community in Palestine started to diminish they replaced 
Britain with the US. To this skill one should add the 
accessibility by Zionist circles to the decision making 
processes of the politically important actors such as 
Britain and the USA. This naturally facilitated the task of 
Zionists in bringing the issue of a Jewish state to the 
attention of the governments of these countries. 
Furthermore, the successful linking of the solution of the 
'Jewish refugee problem' in Europe to the future of 
Palestine appears to have favourablY influenced the 
attitudes of various actors towards a Jewish state. 
Finally, to these factors one also needs to add the 
predisposition of the strategic interests of the two 
emerging 'superpowers'. 
On the Palestinian Arab side 
different. During the Mandate 
the 
the 
picture was 
Palestinian 
very 
Arab 
community never had a political-administrative 
infrastructure as complex and elaborate as that of the 
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Jewish community. British attempts to establish an Arab 
Agency similar to the Jewish Agency had not been well 
received. 62 This particular lack of an internal 
organisational structure may well have played an important 
role in the breakdown of the Palestinian Arab society in 
the aftermath of the 1948 war. Even though the Partition 
Plan had recognised the political rights of the 
Palestinians with provisions for an Arab state, with more 
than half of its population displaced the Palestinian Arabs 
were far from establishing a state. A tentative attempt to 
set up an "All Palestine Government" in September 1948 
received recognition from Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon 
but never achieved the status of a politically independent 
unit. 63 Of the areas remaining outside Israel, the Gaza 
strip remained under Egyptian military rule while the West 
Bank was annexed by Jordan despite great Arab League 
opposition. 
The situation for the Palestinian Arabs at the 
international level was not any better. The Palestinian 
Arabs as well as members of the Arab League lacked the 
degree of accessibility to the governments and domestic 
politics of important countries that the Zionist enjoyed. 
This lack of influence was particularly evident during the 
debates and decisions over Palestine. Most of the few 
countries that did support the Arab position had done so as 
a result of Islamic solidarity. 
As Israel gained admission to the UN 64 in May 1949 the 
Palestinian Problem became set to be relegated to the 
status of a 'refugee problem'. Although the 'right of 
refugees to return to their homes' was supported by a 
series of resolutions including the resolution admiting 
Israel to the UN the issue began to loose its political 
nature. This was particularly evident in the growing number 
of resolutions of a 'technical and humanitarian' nature 
pointing to the plight of refugees and noting the need to 
. d f' . 1 . t 65 offer them technlcal an lnanCla aSS1S ance. 
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In this context, two developments at the UN appear to have 
played a central role in bringing about an eventual change 
in attitudes that redefined the nature of the Palestinian 
Que s t ion a way fro map rob 1 em 0 f 's elf -d e t e r min a t ion I. The 
first change came in the content of resolutions refering to 
the refugee problem. Until the fifth session of the 
Assembly resolutions concerning the refugees had stressed 
speedy 'repatriation'. However, starting with Resolution 
394 (V) on 14 December 1950, Assembly resolutions began to 
add to their recommendations 'resettlement' and 
'rehabilitation'. These recommendations were supported by 
Israel and certain Western governments. They maintained 
that the solution of the refugee problem would not be 
achieved by repatriation but instead through their 
resettlement in neighbouring Arab states. The Arab 
governments saw these developments as an attempt to erase 
the problem of Palestine by removing the refugees from the 
area. At the UN these developments had their impact by 
further pushing the political rights of the Palestinian 
Arabs into obscurity and in some ways prepared the 
groundwork for the second change. 
The second change came in the form of the exclusion of the 
agenda item entitled 'Question of Palestine' from the 
Assembl y' s agenda. When the Secretary -{;ener a1 66 chose in 
1952 not to include the 'Question of Palestine' in the 
provisional agenda of the Assembly, the Arab delegations 
attempted to get the Assembly to discuss the political 
aspects of the Palestinian problem. However, in the ensuing 
procedural politics surrounding the additional Arab item 67 
and the counter-item suggested by Israe1 68 the changing 
attitude of the Assembly became even more conspicuous. A 
draft resolution by Western and Latin American countries 
argued that previous UN resolutions on Palestine 
constituted an obstacle 
achieving direct peace. 69 
to direct negotiations for 
Although this resolution as 
recommended by the Ad Hoc Political Committee did not meet 
the Assembly President's two-third majority request for 
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the plenary the damaged was done, at least from the Arab 
delegations point of view. 70 The Palestinian problem lost 
its independent existence as an item on the agenda and 
instead it became an issue pushed into obscurity behind 
items concerning the refugees of the Near East. 
In the mean time Israel appeared to be dominating the 
international scene outside the UN too. As Table 2 shows 
Israel, during the 1950s and 1960s substantially expanded 
her diplomatic relations with the outside world. 
Particularly significant were Israel's growing diplomatic 
and economic ties with the newly emerging Third World. 72 
Israel's preparedness to share her developmental and 
technical experience with the Third World made her 
particularly sought after. These bilateral relations were 
supplemented by a sympathetic attitude towards problems of 
great concern to the Third World such as decolonisation and 
apartheid. Israeli success in maintaining such a high 
status did play its role in perpetuating the status quo 
during the 1950s and early 1960s. 
1951 1967 
Diplomatic ｾ＠ Diplomatic ｾ＠
Embassy Rep. resentation Embassy Representation 
W.European 1 16 15 7 
E.European 1 4 2 5 
L.American 6 16 5 
Africa 25 4 
Asia 1 6 4 
TOTAL 2 27 (29) 64 15 (79) 
TABLE 2.1: Expansion of Israeli ｄｩｰｬｯｭ｡ｴｩｾｬｒ･ｰｲ･ｳ･ｮｴ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠
Abroad Between 1951-1966 
However, already from the early 1960s the beginnings of a 
change, particularly at the local level became evident. In 
the early 1960s there were the first signs of an awakening 
Palestinian national movement. Until then the Palestinian 
national movement, mostly as a result of the traumatic 
experience of the 1940s had remained disunited. Both A1-
tt CGVVfS M ｾ＠ ｲｉＢｾ＠ ｾ＠ Ｌｳｾ＠ M ｌ･Ｎｳｾ＠ Ｎ｣ＮＭＬＮｾ＠ aU ｉｊＢＮＮｾ＠
ａＢＧＧＧｓＧｾＧｲｳ＠ . 
14 
Fatah and the early PLO sponsored by the Arab League played 
an important role in providing the Palestinian national 
movement with an institutional-organisational background. 
During the late 1960s and 1970s the movement centred around 
the PLO gained increasing support and legitimacy amongst 
both the Palestinians and the Arabs. 
This process of mobilisation of support for the PLO and the 
Palestinian cause did not remain limited to the local and 
regional levels. A similar process at the international 
level became also evident. The 'Palestine Question' that 
had for so long been treated as a 'refugee problem' started 
to change its content. At the United Nations General 
Assembly increasing number of delegations drew attention to 
the political nature of the Palestinian Question. As early 
as 1969 resolutions referring in one form or the other to 
the political rights of the Palestinians began to receive 
majorities. Third World governmental forums such as the 
Islamic Conference Organisation, the Non-Aligned ｾＱｯｶ･ｭ･ｮｴ＠
and the OAU began to recognise and lend their support for 
the Palestinian cause. This was followed by a recognition 
of the PLOts authority and legitimacy to represent the 
Palestinian cause. This growing base of support took a 
concrete form at the 29th General Assembly session which in 
1974_re-introduced the 'Palestine Question' as a separate 
item on its agenda, adopted resolutions in support of the 
Palestinians' right to self determination and granted the 
PLO observer status. 
Within less than a decade of the re-appearance of 
indigenous Palestinian national movement a significant 
section of the international political system had changed 
its attitude towards the Palestinian problem. This problem 
was not any more perceived simply as a 'refuge problem' but 
one of 'self-determination'. The Palestinian dimension of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict that had been ignored previously 
became restored. 
lS 
The globilisation of the basis of support and recognition 
of the Palestinian cause enabled the possibility for the 
PLO to consolidate its role as the representative of the 
Palestinian people both locally and internationally. Hence, 
the image of the PLO held by a great majority of the 
governments and other actors as 'terrorists' changed. 
Furthermore, many governments did not simply recognise the 
PLO as the representative of the Palestinians but also 
granted this organisation varying degrees of diplomatic 
status. This newly acquired legitimacy and status as an 
actor in world politics gave the PLO the possibility to 
work directly with a large number of governments and 
international organisations, hence enabling the PLO to 
increase the salience of the Palestinian issue to a great 
variety of actors. 
It is the desire to discover the probable causes behind 
this process of change and mobilisation of support, which 
brought an item of relative obscurity to the forefront of 
the world political agenda, that constitutes the research 
problem of this thesis. Given that the issue concerning the 
Palestinian problem remained outside the immediate concern 
of the global political agenda how can we explain the 
gradual recognition of the Palestinian problem as a 
political, rather than a 'refugee problem'. In other words, 
what kinds of factors and processes have led various actors 
in the international political system to change their 
perception of the nature and salience of the Palestinian 
problem? 
1.3. Organisation of the thesis 
1.3.1 Introduction 
Throughout this introductory chapter the importance of the 
mobilisation of political support was noted. Both the 
Arabs and the Zionists right from the very early stages of 
the Palestinian problem were aware of the role of 
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aggregating support, both locally and internationally, in 
influencing the attitudes and policy formation processes of 
various actors. However, it was only the Zionists who 
successfully exploited the mobilisation of support during 
the mandate period and the 1950s. 
In this respect The Arabs and more particularly the 
Palestinian Arabs remained unsuccessful until the early 
1960s. It was with the gradual re-emergence of the 
Palestinian national movement in the 1960s that the 
attitudes of various international actors towards the 
Palestinian question began to change. The Palestinian 
question that had been perceived as a 'refugee problem' 
during the 1950s and 1960s was increasingly treated as a 
political question arising from the denial of the right of 
s elf -d e t e r min a t ion tot h ePa 1 est i n ian A r a b s . I tis the 
purpose of the following two chapters to introduce an 
analytical framework, stressing the mobilisation of support 
to study how the Palestinian problem became an important 
item on the world political agenda after an absence of two 
decades. 
The thesis is presented in two parts. The first part 
reviews the state of theory in international relations and 
constructs a model to study the research problem. The 
second part presents the results obtained from the 
application of the model offered in the first part to the 
regional and global levels of analysis. 
1.3.2 PA.RT I 
1.3.2.1 Chapter 2; A review of theory in International 
Relations 
The Kuhnian approach 73 to the accumulation of knowledge in 
science notes the role that paradigms play in selecting and 
researching a problem. The debate about the validity of 
this approach and its applicability to social sciences is 
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far from resolved. However, this approach to a certain 
degree has gained some acceptability in the study of 
international relations. The influence of this approach on 
the works of scholars such as Waltz,74 Vasquez,75 Mansbach 
and Vasquez 76 is quite evident. The purpose of this 
chapter is to identify a paradigm in the study of 
international relations that best a"ccomodates our research 
problem. 
The Realist paradigm appears to dominate international 
relations together with a number of contenders. Amongst 
these contenders the Global Politics Approach seems to 
offer the most serious and systematic challenge to the 
dominant paradigm. 77 It is these two paradigms that are 
closely examined and compared in respect to our research 
problem. The Global Politics Approach that appears to 
accomodate our research problem better than the Realist 
paradigm is selected. This selection is done in the belief 
that the accumulated theoretical and methodological 
knowledge in a paradigm provides the basis from which one 
can construct an analytical framework. 
1.3.2.2. Chapter 3: The Analytical Framework 
The concepts central to the analytical framework is derived 
mostly from the contributions of Mansbach and Vasquez 78 to 
the Global Politics paradigm. These concepts are 
supplemented by ones from the literature on mobilisation 
theory. On the other hand, the dynamic nature of the model 
capturing the mobilisation process relies on the concept of 
feedback and holism from systems thinking. 
The change in governmental attitudes towards the 
Palestinian question 
of the mobilisation 
support is treated 
is assumed to have occured as a result 
of support. Therefore mobilisation of 
as the dependent var iable •. Three 
explanatory variables are suggested; accessibility to the 
decision making process of political actors, conduciveness 
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of the environment and cognitive linkage. The cumulative 
and interactive nature of the mobilisation process across 
levels of analysis and time is captured by allowing for a 
feedback mechanism. Methodological matters and problems 
associated with operationalisation and measurement of some 
concepts and the quantitative analysis employed in the 
research are discussed in appendix I and II. 
1 . 3 . 3 PART I I 
1.3.3.1 Chapter 4: The local Palestinian level 
This chapter applies the mobilisation process model to the 
Palestinian level and examines how the mobilisation process 
began and how it expanded to cover and gain the support of 
all sections of the Palestinian community. The role of the 
guerrilla groups and the PLO as the initiators and 
sustainers of the mobilisation process is particularly 
stressed. 
1.3.3.2 Chapters 5,6 and 7: The Regional Levels 
The results obtained from the analysis guided by our model 
are presented on a regional level basis. Chapter 5 will 
look at the changing Arab environment which encouraged the 
emergence of the contemporary Palestinian national 
movement. The access routes exploited by the Palestinians 
in bringing the Palestinian issue on the Arab governmental 
agenda will be stressed. Similarly, the various linkage 
processes associated with actors and issues in the area are 
presented. Chapters 6 and 7 follow the same structure as 
the previous one but instead of the Arab level they 
concentrate on two other broader regional levels. The first 
regional level is the Third World, while the second one is 
constituted of member countries of the Western and Eastern 
European Groups. The basis and composition of various sub-
regional groupings are given in appendix III. 
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1.3.3.3 Chapter 8; The Palestinian Issue at the Global Level 
This chapter looks at the Palestinian issue in respect to 
the United Nations agenda. The chapter assumes that the UN 
agenda can be treated as an indicator of world concern and 
opinion. The impact of the changing structure and 
com po sit ion 0 f the UN 0 nth ePa 1 est in ian Que s t ion is 
examined in respect to the concept of a conducive 
environment. The role of accessiblity by various political 
actors, including the PLO, to the decision making bodies of 
the UN to promote the Palestinian cause is examined. 
Furthermore, the major sources of cognitive linkages, such 
as anti-colonialism, that appear to have influenced the 
delegates' attitudes towards the Palestinian question are 
also analysed. 
1.3.3.4 Chapter 9; Conclusion: The Model Revisited 
This chapter re-examines the model in the light of 
empirical observations. The dynamic nature of the 
mobilisation process as well as the non-hierarchical nature 
of the growth of support for the Palestinian issue are 
noted. The way in which the Palestinian issue became 
redefined both in respect to the initiators as well as the 
supporters coupled with changes in the behaviour of the PLO 
are stressed. 
1.3.4 Appendices 
This section basically deals with the more technical 
aspects of the thesis. The construction of indices of 
support, identification of political groupings, description 
of data sets and computer packages employed in the 
quantitative parts of the thesis are presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR A 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING MOBILISATION OF 
SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL 
2.1 Paradigms as a source of guidance for selecting and 
tackling research problems. 
Waltz warns us of the futility of starting research without 
"at least a sketchy theory"l. Such a theory, however 
sketchy, has to rely on some existing body of knowledge. 
Then, the first task, in formulating this theoretical 
framework to understand and explain the problem presented 
in the earlier chapter, is to identify a suitable body of 
knowledge. 
According to Kuhn's work, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, it is paradigms that provide the ground 
knowledge needed to further our understanding of the world 
around us. Hence, scholars turn to a paradigm for guidance 
to select a research question and construct a suitable 
theoretical framework to study a problem. 
In an effort to explain how scientific knowledge grows Kuhn 
uses the concept of a paradigm in a rather vaque and loose 
manner. Masterman iden,tified twenty-one different ways in 
which Kuhn appears to describe a paradigm. 2 Here, it would 
be appropiate to think of a paradigm as supplying a 
scientific community with a set of conceptual and 
instrumental tools 3 which help the members of the 
community to identify and resolve certain puzzles. The 
particular paradigm that a scientific community employs 
will then be evident in the work they produce 4. 
2.2 Paradigms in the study of International Relations. 
Since the appearance of Kuhn's work numerous scholars have 
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examined the applicabilty of his propositions about the 
advancement of knowledge to social sciences and 
in particular. Some rather 
appear to have been reached. 
International Relations 
conflicting conclusions 
Lijphart 5 used Kuhn" s approach to argue that the 
behavioural paradigm had challenged the traditional 
paradigm. However, Beal disagrees with Lijphart and 
claims that he 
"has confused the magnitude of the methodological 
revolution accompanying the behavioural movement for a 
paradigm %nslaught against the traditional 
perspective" . 
Defining a paradigm more narrowly as a theory7, Beal has 
serious doubts that a paradigm shift in International 
Relations could ever happen. Yet, more recently Vasquez 8 
has used the Kuhnian approach to show, empirically, the 
inadequacies of the dominant paradigm to generate any 
further knowledge about world politics. This has led 
Vasquez together with Mansbach 9 to try to concretise an 
alternative emerging paradigm. 
If one uses the earlier definition of a paradigm, 
literature in International Relations suggest that there 
are roughly four different ways of picturing world 
politics. 
By far the dominant paradigm in international relations 
literature is the Realist or the power-politics paradigm. lO 
Most of the work produced in International Relations since 
World War II has been inspired by this paradigm. 
Morgenthau, a major and early contributor to this paradigm, 
typically sees the international political system as 
anarchic thus inducing states, which are assumed to be 
unified, to struggle for power in an attempt to satisfy 
their national interest. ll Over the last three decades work 
on this paradigm has len it to become the most articulated 
and structured paradigm, capable of providing a general 
theory of international relations. l2 Yet, since the early 
19705 it has come under continuous challenge, particularly 
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from scholars belonging to the Global Politics paradigm, 
for having encountered a number of anomalies and for not 
having produced any significant new knowledge, in the last 
decade or so.13 These challenges, So far, do not seem to 
have led to the collapse of this paradigm the way the 
idealist paradigm had found its unequivocal demise in the 
late 1930s. Instead scholars such as Waltz 14 and more 
recently Little15 claim the Realist paradigm to be still 
the best equipped paradigm for understanding and explaining 
world politics. 
The second most evident paradigm in International Relations 
literature has originated mostly from the US since the 
early 1970s.l 6 The Global Politics paradigm asserts that 
the assumptions central to the Realist paradigm are 
defective and hence Realist propositions about world 
politics are inaccurate. This paradigm has questioned and 
empirically demonstrated the weaknesses of focusing on 
states as the only important actors in world politics 17 , 
treating them as though they are completely monolithic and 
rational, separating domestic and international politics 
from each other and assuming that world politics is simply 
a struggle for power and peace. 
claims that world politics is 
multitude of issues imperfectly 
Instead, the paradigm 
better depicted by a 
linked receiving the 
attention of a variety of actors and parts of the state. 
Although there is a realisation that an alternative 
paradigm must consist of something more than just the 
questioning of various aspects of the dominant Realist 
paradigm18 , the Global Politics paradigm does not yet seem 
to have achieved the high level of structure and 
articulation of the paradigm it aspires to replace. This 
paradigm l9 still appears to be at the level of trying to 
articulate and reach agreement over its central-organising 
concepts such as interdependence, issue cycles and 
linkages. 20 
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The remaining two paradigms in the study of world politics 
are less com prehensive in their scope compared to the 
preceding ones. Nevertheless, the World Society and 
Marxist paradigms do embody "distinct assumptions about who 
should be regarded as the significant participants in int 
ernational relations and the nature of the transactions 
between them".2l 
For the World Society paradigm the unit of analysis is the 
'system', rather than the state and they envisage a world 
that is depicted by a 'cob-web' model. 22 This model 
pictures a world that is characterised by a great variety 
of exchanges ranging from economic to cultural ones. It is 
around these exchanges that the boundaries of the 
'relevant' system are drawn and its structure investigated 
with a view to explaining the problem at hand. However, 
although the concepts central to this paradigm are 
attractive, they are plagued by lack of clarity which 
prevents the paradigm from being amenable to empirical 
research. 23 Furthermore, this paradigm's philosophical 
roots in functionalism and liberal international thought 
burdens it with normative and prescriptive assertions. This 
is reflected, against all empirical evidence, in its claim 
that the role of the state is diminishing and that the 
state is an impediment to the maximization of human 
welfare. This approach in complete contrast to the Realist 
paradigm limits its area of concern to the cooperative 
aspects of international relations and to the need to study 
structures that would increase cooperation in the 
. . 1 t 24 lnternatlona sys em. 
The fourth and final paradigm is the Marxist one. Although 
classical Marxism dates back a century, its actual use in 
the study of international relations is more recent. For 
the Marxist paradigm the level of analysis is lowered from 
state-to-state interactions to the relations between socio 
economic classes. The state is given a secondary importance 
being a superstructure simply reflecting the prevailing 
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economic relationships in a society. Marxism's central 
concern with economic exchanges between classes has led the 
Marxist paradigm to be increasingly employed in the 
analysis of the international political economy. However, 
in spite of its conceptual and methodological richness, 
embedded in dialectics and historical materialism, the 
application of the Marxist paradigm to the study of 
international relations has been rather limited. This has 
led Thorndike to conclude that scholars in international 
relations should "stop and think, and invite the Marxist 
perspective to come out of the cold".25 
This conspicuous preponderence of paradigms in the study of 
world politics may not necessarily be the sign for a 
protracted and fractionalised revolution in the Kuhnian 
sense but rather that the discipline is a multi-paradigm 
one. 26 In such a discipline the decision for a scholar 
with which paradigm to work will be a political and 
cultural one, determined by the nature of the problem at 
hand and by whether the scholar feels intellectually closer 
to one or the other paradigm. 
The following section will examine, closely, the first two 
dominant paradigms in relation to our research problem. 
2.3 The Research Problem and the Global Politics Paradigm 
If "Understanding means nothing more than having 
whatever ideas and concepts are needed to recognise that a 
great many different phenomena are part of a coherent 
whole"27 then it seems that it is the ideas, concepts and 
theories associated with the Global Politics paradigm 
which provide the most fertile ground on which we can 
consruct our theoretical framework to explain our research 
problem. This appears to be the case for the following 
theoretical and methodological reasons. 
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2.3.1 Theoretical Considerations 
We have already mentioned that puzzlements, which form the 
basis of a research problem, are paradigm bound. An 
analysis of, particularly two of, the three 'central Realist 
assumptions should demonstrate that it would be difficult 
to place our research problem within the context of the 
Realist paradigm. 28 In other words, to the scholars working 
within the Realist paradigm these assumptions would prevent 
our research problem from coming across as worth studying. 
2.3.1.1 The assumption that states are the actors 
The first central assumption in Realist thinking is that 
the state is seen as the only important actor in world 
politics and furthermore rather like billiard-balls, these 
states are assumed to be hard-shelled and monolithic. In 
respect to our research problem this assumption faces a 
number of problems. 
Firstly, the first part of the assumption manages to 
squeeze out the potential role of non-state actors, such as 
the PLO, so central to our research problem. It also 
ignores the independent impact that the United Nations, the 
Non-Aligned and other political groupings can have on world 
politics, particularly in attitude formation. 29 This 
particular aspect of Realist thinking also makes it 
difficult to account for the processes that lead to the 
creation of new actors as well as the impact such new 
actors may have on the structures and processes particular 
to a system. 
Secondly, to treat the state as a monolithic unit makes the 
conceptualisation of various aspects of our research 
problem rather difficult if not impossible. It seems that 
the only way to alleviate this problem is to disaggregate 
the state into its constituent parts. It is by drawing a 
distinction between the state, the nation and the 
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government that we can begin to account for the 
characteristics of some of the more important actors and 
the nature of the interactions between them. Otherwise if 
one worked within the Realist paradigm it would not be 
possible to talk about the Palestinian nation scattered 
across a number of states. Equally, it would not be 
possible to account for the effects that certain political 
processes at the international level can have on different 
parts of a government or a country.30 
In terms of this research, within the realist framework, it 
would be very difficult to account for the emergence of an 
independent modern Palestinian identity as a transnational 
force which at the first instance manifested itself interms 
of entry into the Middle Eastern political system of a new 
actor in the form of the PLO. Although the PLO was created 
by the decisions of the Arab governments it nevertheless 
was a response to growing signs of Palestinian nationalism 
and within a few years came under the influence of 
Palestinian guerrilla groups. This development played an 
important role in the mobilisation of the Palestinian 
community but also precipitated a process that changed the 
perceptions and attitudes of the outside world towards the 
definition and nature of the Middle Eastern Conflict. 3l The 
definition of the problem became revised in such a way that 
the conflict was not any more perceived as a conflict 
between Arab states- and Israel but instead one between the 
Palestinian people and Israel. 
2.3.1.2 The assumption of a struggle for power 
The second assumption central to the Realist paradigm is 
that world politics can be pictured as a struggle for 
power. This struggle constitutes a single issue in a single 
system and entails a ceaseless and repetitive competion for 
a single stake of power. In such a system the major source 
of power becomes military strength and the ultimate use of 
force remains as an omnipresent concern in the minds of 
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statesmen. 
Naturally, with such a conflictful image of world politics 
where strategic-security considerations dominate the 
political agenda, it is not surprising that this assumption 
will fail "to accomodate the multiplicity of values and 
stakes for which actors both cooperate and compete".32 
This makes it difficult to consider situations where new 
issues can make their way on to the global agenda. The 
Realist paradigm, by introducing a distinction between high 
and low politics, treats any issue that fall outside 
national security, power and strategic considerations as 
being of minor significance world politics. 
There are two problems, one general and the other 
particular to our research, associated with this 
distinction between high and low politics. The first and 
general problem is a methodological one caused by the 
sUbjective nature of how to decide or define what 
constitutes 'high politics' at anyone time or location. An 
issue that may be treated as low politics by one government 
may well be of crucial importance to other governments. 
"For many governments of the Third World, such as 
Jamaica, Ghana or Sri Lanka, there may be no 
significant problems of 'national security' affecting 
their international relations .... For them the high 
politics of ｪｾｴ･ｲｮ｡ｴｩｯｮ｡ｬ＠ relations lies in trade and 
aid issues". 
Similarly, an issue that was not regarded as high politics 
may, at a later point in time, come to be redefined as of 
paramount significance. Wallace points out how the question 
of Britain's relations with the EEC was redefined from 
being a matter of foreign trade policy to a matter of high 
policy.34 
The second problem caused by this distinction is more 
central to the substance of our puzzlement that forms our 
research problem. The question of how the political and 
human rights of the Palestinian people became a major issue 
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on the agendas of numerous governments, international 
organisations and other actors could not be raised within 
the Re a lis t par ad i g m , ass elf -d e t e r min a t ion and hum a n 
rights would typically constitute issues of low policy. 
In contrast, the Global Politics paradigm is not plagued 
with these problems associated with a unidimensional view 
of world politics. Instead the Global Politics paradigm 
with the help of a concept like 'issue-salience' resolves 
the methodological problems associated with the concept of 
high and low politics. Hence, this concept bypasses 
difficulties of having to define, for once and all, what 
constitutes high policy for a government by enabling the 
researcher to determine empirically how much salience a 
government or an actor attaches to an issue. 35 
Furthermore, this paradigm allows scholars to view a world 
politics that is not simply dominated by one issue and 
accompanying conflict behaviour. Instead they have 
demonstrated that world politics is not unidimensional and 
that behaviour does vary according to issues. 36 
These characteristics of the Global Politics paradigm make 
it possible to postulate that the Palestinian issue could 
have varying degrees of salience for a variety of actors in 
world politics and that these actors will interact with 
each other in ways that will produce different kinds of 
behaviour. While the Palestinian issue for leading Arab-
African governments, Israel, the PLO, the Special Committee 
on Palestine will be of high salience this may not be the 
case for the Bahamas government, the Friends of the Earth 
or Commonwealth summits. During the decision making process 
for allocating the various values and stakes associated 
with the Palestinian issue, some of these actors may 
cooperate and form coalitions, other opposed actors may 
follow policies to undermine this cooperation. This process 
will be influenced by the changing salience of the 
Palestinian issue for various actors. 
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Hence, according to the Global Politics paradigm world 
politics is not seen as a unidimensional activity in which 
the players are states struggling for power in an anarchic 
international environment. Instead an alternative view of 
politics is argued which defines politics as contention 
over issues. 
governments 
The participants are 
to NGOs. Each ac to r 
actors ranging from 
may attach different 
degrees of salience to a wide range of issues that may be 
on the world political agenda. The process of interaction 
between these actors is not characterised by a competion to 
acquire as much power as possible. Instead actors are seen 
to interact with each other in order to influence the 
composition of the agenda as well as mobilise support for 
positions they hold on issues of salience to them. 
2.3.1.3 The assumption of the separability of international 
politics 
The third and final assumption in Realist thinking is 
centred around separating domestic politics from 
international politics. This assumption is based on the 
idea that states are simply responding to stimuli from the 
international environment and that a state's response will 
not be influenced by domestic factors, just as internal 
politics of a particular state will not be affected by 
events outside a country. Rosenau was one of the first 
scholars to question this assumption and point out the 
linkages existin9 among issues transcending the boundary 
between the two systems. Rosenau noted that 
"Almost every day incidents are reported that defy the 
principles of sovereignty. Politics everywhere, it 
would seem, are related to politics everywhere 
else.... One can no more comprehend the internal 
political processes of a Latin American country 
ｾｩｴｨｯｵｴ＠ accounting for the United States presence (or, 
more accurately, the multiple United States presences) 
than one can explain the dynamics of political life in 
Pakistan or India without reference to the Kashmir 
issue".37 
Inherent in this assumption is also the Realist proposition 
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that while domestic politics is characterised by order and 
stability, international politics is dominated by anarchy 
and lack of order. 38 This, Realists, say is caused by the 
absence of a centralised authority in the international 
system capable of performing the role of governments in 
maintaining law and order. However, increasingly incidents 
around the world show that not all national political 
systems are stable and peaceful. The frequency of political 
unrest and civil wars in ever growing number of countries 
makes it rather diffcult to separate the two political 
systems on the basis of order versus anarchy.39 
Furthermore, just as not all parts of the international 
system are unstable and violent, the international system 
does have a growing number of collaborative arrangements 
and legal regimes governing the allocation of values in an 
ordered and peaceful manner. 
This final Realist assumption too affects our research 
problem in a number of ways, although not in as direct a 
manner as the other two. This is a result of the study's 
general focus actually being the international level. 
Without undermining the last assumption of the separability 
of international poitics, it would be difficult to 
understand the dynamism behind some of the central 
processes characterising the mobilisation of support for 
the Palestinian cause. The interplay between international 
and national politics makes itself, to a certain degree, 
evident in understanding the attitude of certain 
governments towards the Palestinian cause. It would be 
difficult to understand US attitudes towards the 
Palestinian issue without considering how the Jewish lobby 
influences US foreign policy toward the Middle East. 40 
S i mil a r I y , to u n d e r s tan d the a t tit u d e 0 f Non -A I i g ned 
governments particularly towards the Palestinian issue one 
would need to explore the cognitive linkages, that are 
formed in the minds of the policy makers, between the 
situation in Southern Africa and the Palestinian Question. 
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In the other direction, although, not of immediate interest 
to this study, the internal politics of the PLO as well as 
of the Palestinian community appear to have been influenced 
by political developments at the international level. This 
is particularly evident in the changing nature and 
intensity of violence employed by the PLO in response to 
growing international recognition for the organisation and 
for the cause it represents. 
So far, we have tried to elaborate the theoretical reasons 
as to why the Global Politics paradigm appear to be the 
better equipped paradigm for tackling the puzzlement that 
forms the core of our research problem. Now, we shall 
examine certain methodological considerations that are 
better satisfied by the Global Politics paradigm. 
2.3.2 Methodological Considerations 
The Global Politics paradigm has, in a number of ways, 
better potential for guidance in methodological matters 
too. This is because the paradigm's behaviouralist origins 
encourage the researcher to use knowledge from other 
disciplines and its theoretical (substantive) composition 
encourages the use of data that otherwise would be 
considered unimportant. 
Behaviouralism, from its very inception in the early 1950s, 
found fertile ground in the study of politics and at a 
later stage triggered a lively debate between the followers 
of the Historical approach (the Traditionalists) and the 
Scientific approach (the Behaviouralists) in international 
relations. 4l For a long time, however, the academic 
community confused the attempts to employ scientific 
methods in theory building and testing in international 
relations with a substantive-theoretical breakthrough. 42 
Instead this led to a situation whereby there were Realist 
scholars such as Morgenthau, Bull, following a 
traditionalist methodology on the one hand and scholars 
39 
such as Singer, Kaplan employing a scientific methodology, 
on the other hand but they all worked from a similar 
theoretical basis about the nature of the international 
system. 43 
However, it should be noted that behaviouralism "means more 
than scientific techniques, more than rigour".44 It is not 
simply an attempt to employ sophisticated and rigorous 
techniques for accumulating, interpreting and analysing 
data. According to Easton one of the crucial tenets making 
up behaviouralism is; 
"Integration: Because the social sciences deal with 
with the whole human situation, political research can 
ignore the findings of other disciplines only at the 
peril of weaking the validity. and undermining the 
generality of its own ｲ･ｳｵｬｴｳＢＮｾＵ＠
It is particularly this aspect of behaviouralism that, at 
large, distinguishes the Global' Politics paradigm. Scholars 
working within this paradigm have not only tried to employ 
scientific techniques and methods in their research but 
they have also made a conscious effort to use knowledge 
from different disciplines. The evidence for this is 
particularly strong in two areas, that are strongly related 
to our research problem. These two areas amongst others, 
from which the Global Politics paradigm has borrowed ideas 
and concepts are psychology (social-psychology) and 
comparative government. 
Jonsson notes that in recent years there has been growing 
interest in using cognitive approaches in international 
relations in an attempt to develop theories that can 
account for the gap between the 'perceptual world' of 
actors and the actual world. 46 Willetts too has tried to 
think of interdependence in terms of psychological 
resources where the cognitive realm of actors become 
important. 47 He argues that Festinger's 'cognitive 
consistency theory,48 is applicable to the study of global 
politics. This stems from the idea that not only 
40 
individuals but also collectivities can have a drive to 
make their perceptions of the world harmonious. 
Comparative government is another area from which the 
Global Politics literature has drawn ideas. This has been 
facilitated by a preparedness not to treat domestic and 
international political systems as completely different. 
Breaking down the distinction between domestic and 
international politics has enabled the possibility of 
assuming that certain political processes within and 
between countries have similarities. When Mansbach and 
Vasquez 49 define politics as the raising and resolving of 
issues by actors they stress the central importance of 
understanding the agenda process. But they also note that 
this problem of "how issues are born, how and why they are 
placed on the agenda, how they are removed, and how and why 
the content of agendas change overtime" has not been 
investigated in the Global Politics literature. 50 This lack 
of a body of knowledge on this phenomenon has led them to 
borrow ideas particularly from the work of Cobb and Elder 
who have studied the dynamism of agenda building in US 
politics. 5l 
The hard-core Realists have always been reluctant to make 
use of knowledge from other disciplines. This is a result 
of them defining international relations strictly as the 
study of state-to-state interactions, setting it apart from 
all other disciplines. Some Realists have openly questioned 
the usefulness of explaining international relations in 
terms of psychological or social-psychological factors. 
Their position is that such 'reductionist theories' cannot 
provide better explanation than theories of international 
politics. 52 
Although this may be a broadly supported view it should, 
however, be noted that Realists are not that monolithic a 
group. Amongst Realists there have been, particularly in 
the area of decision making, scholars who have employed 
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ideas particularly from psychology and socio-psychology.53 
Their readiness to make use of knowledge from other 
disciplines may well have been a result of the influence of 
the then emerging behaviouralism. It seems that 
behavioural ism did not only lead this sub-set of Realist 
scholars to be more rigorous and precise in their work but 
also to try to integrate ideas from other disciplines. This 
appears to have brought these scholars to the fringes of 
the Realist paradigm by discovering the weaknesses of some 
of the Realist assumptions and concepts. 54 However, by and 
large the Realist paradigm has not encouraged its followers 
to employ concepts and ideas from other areas of study. 
The final methodological issue we wish to consider concerns 
the kind of data we intend to use for operationalising the 
more central concepts in 'our theoretical framework. Vasquez 
shows how data-making in international relations has been 
wholly dominated by the Realist paradigm. However, he does 
note that some of this data has been used by people within 
the Marxist and, in a very ｬｩｭｾｴ･､＠ way, the Global Politics 
paradigms. 55 The .major sources of data we intend to use 
will come from voting at the United Nations and diplomatic 
exchanges. Both are highly government centred data. This is 
not surpr ising as most of data used in international 
relations are in one way or the other based on or derived 
from government collected data. This will probably remain 
so until the Global Politics paradigm develops and 
accumulates its own data. The data on UN voting has not 
been put into significant use by the Realist paradigm. This 
is because the theoretical considerations within the 
Realist paradigm does not attribute any significance to UN 
voting. However, as Alker 56 has shown and Vasquez 59 has 
also argued there does not appear to be any reason why this 
data-set could not be used for testing non-Realist 
hypothesis. 
As the above theoretical and methodological considerations 
show our research problem falls firmly within the realm of 
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the Global Politics paradigm. In the following section we 
intend to develop an analytical framework which will draw 
not only from an already existing body of theory in the 
Global Politics paradigm but also from mobilisation theory. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
In the preceding section we tried to show how the Global 
Politics paradigm appears to be the most suitable one 
within which the research problem can be approached. The 
following section hopes to offer an analytical/conceptual 
framework that will guide the examination of how the 
Palestinian Question became an important item on the global 
agenda. Mansbach and Vasquez in their book In Search of 
Theory have made a conscious effort to take their work 
beyond a criticism of the Realist paradigm and introduce an 
integrated theory that they hope will "serve as a guide to 
research".l The parts that apply to our research problem 
will be critically examined. Suitable elements from this 
theoretical framework will then be supplemented with 
concepts derived from mobilisation theory to complete our 
analytical framework. 
3.2 Agenda Politics 
Inspired by Cobb and Elder,2 Cobb et al.,3 and Easton,4 
Mansbach and Vasquez define global politics as the raising 
of and the authoritative resolution of issues. They stress 
the importance of developing a theory of agenda politics 
taking into account the decentralised nature of world 
politics. S This theory, they suggest, should aim to 
explain "how individual actors inject issues of concern to 
them into (an) agenda building process and what happens to 
issues once they have been added".6 They identify the 
factors that play an important role in the agenda setting 
process as (i) the nature and var iety of access routes and 
ｾｩｩＩ＠ the salience of an issue to key actors. 7 
The analytical framework to be developed for this study 
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relies heavily on Mansbach and Vasquezs'" theoretical work 
on agenda politics. However, this does not mean that the 
theory can be employed just as it stands. This is because 
there are certain general problems, as well as problems 
particular to oUF research. These problems appear to arise 
from their definition of 'global agenda', 'high status 
actor' and 'critical issues', and the relationship between 
the three. 
3.2.1 Access to the global agenda 
Mansbach and Vasquez offer a number of access routes that 
actors might follow in an effort to push an issue of 
concern to them on to the global agenda 8 which is "defined 
as those issues and associated proposals that attract 
serious attention from either a large number of actors or 
from those capable of resolving the claims".9 Most 
important of those access routes are the ones that lead to 
the particular agendas of 'high status actors', which will 
be equipped. with the resources to put the issue on the 
global agenda. This they believe, occurs because a high 
status actor on its own or together with other ones can 
resolve issues in an authoritative manner and confer 
legitimacy to dispositions in the system. lO 
Beside direct access to the agendas of 'high status actors' 
Mansbach and Vasquez discuss two other access routes that 
may play an important role. These routes can also be seen 
as 'transmission belts' carrying a new issue from a 
multiple of actors to the agendas of 'high status actors'. 
These routes can be grouped into two. 
International organisations that allow less-powerful member 
states to 
"raise issues of importance to them (economic 
development, racism and colonialism), but of lesser 
importance to the mighty, in the General Assembly and 
other UN organs. The effects of ensuing rhetoric and 
resolutions upon the agendas of high status actors is 
far slower than direct access but can be cumulative if 
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the existence of opportunit\ls or the presence of 
threat to them is made clear". 
Similarly, certain liberation movements and functional non-
govermental organisations have also the opportunity to 
influence the agenda of 'high status actors' through 
informal access to various parts of the UN and its 
specialised agencies. lOs provide a forum within which new 
issues may be raised, but the process may not always be 
successful. 
Familiarity and experience of participation in 'agenda 
politics', within a certain 'institutional framework' 
following the established rules and norms that govern it 
can help in mobilising the attention of a 'high status 
actor'. Mansbach and Vasquez note that, the skills and 
experience needed to participate effectively in agenda 
politics would not be unlike those that are associated with 
successful lobbyists in a domestic context. 12 The behaviour 
of the PLO since the mid-1970s at various General Assembly 
and Security Council sessions as well as in the diplomatic 
world is a typical example of an actor that has acquired 
the skill to promote its cause by working within the 
system. 
A different access route is the use of violence and various 
forms of disruption. This strategy is employed by actors 
that have no direct or indirect access to 'high status 
actors'. The aim of such a strategy is to create publicity, 
as well as "convince elites that ignoring the dissatisfied 
will be more costly than dealing with the issue they 
raise,,13 This is most dramatically depicted in the use of 
I 
international terrorism by certain Palestinian groups to 
change the image held by the world of Palestinians as 
harmless refugees. The function of such a strategy was well 
summarised by G.Habbash, when he noted that 
"when we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we 
killed a hundred Israelis in battle. For decades world 
public opinion has been neither for nor against the 
Palestinians. It simply ｩｾＲｯｲ･､＠ us. At least the world 
is talking about us now." 
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3.2.2 Problems associated with the concept of a 'high 
status actor' 
The first problem arises with the definition of high status 
actor. For Mansbach and Vasquez "status refers to the 
relative worth or respect one is accorded by others,,15 yet 
their application of status to actors in global politics 
seems uncomfortably close to the Realist conception of 
major/powerful actors. This is evident when they note that 
the criteria for an actor's status to be 
"related to overall political capability, which in 
turn seems to be based on such objective criteria as 
size (both demographic and territorial, including 
resource fgse), economic capability and military 
strength". 
Such a definition although difficult to reconcile with an 
attempt to develop a non-Realist paradigm, is not 
surprising considering that it heavily draws on the works 
of established Realist scholars.17 
This definition pepends on an established set of indicators 
that enables a researcher to calculate the score that a 
country receives on each attribute and hence its rank on 
the overall hierarchy(ies). However, the problem arises 
when these attributes have to be aggregated into one single 
indicator. Is each attribute, i.e military stregth and 
size, to be given an equal weight? If not what standards or 
guidelines can be employed to determine which resource 
yields more power? Such methodological problems lead 
Taylor to go as far as to note that 
"the power of a state is essentially an unquantifiable 
phenomenon and no amount of debate about definition 
and redefinition can change this. All that can be 
counted are those resources which, like men under 
arms, seem likely to prove useful in future specific 
situations. However, there is no quarantee that they 
will prove so and thus they remain at best ｩｮ､ｩ｣｡ﾣｾｲｳ＠
of power, guides as to where perhaps it will lie." 
This problem is further complicated if one wants to use a 
Realist inspired definition of 'high status actor' for 
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explaining world political behaviour that is not simply 
ｵｮｩｾｩｭ･ｮｳｩｯｮ｡ｬ＠ but characterised by 
Does 
"multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or 
ｾｯｮｳｩｳｴ･ｮｴ＠ hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among 
1Ssues means, among other things, that ｭｩｬｩｴ｡ｬＧｾ＠
security does not consistently dominate the agenda". 
one use the same index for military security issues as 
well as for non-strategic issues? 
Moreover, it is also central to the Global Politics 
paradigm that states are not the only important actors in 
world politics. 20 According to Mansbach and Vasquez 
"Actors in global politics may consist of any individual or 
group that is able to contend for the disposition of a 
pol i tical stake". 21 However, the above cr iter ia tha t 
appears to equate 'high status actors' with 'major/powerful 
actors' would automatically preclude a large number of non-
s tat e act or s who may com man din flu en c e up 0 n dec is ion son 
certain issues. As Willetts notes "IBFAN has had more 
impact than the US government upon the baby foods issue and 
the IPPF has had more impact upon the global politics of 
birth control than the Soviet government".22 
It seems, particularly for the purposes of this study, it 
might be useful to take the definition of a 'high status 
actor' beyond one relying predominantly on Realist 
elements. A definition of 'high status actor' ought to also 
take into account resources other than, economic and 
military ones. This would make it possible to consider 
actors that may have high levels of perceived legitimacy 
with low levels of "economic capability and military 
strength".23 
After all, even though the Vatican does not have any 'tank 
divisions', it does occasionaly have an impact on world 
politics. The success that the Vatican had in bringing 
about a peaceful resolution to the Seagle conflict can only 
be seen in terms of the legitimacy conferred on the Pope. 
However, an attempt to operationalise 'high status actor' 
54 
relying on legitimacy would be fraught with methodological 
and theoretical difficulties too. It would be a rather 
difficult task to find reliable practical indicators of 
legitimacy. 
The manner in which a 'high status actor' is 
operationalised becomes important because Mansbach and 
Vasquez postulate a strong relationship between the 
prevailing status hierarchy in the system and the ranking 
of issues on the global agenda. 24 However, if the 
definition of a 'high status actor' remains synonymous to 
'powerful actors' it would become difficult to account for 
a host of issues that find their way on to the global 
agenda in spite of such actors' oPPosition. 25 
Historically, the Palestinian question as defined by the 
Palestinians is one such issue that was pressed on to the 
global agenda without any high status actor taking the 
initiative and in spite of the opposition of at least one 
of the major 'high status actors'. 
The US government for along time remained reluctant to 
consider the Palestinian problem as an independent issue 
concerning the political rights of the Palestinians. 
Instead they maintained that the Palestinian problem was a 
refugee/humanitarian stake within the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. But this, for any person familiar with world 
politics, has not kept the Palestinian Question from 
becoming an important item on the global agenda. 
Conversely, the US in spite of being a 'high status actor' 
was able neither to impose its version of the Central 
American issue on the global agenda nor to allocate the 
stakes attached to the issue in a conclusive manner. It has 
also found its actions towards the imposition of a 
particular outcome on the problem increasingly difficult to 
support legally let alone to legitimise. 26 
Although Mansbach and Vasquez offer highly useful 
theoretical insights to understand agenda building, their 
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concept of a 'high status actor' faces Some operational 
difficulties. We have also noted that the possibility of 
center ing 'high status actor' around the concept of 
legitimacy has its own operational and practical 
difficulties. However, it would also be very 
unsatisfactory to drop completely the role that a 'high 
status actor' can play in helping issues to the global 
agenda. One practical way around this problem might be to 
relate the idea of 'high status actor' to highly active 
actors. There are three advantages of this formulation. 
The first advantage comes from the fact that such an 
'active actor' can be a government as well as a non-
gover nmental actor or an interna tional organisation. The 
second advantage is that it would be relatively easy to 
construct an index for ranking actors, based on the number 
of acts they initiate or number of interaction they become 
involved in on an issue or a selection of issues. In this 
way, the International Red Cross, for example, would in the 
area of humanitarian law and the rights of prisoners of 
war, appear high up on the 'activity scale'. The other 
advantage would come in the resolution of the problem of 
determining what is a 'critical issue'. To appreciate this 
we will first have to look at the relationship between 
issue salience and the global agenda. 
3.2.3 Issue salience, critical issues and high status actor 
vs active actor 
Mansbach and Vasquez cite issue salience to key actors as 
the most crucial factor in determining whether an issue 
reaches the global agenda. 27 Without going into the details 
of factors that make an issue salient to an actor we shall 
examine the difficulties inherent in some of the more 
central elements in the scheme depicting the relationship 
between an issue and the global political agenda. 28 
The difficulty in the scheme arises in the way in which a 
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'high status actor', conceived as a 'powerful actor', plays 
an important role in determining whether the salience of an 
issue is high enough to warrant it to be on the global 
agenda. 
"Issues that have the highest salience in the 
political system can be referred to as critical 
issues. These are issues that are initially at the 
apex of the individual agendas of all or most of the 
high-status actors and that, in time tend to draw in 
or redefine other issues. Such issues dominate and 
shape the agendas ｾｾ＠ lesser actors and consequently, 
the global agenda." 
Such a formulation of a 'critical issue' has two 
limitations. Firstly, it would be difficult to explain how 
a powerful actor or a group of actors, following the OPEC 
oil price increases in 1973, could not get the issue of the 
control of oil price increases and the question of energy 
supplies on the global agenda. Instead these attempts were 
frusta ted by the convening, wi th an overwhelming support, 
of the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly 
dedicated to questions of development. 'Lesser actors', 
"had succeeded in carrying the discussions about the 
international economic system into to international arena" 
at the expense of economic issues of greater concern to 
'major' actors. 30 
The second limitation is a result of the idea that a 
'critical issue' draws in and redefines other issues. In 
certain cases, this is also rather difficult to 
substantiate. The re-emergence of the Cold War, in recent 
years, has become a central concern to the US 
administration. This development has, surely enough, led 
the US government to redefine the predicaments of Central 
America away from being problems associated with 
development and human rights to the realm of 'communist 
subversion' and global strategic considerations. However, 
evidence so far does not suggest that many domestic and 
international actors have followed suit, in spite of 
considerable pressure to do so from the US administration. 
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The idea of using 'active actors' rather than 'powerful-
important actors' to determine a 'critical issue' is also 
supported by other scholars. Willetts notes that "an issue 
can only be critical, with reference to salience, by 
dominating the attention of the actors which are most 
active on the issue".3l This should allow the global 
agenda to be made up of issues that would reflect the 
number of actors and the level of activity with each issue. 
In this way, there would not be a global agenda dominated 
by issues solely reflecting the concerns of only those 
actors occupying the higher echelons of a 'hierarchy' 
that heavily relies on indicators of economic and military 
strength. 
The advantage of using levels of political activity and 
number of actors interacting on an issue is that they can 
be treated as rough measures of the degree of 'salience' 
being attached to an issue. It is those issues that 
generate high levels of activity and involve large numbers 
of actors which might best be seen as 'critical issues'. 
One such issue is the problem of apartheid in Southern 
Africa. It is an issue that has been on the global agenda 
since the early 1950s. It has involved political activity 
eminating from a great variety of actors such as the ANC, 
the South African goverment, the International Olympic 
Committee, MNCs, the UN to count but a few. 
So far, we have tried to show how the idea of an 'active 
actor' facilitates the process of determining the access 
routes available for an issue, the sal'ience of that issue 
to various actors and the relationship between that issue 
and the global agenda. However, before proceeding to 
introduce the analytical framework it should be pointed out 
that this formulation too suffers from two weaknesses for 
which we shall suggest local solutions. 
The first weakness stems from the fact that 'active actor' 
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may not always be capable of allocating values 
authoritatively even though they may have an impact on the 
politics of raising an issue for the global agenda. It 
should become apparent in the following section that in 
respect to our analytical framework this does not 
constitute a major stumbling bloc. This is because we are 
only interested in examining how an issue became an 
important item on the global agenda. It could be said that 
the Palestinian question is still going through the 
decision making stage of the issue cycle. 32 In other words 
the contention over the authoritative allocation of the 
values attached to the stakes that make up the issue, still 
continues. 
The second problem applies to both formulations. Neither 
Hansbach and Vasquezs' formulation nor the above one 
provides any concrete description of what the global agenda 
actually is. Mansbach and Vasquez are aware of this problem 
and they see it as a result of the absence of explicit and 
authoritative decision makers, who would have a 'formal 
agenda' the way Cobb and Elder visualise it. 33 The 
decentralised nature of world politics leads Mansbach and 
Vasquez to suggest that "a global agenda can be seen as 
consisting of those elements of individual actors' agenda 
that overl ap "34, a kind of juxtapositioning of numerous 
individual agendas as depicted by Figure 3.1. 
If each actors' agenda could be pictured as a matrix the 
global agenda, at anyone point in time would be the 
aggregation of the individual matrices. The aggregation, 
however, would not be a simple straight forward additive 
process. Instead, it would take into account the amount of 
activity surrounding each issue. Only issues characterised 
with high activity would make it to the global agenda. Such 
an approach would pave the way to determining the agenda 
empirically. However, the collection and processing of the 
relevant data would call for resources beyond the ones 
available for this research. As a result of the 
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determination to give the idea of a global agenda an 
empirical referent it was decided that the United Nations 
General Assembly and Security Council agendas would be used 
to represent the global agenda. 
Actor A 
••...•..••..••.••..••..........•..• Actor N 
Issues 
Issue 1 
Issue 2' 
Issue 3 + • • • • • . • + 
ｾｬＯ＠
Global Agenda 
· . . 
· . . 
· . . 
Figure 3.1 The composition of the Global Agenda 
There are three advantages to using the UN agendas 
supplemented by the agendas of regional organisations. 
Firstly, these agendas in world politics are the nearest 
one can get to Cobb et al. 'formal agenda' used in studying 
agenda building in internal politics. 35 These agendas can 
be thought of as formal indicators of the kinds of issues 
that concern the majority of member states as well as 
various non-state actors. One word of caution is that, 
though with diminishing success some states do keep certain 
issues off these agendas. Also localised and short duration 
issues tend not to reach UN agendas. Thus, it would be 
futile to postulate one to one correspondence between UN 
agendas and the global agenda. However, such localised 
issues will appear on the agendas of regional 
ｯｲｧ｡ｮｬｳ｡ｴｬｯｮｾＮ＠ The second advantage is that these agendas 
are easily obtainable and reliable. Moreover, the politics 
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that is associated with the drawing-up of these agendas is 
extremely well documented. This tends to provide 
interesting and often concrete insights into precisely the 
process that we are so interested to investigate. The third 
advantage is that from these records it is relatively 
straight forward to identify 'active actors' by examining 
participation in drafting resolution, tabling resolutions, 
speech making and voting. The only disadvantage being that 
one can not easily gain information on lobbying or activity 
that takes place without entering the official records. 
3.3 The Model 
3.3.1 Introduction 
It is latent in our analysis that our research problem is 
to be examined within the context of agenda politics. In 
the preceding sections we tried to show and improve upon 
some of the weaknesses inherent in Mansbach and Vasquez 
original formulation. This led us to conceive an agenda 
politics that is closer to Cobb et ale idea of 'agenda 
building'. Agenda building is described as "the process by 
which demands of various groups in the population are 
translated into items vying for serious attention of public 
officials".36 The stress in the study of this process is on 
the raising of an issue to public attention followed by 
entry to the formal agenda. Hence, the process to be 
explained is, "how individual actors inject issues of 
concern to them into this agenda-building process •.• ".37 
Another way of stating this is to examine how actors appeal 
to other actors in the system in order to mobilise support 
to bring the issue on the agenda. Such efforts can take two 
forms; convincing other actors of the importance of one 
particular issue or getting them to change their perception 
of an issue in away that will allow the accomodation of the 
interests of the actor promoting the new issue. In other 
words the issue ｣ｯｾｬ､＠ also become redefined along lines 
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that would increase its potential of reaching the agenda. 
It should be noted that such a redefinition would be the 
product of an interactive process. The ultimate form that 
the issue takes may not always correspond to the original 
definition proposed by the initiators. 38 
As mentioned earlier on, if one could assume that the 
global agenda is the aggregation of individual actor 
agendas, what we would like to examine is the process by 
which a global agenda which originally had the Palestinian 
Question as a stake subsumed within the Arab-Israeli 
conflict evolved into an agenda with the Palestinian 
Question as an issue in its own right. How did world 
political actors change their perception of the Palestinian 
Question from being a refugee problem to being one of 
'self-determination'? Needless to say that this change did 
not occur overnight. Instead it was a result of mobilising 
support, over a certain period, in favour of redefining the 
Palestinian Question in such away that it could reach the 
global agenda as a separate item. 
3.3.2 The Model and its components 
Feedback 
I -------------------------)---------------------------I 
Mobilisation 
of support 
I Accessibili ty I 
Linkage I 
Conducive 
Environment 
Figure 3.2: Model for studying the mobilisation of 
support for the Palestinian Cause 
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As figure 3.2 shows the model is made up of four parts; 
i) The dependent variable, conceived as the mobilisation 
of support for putting an issue on the agenda. 
ii) Three sets of explanatory variables 
a. Conducive Environment 
b. Accessibility 
c. Linkage 
iii) The relationship between the variables 
iv) A feedback mechanism to capture the dynamic nature of 
the process. 
3.3.3 Defining the variables 
3.3.3.1 Conducive environment 
This variable is probably the most difficult one to 
operationalise in this model. It is a concept widely used 
in the 1 i t era t u reo n mob i 1 is a t ion the 0 r y. Th e n ear est 
corresponding concept in international relations literature 
is the idea of a favourable 'international climate' or 
'international environment'. Although widely used this 
concept in both literatures has not been defined in any 
clear and systematic way. Instead it often defines itself 
in the context of an analysis. 
Obershall has this concept in mind when he points at "the 
impact of outside events and the outside support that 
played an important role in loosening social control and 
providing the resources for black mobilisation".39 He 
specifically points at 
" ••• increased federal executive and judiciary activity 
in the 1940s -(in the form of) - •.. the integration of 
the armed forces, the desegregation of Washington, 
D.C., fair employment in the federal government and, 
increasingly, in local and state governments outside 
the South, the requirement of nondiscrimnatory 
employment and hirirN in private industry holding 
government contracts" 
creating a favourable environment for efforts to expand the 
enforcement of black civil rights in the Southern States. 
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Walsh, too, stresses the importance of the role of 
structural conduciveness in the mobilisation of farm 
workers in the United Farm Workers Union in the late 1960s 
in California. He notes that during the late 1960s, 
"The environment could hardly have been more favorable 
for the launching of the new mobilization effort. The 
Berkley Free Speech Movement, the radicalization of 
the Black Civil Rights Movement, the first phase of 
the ant i -v i e t n a mag ita t ion, the po s t -Va tic a n I I 
Catholic church era and signs of a revitalized labor 
movement in the search for new membership were all 
factors facilitating the growth of the UFw.n41 
Both examples demonstrate the role that a favourable 
environment plays in the mobilisation process. But this 
should not be taken to mean that it actually initiates a 
mobilisation process. Instead it simply facilitates it or 
provides a basis for it. It might be referred to as a 
structural variable. In agenda politics the importance of 
such a variable would stem from the fact that it can point 
at the availability and nature of access routes to an 
agenda. 42 It would then depend on the actors who are 
trying to raise an issue to the agenda to decide what 
strategy to employ to convert a conducive environment into 
an active resource. 
In the context of our research the conduciveness of the 
international environment can be determined by looking at 
the organisational set up prevailing in the system. The 
composition and behaviour of various international and 
regional organisations can indicate whether they form a 
favourable basis for accomodating and promoting various 
issues. A number of examples might help to clarify this 
point. 
-
Our in g the c i viI war inN i g e ria th e A f ric a n po lit i cal 
environment did not constitute a very conducive environment 
for the Biafrans to promote and gain support for their 
demands to set up a separate state of their own. This lack 
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of conduciveness for such an action was the outcome of an 
established African consensus, inscribed in the OAU 
Charter, to refrain from acts that may jeopardise the 
integrity of political boundaries as inherited from the 
colonial era. Similarly, the question of Algerian 
independence was prevented from reaching the UN agenda 
because the composition and concerns of the UN membership 
was still favourable for accepting the French argument that 
the issue was a matter of domestic jurisdiction, hence 
outside the UN's competence. On the other hand, the sudden 
influx of newly independent states to the UN enabled the 
General Assembly to take up the issue of Portuguese denial 
oft he' rig h t to s elf -d e t e r min a t ion' 0 f pe 0 pIe in its 
African territories. Previously, Portugal used to block the 
raising of the issue by maintaining that these African 
territories were overseas provinces, which together with 
metropolitan Portugal constituted a single unitary state. 
As mentioned earlier on, a favourable environment is not 
adequate on its own to raise an issue on to an agenda. A 
conducive environment, when conceptualised as 
organisational structures (in the form of formal 
international organisations such as the UN, the OAU) and 
informal political-diplomatic groupings, provides 'would be 
mobilisors' with existing political and communication 
channels. It is the accessibility of this organisational 
set up, to actors seeking support for their posi tion, that 
constitutes the next variable. 
3.3.3.2 Accessibilty 
Earlier in the chapter it was noted that the ability to 
exploit access routes to the global agenda is a crucial 
factor in raising an issue to the agenda. Three types of 
access routes were mentioned. (i) The first one was 
access to the agendas of 'active actors'. A distinction was 
drawn between Mansbach and Vasquezs' definition of 'high 
status actor' and an 'active actor'. The determining factor 
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for an 'active actor' was the frequency of participation in 
interactions or acts concerning the issue. (ii) The 
second route was related to the ability to use an 
institutional framework effectively. Just as in the case of 
domestic political systems, the international system, in a 
more informal and decentralised manner, also has certain 
established rules, customs and patterns of behaviour 
governing various kinds of interactions including the 
raising of issues. Following the 'rules of the game' more 
effectively does tend to increase the chances of having an 
impact on a decision making process. 43 (iii) The last route 
mentioned was the use of violence to force an item on the 
agenda for consideration. 
Accessibility, as a variable in this model will be defined, 
albeit not in a measurable form, in respect to the three 
types of access routes. The first two can be seen as 
complimentary routes. While the third access route, is 
mostly employed in situations where the initiators of an 
issue cannot have an impact on agenda politics in any other 
way. In that sense there is an inverse relationship between 
use of the first two and the last access route. Hence, it 
should be reasonable to assume that an actor will tend to 
resort less and less to violence as it perceives that it is 
gaining access to more established forms of participation 
in agenda poli tics. 
The importance of having access to a network of existing 
channels of communication and political action within a 
favourable organisational fabric for mobilising support is 
also stressed by the Mobilisation literature. Oberschall 
notes that 
"The presence of numerous organisations ensures a 
preestablished communications network, resources 
already partially mobilized, the presence of 
individuals with leadership skills, and a ｾｲｾ､ｩｾｩｾｾ＠ of 
participation among members of the collectlvlty • 
Similar arguments are also put forward by Wilson and Orum 
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and Cameron. 4 5 It should be noted that the 'existing 
organisa tional network of communica tion and infl uence' to 
which the mobilisation literature refers, encompasses only 
the negatively pr ivileged groups, 'challengers' in Tilly's 
terminology,46 and not the one dominated by the 
establishment. However, it relates to our model as far as 
it stresses the function of political networks and the 
accessibility of such networks. Naturally it is possible 
to think of groups the equivalent of 'challengers' in world 
politics. Some such groups are composed of governments 
or/and NGOs. Two such examples are the Casablanca Group in 
the early 1960s and the Arab Rejectionist Front after Camp 
David. 
We have already noted that the United Nations General 
Assembly and Security Council agendas together with the 
agendas of regional organisations form our global agenda. 
We shall therefore place our agenda politics around a 
quasi-centralised, institutional structure, whose major 
participants will be international organisations, 
delegations from member states, NGOs. The basis of this 
decentralised international structure will be conceived of 
as ｴｨｾ＠ aggregation of the rules of procedures of various 
multi-lateral bodies, practices and decisions emerging from 
the interaction of the major participants and the body of 
law and customs as interpreted and implemented by these 
participants. 
We shall conceive of two types of access to this 
institutional structure1 
i) A direct, formal access by which we mean the capacity 
for the initiators, in this case the PLO or an indigenous 
Palestinian representative organisation, to raise the 
Palestinian issue with a government, a group of governments 
or an international organisation. The PLO will be 
considered to have direct access to actors which recognise 
the PLO as a public body and as the representatives of the 
Palestinian people. The important effect of this 
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recognition must be that the PLO acquires the right to 
raise the Palestinian cause through direct interaction with 
the actors involved. This in the case of an international 
organisation can take the form of granting observer status. 
On the other hand, with a state it can take the form of 
diploma t ic r ecogni tion, tha t en ti tIes the PLO to have 
access to the government. 
ii) Indirect, access occurs when an attempt is made to 
raise an issue with the assistance of sponsors who have 
direct access to the process drawing up the global 
agenda. 47 These sponsors can be linked to Cobb et al.'s 
'identification group'. They define such a group as 
"those people who feel strong ties to the originators 
of an issue and who see their own interest as tied to 
that of those raising the issue. The members of the 
identification group are not only the first to be 
mobilized but are also most likely to support the 
position of the originators.,,48 
It is the role these identification groups playas an 
access route in raising the Palestinian issue on to the 
global agenda that will be examined. 
Even though these access routes are postulated to play an 
important role in bringing the Palestinian issue to the 
attention of world political actors, there is one more 
explanatory factor that needs to be considered. 
3.3.3.3 Linkage 
The third and final explanatory factor is the role that 
establishing linkages between separate issues play in 
mobilising support for an issue. Cobb et al. suggest that 
linking an issue with already existing ones and with 
"emotionally laden symbols" is an important step towards 
"expand ing an issue to new groups".49 However, before 
introducing this variable it should be pointed out that the 
literature appears to use the linkage concept in, roughly, 
three contexts. 
The linkage concept is most commonly used in the context of 
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bargaining and negotiations. Prutt notes that parties in a 
bargaining process may introduce a variety of linkages. 50 
In this context the most familiar bargaining linkage in 
world politics is probably the one so often associated with 
H.Kissinger. This is reflected in Kissinger's belief that 
"every problem between the United States and the Soviet 
Union was linked with every other problem; and progress on 
one would effect progress on all".51 This kind of linkage 
is regularly demonstrated during the EEC meetings, for 
example at the summit in December 1984, when various 
members linked progress on certain issues, such as wine 
production, fisheries and financial assistance with 
progress on negotiations for the entry of Spain and 
Portugal to the EEC. 
The concept of linkages is also encountered in efforts to 
break away from traditional Realist thinking in the study 
of world politics. According to Rosenau the need to develop 
the concept "arose of a conviction that students of 
comparative and international politics were needlessly and 
harmfully ignoring each other's work".52 This conviction 
culminated in the articulation of the concept of 'linkage 
politics' that was defined as "any recurrent sequence of 
behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to 
in another".53 The purpose of the concept was to capture 
the way in which behaviour originating in one political 
system could influence behaviour in another one. 
Previously, the assumption that domestic and international 
politics were distinct and separate would not have allowed 
the possibility of taking into account the role of the 
"Jewish lobby" or the "Polish lobby" on US foreign policy 
behaviour towards the Middle East and the Soviet Union. 
It is also possible to talk about linkage or rather 
cognitive linkage in the context of the perceptual world of 
political actors. Cognitive linkages acquire particular 
relevance in the context of the drive individuals feel 
towards perceptual consistency that induces them to br ing 
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harmony to the great diversity inherent to the empirical 
world surrounding them. These pressures to achieve 
cognitive consistency leads individuals to establish 
growing similarities between certain events or objects. 54 
This enables an individual to force these set of events or 
o b j e c t sin to pre -e xis tin g I pig eon -h ole s I. Will e t t s a r g u e s 
that homologuous processes can be assumed to operate at the 
group level. 
"For the group, there is the need to hold the 
allegiance of its constituent members, to establish a 
coherent identity and to project a credible view of 
the world as the basis for aQQealing for wider support 
to achieve the group's goal,,55 . 
This opens the possibility to apply ideas from cognitive 
consistency theory to actors other than individuals. 
Actors perceive the world around them on the basis of a 
belief/value system they have. It is with the help of this 
world image - Weltanschauung, ideology, meaning of values 
and expectations about the world and life in genera1 56 -
that actors come to evaluate behaviour and interactions 
around them. Often central to this process are abstract 
values, that can be represented as political symbols. It is 
via such abstract values that cognitive linkages (between 
an issue and a symbol) are formed and more support for an 
issue is generated. Walsh notes the role that appeal to 
democratic eqalitarianism played in enlisting urban support 
for the United Farm Workers. 57 Symbols of equality have 
also been equally stressed in the growth of support for 
civil rights and women's liberation movements. 58 Similar 
processes are applicable to world politics too, 
"The Non-Aligned Movement has long been committed to 
the hyper-issue of non-use of force in international 
relations. This provided linkage between Yugoslav and 
Indian promotion of detente, African fears of South 
African ｭｩｬｩｴｾｧ＠ might and Arab hostility to Israeli 
expansionism". 
Actors by appealing to such symbols or abstract values will 
try to recruit more support for their position and try to 
raise the salience of the issue to other actors. 
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There is one other kind of cognitive linkage that could 
occur along the above lines. It happens when actors come to 
evaluate a new issue by establishing similarities between 
this new issue and an already recognised-salient issue. A 
striking example of this process is, "when a 'Declaration 
on the Struggle for National Liberation' defined Palestine 
as a colonial question 'exactly the same as the situation 
in Southern Africa",.60 The consequence of such a 
'cognitive linkage' is that it will tend to increase the 
legitimacy of the new issue and link it with an existing 
pool of support. Simultaneously, being linked to what is 
regarded as a 'high salience' issue will increase the 
salience of the new issue to the related actors and hence 
its potential of being supported for inclusion on the 
global agenda. 
3.3.3.4 The dependent variable, interactions and feedback; 
It has already been stated that the raising of an issue to 
an agenda will be conceived as a result of mobilisation of 
support and cosntitutes our depedent variable. The 
initiators' efforts to raise the issue of concern can be 
seen in the light of the interaction between the above 
three factors and a feedback mechanism. The relationship 
between these factors are of a positive nature. That is an 
increase in the 'conduciveness of the environment' is 
expected to effect the level of mobilisation through the 
other two factors. As the model depicts a 'conducive 
environment' on its own will not generate support. Instead 
initiators have to bring up the issue via 'accessibility'. 
'Conducive enviroment' as a variable' also affects the 
'linkage' variable by making the actors more amenable to 
perceiving parallels between issues. 'Accessibility', in 
turn, interacts with the level of mobilised support 
directly by the initiators or sponsors raising the issue to 
the attention of would be supporters or indirectly via the 
'linkage' variable by arguing or promoting the similarity 
between their issue and already existing ones. 
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This interaction amongst the explanatory variables will 
lead to a level of mobilisation that will be fed into the 
next round through a feedback mechanism. This attribute of 
a mobilisation process appears to have first been suggested 
by Snyder and Kelly, in their 'fully interrelated Model' 
for the analysis of Mobilisation Processes. 6l The rationale 
behind a dynamic process they suggest is because 
"Social movements and their organizations do not 
necessarily, or even typically, move through a 
(nearly) linear sequence in which there is a single 
outcome (or at most a few). Instead, they are entities 
that persist through time, during which they 
continually mobilize resources, apply them in various 
forms of collective action or "tactics" and ･ｸｰ･ｲｩ･ｾ｣･＠
the consequences of those strategies in a fully 
interrelated process that also affects ｳｵ｢ｳｾｱｵ･ｮｴ＠
"rounds" of mobilization, action, and outcome.,,62 
In other words, the purpose of the feedback mechanism is to 
capture the dynamic nature of the process whereby an issue 
is raised to the agenda as a consequence of 'rounds' of 
mobilisation. Each 'positive' round leads (i) to the 
environment becoming more conducive (on top of what may be 
caused by exogenous factors); (ii) to an increase in 
accessiblity (e.g. one quantum increase would be the result 
of a shift from an indirect to a direct formal access 
route); (iii) to linkages growing stronger and culminating 
in realignments. 
The i'ncrease in the level of mobilisation at each round 
will be measured by a 'support' index constructed from data 
on UN General Assembly voting. Ideally, it would be 
preferable to think of rounds as a continuous process. 
However, the model and the accompanying analysis is based 
on ､ｩｳ｣ｲｾｴ･＠ time frames, ｣ｯｲｲ･ｳｰｯｮｾｩｮｧ＠ roughly to a UN 
General Assembly session. The construction of the index and 
the methodological and theoretical problems associated with 
this exercise are discussed in Appendix I. One major 
weakness of this index and hence the model is that the 
analysis is based on data about governmental behaviour. In 
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consequence it takes the governmental position as given and 
representing a state's attitude on the matter. Whereas, the 
state is not a monolithic unit and particularly in the West 
there will be intra-state actors with conflicting attitudes 
towards lending support for raising the issue to the 
agenda. Where possible such occurences will be pointed out. 
Elsewhere for all its disadvantages, we shall assume that 
the position of the government corresponds, roughly, to the 
aggregation of positions held by all actors within the 
society together with the government. 63 
3.3.4 Limitations of the Model 
The limitation of such a model is that although the 
conceptualisation of it, in the sense of identfying the 
var ious var iables and the relationships between these 
variables, is reasonably straight forward, to state and 
test the model in a formal way, in the 'hard science' sense 
of the word, was problematic. This was because the data 
concerning 'conducive environment' and 'accessiblity,64 is 
difficult to represent in a numeric form. This naturally 
excluded the possibility of using quantitative methods to 
examine the impact that these two variables have on the 
dependent variable, as well as their interaction with the 
feedback process. However, it was possible to 
operationalise and construct indices for the other two 
variables. This made it possible to test the relationship 
between the 'linkage' variable and the dependent variable, 
the level of mobilised support. This discrepancy between 
these two sets of variables prevented us from offering a 
fully integrated formal model expressed in mathematical 
terms. As a consequence it became impractical to account 
for the variance in the dependent variable that could be 
attribute. to each independent variable and the feedback 
mechanism. It was equally not possible to account for the 
covar iance resul ting from the interaction between the 
independent variables that the model depicts • 
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These difficulties, in many ways are not much different 
from the ones inherent in the study of social behaviour. 
The complexity of social behaviour coupled with the 
frequent lack of appropriate, reliable data and formal 
theories from which testable propositions can be derived, 
continue to leave a lot to be desired. Within the context 
of these broader limitations the aim of the model was to 
represent an analytical framework whose theoretical 
background, central assumptions, concepts and relationships 
were stated as clearly and as conspicuously as possible. 
Where possible some of the propositions emerging from the 
model were statisticaly tested. The relationships between 
the parts of the model, that were not amenable to 
quantitative analysis, and the empirical world was 
established by, hopefully what still is a reproducable, 
qualitative analysis. The index associated with the 
dependent variable made it possible to observe the change 
in the level of support from one level to the other. Hence 
opening the possibility for the model to account, albeit 
not in a formal way, for the impact that one previous level 
of mobilisation had on the mobilisation process leading to 
the following level. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT AT THE PALESTINIAN LEVEL 
4.1 Introduction 
The major concern of this chapter is to examine the 
emergence and consolidation of modern Palestinian 
nationalism. This however should not be taken to mean that 
Arab inhabitants of Palestine had not in the past 
experienced some sense of a national identity. Ovendale 
notes that as early as 1890s Palestinian Arabs were aware 
of an Arab awakening against Ottoman rule to assert an 
independent identity as well as the particular threat 
caused by the "increasing flow of Jewish settlers" into 
Palestine. l During the period between the defeat of the 
Ottomans and the establishemnt of the new post First World 
war order in the Middle East the Arabs in Palestine had 
looked towards the short lived rule of Faysal in Syria for 
their political future. 
"But Faysal's fall in July 1920 resulted in a swift 
reorientation of Palestinian political attention and 
aspirations. A Palestinian nationalism emerged which 
was concerned with problems caused by Zionist 
aspirations, ｰｲｯｾｬ･ｭｳ＠ that were not faced by the other 
Arab countries." 
The early Palestinian Arab calls for independence failed 
and Palestine ｢ｾ｣｡ｭ･＠ a British Mandate with provisions for 
the establishment of a Jewish homeland. The inability of 
the Arab and Muslim world to respond in an effective manner 
to Palestinian Arab calls for support culminated in an 
increase in resistance activities against the Mandate. This 
resistance became particularly fierce when Jewish 
immigration into Palestine grew after Hitler's accession to 
power. 
The Palestinian national identity found expression in this 
resistance against Jewish immigration and against British 
rule that facilitated it while denying them independence. 
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This resistance attained the level of a rebellion in the 
mid-l930s. The rebellion was suppressed by Britain in a 
heavy handed manner destroying the local Palestinian 
political structure. 3 
In the aftermath of World War II, the Palestinian Arabs 
were unable to meet the Zionist challenge. As Israel 
emerged the Palestinian Arabs turned completely to the Arab 
world for help. However, the failure of Arab governments to 
prevent the establishment of Israel and the demographic as 
well as political dislocation caused by the 1948 war left 
the Palestinian Arabs in a situation even worse than the 
one after the collapse of their rebellion,just before the 
Second World War. 
Nevertheless, from then on the Palestinian Arabs carne to 
look to the independent Arab world as their means of 
achieving independence. The growth of the idea of 'Arab 
unity' and pan-Arabism in the 1950s strengthened the belief 
that "Palestine was not merely a Palestinian problem: since 
it was an integral part of the Arab nation, they expected 
Arabs everywhere to assist in its liberation."4 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how, against the 
above background, support for a separate Palestinian 
national identity was mobilised. We shall refer to the 
emergence of this new identity as modern Palestinian 
nationalism. The period of study will be limited to the 
1960s and 1970s. The Palestinian Arab identity that 
developed during the Mandate period will be assumed to be 
one belonging to a different historical' period and hence of 
no direct interest to the study of the growth of a separate 
modern Palestinian Arab consciousness. 
In respect to studying how the Palestinians were mobilised 
to assert and struggle for their independent political 
identity, the Palestinian community constitutes a unique 
problem. As a result of the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars 
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the Palestinian community became to a certain degree 
dispersed. This dispersion for 1977 can be seen in Table 
4.1. 
TABLE 4.1: 
West Bank 
Gaza Strip 
Israel 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Kuwayt 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Gulf States 
Saudi Arabia 
Libya 
U.S.A 
West Germany 
Latin America 
TOTAL 
750,000 
410,000 
380,000 
1,100,000 
260,000 
180,000 
170,000 
37,000 
16,000 
18,000 
25,000 
7,000 
25,000 
17,000 
6,000 
3 , 400.1 , 0 0 0 
Estimated ｄｩｳｴｲｩ｢ｾｴｩｯｮ＠ of Palestinians for 
1977 
Structurally it is possible to talk of a Palestinian 
community divided into four groups. 
i) Palestinians living within Israelandoften referred 
to as Israeli Arabs, 
ii) Palestinians of the territories occupied since 1967 
a. in the West Bank 
b. in the Gaza Strip, 
iii) Palestinians in the numerous refugee camps in the 
countries neighbouring Palestine, 
iv) Palestinians of the diasporai 
a. those living in the Arab world 
b. those living beyond the Arab world. 
To make these distinctions is particularly significant in 
studying the mobilisation process amongst the Palestinians. 
The Palestinians in these four groups have been exposed to 
the mobilisation process in different ways and at different 
times. While the initiators, in the form of the elite as 
well as the rank and file of the resistance movement, 
tended to come mostly from Palestinians in the refugee 
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camps and those living in the Arab world, the Palestinians 
living within Israel and outside the Arab world had a more 
passive role. Similarly, Palestinians living in the refugee 
camps were more easily accessible to the Palestinian 
resistance movement, than the Palestinians living in 
Israel. Hence the Palestinians in the refugee camps were 
the first ones to lend their support to the resistance 
movement and later recognise and support the PLO as their 
representative. 
4.2. The emergence of the Palestinian Resistance Movements; 
The initiators 
In studying the emergence of the Palestinian national 
identity a distinction should be made between the 
initiators of the mobilisation process and the targets. The 
initiators constituted the sections of the society that 
were not content with the prevailing status-quo and were 
prepared to take measures to bring about change. In this 
case the initiators were the various groups that made up 
what is referred to as the Palestinian resistance movement 
and the early-PLO, as sponsored by the Arab League. 
The target, at this level of analysis, is the Palestinian 
community. The Palestinian community after the traumatic 
experience of the 1948 war and the establishment of Israel 
had become dispersed. The indigenous political infra-
structure of the Palestinians had been destroyed. 6 The 
Palestinians found themselves either under the political 
rule of Israel or Arab states, or in refugee camps 
administered by the UNRWA. 
Although a very small group of Palestinians remained 
committed to their national identity as Palestinian Arabs 
and to the liberation of Palestine, the large majority 
allowed their struggle and identity to be submerged within 
the broader concept of Arab unity. The immediate concern of 
particularly displaced persons became the struggle to 
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return to their homes. 7 The larger problem of liberating 
Palestine from foreign occupation was left to the Arab 
states. 8 In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the general 
feeling amongst many Palestinians was one of helplessness 
and despair. 
4.2.1 The initiators: AI-Fatah 
The situation amongst the initiators was different. The 
first and most important of the initiators was Al-Fatah. 
The origins of AI-Fatah can be traced back to the mid-1950s 
to a group of Palestinians that had never relinquished 
their national identity and their belief in the necessity 
of liberating Palestine via Palestinian means rather than 
relying on Arab states. 9 Yet, throughout the 1950s the 
attitude of the Palestinians remained mostly sceptical, if 
not uncommitted to AI-Fatah's ideology.10 It was in the 
early 1960s that the situation began to change enabling Al-
Fatah to expand its organisational structure and base. 
These developments reached a particularly critical point in 
December 1964 when AI-Fatah's military arm mounted its 
first operation against Israel. 
Under the leadership of Arafat AI-Fatah pursued an ideology 
which simply stressed the nationalist struggle to liberate 
Palestine without dwelling too deeply on any theoretical 
speculations about the nature and form of the future 
Palestinian society.ll The nationalist and uncontroversial 
nature of AI-Fatah's ideology enabled it to relate to 
various parts of the Palestinian community as well as some 
Arab governments. This manifested itself in the growing 
support that A1-Fatah mobilised both amongst the 
Palestinians and Arab governments, and culminated in its 
eventual domination of the PLO after 1969. 
4.2.2: The Initiators1 PFLP and PDFLP 
The first of the two radical Palestinian resistance groups. 
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emerged in late 1967 as a direct result of the June war. 
The founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation 
Palestine, G.Habbash, before the 1967 war had been the 
leader of the radical Arab Nationalist Movement. This 
organisation had existed for almost two decades within the 
fr amework of pan -Ar abism and had conceived the 1 ibera tion 
of Palestine within the context of an Arab struggle against 
Zionism and imperialism. However, it was the decisive 
failure of Arab armies against Israel that forced Habbash 
to reconsider his position. The ANM was then transformed 
into a "Palestinian organisation with its 'nationalist' 
goals recast in a Marxist-Leninist ideological 
framework".12 
The PFLP, unlike Al-Fatah, became a group which articulated 
its ideology to its 1imits. 13 The liberation of Palestine 
was envisaged as part and parcel of a larger revolutionary 
struggle to transform Arab society along Marxist-Leninist 
lines. The radical and narrow nature of its ideology 
limited its base of support mostly to students and 
intellectuals. However, its preparedness to embark on 
spectacular acts of international terrorism played a 
crucial role in bringing the Palestinian problem to the 
world public agenda. Similarly the impact of this type of 
violence is noted by Rodinson to have had its share in 
mobilising not only the Palestinians but also Arab 
masses. 14 
The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine is a smaller group that came to existence as a 
result of a split from the PFLP in February 1969. 15 Just 
like Habbash, the background of Hawatmeh, the leader of 
this group, lies with the ANM. However, the more radical 
and pro-Soviet position of Hawatmeh culminated in an 
eventual ideological confrontation between the supporters 
of Hawatmeh and what they perce ived to be the less-
revolutionary and moderate section of the PFLP led by 
Habbash. It was as a result of this conflict that PDFLP 
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became separated from the PFLP. 
Although its ideological arguments have mostly appealed to 
radical circles amongst Palestinian students abroad16 in 
practice it has followed policies more in line with Fatah 
and the PLO. After the mid-1970s this alliance collapsed 
when Arafat became increasingly willing to enter into a 
dialogue with Arab governments, in particular Jordan. The 
PDFLP played a leading role in placing on the Palestinian 
political agenda the idea of a 'democratic Palestinian 
state' with Jews and Arabs living along side each other in 
the late 1960sl 7 and then the idea of a 'mini state' in 
the early 1970s.l 8 
4.2.3 The Initiators: Arab government sponsored resistance 
groups 
The above two group of initiators were purely Palestinian 
in the sense that they were established and run by 
Palestinians without any direct political dependence on any 
particular Arab government. After it became quite evident 
that Arab states were not going to get Palestine liberated 
and the Palestinian resistance movement began to emerge and 
consolidate itself, some Arab governments felt the need to 
continue to have some direct influence in Palestinian 
politics. Syrian and Iraq were two such governments. 
Traditionally Syria always had an interest in the politics 
of Palestine and Lebanon which for Syrians forms an entity 
known as Greater Syria. Furthermore, the loss of actual 
Syrian territory during the 1967 war brought the problem of 
liberating Palestine closer to home. Hence the Baathist 
regime in 1968 established Al-6aiqa which became the second 
largest guerrilla organisation after Fatah. It follows a 
strict Syrian line and reflects the Baathist thinking that 
dominates the Syrian political scene. This has led Al-6aiqa 
to envisage a struggle for the liberation of Palestine 
fought within a ｰ｡ｮｾｲ｡｢＠ movement led by Syria.19 
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The Iraqi equivalent of A1-Saiqa is the Arab Liberation 
Front. The growing rivalry between Iraq and Syria led the 
new Iraqi Baathist regime to establish ALF in April 1969 to 
have its own means of influence on the Palestinian 
resistance movement. Although the ideology of the ALF was 
very similar to Saiqa in stressing the primacy of Arab 
unity it never achieved the size of its Syrian rival. Its 
membership remained mostly Arab rather than Palestinian. 20 
I tis i n t ere s tin g ton 0 t e t hat, a s are s u 1 t 0 f A 1 -S a i q a's 
and ALF's Baathist backgrounds which uphold pan-Arabism, 
they remained reluctant to talk about an independent 
separate Palestinian entity. This is evident in the 
conspicous absence of the word 'Palestine' in their 
names. 21 
4.2.4 The Initiators IV; The PLO 
The PLO amongst all the initiators that have been mentioned 
so far is without any doubt the most important. However, it 
is important to make a distinction between the PLO from 
1964 to 1969 and the PLO thereafter. 
The PLO was set up in 1964 bV an Arab League decision in 
response to growing signs of Palestinian unrest. The 
position of the Arab'governments was that a PLO under Arab 
League supervision would be the best way of satisfying the 
demands made by an emerging Palestinian national 
consciousness. Also it was felt that through such an 
organisation Arab governments could be able to control 
Palestinian political activities. Hence, it is generally 
accepted that during Shuikary's leadership the PLO did not 
attain a great degree of independence in developing and 
pursuing policies towards the liberation of Palestine. 
However, inspite of this weakness the PLO between 1964 and 
1969 did build the basis of what gradually became a complex 
political-economic-social organisational entity. 
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The situation in the aftermath of the 1967 war changed 
drastically. The resistance activities of various guerrilla 
organisations, in particular AI-Fatah and the PFLP, gained 
the increasing support of the Palestinians. The activities 
of the Palestinian resistance movement reached a turning 
point when Fatah and to a lesser extent PFLP emerged 
politically triumphant from a military engagement with 
Israeli forces near Karameh in March 1968. 
This oft cited battle led to a significant increase in 
support and membership for guerrilla groups. It was in the 
immediate aftermath of this battle that the agreement to 
re-allocate the seats at the next Palestine National 
Council was reached at a meeting between the PLO, Fatah and 
the PFLP in Beirut. This decision was then formally 
endorsed by the PLO Executive Committee. This represented a 
rather formal recognition on the part of the PLO's 
traditional-moderate leadership of the prestige and support 
that guerr ilIa groups had come to enjoy amongst 
Palestinians. 22 However, it was not until the fifth 
National Council in Cairo in February 1969 that the PLO 
came under the control of a resistance oriented new 
leadership, with Arafat as the Chairman. 
This new political composition enabled the PLO to have a 
more effective and central role in mobilising the 
Palestinians and in expanding its. basis of support both at 
the local and international levels. The PLO became an 
umbrella organisation for the various guerrilla groups. 
These groups had direct access to decision making as 
members of the Executive Committee. The legislative arm, 
the -Palestine National Council, provided a wide range of 
Palestinian groups from various sections of the Palestinian 
community with the ability to participate in the decision 
making process. In turn these various 
groups represented at the Palestine 
enabled the PLO to gain access to parts 
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local Palestinian 
Na tional Council 
of the Palestinian 
community otherwise not directly accessible to it. 
In respect to mobilising the Palestinian community the role 
of the various economic and social-welfare institutions run 
by the PLO must also be noted. These institutions enabled 
the PLO to bring day to day services including education 
and health services to the Palestinian community, in 
particular to those living in refugee camps. Here it might 
be possible to draw an analogy to the way in which most 
modern governments retain their citizens loyalty by, inter 
alia, providing a variety of public services. However, this 
analogy has its limits as the PLO does not actually have 
full mandate over a definite piece of territory instead it 
has varying degrees of access to parts of the Palestinian 
community. 23 
So far the main initiators were identified in the belief 
that an awareness of the more central actors will 
facilitate the application of the model to understand the 
mobilisation process. However, it should be noted that the 
initiators that make up the Palestinian resistance movement 
are not necessarily the actual agents of the overall 
mobilisation process itself. Instead it might be more 
appropriate to think of the resistance movement as 
performing the function of a catalyst in a chemical 
reaction. 24 
The fluid, interactive and dynamic nature of the 
mobilisation process makes it rather difficult to pin with 
any exactitude a particular point where this stage actually 
begins. Yet, intuitively it can be said that once protest 
groups emerge as a response to demands for change, these 
groups will articulate their objectives and policies to 
bring about the desired change. It is in their attempt to 
achieve their objectives that the need to acquire the 
support of outside or identification groups will become 
important. In the case of this study the primary 
identification groups or targets for the Palestinian 
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resistance movement was the Palestinian community. 
4.3 The mobilisation process 
In the coming sections the model depicting the mobilisation 
process will be applied to the emergence of the Palestinian 
national identity. The first set of outcomes from the 
mobilisation process will be the formation of the various 
groups that make up the Palestinian resistance movement. 
The second set of outcomes of interest to this study will 
be the growing supPort for the Palestinian national 
identity received from various parts of the Palestinian 
community. This will be seen mostly as a result of the 
Palestinian resistance movement's efforts to aggregate 
support for the expression of the Palestinian national 
identity through the liberation of Palestine and the 
establishment of a Palestinian state. 
However, although the emergence of initiators relatively 
easy to follow the samething can not be said about the 
mobilisation of Palestinian support for the Palestinian 
resistance movement and the PLO. This is mainly the result 
of a measurement problem caused by the absence of publicly 
and practically available data to construct reliable and 
valid indices to measure growth in Palestinian support. The 
lack of data such as regular and systematically taken 
public opinion polls, election results, membership and 
financial contributions to guerrilla groups makes it 
difficult to develop measurable indicators of support. 
Therefore the growth or change in the levels of support for 
the Palestinian cause, as represented by the Palestinian 
resistance movement and the PLO, will be established mostly 
by indirect indicators such as speeches made by public 
persons and written documentation. The drawback of ｾｨｩｳ＠ is 
that the analysis based on such indirect indicators can not 
achieve the thoroughness and reliablity of an analysis 
based on reproducible indices constructed from 
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systematically and exhaustively collected hard data. 
Furthermore, such analysis will only point towards trends 
in change and will provide neither the rate nor the amount 
of change. 
4.3.1 Conducive Environment 
This part of the mobilisation process accounts for certain 
external and structural changes central to the emergence of 
the modern Palestinian identity. It has already been noted 
that throughout the 1950s the Palestinian community 
remained in a state of passiveness. The political structure 
of the community had collapsed and most Palestinians had 
come in one way or the other under the rule of other 
states. Furthermore, to this the disruption caused by the 
displacement of a large number of Palestinians must be 
added. 
This state of affairs within the Palestinian community 
produced a situation receptive to Nasser's newly 
revitalised idea of Arab unity. Nasser had become 
successful in articulating the ideology of Arab nationalism 
that was to be expressed in Arab unity. Nasser's success in 
nationalising the Suez Canal followed by the declaration 
of Union in 1958 between Egypt and Syria were seen as the 
tangible fruits of his struggle for Arab unity. Naturally, 
in such an environment dominated by pan-Arabism and the 
charismatic leadership of Nasser, the Palestinians strongly 
identified themselves with the Arab world. "In the eyes of 
the Palestinian masses Nasser was the only horizon".25 
The Palestinians came to accept and even stress their Arab 
identity. It was through this identity that they saw the 
liberation of their land. This was, for example, 
symbol ically demonstrated in the request of Haji Hussein, 
the head of the Arab Higher Committee, to join the United 
Arab Republic. 
In the early 1960s a series of events appears to have 
t2 
created a situation favourable for a sustained mobilisation 
process to begin within the Palestinian community. One of 
the first events to have significant consequences for the 
em erg e n ceo f Pal est in ian nat ion ali s m was the b rea k -u p 0 f 
the union between Egypt and Syria. Nasser had spent a good 
part of the 1950s promoting his revitalised ideology of 
pan -A r a b nat ion ali sm. In the 1 9 50s t his ide 01 0 g y f 0 un d a 
wide range of followers from all corners of the Arab world. 
It played a central role in bringing about significant 
political changes in many Arab countries. However, it was 
not until 1958 that pan-Arabism as a transnational force 
achieved something tangible in the struggle towards Arab 
unity. Hence, when in February 1958 Egypt and Syria 
announced the establishment of the United Arab Republic 
this was hailed as a major step towards Arab unity. In 
Palestine it carried particular significance as the 
liberation of Palestine had always been envisaged within 
the context of the struggle for Arab unity. Yet as the 
un ion cam e to an end inS e pte m be r 1 96 1, the pa r tic u 1 a r 
symbolic importance that the Palestinians had given to the 
union led them to begin to question their belief in the 
liberation of Palestine through Arab unity.26 
The collapse of the union was soon followed by the 
independence of Algeria in July 1962. The significance of 
this event for the Palestinians stemmed from the fact that 
the liberation of Algeria was seen as the product of a 
ｲ･ｶｯｬｵｴｩｯｮ｡ｲｹｾ｡ｴｩｯｮ｡Ｑｩｳｴ＠ armed struggle. The Algerians had 
achieved their independence as a result of purely 
nationalist struggle outside the context of pan-Arabism. 
The Alger ian example, in some ways, gave the Palestinians 
the possibility of countering the disappointment caused by 
the break down of the only tangible evidence of the 
successful struggle for Arab unity. And in its place 
offered an example for an alternative but successful 
liberation ideology. 
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Historically a less spectacular but nevertheless 
significant event, from at least the Palestinian point of 
view, occured in January 1964 at the very same Arab summit 
that led the way to the eventual establishment of the PLO. 
Arab states had been unable or unwilling to take any 
e f f e c t i ve co un t e r -m e a sur e sag a ins tIs rae 1 i e f for t s to 
divert the Jordan river, in spite of their repeated 
promises and their announcement that "the battle of the 
Jordan river is a part of the Battle of Palestine".27 Their 
hesistancy took a particularly conspicuous form when the 
first Arab summit voted not to engage in a war with Israel 
over of the Jordan river diversion scheme. 28 The diversion 
programme itself was perceived by the Palestinians as an 
act of aggression committed against their homeland. 29 It is 
to some extent in defiance of the Arab leaders inability to 
respond to the diversion scheme that AI-Fatah mounted its 
first operation against an Israeli irrigation 
installation. 3D 
The last, but in its implications the most significant, 
event to contribute to an environment favourable to the 
mobilisation of the Palestinians was the defeat of the Arab 
armies in 1967 and the consequent acceptance by Egypt and 
Jordan of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
242, which referred to the Palestinians simply as refugees. 
During the period preceding the 1967 war Arab leaders, in 
particular Nasser, had repeatedly stressed the preparations 
being made to liberate Palestine. However, after the defeat 
of the Arab armies in June 1967 a growing number of 
Palestinians joined ranks with those who had already been, 
for some time, arguing the need for a national armed 
struggle to liberate Palestine. As a PLO official notes 
"By the defeat of 1967, the Arab governments had fortfeited 
all claims to speak or negotiate on behalf of the 
Palestinian peoPle".3l 
Egypt and Jordan's acceptance of Resolution 242 and later 
on their willingness to participate in negotiations around 
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the Ro g e r 's p 1 ani n J u 1 y 1970 was m 0 ret han en 0 ugh to 
convince even the sceptics that there should be an 
alternative to relying on Arab governments for the 
liberation of Palestine. It had become quite evident that 
these governments were not going to put Palestine before 
national considerations. This belief was once more 
reinforced when Jordan mounted an operation to eradicate 
the Palestinian resistance movement from Jordan while Arab 
governments remained relatively passive. 32 
In the literature concerning this subject these events are 
widely referred to as factors that appear to have brought 
about the emergence of the Palestinian national identity.33 
There seems to be one major problem inherent in such an 
analysis of the relationship between these events and the 
growth in Palestinian consciousness. Such an analysis tends 
to assume that these events had a direct and uniform impact 
in getting the Palestinian Arab community as a whole to 
raise its Palestinian consciousness. The relationship 
between the occurrence of these events and the emergence of 
a widely felt Palestinian national identity is not 
necessarily a direct and uniform one. Such an analysis 
remains rather static and unable to account for the fact 
that the interaction between these events and the growth of 
Palestinian consciousness was a dynamic and an indirect 
one. 
The analytical model presented in chapter three opens the 
possiblity of conceptualising the emergence of the 
Palestinian national identity as a result of a dynamic and 
complex mobil isa tion process. It is within the context of 
the first element of this model, the 'conducive 
environment', that the impact of these events on the 
mobilisation process should be seen. They were events that 
took place at different points in time and signalled a 
growing need amongst Palestinians to reconsider the 
prevailing attitudes towards the question of the liberation 
of Palestine. 
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4.3.1.1 Conducive environment and the emergence of the 
Palestinian resistance movement 
One point to bear in mind is that as a result of the 
dynamic nature of the relationship between the two 
phenomena, the form of the response to these signals 
differed depending on when and where the response came 
from. At the very early stages of the mobilisation 
process the initial response was in the form of the 
emergence of indigenous Palestinian political 
organisations, that earlier on were introduced as 
initiators. However, these organisations did not emerge all 
at the same time and also they did not have the same kind 
of response to the mobilisation support for the liberation 
of Palestine. 
A1-Fatah and the ･｡ｲＱｶｾｌｏ＠ entered the Palestinian scene in 
the early 1960s. It was the collapse of the union between 
Egypt and Syria, and the success of the Algerian revolution 
that began to lend credibility to Fatah's argument for the 
need to liberate Palestine through a Palestinian led armed 
strugg1e. 34 Until then these ideas professed by Fatah had 
been received only with suspicion. 35 On the other hand 
while Fatah was led by a radical-nationalist Palestinian 
leadership the early-PLO was founded and led by a 
conservative Palestinian elite, closely associated with the 
Arab governments. Hence as a result of this conservative 
leadership coupled with Arab governments control, the PLO 
at this time could not envisage the liberation of Palestine 
by means that would be unwelcome to the Arab governments. 
The other major Palestinian political organisations emerged 
only later on, as a result of the final blow inflicted by 
the 1967 war on pan-Arab thinking in the liberation of 
Palestine. The guerrilla organisations that carne to 
existence in the aftermath of the war developed a different 
approach to the problem of Palestine. PFLP, PDFLP and A1-
Saiqa were such organisations. While the PFLP and later the 
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PDFLP professed strongly Marxist-revolutionary ideologies 
in respect to the liberation of Palestine, they were 
different from Al-Saiqa because of their independent 
Palestinian basis. Overall, these groups compared to the 
Fatah and the PLO had a relatively different response to 
the Palestinian problem. 
The 1967 war had its own impact on the already existing 
Palestinian organisations too. Al-Fatah was able to expand 
its resistance operation as it gained access to growing 
volunteers from refugee camps freshly swollen with a new 
wave of refugees. On the other hand the inability of the 
PLO's conservative leadership to promote any effective 
resistance operations culminated in the eventual transfer 
of power to the armed-struggle oriented guerrilla 
organisations. The PLO under its new leadership was then 
\ 
able to develop and consolidate an organisational framework 
that in itself could be utilised to the mobilisation 
process. 
As has been pointed out the above series of events had 
their impact in generating a response from within the 
Palestinian community that culminated in the emergence and 
growth of the Paletinian resistance movement loosely 
t 
organised under the umbrella of the PLO. Another way of 
describing this interaction could be by seeing the above 
series of events as highly salient external inputs into the 
Palestinian system. These inputs then precipitated 
developments that brought about an organisational 
structure to the Palestinian community that came to playa 
central role in the mobilisation process. The picture, 
however, would not be complete without mentioning a number 
of other contributory factors that made possible the 
emergence of an environment successful for starting and 
perpetuating a mobilisation process. 
The Palestinian community during the 1950s was 
characterised by socio-po1itical attributes associated ｷｩｴｾ＠
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traditional societies. The leadership remained split 
usually along the lines of two prominent notable families. 
This made the development of a unified approach to the 
Palestinian problem difficult. 36 At least in practice this 
leadership remained status-quo oriented and was strongly 
aligned with the Egyptians in Gaza and with the Jordanians 
in the West Bank. However, a process of modernisation, to 
large extent attr ibutable to UNRWA's educational 
programmes 37 and to Israel's direct influence,38 
precipitated changes in the social-political structure of 
the Palestinian community both inside and outside Israel. 
Most influenced by this modernisation process was a new 
generation of young people in whose eyes the. authority and 
legitimacy of the traditional leadership became gradually 
eroded. Hence the modernisation process not only planted 
the seeds of a new leadership independent of traditional 
social-political ties but it also caused at least a section 
of the Palestinian community to become more receptive to 
modern nationalist approaches. 39 
Finally the 1967 war affected the Palestinian community in 
two more ways which did have some implications for the 
mobilisation process. The war created another wave of 
refugees most of them suffering the frustration of having 
been displaced twice in a life time. This did generate, 
especially amongst the young, a mood of defiance, ready to 
question the credibility of the idea of relying on Arab 
governments to liberate Palestine. Furthermore, as a 
consequence of the war a large proportion of the 
Palestinian community became ｴ･ｲｲｩｴｯｾｩ｡ｬｬｙ＠ re-united. 40 
This brought the possibility of direct interaction between 
the various sections of the Palestinian community that 
previously had remained isolated from each other. 
These last set of factors must be seen in the context of 
the earlier series of events and the emergence of the 
Palestinian resistance movement. The 'conducive 
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environment' should then be seen as the end result of the 
dynamic interaction between these three sets of factors; 
the we a ken i n g 0 f pan -A r a b ism a sam e an s 0 f 1 i be rat i n g 
Palestine, the changes within the Palestinian community and 
the defeat of Arab armies in 1967. It is this interaction 
that constitutes the 'conducive environment'. The 
'conducive environment' a part of the mobilisation process 
that on its own does mobilise a certain level of support, 
for the Palestinian cause. This level of support is 
represented by the emergence of various guerrilla groups 
and their supporters. 
Although difficult to capture in any tangible form the role 
of the feed-back mechanism must also be kept in mind. Once 
the 'conducive environment' generates a certain level of 
support for the Palestinian cause, at this particular stage 
represented by the emergence of guerrilla groups, the feed-
back mechanism performed a positive loop and made the 
'conducive environment' even more favourable leading to the 
emergence of other participants. For the further expansion 
of this support to cover growing sections of the 
Palestinian community one must examine the role of the two 
other elements of the mobilisation process. 
4.3.2 Cognitive linkages 
In chapter three while introducing the mobilisation process 
model it was argued that initiators (protest groups) in an 
effort to mobilise support try to establish linkages or 
similarities between their movement and already existing 
prestigious movements and ideas. Such ｾｩｮｫ｡ｧ･ｳ＠ or efforts 
appear to perform two functions. 
Firstly, cognitive linkages are useful in assisting the 
development and articulation of a group ideology. The role 
of ideologies .are central to any actor that has to mobilise 
support. It helps the actor to interpret one particular 
situation, determine its goals and develop policies in an 
99 
attempt to achieve these goals. 4l The nature and level of 
articulation inherent in an ideology with which an actor 
works will to a certain degree influence the mobilisation 
of support within and outside the group.42 
Second 1 y cogni ti ve 1 inkages also prov ide an effecti ve way 
of expanding a movement's basis of support. One of the 
primary ways of expanding one's basis of support is to 
persuade potential supporters of the just nature of one's 
cause. The likelihood of receiving such support is to some 
degree enhanced if the applicability of certain symbols 
(values) and existence of similarities between one's own 
cause and widely supported other causes can be 
demonstrated. Once a successful linkage has been 
established the initiator can benefit from an already 
existing pool of support mobilised by an established 
movement or accruing to a prestigious symbol. 
Literature on cognitive dissonance points out the need that 
individuals feel to bring some form of structure and 
harmony to their perceived world. This structure and 
harmony is achieved by maintaining and working within the 
realm of cognitives structures or world views. 43 Hence, 
an individual confronted with a situation demanding a 
change in his attitude towards a certain issue is more 
likely to make this change if he can establish a degree of 
congruence between the cognitive structure that he works 
with and the new demand being made on his assessment of a 
situation. It is at this point that cognitive linkages can 
play an important role by enabling the individual to 
establish relationships between various concepts, which 
previously had been ignored or not seen as being related to 
more central concepts. Although this is a process that 
takes place at the individual level it has been argued that 
homo10guos processes at group level are also possib1e. 44 \ 
This opens up the possibility of suggesting a similar 
mechanism for the role of cognitive linkages affecting 
actors other than individuals. 
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In respect to the mobilisation process amongst the 
Palestinians one can observe the role of cognitive 
consistency in two closely related areas. The first and in 
some ways the most interesting one is the attempts to 
decouple the role of pan-Arabism from the liberation of 
Palestine. The second area in which cognitive linkages were 
used was in developing a new approach for the liberation of 
Palestine. 
It was earlier on pointed out that the majority of the 
Palestinians during the 1950s looked to Arab capitals, in 
particular to Cairo, for their liberation. The liberation 
of Palestine was tightly bound with the struggle for Arab 
unity. With the exception of the early supporters of Al-
Fatah, the attitude of the remaining Palestinians towards 
their homeland was determined by pan-Arabism. The 
Palestinians participated in the politics of Arab 
nationalism with enthusiasm. 45 The consequence of the 
strength of this pan-Arabist hold on Palestinians was that 
it created a situation whereby Palestinian efforts and 
energies were drawn away from their Palestinian identity 
towards the enhancement of Arab unity.46 
The first changes 47 in this state of affairs began to occur 
in the early 1960s and were reflected in an interesting way 
during the adoption of the PLO Covenant. The draft 
constitution of the PLO as prepared by Shukairy referred to 
the Palestinians throughout the text as 'Palestinians' or 
the 'Palestinian people,.48 The use of the label 
'Palestinian people' instead of 'Palestinian Arabs' or the 
more distant 'Arabs of Palestine' can be regarded, as the 
expression of an independent Palestinian identity. This 
argument in some ways is c1ear1v supported by the manner in 
which the final text differed from the first draft. The 
text, when it was finally adopted as the National Covenant 
of the PLO, had seen a number of changes that may well 
reflect the conflict between a Palestinian identity and 
pan-Arabism. The final text referred to the 'Palestinian 
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Arab people' instead of the 'Palestinian people'. 
Suggesting a possible compromise between the latter label 
and 'A r a b s 0 f Pal est i n e' 0 r ' Pal est i n ian A r a b s '. Th e fin a 1 
text also included clear references to Arab unity and the 
role of Arab unity in the liberation of Palestine. 49 
AI-Fatah had always been stressing the primacy of 
Palestinian interests and the role of a national armed 
struggle. The influence of AI-Fatah's thinking together 
with the mood created after the 1967 defeat of Arab armies 
reflected itself in the adoption of the new Palestinian 
National Covenant at the 4th PNC in July 1968. 50 Although 
the new Covenant continued to refer to the 'Palestinian 
Arab people' it included a series of new articles that 
stressed the importance of the Palestinian 'national' 
liberation struggle. 51 A much stronger Palestinian identity 
was expressed in AI-Fatah's seven point policy outline 
adopted by its Central Committee in Januarv 1969. 52 It 
referred to the 'Palestinian people' and its liberation 
struggle although some lip service was also paid to the 
distant objective of a 'progressive and united Arab 
society' • 
However, the idea of Palestinian nationalism did not 
receive instant support amongst Palestinians. This is quite 
evident in West Bank demonstrations that continued to 
stress an Arab rather than a Palestinian identity by 
continuing to use slogans supportive of Nasser and Arab 
unity.53 It· is at this point that another set of cognitive 
linkages played an important role in mobilising support for 
an ind igenous Palestinian identi tv and struggle. Al-Fatah 
as well as radical groups such as the PFLP and PDFLP used 
the Algerian and Vietnamese national liberation struggles 
as examples to improve their arguments. Parallels were 
drawn between the Palestinian situation and the situation 
in Algeria and Vietnam to gain support for a Palestinian 
national struggle. "An important factor in the Palestinian 
move for ｴｨｾ＠ 'repalestinization' of the conflict was the 
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influence of the Alger ian War".54 
These Palestinian groups also came to stress the anti-
colonialist and anti-imperialist nature of the Palestinian 
struggle in an attempt to increase the prestige of an 
argument favouring a Palestinian national struggle. This is 
evident in the 1969 Fatah programme which stated that, 
"The struggle of the Palestinian people, like that of 
the Vietnamese people and other peoples of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America, is part of the historic 
process of the liberation of ｴｨｾ＠ oppressed peoples 
from colonialism and ｩｭｰ･ｲｩ｡ｬｩｳｭＢＮｾＵ＠
Fatah was not the only group to exploit the concept of 
anti-imperialism. The PFLP and PDFLP too employed this 
concept to articulate their ideology, which was heavilY 
influenced by Marxist and Leninist thinking. In both cases 
the Algerian and Vietnamese struqgles were portrayed as 
anti-imperialist struggles and similarities were drawn 
between these struggles and the need for a revolutionary 
struggle for the liberation of Palestine. 
Prior to 1967 most Palestinians held images of themselves 
as Arabs. In the minds of these Palestinians the equating 
of a Palestinian identity to an Arab one and the stressing 
of Arab nationalism and unity as a source of strength for 
liberating Palestine formed a cognitively consistent whole. 
However, a series of events in particular the 1967 war 
steadily increased the stress on this cognitive structure 
and eroded its consistency to the point where the 
liberation of Palestine became only possible to visualise 
by stressing a separate Palestinian identity. 
Hence, the de-linking of the Palestinian identity and the 
liberation of Palestine from Arab nationalism and the 
struggle for Arab unity was a crucial step in bringing 
about the necessary conceptual modifications in Palestinian 
cognitive structures. It was these conceptual modifications 
that helped to bring about the change in Palestinian 
attitudes towards their own identity and towards the way to 
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express this identity. The arguments that precipitated this 
process of cognitive change was aided by references to 
Successful liberation struggles such as ｾｬｱ･ｲｩ｡Ｌ＠ Cuba 
etc ... and to concepts such as anti -imper ialism and anti-
colonialism. The references to the Algerian struggle lend 
credibility to the idea of waging a successful armed 
struggle. The above two concepts helped Palestinians to 
place an indigenous struggle to liberate Palestine into a 
broader world view. 
4.3.3 Accessibility 
During the building of the mobilisation process model it 
was argued that access to the political decision making 
processes and agendas of actors play an important role in 
drawing attention to an issue and in aggregating support 
for it. It was argued that initiators in their efforts to 
raise an issue try to gain access to the public and/or 
formal agendas of political actors. Initiators achieve this 
by means of direct or indirect access to the actors and by 
employing methods ranging from lobbying to terrorism. 
Earlier in this chapter the various members of the 
Palestinian resistance movement and the PLO were presented 
as the initiators. Their aim, inter alia, was to raise the 
national consciousness of the Palestinians and mobilise 
amongst the Palestinian community· support for their 
struggle to liberate Palestine. The Palestinian community 
at large constituted the major target for the initiators. 
4.3.3.1 Violence as an access route 
Table 4.2 depicts the various access routes employed by the 
Palestinian resistance movement and the PLO in their 
efforts to reach and mobilise support from the Palestinian 
community. Although in the late 1970s Palestinian violence 
directed towards other Palestinian groups or individuals 
did occur, there were no such reported attempts in the 
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1970s to intimidate the Palestinian community to support 
the Palestinian cause. The role of violence in mobilising 
the Palestinian community was of an indirect nature. In the 
sense that once the Palestinian guerrilla groups emerged 
with the intention of liberating Palestine by fighting a 
popular war, the armed struggle directed towards Israel had 
a spillover effect in bringing about a change in 
Palestinian attitudes. This particular role of violence in 
the mobilisation of the ｐ｡ｬ･ｾｴｩｮｩ｡ｮｳ＠ is noted by Frangi, a 
PLO official, in his description of the position of the 
leadership of Fatah on armed struggle. 56 
Direct 
access 
Indirect , 
access 
violent means 
local 
coercion 
attacks on Israel 
international 
terrorism 
non -violent 
means 
organisational 
access 
access via 
proxy 
organisations 
TABLE 4.2 Matrix of access routes to the Palestinians 
The literature looking at the growth of Palestinian 
consciousness too notes this particular role of the armed 
struggle against Israel. 57 However, the lack of publicly 
available systematically collected data on armed guerrilla 
operations and the growth of Palestinian national 
consciousness precludes the possibil i ty of establishing a 
statistically supported relationship. Hence, most of the 
analysis on this relationship relies on partially available 
data and impressions der ived from existing interviews and 
news reports. 
Nevertheless, Hudson does demonstrate in a relatively 
tangible manner the impact of armed operations on the 
growth of guerrilla membership. 
"Before the June war, according to a reliable 
Palestinian source, Fa tah numbered no more than 200-
300 men: by the time of the Karameh battle it had 
increased to around 2000, but in three months 
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follow In g the K a ram a h bat tIe i t had bur g eon e d to 
15000".58 
Other scholars too have noted the impact of armed struggle, 
particularly of the Karameh battle of March 1968, on 
enrolments of Palestinians to guerrilla organisations. 59 It 
should be relatively safe to say that this growth in 
membership to guerrilla groups does to a certain extent 
reflect the growing support enjoyed by the Palestinian 
resistance movement, at least amongst young Palestinians. 
Whether the Palestinian resistance movement's armed 
struggle against Israel did also bring the new line of 
thinking for the liberation of Palestine closer to the 
Palestinian community at large, is naturally more difficult 
to establish. 
The same literature also notes the impact that 
international terrorism appears to have had on Palestinian 
attitudes towards their national identity. Although, Fatah 
limited its operations to Palestine, the PFLP, as a result 
of its more radical and revolutionary ideology took its 
armed violence to the international arena. The purpose was 
not simply to weaken Israel and attract world attention but 
also mobilise Arab support for the Palestinian cause. 60 
The spectacular PFLP terrorist operations in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s did bring the Palestinian problem to the 
world public agenda eventhough at the cost of Western 
outrage but more importantly caught the imagination of Arab 
masses. 6l The Palestinia n cause as a resul t of these 
dramatic events reached practically every household exposed 
to the mass media. 
4.3.3.2 Non-violent access routes 
Violence was not the only way that the Palestinian 
resistance movement gained access to the Palestinian 
community and mobilised their support. Al-Fatah soon after 
the 1967 war began to develop an infra-structure to cater 
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for the health and welfare needs of the Palestinians 
particularly in refugee camps. Once the PLO came under the 
control of the Palestinian guerrilla groups, and despite 
the damage inflicted by the Jordanian civil war in 1970-71, 
the organisationl structure providing these services 
continued to grow. The PLO through these facilities 
influenced the education programmes run by United Nations 
Relief and Work Agency, ensured the physical security of 
Palestinian refugee camps, ran commercial ventures 
providing jobs for Palestinians and provided funds for its 
welfare programmes. This complex organisational structure 
gave the PLO growing access to the Palestinian community in 
the refugee camps and other areas not under the control of 
Israel. 62 
However, these activities did not remain restricted to the 
Palestinian community to which the PLO had direct access. 
The 10th PNC in April 1972 stressed the importance of 
organisational assistance to education, welfare and 
cultural institutions in the occupied territories in 
increasing the Palestinian awareness of their identi tV. 63 
The PLO particularly after its 13th PNC in March 1977 has 
also channelled funds to various municipalities in an 
attempt to decrease their dependence on Israel. A variety 
of social bodies, such as women's associations and the 
Palestinian Red Crescent, have also received PLO funds. 
Their role is seen in the light of nation building 
"strengthening, deepening, and solidfying the 
ide n t i f i c"a t ion 0 f the Pal est in ian p e 0 p 1 e wit h the 
Palestinian nation as a whole and with tgi goals of 
the Palestinian nationalist movement". 
Probably the most important institution within the PLOts 
that enables it to gain access to the Palestinian 
community at large is the PNC. Recognised as the supreme 
legislative body of the PLO, PNC meetings are held at 
approximately annual intervals. 65 It brings together 
usually more than 200 Palestinians in their capacity as 
representatives of various parts of the Palestinian 
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community as well as various organisations ranging from 
guerrilla groups to student associations. PNC meetings 
allow Palestinians representing all sections of the 
Palestinian community, including those from outside the 
Middle East, to deliberate over wide ranging issues and 
adopt binding decisions. It is through the members of the 
PNC that the PLO achieves political access to various 
parts of the Palestinian community and ensures the 
implementation of decisions adopted by the PNC. 66 
The Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and 
Israel are not directly accessible to the PLO. Although 
groups from the Palestinian resistance movement have 
mounted armed operations, the PLO can not maintain direct 
organisational existence in these areas. Instead during the 
1970s a variety of organisations have come to represent the 
views of the PLO, allowing the PLO to reach these 
communities indirectly. 
Both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip throughout the 1950s 
and the 1960s had remained under the administrative 
control of a tradi tional leadership strongly attached to 
the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes. 67 It was not until 
early 1973 that the PLO made a formal attempt to build a 
political network to reach the Palestinian community in 
the occupied territories. In August 1973 the Palestine 
National Front was formed to act as an organisational 
framework to coordinate nationalist forces in the occupied 
territories with full allegiance to the PLO. 68 The 
unwi11ingnes of Jordan to enter the 1973 war strengthened 
the hand of the PNF. The support that the PNF enjoyed was 
demonstrated by the readiness of Palestinians from the 
occupied territories to join strikes and demonstrations to 
disrupt Israel's war efforts. 69 
The PNF activists who were expelled from the occupied 
territories after the war were incorporated into the PLO. 70 
This enabled the maintenance of close ties between the PLO 
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and the PNF supporters in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The growth in the PLOWs influence in the occupied 
territories was consolidated when candidates affiliated 
with the PNF won a substantial majority during the local 
elections in April 1976. 71 These results in a conspicuous 
manner confirmed the end of the conservative and 
traditional rule practiced by the notable families. 72 
Although not in a direct manner both the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip had become reasonably accessible to the PLO. 
The Palestinians in Israel, on their part, had remained 
politically passive with strong pressures for assimilation. 
The limited political participation that did take place was 
in an environment that lacked institutions encouraging 
Israeli -Arabs to join in politics in any effective way.73 
The sole exception to this state of affairs was the Israeli 
Communist Party (Maqi), which was founded after the 1948 
war by Palestinian Arabs and anti -Z ionist Jews. It had 
recognised the Palestinians right to self-determination as 
early as October 1949 opening the possibility of some Arab 
participation. 74 In 1965 the New Communist List, Rakah, 
split from Maqi which became an all-Jewish Communist 
Party.75 It was after this development that Israeli -Arabs 
began to participate in political party politics in a more 
active manner. 76 
Rakah, notes Gilmour, "is the only political party which 
represents the Arabs in Israel at a national level and 
which is prepared to fight for their rights. n77 It has 
received increasing support from the Arabs at the cost of 
the Israeli Labour Party, which has usually been 
associated wi th local tradi tional leadership.78 Rakah is 
also an active participant to the Democratic Front for 
Peace and Equality which recognises the Palestinian 
people's right to self -determination and the PLO as their 
representative. 79 The existence of relations between the 
PLO and Rakah, since 1977, has probably enabled the PLO to 
gain some degree of accessibili ty to the Palestinians in 
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Israel. SO 
As the above analysis points out during the early stages of 
the mobilisation period the use of violence appears to have 
played an indirect but important role in bringing the 
Palestinian cause to the attention of the Palestinian 
community. This period was one when actions spoke louder 
than words in raising the political consciousness of the 
Palestinian community. It was only in the aftermath of this 
period that non-violent politics began to play an 
increasing role in expanding and strengthening the 
Palestinian national identity. However, it would be wrong 
to think that these two stages were completely separate 
from each other. It is better to conceptualise two stages 
that significantly overlapped, with each stage being 
dominated by one or the other form of access routes. 
4.3.4 The Output; Growth of support 
., 
Four points need to be stressed in respect to the growth of 
Palestinian support for the Palestinian cause. Firstly, the 
growth of support was not uniform throughout the 
Palestinian community. Secondly, the three set of factors 
that have just been studied influenced parts of the 
Palestinian community at different rates. Thirdly, the role 
of the feedback mechanism must be kept in mind. Finally, 
the mobilisation process within the Palestinian community 
is treated in isolation from similar process outside it. 
The role of the interactions between the mobilisation 
processes at different levels will be introduced at a later 
stage. 
It was, earlier on pointed out that with the exception of 
the founders of Al-Fatah and a number of student groups in 
Egypt the rest of the Palestinian community did not stress 
their national identity. Hence, it is not surprising that 
as the Arab environment began to become favourable for the 
mobilisation process to start, it was AI-Fatah who first 
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responded to it. Although growing number of smaller 
guerrilla groups, mostly supported by Arab states, joined 
AI-Fatah and similarly Palestinian workers and students 
organisations, particularly in Europe, lent their support 
to AI-Fatah, its views continued to raise suspicion until 
after the June. war. 81 AI-Fa tah's difficulty in making some 
headway can be attributed to the formation of the PLO in 
1964 by the Arab League. By this move the Arab governments 
although reco9nising the Palestinian identity, were able to 
perpetuate the role of Arab unity in the struggle to 
liberate Palestine. 
Just prior to the 1967 war it would be very difficult to 
talk about a broad basis of national awareness amongst 
Palestinians, let alone support for the Palestinian cause. 
However, in the immediate aftermath of the war the 
situation began to change significantly. The impact of the 
Arab armies defeat on pan-Arabism showed itself in the 
emergence of a new guerrilla leadership with radical 
ideologies. The growth in the number of refugees on the 
other hand provided a pool of recruits for these guerrill 
groups. The battle of Karameh in March 1968 became a 
landmark as violence directed towards Israel increased the 
awareness of the Palestinian national identity. 
However, in the late 19605 the emergence of a Palestinian 
identity remained rather limited to the formation and 
consolidation of the Palestinian resistance movement. Even 
though the size and activities of the Palestinian 
resistance movement grew, as the PLO came under the 
control of Palestinian guerr ilIa groups and began to 
consolidate itself in refugee camps in Jordan and 
Lebanon,82 the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian 
cause had not yet made any substantial progress in the 
occupied territories and amongst the Palestinians in 
Israel. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip appeared to be 
still under the influence of pan-Arabism as a number of 
pro-Nasser demonstrations in 1968 and 1969 seem to 
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indicate. 83 Furthermore, the traditional Palestinian 
leadership in the West Bank not only remained intact but 
also tended to take an apologetic stand on Palestinian 
resistance activities and favour deals with Israel. 84 As 
late as in 1972 the strength of the traditional 
leadership's grip on the West Bank is probably best 
captured by the very high turnout of the Palestinian 
electorate at the mayoral elections in March, despite the 
call for a boycott by the PLO. 85 
Nevertheless it was in the early 1970s that the signs of 
support for the Palestinian cause in the occupied 
territories began to surface in a conspicuous manner. The 
early 1970s was a period marked by dramatic events such as 
the death of Nasser, the spectacular Palestinian violence 
at the international level, the Jordanian civil war, and 
the Israeli and Lebanese attacks on the Palestinian 
resistance movement in South Lebanon. In the aftermath of 
these events the mood of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
residents towards their Palestinian national identity is 
best demonstrated in the way they reacted to the 
assassination of three PLO leaders by Israel in April 1973. 
"The reactions to the killings were ••. significant 
because they were so general. There were 
manifestations of grief and condemnations in all 
towns and areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
while nearly a quarter of a million Palestinians and 
Arabs marched behind the coffins of the three leaders 
in Beirut. The Palestinian people, both inside and 
outside the occupied homeland, seemed moved by the 
same feelings of ｵｾｩｴｶＬ＠ suffering and aspirations to 
a common future."a 
This particular event was not the only one to point towards 
a strong Palestinian national identity in the occupied 
territories. The establishment of the pro-PLO PNF, its 
role in organising the Palestinians against Israel's 
efforts during the October war, and the pro-PLO 
demonstrations the day Arafat addressed the UN General 
Assembly in November 1974 are all indicative of the same 
phenomenon. 87 The Israel i med ia too recognised these 
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developments even before the October war. The Israeli dailY 
Maariv after the October war noted and commented on the 
political developments in support of the PLO in the 
. d t . . 88 Th , occuple errltorles. is pro-PLO mood surfaced again 
when Sadat made his peace initiative with Israel. This move 
t.riggered student demonstrations in the West Bank against 
Sadat 89 and led the West Bank mayors to support the PLOts 
criticisms of Sadat. 90 Sadat attempts to lobby for support 
for his initiative in the occuppied territories met little 
success. The only people to respond were some notables 
which the Israeli daily Haretz chose to refer to as "third 
rate personalities".91 
However, the most decisive indicator of this strong 
Palestinian national consciousness and pro-PLO feelings in 
the occupied territories came in April 1976 at the local 
elections in the West Bank. The results of these elections 
were generally recognised as a referendum giving the PLO 
the mandate to represent the political aspirations of the 
Palestinians to express their national identity in a 
Palestinian state. 92 
The Palestinians in Israel were probably the last to become 
mobilised. In this the traditional nature of the dominant 
leadership played an important role. It was a leadership 
that showed a readiness to work with Israeli political 
parties not necessarily receptive to the idea of a separate 
Palestinian identity. The lack of Arab political 
institutions until the late 1960s was another factor that 
contributed to their passive mood. However, this 
change by the late 1960s and Rakah appears to have 
significant role in this. It is generally assumed 
gradual shift in the Arab vote since the early 
began to 
played a 
tha t the 
1970s in 
favour of a political party supportive of Palestinian 
political rights and the PLO is a reasonable indication of 
growing Palestinian consciousness and support for the PLO 
amongst Israeli Arabs. 
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The Palestinian national identity became completely 
consolidated by the mid-1970s. This was as a result of a 
decade long mobilisation process. It was the emergence of a 
Palestinian resistance movement that constituted the first 
signs of a Palestinian national consciousness that had 
remained dormant for more than a decade. The first groups 
to be mobilised were young recruits to the guerrilla groups 
from the many refugee camps. Soon the PLO began to 
consolidate its authority and legitimacy within refugee 
camps in the Lebanon and Jordan. From the early 1970s, the 
Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip began to 
become aware of their Palestinian national identity and 
support the Palestinian cause in great numbers. By 1976 it 
had become generally accepted that the Palestinians at 
large regarded the PLO as their representative and 
supported PLO's efforts to express the Palestinian national 
identity in the establishment of a Palestinian state. 
So far the mobilisation process amongst the Palestinians 
has been studied in isolation from its Arab and larger 
environment. The following section will examine the gradual 
recognition of a separate Palestinian national identity by 
Arab governments and the PLO's efforts to consolidate 
itself as 'the sole and legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people.' The study of the mobilisation process 
at the Arab governmental level should also prepare the way 
for a concluding analysis looking at the interactive nature 
of the mobilisation process influencing the growth of 
support at different levels of analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE ARAB GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL 
5.1 Introduction 
In this study the Arab governmental level is constituted by 
the membership ,of the Arab League. It is through this 
membership that a country asserts its Arab identity. At its 
inception the Arab League had six members and it has since 
expanded to its present size of twenty-two. The list of the 
members of the Arab League can be seen in Appendix III. 
The study of the mobilisation process in support of the 
Palestinian cause at the Arab level concentrates mostly on 
Arab governments that have had a direct involvement with 
the question of Palestine. These are the countries 
neighbouring Palestine (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the 
Lebanon) together with Iraq and Algeria. Most of the other 
Arab governments have tended to follow the lead of the 
above group of core countries. l This group has not been 
uniform and coherent. The idiosycracies of each regime and 
its leadership, together with the primacy of each 
individual Arab government's immediate concerns and goals 
over the interests of Palestine has culminated often in 
individualistic and conflicting approaches to Palestine. 
The resulting rivalries that seem to characterise Arab 
politics in the region have, even at the height of pan-
Arabism, prevented the development of a coordinated and 
unified approach towards Palestine. The only point over 
which they have all seemed to agree has been Israel's 
i11ega1ity.2 
The purpose of this chapter is not to chart the 
development, changes and nature of each Arab government's 
policy toward Palestine. Instead the purpose is to study 
how Arab governments as a group interacted with the 
mobilisation process and came to revise their attitudes 
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towards Palestnian problem. 
The established Arab governmental attitude of the 1950s was 
one which defined Palestine as an Arab problem. Both 
Nasser's Egypt and Baathist Syria and Iraq saw the 
liberation of Palestine within the context of Arab unity. 
On the other hand King Hussein, who represented part of the 
royalist and traditional trend in Arab politics remained 
concerned with the consolidation and recognition of 
Jordan's rule over the West Bank. This attitude began to 
change dur ing the '1960s. The emergence of Palestinian 
groups stressing an independent and separate Palestinian 
national identity together with the inability of Arab 
governments to put pan-Arab rhetorics into effect and their 
defeat in the June 1967 war were developments that 
contributed towards these changes. 
These changes were examined from a Palestinian perspective. 
That is these changes were seen as the product of a 
Palestinian initiated mobilisation process to bring the 
redefined' Palestinian cause to the attention of Arab 
governments and to mobilise support for this cause. 
However, it should be noted that Palestinian efforts to 
gain the support of Arab governments was an interactive 
process. The net effect of this interaction was that Arab 
governments changed their attitudes towards Palestine and 
the Palestinian cause together with the Palestinian 
resistance movement finding it necessary to reconsider and 
revise its goals and policies. 
5.2 The mobilisation process 
The analysis focuses on Arab governmental responses to 
demands put forward by the Palestinian resistance movement 
and the PLO to gain Arab recognition and support for the 
Palestinian cause. The attitude of various non-governmental 
groups within Arab countries such as political parties, 
trade/student unions, religious and professional groups, 
123 
will not be examined in any particular detail. However, 
this should not be taken as an indication of an implicit 
acceptance of the assumptions either that states are 
monolithic and unified or that international relations and 
domestic politics do not interact. It is generally accepted 
that in most of these countries the public tends to have 
little influence on foreign policy making and that this 
domain remains the exclusivity of the immediate leadership. 
However, where the public opinion appears to have 
significantly differed or for that matter converged with 
the governmental position this will be noted. 
5.2.1 Conducive Environment 
The 1950s in the Arab world, just like in Palestine, was a 
period of optimism caused by a series of achievements 
attributed to the growing strength of Arab nationalism. The 
conservative regimes in Egypt and Iraq had been swept away 
by Arab nationalist forces. Nasser's challenge against 
colonial powers over Suez had culminated in a political 
victory. The independent Arab world was expanding as more 
and more areas under colonial rule achieved independence. 
Furthermore this period of struggle fot Arab unity bore 
its first fruit with the establishment of the United Arab 
Republic. 
All these events made the Arab world confident of the 
eventual liberation of Palestine. It was a matter of time 
before the Arab armies would move on to liberate Arab 
Palestine. According to Nasser this was predicted to happen 
"once we are fully emancipated from the shackles of 
colonialism and intrigues of colonialist agents, we 
shall take a further step forward towards liberation 
of Palestine. When we have brought our armed forces to 
full strength and made our own armaments we will take 
another step forward towards the liberation of 
Palestine ••• , and when we have manufactured jet 
aircraft and tanks ｷｾ＠ will embark upon the final stage 
of this liberation". 
Such an environment was far from being receptive to a 
124 
mobilisation process in support of a Palestinian cause 
stressing the indigenous nature of the Palestinian national 
identity and the need to mount an independent armed 
struggle to achieve it. It is, as was pointed out earlier 
on, this lack of a conducive environment that kept Al-Fatah 
from surfacing until 1964. This however does not mean that 
the idea of an indepedent Palestinian struggle was not on 
the public agenda at all. Al-Fatah together with some 
smaller Palestinian groups4 had been talking about an 
independent Palestine throughout the 1950s. 5 By the early 
1960s the issue began to be taken up by Arab governments 
too. Iraq, for example, became the first country to commit 
itself to an independent Palestinian enity and expressed 
willingness to assist a Palestinian armed struggle as early 
as 1961. 6 Algeria followed suit as it emerged independent 
from a long anti-colonial struggle which had been fought 
from a nationalistic rather than a pan-Arabic ideological 
basis. 
The event that probably had the most significant impact, in 
changing the environment towards one more conducive for a 
Palestinian initiated mobilisation process, was 
precipitated by Israel. Israel had been working on a 
project to divert the waters of the Jordan river since 
1953. This irrigation project was perceived by the Arab 
world as an aggression committed against Arab land 
precipitating promises of preventive Arab governmental 
action. However, as sections of this project reached its 
completion Arab governments began to critise each other for 
not doing something concrete about it. In the face of 
growing criticism directed towards Egypt's reluctance to 
engage Israel and pressure from "revolutionary elements in 
the Arab World ••• accusing Nasser of having neglected the 
Palestine problem", Nasser called for a summit meeting of 
all Arab governments in January 1964 to discuss the 
situation.7 It was during the summit deliberations that 
"Bourguiba and Ben Bella put forward a proposal to the 
Summit Conference for the formation of a «FLN-style» 
organisation (i.e National Liberation Front) to push 
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forward the campaign for ｴｨｾ＠ restoration of the rights 
of the Arabs of Palestine". t3 
This proposal was then endorsed by the summit and it was 
agreed that an ｯｾｧ｡ｮｩｳ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ of the Palestinian people 
should be set up to enable them to liberate their homeland 
and determine their future. The summit authorised an ex-
Saudi Arabian diplomat of Palestinian origin, Shukairy, to 
take necessary measures to establish a Palestinian 
organisation to represent Palestinian Arab aspirations. 9 
,Even though the Arab governments decided not to go to war 
with Israel over the Jordan river,lO they set in motion 
the process that brought about the establishment of the 
PLO. As a result of Shukairy's consultations with 
Palestinians and Arab governments, the PLO was formed by 
the first Palestinian National Council in May 196411 and 
endorsed by the Alexandria summit conference of the Arab 
League in September 1964. 12 
Although in a letter to U'Thant, 25 May 1964, Shukairy 
claimed the right to be regarded as the "only legitimate 
spokesman for all matters concerning the Palestine 
people"13 this was a long way from reality. Instead, the 
PLO remained under the tutelage of Arab governments. This 
was particularly evident in military affairs. The Palestine 
Liberation Army which was set up as the PLOts military arm, 
in spite of Shukairy's urgings, was never allowed to mount 
any military action and his attempts to make the PLA an 
effective military unit remained frustrated. 14 It was 
qui te evident from the decisions of the Third Arab Summit 
in September 1965 that the liberation of Palestine was 
still envisaged through Arab unity and convential military 
action. This was also reflected in the reluctance of the 
summit to endorse Boumedienne's suggestion that the PLA 
adopt a strategy of guerrilla warfare. IS Nevertheless, the 
establishment of the PLO to some extent was an 
acknowledgement by Arab states of a growing Palestinian 
political awareness. 
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The outcome of the 1967 war had an impact on the Arab 
governments in two ways. Firstly, Nasser's resignation 
after Egypt's defeat symbolically demonstrated the 
difficulty of Arab armies liberating Palestine. 16 The 
growth of the Palestinian resistance movement in the 
aftermath, of the war and the Karameh battle in particular, 
increasingly convinced Nasser that a Palestinian armed 
struggle could have a role to play in the liberation of 
Palestine.17 Syria and Iraq too came to support the idea of 
guerrilla warfare and sponsored guerrilla groups. In 
addition Jordan in the face of growing support was induced 
to change its negative attitude towards the Palestinian 
resistance movement. 18 
Secondly, the war took Israel beyond Palestine dramatically 
increasing the salience of the conflict with Israel. 
"Israel now occupied in addition to all of Palestine, 
significant portions of Syria, and Egypt. This 
condition made it impossible for Arab leaders to put 
the question of Israel 'on the back burner' as 
President Nasser did between the wars of 1956 and 
1967" .-IY 
It brought Egypt and Jordan together in their concern to 
ensure the return of the occupied areas. 20 
Howe v e r, t his de vel 0 p men twa s rat her 1 ike ado ubI e -e d g e d 
sword. On the one hand the Israeli occupation was 
increasing the salience of the Palestinian issue to the 
Arab governments on the other hand the narrower territorial 
considerations were making a political settlement along the 
lines of Security Council Resolution 242 and the Rogers 
Plan more tempting. Hence, King Hussein and more 
importantly Nasser were drawn away from the position held 
by the Palestinian resistance movement which stressed the 
role of armed struggle in liberating Palestine. 
The damage inflicted to the prospects oE Arab unity with 
the colla p s e 0 f the E gyp t ian -S y ria nun ion, the 
establishment of the Arab League sponsored PLO, the defeat 
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in the 1967 war, the growth in size and effectiveness of 
the Palestinian resistance movement were major events that 
brought about an environment more receptive to the demands 
of the Palestinians. This Occurred as a result of the 
impact that these events had both on the structure of the 
regional political system and on the dominant political 
processes. 
The entry into the Middle Eastern political system of new 
elements in the form of the PLO and the Palestinian 
resistance movement brought about structural changes which 
enabled these elements to gain access to the Arab 
gover nmen ts. The ro Ie of access ib il i ty in mobil is ing Ar ab 
governmental support will be examined more closely when the 
'accessibility' variable of the mobilisation model is 
introduced. Events such as the collapse of the union 
between Egypt and Syria, the 1967 defeat of the Arab armies 
weakened the dominance of pan-Arabism in the political 
system. This allowed the possibility of new political 
.processes stressing a separate Palestinian national 
identity and recognising the role of an indepedent 
Palestinian struggle in liberating Palestine to emerge. It 
is the purpose of the following section to examine how 
these processes altered Arab governmental attitudes towards 
the Palestinian problem. 
5.2.2 Cognitive Linkages 
In the preceding chapter the inhibiting role of pan-Arab 
thinking on the mobilisation of support amongst 
P 1 t ' , , t d out Arab nati'onalism and the a es inians was pOin e • 
struggle for Arab unity had a similar affect on the 
approachof the major Arab governments to the Palestinian 
problem. 
As leadership motivated by Arab nationalism began to 
replace royalist and conservative ones they introduced 
changes to their foreign policies. The revolutionary nature 
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of Arab nationalism under the leadership of Nasser began to 
challenge the status-quo in the region. This challenge was 
aimed at the pro-Western and status-quo oriented approaches 
followed by the traditional royal regimes of Egypt before 
Nasser, Iraq and Jordan. After the signing of armistice 
agreements with Israel, these traditional regimes had come 
to accept to 1 ive wi th the ex ist ing si tua tion. The ir 
'complacency' was evident in their reluctance to do 
anything more than giving some lip service to the problem 
of Palestine. 
However, with Nasser the situation began to change 
drastically. One of the first manifestation of the 
revolutionary nature of the struggle for Arab unity on 
foreign policy was evidenced in Nasser determination to 
challenge Britain over the status of Suez. A similar 
challenge was also directed towards Israel. Soon after 
Nasser came to power he closed the straits of Tiran to 
Israeli shipping, the first major belligerent move of any 
significance directed towards Israel since 1949. Suez and 
the problem of Palestine were perceived in the context of 
Arab nationalism and Arab unity. Arab nationalism 
constituted a major input into Egypt's foreign policy 
behaviour. Accordingly the liberation of Palestine was part 
and parcel of a struggle against colonialism and 
imperialism to bring about Arab unity. The ultimate goal 
was defined as Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine 
constituted a major task within it. 
This central role of Arab unity in the liberation of 
Palestine is well noted in some of Nasser's speeches. His 
address to the public in Aleppo in February 1960 is a case 
in po in t. 
"The rights of the people of Palestine are Arab rights 
above all. We feel it is our sacred duty to regain 
those rights for the people of Palestine. 
BV this unity which is binding you and the power of 
Arab unity and Arab nationalism, we can march along 
the road of freedom and liberation in order ｾｾ＠ get 
back the usurped rights of the Palestine Arabs." 
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Hence pan-Arabism and the struggle of Arab unity came to 
condition the thinking of those Arab governments and 
circles associated with this ideology.22 It is this 
cognitive linkage between Arab nationalism and the 
liberation of Palestine that denied any role to an 
indigenous Palestinian armed struggle, for so long. When 
the idea that Palestine was a problem for the Palestinians 
was first brought up by Syria and Iraq at the Arab League 
meeting in September 1963 it was more as a result of the 
rivalry between Egypt and Syria in alliance with Iraq, 
rather than a break away from a pan-Arab attitude towards 
Palestine. 23 Even then the role of the Palestinians in the 
liberation of Palestine was never envisaged as superceding 
Arab governmental efforts. 
This stance is well demonstrated by the attitude that Syria 
and Egypt took towards AI-Fatah's public pronouncement on 
the question of Palestine. Both Syria 24 and Egypt 
regarded AI-Fatah's activities with suspicion and did not 
hesitate to arrest and imprison its ｭ･ｭ｢･ｲｳｾＲＵ＠ This 
attitude was also shared by the Arab media which in the 
aftermath of AI-Fatah's first military operation regarded 
the activities of Fatah as one that would undermine Arab 
unity.26 The prevelance of such a frame of mind in early 
1965 culminated in the adoption of a resolution by Arab 
League defence ministers which called on all Arab 
h . 27 governments to supress ｆ｡ｴｾ＠ operatlons. 
"As an Algerian observer noted most Arab states were 
suspicious of Fatah before 1967 because 'for the first 
time a Palestinian organisation presented itself as 
exclusively Palestinian, with exclusively Palestinian 
objectives. A ｲ･ｶｯｬｵｾ｡ｏｮ｡ｲｹ＠ attitude because it was 
totally unorthodox'". 
The situation with Algeria was very different. Algeria had 
just achieved its independence after a long national 
liberation war. A war that was after all fought by the 
Algerians alone. Even though Arab states did lend their 
political support at the international level and, after the 
establishment of its provisional government, gave Algeria 
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financial support,29 at no point did the Arab governments 
contemplate liberating Algeria for the Algerians. The 
nearest the Arab governments came to commiting themselves 
to military action was in an Arab League decision in March 
1960 calling for volunteers to fight for Algeria. 30 The 
Algerian struggle for independence was a national one that 
did not rely on Arab unity or pan-Arabism. It was a purely 
national anti-colonial struggle. Hence it is not surprising 
that soon after its independence Ben Bella expressed 
support for Al-Fatah, allowed them to open an office in 
Algiers 3l and argued amongst Arab governments the need for 
guerrilla warfare led by an FLN-style style Palestinian 
national organisation. 32 Boumedienne on his part during the 
deliberations at the Third Arab summit in Septenber 1965 
urged for guerrilla warfare rather than conventional 
military action. 33 
Pan-Arabism and the struggle for Arab unity influenced 
perceptions of who the Palestinians were and whether they 
could achieve a state of their own. From the early days of 
the Arab League the Palestinians were referred to as 'Arabs 
of Palestine'. This gained particular strength when 
revolqtionary Arab regimes came to power in the 1950s. Arab 
League Council decisions during the 1950s appear to reflect 
this in their regular reference to the Palestinians and 
Palestinian refugees as 'Arabs of Palestine' and 'Arab 
refugees of Palestine,.34 This is also evident in a speech 
made by Nasser in 1960 where the Palestinians were 
referred to as 'Arabs of Palestine' and Palestine was 
treated as an Arab land. 35 
While the Arab nationalist regimes saw Palestine within the 
framework of a unified Arab world, King Hussein's monarchy 
had a different approach particularly to the West Bank. The 
residents of Palestine were seen as Jordanians and any 
debate over the liberation of Palestine including the West 
Bank was seen as undermining the sovereignty of Jordan. 
This remained a source of particular tension between the 
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Egypt and Jordan during the late 1950s and was only 
resolved in the early 1960s during the establishment of the 
PLO by a clear understanding of respect for Jordanian 
sovereignty.36 
The hold of Arab nationalism on most Arab governmental 
attitudes towards the Palestinians and their perception of 
the role of an indigenous Palestinian struggle continued 
until after the 1967 war. It was the changing environment 
particularly brought about by the defeat of Arab armies and 
the growing success and popularity of Palestinian 
resistance movement that began to weaken the influence of 
pan-Arabism. Both changes began to occur roughly at the 
same time. 
The first signs of change began to take a concrete form in 
1969. Nasser who had started to reconsider his attitude 
towards the Palestinian resistance movement after the 1967 
war decided to attend the fifth Palestine National 
Council. The symbolic importance of Nasser's attendance 
stemmed from the fact that this PNC session elected Arafat 
as its chairman37 Arafat, as the leader of Al-Fatah, had 
been urging Palestinian armed struggle to liberate 
Palestine since the early 1960s. He had also been 
challenging the Arab sponsored Palestinian leadership of 
the PLO to adopt this policy. It was at this PNC meeting 
that the transfer of the PLO leadership to the Palestinian 
resistance movement was completed, with the blessing of the 
most important Arab government and its leader. However, as 
will be pointed out later on, this attitude did not gain 
broad, instant and continuous support. 
The Arab governmental percePtions of who exactly the 
Palestinians were and whether they were to be a part of a 
unified Arab nation had began to change soon after the goal 
of Arab unity had experienced its first set back with the 
break up of the UAR. Arab governmental decisions and 
speeches that used to refer to the Palestinians as 'Arabs 
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of Palestine' introduced the term 'Palestine Arabs' 
suggesting a certain degree of change in their perception 
of the Palestinians. 38 This change occurred when Arab 
governments increasingly became aware of the difficulties 
o f a chi e v in g , A r a bUn i t Y , • N ass e r ' s po 1 i c i est hat s t res sed 
Arab unity were seen as interference in their domestic 
affairs particularly by the conservative regimes. It is as 
a direct result of these developments that the concept of 
'Arab solidarity' developed to replace the idea of 'Arab 
uni ty'. 'Ar ab sol idar i ty' stressed the "r igh t of every Ar ab 
state to determine its own internal and external 
policies.,,39 
A second set of changes in Arab governmental perceptions 
occurred after the 1967 war and during a period when the 
Palestinian resistance movement began to have an impact on 
both Palestinians and Arab governments. The reference to 
'Arabs of Palestine' disappeared in a conspicuos manner. 
Arab governments used the term 'Palestinian Arabs' together 
with 'Arab Palestinians'. However, it is difficult to 
SUbstantiate a clear and unambiguous pattern until the 
Algiers summit in 1973. It was at this summit that 
reference to the 'national rights' of the Palestinian 
people was first used, suggesting the recognition of a 
separate Palestinian national identity. This took an even 
clearer form at the Rabat summit of October 1974 when Arab 
governments supported the right of the Palestinian people 
to establish an independent national authority. The 
Palestinians were now perceived as a distinct nation 
entitled to exercise their right to self-determination in 
the form of the establishment of a state of their own. 40 
Accessibility by the Palestinian resistance movement and 
later the PLO to the Arab governments played an important 
role in influencing this conceptual/perceptual change in 
Arab thinking on the means of liberating Palestine and the 
future of Palestine. Access to Arab governments gave the 
Palestinian resistance movement the possibility to raising 
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or arguing their case and trying to change Arab perceptions 
of themselves and the Palestinian problem. 
5.2.3 Accessibility 
Access to the Arab governments was another factor that 
played an important role in mobilising support for the 
Palestinian cause. The PLO from its early days enjoyed 
direct access to the Arab governments through the Arab 
League and kept the Palestinian issue on the agenda. 
However, during Shukairy's leadership it did not mobilise 
support for armed struggle. In the case of the Palestinian 
resistance movement in the mid-1960s violence appeared to 
be the only means by which it could have its voice heard. 
It was only after Palestinian resistance movement received 
recognition for their role in the liberation of Palestine 
that they began to aquire the possibility of direct though 
informal access to the Arab governments. This accessibility 
increased when the Palestinian resistance movement in the 
late 1960s took over the leadership of the PLO. As the 
prestige and status of the PLO inside and outside the 
Palestinian community became evident and the PLO was 
recognised by the Arab governments as the representative of 
the Palestinian people, the PLOts direct access to these 
governments was formalised by the opening of PLO offices. 
Indirect 
access 
Direct 
access 
violent 
means 
against 
Israel 
against 
Arab states 
non -v iolent 
means 
early -PLO 
Participation in 
the Arab League 
informal -1973 
formal 1974-
TABLE 5.1 Access Routes to Arab governments 
As Table 5.1 depicts there were a number of different ways 
of reaching the Arab governments. Al-Fatah from its early 
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days recognised the importance of having access to the Arab 
public and the Arab governments in launching an armed-
struggle to liberate Palestine. 41 Al-Fatah's first military 
operation, even though not well received by the Arab 
governments and the public, put the Palestinian armed 
struggle on Arab governments' agendas. In the light of AI-
Fatah's unsuccessful early attempts to establish links with 
the Egyptian government and gain its cooperation,42 the 
only remaining option left for Al-Fatah was to continue to 
use violence against Israel to raise the tension between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours. 43 This was at least a 
successful way of drawing attention to what they had to 
say. Violence against Israel was a way of keeping the 
Palestinian cause on the agendas of Arab governments. 44 
Simultaneously, the PLO led by Shukairy also constituted a 
channel through which the Palestinian cause was raised. 
Although there remained a gap between the PLO's and AI-
Fatah's approach to the liberation of Palestine at least 
the PLO had some direct access to the Arab governments. It 
was able to participate at the Arab League deliberations on 
Palestine 45 and raise the need for support for the 
Palestinian cause including mili tary action. However, the 
effectiveness of this access route is rather questionable, 
as Shukairy appears to have had little impact on Arab 
governments attitudes towards making the PLA, PLO's 
military arm, an effective fighting force. 46 
Al-Fatah and the Palestinian resistance movement's access 
to Arab governments and the public improved significantly 
as the environment became conducive after the 1967 war and 
Arab nationalism began to loose its hold. Violence 
continued to play its role as an access route. The 
guerrilla fighter won the support of the Arab people as "an 
individual who has taken his future into his own hands, who 
sacrifices personal advantages, who works as part of a team 
for a noble purpose." 47 It was in such an atmosphere that 
the Palestinian resistance movement's violence against 
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Israel began to make Arab governments reconsider their 
earlier position. The first evidence of a change in 
attitude came from Nasser as he developed direct relations 
with Al-Fatah. Throughout 1967 and 1968 Arafat on numerous 
occasions met with Nasser. As early as in 1968 Arafat was 
included in Nasser's delegation to Moscow giving AraEat 
ample opportunity to raise his case not only amongst 
Egyptians but with Soviets too. 48 Similarly, the take over 
of the PLO by the Palestinian resistance movement at the 
fifth PNC opened the possibility of participating in Arab 
League meetings. This naturally enabled the PLO to argue 
their case directly with the Arab delegations during such 
meetings. 
The Palestinian resistance movement found itself in a 
situation where it resorted to violence against Arab 
states, too. The presence of the PLO in Jordan and the 
Lebanon became increasingly unacceptable to both countries 
governments. These governments saw the presence and 
activities of the PLO as undermining their sovereignty. The 
tension between the PLO and these two governments errupted 
into violence in 1969, 1970-71 and early 1973. 49 The armed 
confrontations had three results. 
Firstly these confrontations attracted the attention of the 
public in Arab countries. During the civil war in Jordan 
the public appears to have expressed support for the 
Palestinians. 50 Secondly, it resulted in Arab governments 
intervention to try to bring the violence to an end in a 
manner favourable to the PLO. Thirdly, this violence forced 
the Arab governments to face up to the problems created by 
the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel. At the end 
of these events it was quite evident that the role of the 
Palestinian armed struggle had been accepted. But there 
were naturally deep disagreements over the distributions of 
the costs of the consequences of Israeli retaliation that 
this armed struggle attracted. 
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As pointed out until the early 1970s the PLO had maintained 
access to the Arab governments through a variety of means. 
Firstly, between 1964 and 1971 violence played a role in 
drawing attention to the Palestinian cause. After the June 
1967 war Arafat first as head of A1-Fatah and then as the 
chairman of the PLO began to be received by Arab leaders 
particularly those in Egypt, Syria and North Africa. This 
situation came to a particularly crucial turning point in 
November 1973 at Algiers. As the possibility of an 
International Conference to resolve the Middle East 
conflict in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338 
emerged, an Arab summit was called to discuss the matter. 
The summit decided to support the idea of a Geneva 
Conference but simultaneously declared the PLO to be the 
sole represen ta tive of the Palestinian people wi th Jordan 
entering a reservation concerning the Palestinians living 
in the West Bank. 51 Although Jordan's position was briefly 
supported by Sadat 52 the problem, after extensive 
10bbying,53 was resolved by the next Arab Summit meeting in 
October 1974 at Rabat. The summit recognised the PLO not 
only as the sole but also as the legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people. 
The PLOts 'legitimacy' to represent all Palestinians was 
specially included to stress PLOts right to represent the 
Palestinians in the West Bank. 54 As Frangi notes "At last, 
the Palestinians were equal with other states and the 
Palestinian leadership had to be accepted as equal as 
others".55 Subsequent to the Rabat decision the PLO 
acquired direct access to Arab governments and opened 
offices in all Arab, League member countries except Oman. 
These offices, most of which had diplomatic status, gave 
the PLO the possibility of raising any matter with Arab 
governments. Furthermore, the Rabat decision on the PLO 
opened the way for the PLO to become a full-member of the 
Arab League. Egypt as a direct result of a series of talks 
between Arafat and the Egyptian premier, aimed at 
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redressing the rift caused by the Sinai disengagement 
agreements, called on the Arab League to grant the PLO full 
membership. This was then granted by a unanimous decision 
at the Council session in December 1976. 56 
5.2.4 Output; Growth of Arab Governmental Support 
The growth of Arab governmental support for the Palestinian 
cause as a result of the mobilisation process can best be 
summarised by breaking it down to three stages. The first 
stage covering the period prior to the 1967 war is 
characterised with little change in governmental 
perceptions of the Palestinian problem. The second one 
between 1967 and 1973 is a period of transition and of 
fluctuating attitudes. The last one covers the period from 
1974 onwards when the Arab governments recognised the PLO 
and the Palestinian cause as defined by it. 
5.2.4.1 Period Ii Support prior to 1967 
It was during the early 1960s that the Arab governments 
began to encounter the first open signs of a Palestinian 
awareness. The Arab governments sought to respond to this 
newly surfacing Palestinian consciousness within the 
context of the Arab League. It is within this context that 
the PLO was established. The PLO did represent and to some 
extent mobilised Palestinian aspirations. However, the 
fact that it had to operate within an Arab governmental 
framework limited its scope of action. This limitation was 
reflected in numerous complaints by Shukairy and in his 
willingness to support at least verbally the Palestinian 
resistance movement. 57 
The establishment of the PLO itself was a recognition of 
the urgency of responding to the Palestinian problem and to 
a growing Palestinian national awareness. However, this 
development must be assessed with caution as it was also an 
attempt to control and channel emerging Palestinian 
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nationalism. This was amply demonstrated by the negative 
attitude most governments took towards the guerrilla groups 
that constituted the Palestinian resistance movement of the 
same period. These governments were reluctant to deal with 
the Palestinian resistance movement but also saw them as a 
threat to their security and to the eventual liberation of 
Palestine. 
This rather unfavourable attitude to the Palestinian 
resistance movement and to Al-Fatah in particular was 
evident in Arab governmental response to Palestinian 
resistance movement position on the role of Palestinian 
armed struggle against Israel. The first Fatah operation 
triggered a very unfavourable response from the Arab 
governments. A string of Palestinians associated with Fatah 
were arrested across the Middle East. 58 This clampdown and 
the subsequent Arab League decision January 1965 calling 
for the supression of military operations by Palestinian 
groups reflected the attitude that Arab governments held 
towards a Palestinian identity expressed outside the 
framework of the PLO. The only exception to this rather 
negative attitude towards the idea of an independent 
Palestinian resistance was Algeria. Algeria supported Al-
Fatah's principle of 'guerrilla warfare' in the liberation 
of Palestine. 
This overall negative stance towards indigenous Palestinian 
military capabilities was also evident in Arab governments 
reluctance to cooperate with Shukairy's attempts to build 
an effective military arm for the PLO. The PLO had been 
allowed to develop as a political/administrative 
organisation to preserve the Palestinian entity59 with 
little muscle. Arab governments neighbouring Palestine were 
particularly reluctant to see a Palestinian organisation 
with military capabilities. Although, Egypt, Syria and Iraq 
eventually did allow the PLO to set up the PLA, the units 
from this conventional army was kept under the control of 
the respective host countries. 60 Jordan on the other hand 
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remained completely opposed to the idea. 61 
The period prior to the 1967 war was one when the Arab 
governments did recognise the need of a Palestinian 
organisation to preserve the Palestinian identity. The idea 
of a Palestinian entity acquired legitimacy amongst Arab 
governments including Jordan. 62 However, their attitude 
towards an independent Palestinian struggle for the 
liberation of Palestine remained negative. This was 
reflected in their policy towards AI-Fatah and in their 
reluctance to allow the PLO leadership to follow policies 
not congruent with their interests. In other words, this 
was a period when the Palestinian problem came back on Arab 
governmental agendas and two approaches to this problem 
competed. The dominant approach recognised the need of 
Palestinian's to express their identity but continued to 
see the solution of the Palestinian problem within an Arab 
context. The competing approach called for the 
recognition of an independent national Palestinian armed 
struggle to liberate Palestine but was opposed by Arab 
governments in general. 
5.2.4.2 Period II; Between the wars 
The second period was one characterised by changing 
attitudes. This period of transformation however was not 
one where governmental attitudes changed uniformly and 
simultaneously. Nevertheless the changes that took place 
between the beginning and the end of this period were of 
great significance to the Palestinian cause. The defeat of 
Arab armies in the 1967 war led to the growth of the 
Palestinian resistance movement and support for it amongst 
Palestinians. Similarly, in the aftermath of this defeat 
coupled with growing support for the Palestinian resistance 
movement Arab governments began to reconsider their 
position particularly vis-a-vis the role of Palestinian 
national armed struggle. However, this did not happen at 
once and when it did, the change was rather erratic. 
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The decision adopted by the Arab summit held after the June 
1967 war fell short of Shukairy's request to have no 
dealings even indirect with Israel that might affect the 
Palestinian cause. 63 The Arab governments did not just stop 
at refusing to take into consideration the wishes of the 
PLOts chairman, their own appointee. Instead most l\rab 
governments including Egypt and Jordan found it expedient 
to accept Resolution 242, inspite of the Khartoum decision, 
'no negotiations with Israel,.64 
Yet, it should be noted that in face of the Arab armies' 
defeat coupled with the Karameh action in March 1968, 
Nasser did begin to take a favourable position towards the 
arguments of the Palestinian resistance movement. He began 
to have direct contacts with Arafat. This was generally 
regarded as a symbolic acceptance of the centrality of 
Palestinian resistance movement's arguments for the 
liberation of Palestine. This acceptance of the guerrilla 
groups' role was also reflected in an Arab League council 
meeting in March 1969 that promised aid to the new PLO and 
confirmed "the right of the Palestinian people to liberate 
their fatherland and achieve their right to self-
determination".65 The ability of the PLO to gain the 
support of a high status actor in the Arab world improved 
their position both amongst the Palestinians and Arab 
governments. 
However, these developments favourable to the Palestinian 
resistance movement did not continue unabated. As Quandt et 
ale note the honeymoon was a short lived one. 66 There were 
three setbacks. The rather unclear position of most 
governments towards the PLO became evident during 1969 and 
1970. After the initial enthusiasm over the role of 
Palestinian armed struggle in liberating Palestine some 
Arab circles became sceptical of it. Gaddafi, at the cost 
of undermining his early role 
Palestinian cause "dismissed 
against Israel as fanciful and 
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as the champion of the 
the idea of popular war 
told the fedayeen to join 
with the Arab armies to fight Israel".67 A similar position 
was taken by Nasser in the aftermath of his and Jordan's 
acceptance of the Rogers Plan in July 1970. Heikal, Al 
Ahram's editor often quoted as Nasser's spokesman, in an 
article underplayed the role of Palestinian armed struggle 
in the conflict with Israel. 68 
The acceptance of the Rogers Plan too constituted a setback 
and reflected the inherent ambiguity in Arab governmental 
attitudes towards the problem of Palestine during this 
period. Even though Resolution 242 had initially been 
endorsed, it had fallen into some disrepute as a result of 
Israeli intransigence. Hence after a period of 
rapproachment between the Palestinian resistance movement 
and Nasser during 1968 and 1969 the acceptance of the 
Rogers Plan came as another source of ambiguity. The 
implied recognition of Israel through negotiations inherent 
in the peace-making process suggested by the Rogers Plan 
undermined the Palestinian resistance movement in two ways. 
Firstly, it went against the official position taken by the 
PLO and the individual member guerrilla groups, not to 
mention the Arab summit decision of August 1967. Secondly, 
the negotiations in the context of the Rogers Plan clearly 
were intended to exclude the Palestinians who were referred 
to as 'refugees'. 
The above developments had been received with growing 
anxiety amongst Palestinians. The Palestinian resistance 
movement promoted protests against the Rogers Plan 
particularly in Jordan 69 and the PNC at its emergency 
session in August 1970 rejected the plan and proclaimed the 
independence of the Palestinian resistance movement and its 
armed struggle. 70 This situation exacerbated the already 
high tension between the Jordanian authorities and the 
Palestinian resistance movement. In September it finally 
erupted into violence when King Hussein felt the need to 
respond to what he perceived to be a challenge to his 
. 71 
authority. 
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The third setback in the growth of governmental support was 
embeded in the Arab governments response to the brutal 
manner in which Jordan was suppressing the PLO. Although 
Syria and Iraq showed early signs of military support 72 and 
Nasser threatened to intervene militarly to stop the 
Jordanian suppression of the Palestinian resistance 
movement 73 no Arab government made a decisive move. 
Rodinson notes that 
"The attitude taken up by Nasser and the Arab rulers 
throughout the crisis clearly revealed the ambiguity 
of their position. Most of them were disgusted by what 
Hussein had done, deplored the fate of the 
Palestinians and, on a more political plane, wished to 
conserve for the Palestinian Resistance a certain 
amount of strength.... The concern for the 
Palestinians felt by the Arab masses found expression 
at state leve17fnly in diplomatic pressure and verbal 
denunciation ll • 
Nevertheless, to reflect the deep disapproval of Jordan's 
behaviour Arab governments did take certain relatively mild 
but concrete measures. Libya and Kuwait stopped their 
financial aid to Jordan. Iraq, Syria, Algeria and Libya 
broke or severed diplomatic relations and announced a 
series of boycotts. These measures according to Quandt 
IIdoubtless increased Hussein's receptiveness to the 
Egyptian Saudi mediation efforts ll • 75 
However, by then most of the Palestinian resistance had 
been eradicated. 76 The feeling amongst Palestinians was one 
of having been let down. While Arafat talked about an Arab 
plot against the Palestinians, the PDFLP accused the Arab 
governments of colluding with Jordan. 77 At first it looked 
as though the damage inflicted on the Palestinian 
resistance movement was not going to stop at this point. 
King Hussein, in an attempt to reassert his challenged role 
as the representative of the Palestinians in the West Bank, 
got the Jordanian parliament in February 1971 to reject 
any idea of a Palestinian state and affirmed that 
Jordanians constituted a single integrated people. 78 This 
was happening at a time when the PLO was declaring its 
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intention to liberate all of their usurped homeland 
including the West Bank. 79 
The following year King Hussein announced his plan for a 
United Arab Kingdom in March 1972. 80 However, this plan 
that envisaged a federal Kingdom to be set up through 
negotiations with Israel was not well received by Arab 
governments. 8l The unequivocal rejection of this plan by 
Arab countries indicated the beginnings of a gradual 
process of convergence between Arab governments and the 
PLO, pointing the way towards the end of the setbacks in 
the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause. 
After the death of Nasser it had become quite evident that 
Sadat did not intend to follow the radical policies of his 
predecessor. Sadat appeared to be primarily concerned with 
obtaining Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories 
even if that meant guaranteeing the existence of Israel. 82 
Most Arab governments including Syria appeared to go along 
with this position. The Syrian government in March 1972 
after a change in leadership became supportive of a 
negotiated solution along the lines of Resolution 242, as 
long as the rights of the Palestinians were recognized. 83 
The Central Committee of the PLO dominated by Fatah too 
accepted Egypt's position. As early as January 1971 they 
were prepared to accept Arab efforts for a negotiated 
settlement with Israel provided Arab governments did not 
compromise the rights of the Palestinian people. 84 
This convergence of positions between the PLO and Arab 
governments, although at first opposed by radical guerrilla 
movements, did consolidate itself. This was evident in the 
Arab governments rejection of King Hussein's plan for a 
United Arab Kingdom. To King Hussein's dismay the decisive 
turning point carne roughly a year after the announcement of 
his plan. An Israeli raid into Beirut killed three leading 
PLO personalities and changed the atmosphere in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip significantly.8S The funeral of 
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these three PLO personalities turned into an impressive 
show of support for the PLO. This was coupled by 
demonstrations during which the Palestinian flag was flown. 
"The raising of the Palestinian flag on a nationalist 
occasion was certainly the expression of a 
consciousness that gathered momentum from then oni the 
flag has since been raised on many occasions, whereas 
throughout the period following the June War it was 
the Jordanian flag that headed demonstrations and flew 
over the graves of the soldiers and civilians who had 
fallen during the war."86 
This major breakthrough in Palestinian expression of 
support for their national identity and the PLO did not go 
unnoticed amongst Arab governments. After the October War 
Sadat spoke of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
people together with the liberation of "our territories 
occupied by Israel" as his primary task. 87 However, the 
most decisive and complete affirmation of support at the 
Arab level for the Palestinian rights came at the Algiers 
A r a b sum mit inN 0 v e m be r 1973. Th e dec is ion s t a ken at 
Algiers stressed "the restoration to the Palestinian people 
of their established national rights".88 The Algiers Arab 
summit decided also to confer upon the PLO the right to be 
sole represen ta ti ve of the Palestinian people wi th Jordan 
entering reservations. 89 The Algiers decision was the 
first of its kind at the Arab regional level to refer 
without any ambquity to the 'national rights' of the 
Palestin ians as a 'people'. 90 
5.2.4.3 Period III: Post 1973 
By 1974 the PLO had won the crucial part of the battle for 
recognition. Apart from Sadat's brief flirtation with 
Hussein, in respect to the PLO's representative status, 
other Arab governments held their position. At the Rabat 
summit Jordan too was convinced to join ranks with the 
other Arab governments. Hence, at Rabat the Arab 
governments were able to adopt unanimously a resolution 
that inter alia asserted the "Palestinian people's right to 
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return to their homeland and determine their own fate" it 
also stressed 
"that any Palestinian territory liberated through 
struggle in any form shall revert to its legitimate 
Palestinian ownership under the leadership of the PLO; 
•.. the Palestinian people's right to establish their 
own indepedent authority in all liberated 
territories.,,9l 
Since the Rabat summit Arab governmental support for the 
role of the PLO and the political rights of the 
Palestinians has been reaffirmed at the Tripoli, Algiers 
and Baghdad Arab League summit meetings. The Baghdad summit 
in March 1979 was also the occasion when Egypt became 
isolated and ejected from Arab ranks for having violated 
the letter and the spirit of the Rabat decision by 
implementing the Camp David peace process. 92 This process 
which began informally with Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 
November 1977 culminated in the signing of a peace treaty 
in March 1979 between Egypt and Israel. The peace treaty93 
had no references to the Palestinian problem but an 
adjoining commitment to proceed with the implementation of 
the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" agreed at Camp 
David in September 1978. 
This framework stated that 
"Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities 
for establishing the elected self-governing authority 
in the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as 
mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an 
Agreement which will define the powers and 
responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be 
exercised in the West Bank and Gaza".94 
The provisions of this framework was far from meeting 
earlier Arab governmental decisions recognising the PLO as 
representing the Palestinians in their aspirations to 
achieve sta tehood. 
The reactions in the Arab world to the announcement of the 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is indicative of the 
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ex ten t to wh i ch the PLO had mobil i sed suppo r t fo r the 
Palestinian cause. The day after the treaty was formally 
signed an Arab summit was held in Baghdad that suspended 
Egypts membership of the Arab League, decided to move the 
League's headquarters from Cairo to Tunis and announced 
economic boycotts. The PLO had already in September 1978 
formed the Steadfastness Front with Algeria, Libya, Yemen, 
Syria. The Front had rejected the Camp David agreements 
because it renounced the principle of just peace in the 
Middle East; which they stressed could only be achieved by 
the recogni tion and real isa tion of the inal ienable rights 
of the Palestinian people. 95 The negative reactions were 
not limited to the PLO and Arab governments but to the 
Palestinians and Arabs at large, too. The visit of Sadat to 
Jerusalem had triggered protest demonstrations in the 
occupied ter r i to r ies. 96 
An overwhelming majority of the Arab governments continued 
to support the official PLO position during the post-Rabat 
period. However, two points need to be made. Firstly, the 
official PLO line did not always reflect the position of 
the Palestinian resistance movement as a whole. Firstly, 
the PFLP, PFLP-GC and ALF, as a result of PLO's acceptance 
of the idea of a 'mini-state' and the possibility of 
comprehensive peace talks, formed the 'rejection front'. 
They asserted the continuation of the armed-struggle for 
the total liberation of Palestine. Particularly, the PFLP's 
involement in hijackings during 1974 and 1975 brought this 
guerrilla group into direct conflict with the PLO leaders, 
which had by then banned hijackings. The consequence of 
this division was that Arab governments such as Libya and 
in particular Iraq supported positions 'plus royalist que 
Ie roi'. 
Secondly, although the PLO at the 12th PNC in June 1974 
opened the way to the possibility of negotiations 
position on this matter was at times unclear. In 
its 
the 
immediate aftermath of the Sinai disengagement agreements 
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and Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, it hardened its position 
and moved to a position closer to the one held by the 
rejection front. This became particularly evident in the 
Palestinian declaration of unity signed in Tripoli in 1977 
by leaders of guerrilla groups, including those of the 
rejection front. The declaration reasserted the right of 
the Palestinian people "to self-determination within the 
framework of an independent state set up on any part of 
Palestinian soil that may be liberated."97 The declaration 
appears to have left the issue of 'peace talks' unclear. 
However, the consequence of the PLOts change in its 
position vis-a-vis peace talks has been that it has 
strained and complicated its relationship with particularly 
conservative Arab governments that have favoured the 
resolution of the problem through negotiations. 
Nevertheless, the essential point to bear in mind is the 
fact that the PLO remained recognised as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people. 
As the analysis indicates it was only by the mid 1970s that 
Arab governments had lent their support for the Palestinian 
cause and the PLO. However, the mobil isa tion process tha t 
changed Arab governmental perception of the Palestinian 
cause was a long and complex one. Although as early as 1964 
they came to recognise the resurgence of a Palestinian 
consciousness, they responded to it reluctantly and in a 
manner that did not conflict with their own goals. It was 
the inter-war period from 1967 to 1973 that was the most 
active ｯｮ･ｾ＠ It was characterised by an intense process of 
change in Arab governmental attitudes. The average 
governmental attitude fluctuated between a favourable 
disposition to the Palestinian resistance movement and the 
temptation to slip back to 'old thinking' particularly 
during the Jordanian war. 
Two concluding points need to be made in respect to the 
mobilisation process at the Arab regional level. Firstly, 
the above analysis points out at how as a result of the 
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mobilisation process the PLO has found itself reconsidering 
the definition as well as the means of realising the 
Palestinian cause. The PLO during its efforts to gain 
support amongst Arab governments modified its goals as well 
as the means of achieving them. 
The second point, which has not been introduced into the 
above analysis but does influence the mobilisation process, 
is the interaction between the mobilisation process at 
different levels. In Chapter 4 it was briefly noted that 
the PLO's improved status in the Arab governmental world 
and the international community did generate support for 
the PLO amongst Palestinians. This is quite evident from 
the strong pro-PLO demonstrations in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip both after of the Rabat summit and after 
Arafat's speech to the United Nations General Assembly. A 
similar process exists for the Arab level too. The growing 
support for the PLO amongst the Palestinians, as well as at 
the international level, did pressure the Arab governments 
to come out in support of the PLO. It is probably not a 
simple coincidence that the Algiers Arab summit decision in 
1973 was closely preceded by the Non-Aligned recognition of 
the PLO the legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people in September and by the announcement of the 
establishment of the pro-PLO PNF in the West Bank. 
It will be the task of the concluding chapter to take up 
these points in their aggregate form as they relate to the 
remaining levels of analysis. The nature and centrality of 
these two points will become clearer as the analysis 
expands to include the other regional levels as well as the 
global one. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT AMONGST THIRD WORLD 
REGIONAL AND POLITICAL GROUPINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the mobilisation process amongst 
major Third World regional-political groupings. The 
analysis focuses on five such groupings, three regional 
and two political ones. The three regional groupings are 
the African, Latin American and Asian ones. The membership 
of these three groupings is similar to those of the United 
Nations regional groupings. The two politically based 
groupings are composed of Non-Aligned and Islamic countries 
respectively. Although the first three groups have 
mutually exclusive membership, the composition of the Non-
Aligned and the Islamic group significantly overlap with 
each other and the three geographical groupings as well as 
the Arab group of the previous chapter. l 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the responses to 
various demands put forward by Arab governments and the PLO 
in their efforts to mobilise support for the Palestinian 
cause in the Third World. The analysis concentrates on 
group behaviour as reflected in the decisions adopted by 
the political institutions of the above Third World 
groupings with the exception of the Asian group which 
unlike the others does not have an institutional structure 
of its own. Hence, the data on which the application of the 
mobilisation model rests, is based on the various speeches 
made during the debates and the decisions adopted at the 
formal gatherings of these Third World groups. 
Two limitations in respect to these speeches and decisions 
must be noted. Firstly, the speeches on which the analysis 
relies are made by governmental delegations and reflect the 
posi tion of the governments involved. Al though more often 
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than not it can be assumed that the position of the current 
government does reflect the general attitude of the country 
this may not necessarily be valid in all cases. Secondly, 
the decisions adopted by the political institutions 
associated with the above regional groupings may not always 
reflect the position of all its members. The tendency of 
these groupings to reach their final decisions through 
consensus building rather than by taking votes makes it 
difficult to establish, with a high degree of certitude, 
the unity and support these decisions enjoy. 
The actual change in attitudes and support for the 
Palestinian cause is established in two ways. Firstly, 
Third World decisions and statements on the Palestinian 
cause are examined for changes in their content and 
emphasis. Secondly, member states voting behaviour at the 
United Nations General Assembly on the Palestinian Question 
have been quantitatively studied. This has allowed the 
possibility of constructing an index of political support 
for the Palestinian cause derived from the agreement scores 
of each delegation with Israel on roll calls concerning the 
Palestinian issue. 2 
6.2 Conducive Environment 
The first variable in the mobilisation process is the 
'conducive environment'. This part of the mobilisation 
process consists of cer tain structural changes and events 
in the Third World that brought about an environment 
suitable for raising the Palestinian issue and aggregating 
support for it. 
6.2.1 Structural changes 
The very first structural changes began to take place as 
Third world forums and political institutions emerged. This 
enabled participants in such forums to raise and discuss 
problems of salience to their respective regions. These 
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multilateral interactions gave Third World statesmen the 
possibility of exchanging views, of discussions and of 
trying to formulate a unified approach to problems in an 
attempt to find solutions. Such interactions had the 
cumulative effect of paving the way toward the gradual 
articulation of a broadly supported world view that can be 
likened to an ideology. This ideology then came to perform 
the role of a yard-stick for determining whether issues 
raised by participants warranted their inclusion on the 
agenda for discussion and eventual support. 
The first Third World political institutions to appear in 
world politics were the Arab League in 1945 and the 
Oganisation of American States in 1948. The role of the 
former in respect to our model has already been considered 
in the previous chapter. The case of the OAS is rather 
different from the Arab League and the other Third World 
political institutions to be discussed below. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Cold War was an issue of 
high salience to the OAS. Its members tended to follow 
policies closely associated with the US and in general the 
Latin Americans were seen as close allies of the Western 
Bloc. The influence of the US and Cold War politics for 
example was reflected in the way in which Cuba, after 
Castro's accession to power, was promptly excluded from the 
Organisation's activities. This US influence on Latin 
Americans did not remain restricted to East-West relations 
but also conditioned their attitude towards colonial 
issues. At the 16th session of the United Nationas ｇ･ｮ･ｲｾｬ＠
Assemb1 Y the La tin Amer icans were closely a1 igned to the 
West in their voting behaviour. It was not until a decade 
later that the agreement between "the Western Bloc and the 
Latin Americans dropped to less than half of its original 
value" set during the 16th session. 3 This rather strong 
pro-western position of the Latin Americans throughout the 
1950s and for the most part of the 1960s makes it rather 
difficult to consider the OAS as an institution to be 
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included amongst the 
contributed towards 
environment. 
structural changes 
the emergence of a 
that has 
conducive 
The rest of the Third World as an independent force from 
the West first appeared in the world political scene in any 
significant way in the late 1950s. It was the entrance of 
an increasing number of newly independent states into the 
world political arena that generated the need for these 
countries to meet and discuss problems of interest to them. 
The agenda of world politics in the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War had remained dominated by the Cold 
War. The issues and problems deemed significant by the 
participants in the Cold War did not necessarily include 
problems of greater salience to the newly emerging states. 
The decolonisation of peoples still under colonial rule, 
the racial policies of South Africa and 
development were such problems. 
economic 
It was during the late 1950s and early 1960s that 
developments towards the emergence of a Third World 
approach to world problems began to occur. The Bandung 
Conference in 1955 was the first ever major gathering of 
Afro-Asian countries. 4 In this conference, even though the 
influence of Cold War attitudes were reflected in the 
debates,S racialism and decolonisation emerged as matters 
of salience to particular Afro-Arab participants. 6 The 
Bandung Conference was then followed by a series of African 
meetings that paved the way to the establishment of the OAU 
in May 1963. 7 The establishment of the OAU provided African 
states with a formal institutional structure and a common 
denominator. 8 This denominator was reflected in the OAU's 
determination to eradicate both colonialism and racialism 
from Africa, supplemented by the realisation of the need to 
pool efforts in that direction. 9 
The Non-Aligned gatherings provided another possibility, 
this time for a wider geographical area, to discuss 
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problems and develop common approaches. As these meetings 
became institutionalised into the Non-Aligned Movement in 
the early 1970s, an ideology of particular importance to 
concerted action emerged. In the early 1960s, the Cold War, 
the achievement of a stable world peace together with 
anticolonialism were the major issues of concern to the 
Non-Aligned. 10 In the following decade, as the Cold War 
lost its salience to the Non-Aligned anticolonialism 
continued to remain a very central element of the Non-
Aligned ideology and gradually came to cover the 
Palestinian question too. At the same time the Non-Aligned 
began to direct greater attention towards the establishment 
of a New International Economic Order. The Non-Aligned 
ideology with its coverage of the above issues came to 
condition the foreign policies of an ever growing 
membership. 
Finally, the Islamic Conference Organisation established in 
March 1971, is another forum that has contributed to the 
emergence of a conducive environment. Although the first 
Islamic Conference was called in response to a perceived 
threat to Islam caused by the fire at Al-Aqsa mosque in 
Jerusalem, it quickly expanded to include the Palestinian 
problem in general. Hence the Islamic Conference 
Organisation became a forum for the promotion of Islamic 
solidarity on the Palestinian Question and the coordination 
of a common Islamic stand on the Palestinian Question in 
other Third World and international forums. 
The conduciveness of this environment arises as a result 
of three factors. Firstly, these forums and gatherings 
constituted a place where problems of concern to the Third 
World could be raised and demands formulated. Secondly, 
these meetings enabled members to articulate an ideology 
that guides them in determining which issues and demands 
warrant their support. Thirdly, access to these forums, 
with the exception of the OAS, gave Arab governments the 
possibility of raising the Palestinian problem and more 
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importantly it gave them a chance to influence the 
development of this Third World ideology in a manner that 
eventually allowed its extension to cover the Palestinian 
problem, too.ll 
6.2.2 Key Even ts 
In Chapter 4 it was noted how a series of events, such as 
the Algerian liberation war, the break-up of the United 
Arab Republic and the 1967 war played an important role in 
generating a situation favorable for mobilisation, at the 
level of the Palestinian people, to start and to be 
consolidated. There are a number of events with similar 
consequences that have helped to. bring about an environment 
more receptive to Arab initiatives on the Palestinian 
problem at the level of Third World groupings. 
One such event was the role that Israel played in the 1956 
Suez War. Dur ing the Bandung Conference Nasser had 
descr ibed Israel as a tool of Western imper ialism. In the 
aftermath of this conference Israel's alliance with Britain 
and France during the Suez crisis played a central role in 
increasing the credibility of such Egyptian arguments hence 
undermining Israel's image in the Asian world. Decalo13 too 
notes the loss of considerable Asian goodwill toward Israel 
as a result of the latter's role in the Suez war. 
A large part of Africa was not independent at the time to 
be influenced by this event. Instead another event within 
the African context did later have some adverse effect on 
African perceptions of Israel. Israel had not hesitated to 
lend her support for Biafra during the Nigerian Civil war. 
Israel's readiness to support a seccessionist movement, 
particularly in a country with which it had good relations, 
alienated several African governments.14 For most Africans 
it was difficult to reconcile such behaviour with one of 
the major tenets of the OAU Charter which stresses the 
integrity of each African state. 
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The two Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, in particular 
the latter one, did raise questions about the nature of 
Israel. The wars provided hard evidence for Arab arguments 
about the expansionist nature of Israel. Although the 
African response to the 1967 war was relatively muted and 
reflected a desire not to get embroiled in someone else's 
conflict, by early 1970s African attitudes had began to 
change in a way that prepared the ground for a stronger 
reaction to the 1973 war. A number of factors played a role 
in this. 
Firstly and probably most importantly in the 1973 war it 
was not just the territory of a OAU member that had been 
invaded. As a consequence of the Israeli thrust across the 
Suez Canal the African continent itself had become 
violated. The African governments felt they could not 
remain indifferent to this development. Secondly, the 
gravity of this development was particularly accentuated by 
the failure of their earlier mediation attempt in the 
Middle East. The OAU summit in 1971 had decided to send a 
mediation mission to the Middle East to try to seek the 
reactivation of the Jarring peace mission. lS The failure of 
the OAU mission was attributed to a perceived Israeli 
intransigence towards negotiating about withdrawal from 
captured Arab territories. 16 Hence, Israel was seen to be 
undermining another central African principle: rejection of 
the acquisition of territory by the use force. 
Just the failure of the OAU mission on its own had "brought 
Afr ica a few degrees closer to the Arab posi tion" .19 This 
generated a conducive environment for the Palestinian cause 
in two conspicous ways. Firstly, the Africans became more 
receptive to Arab demands for the withdrawal of support 
from Israel by severing diplomatic relations. Secondly, the 
Africans began to respond to Arab arguments on the 
similarities between the Southern African problem and the 
Palestinian question. This is also pointed out by E1-Ajouty 
"it could therefore be said that the OAU's failure in 
162 
its attempted mediation of the Egypt/Israeli sector of 
the Middle Eastern conflict precipitated a series of 
transformations in the international relationships 
between Africa and Israel. These transformations 
isolated Israel, brought the League of Arab states and 
the OAU together in the process of harmonization of 
policies regarding both the Middle East conflict and 
the Southern Africa conflict, and created more 
ideological interaction between the Palestine 
ｌｩ｢･ｲ｡ｴｩｯｮｬｾｲｧ｡ｮｩｳ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ and the African liberation 
movemen ts". 
The 'conducive environment' as constituted by the above 
structural changes and the key events is dynamic in nature 
and continuously interacts with the other parts of the 
mobilisation process model. The Bandung Conference gave the 
Arabs the possibility of gaining access to a large audience 
and raising the Palestine question. When the Bandung 
Conference was seen together with the Suez war which lent 
credence to Arab arguments about Israel it enabled an early 
consolidation of a reasonably broad base of Asian support 
and sol ida r i t y • The Non -A 1 i g ned, 0 nth e 0 the r han d , 
provided the Arabs with another forum with growing 
membership where problems of direct concern to the Third 
World were discussed. This together with the gradual 
development of an ideology reflecting Third World thinking 
and attitudes towards a wide range of issues provided the 
Arab goverments the raw material with which to commence the 
mobilisation of support. 
The initial accessibility and the possibility of linkages 
to existing legitimised concepts allowed by this conducive 
environment brought about a degree of support for the 
Palestinian question that gradually enabled the PLO itself 
to enter the process. This initial level of support made 
the existing conducive environment even more favourable by 
allowing the PLO to gain access to Third World forums and 
to put forward its own arguments. This enabled the PLO not 
only to benefit from but also contribute to an ideology 
providing legitimacy and support Eor the Palestinian cause. 
This dynamic nature of the conducive environment must be 
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kept in mind as the analysis moves to the next part of the 
model. 
6.3 Cognitive and Bargain Linkages 
In the introductory chapter it was pointed out that the 
Zionist success, in linking the solution of the problem of 
Jewish displaced persons to the establishment of Palestine, 
played an important role in mobilising support for the 
Zionist cause. Similarly, when Israel embarked on a policy 
to expand its basis of international support it did make 
use of various cognitive and bargain linkages. 
Israel's brand of socialism and her access to the Socialist 
International played an important role in gaining 
legitimacy in the eyes of ruling political parties of 
countries such as Burma, Nepal, Ghana and Tanzania. 19 
During the 1960s Israeli government followed policies 
aiming to project the image of an anti-colonialist and 
anti-apartheid country alienating both the South African 
government, with whom it used to have good relations in the 
1950s, and sections of the Jewish community there. 20 
Israel's ability to draw similarities between historical 
Jewish persecution and the sufferings of black peoples too 
appears to have contributed to her strong image in Africa. 
This is reflected in the Congolese (Kinshasa) Premier 
Mulamba's June 1966 statement that "The African people like 
Israel because we are all victims of racial discrimination 
and we have had to fight for our 1 iber ty". 21 
To these cognitive linkages on which Israel relied to 
improve her standing in the Third World one can also 
include bargain linkages. In the late 1950s, as newly 
independent Afr ican and Ｎｾｳｩ｡ｮ＠ countr ies began to discover 
the difficult problems of economic development, Israel 
became interested in lending her expertise to the Third 
World in terms of technical and development aid. 22 One of 
the major considerations that encouraged Israel to adopt a 
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highly active aid programme directed towards the Third 
World was to cultivate the friendship of these countries. 
Her offers of aid were made conditional upon the recipient 
government extending diplomatic recognition to Israel. 23 
This Was done primarily in the belief that African support 
cultivated at the bilateral level would counter or 
neutralise Arab pressure on African countries to revise 
their attitude towards Israel. 24 This relationship which 
remained a major objective for Israel in Africa can be said 
to constitute a bargain linkage. It brought highly sought 
after Israeli developmental aid for Africa in return for 
African denial of support for the Palestinian cause. 
The Arab governments and the PLO too in their efforts to 
gain support for the Palestinian cause amongst Third World 
regional groupings made wide use of similar linkages. 
The efforts to establish cognitive linkages were directed 
towards achieving two aims. One aim was to weaken the 
status and legitimacy of Israel in the eyes of the Third 
World. This was done in two ways: firstly, by stressing 
Israel's reluctance to respect a number of principles 
embodied in the OAU Charter , and secondly, by pointing 
out the growing relations between Israel and South 
Africa. 25 This was done to undermine Israel's legitimacy 
by associating her with South Africa, a state with low 
standing in the eyes of Africans and the Non-Aligned. The 
second aim was to get the Palestinian cause integrated into 
the anti-colonial thinking of the Non-Aligned Movement. In 
this way the Palestinian problem would be perceived and 
treated as an issue falling within the domain of the anti-
colonial dimension of the Non-Aligned ideology, hence, 
benefitting from the same support accruing to other issues 
covered by anti-colonialism. 
6.3.1 Territorial integrity and the inadmisability of the 
acquisition of territory by the use of force. 
Above it was pointed out that overt Israeli support for one 
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secessionist movement together with the 1967 and 1973 wars 
created a conducive environment for the mObilisation 
process to begin. This was because these events by their 
nature undermined principles central to African thinking as 
reflected in the OAU Charter. 26 Arab governments, in 
particular Egypt, played an important role in exploiting 
these principles to weaken the position of Israel in 
Africa. At the OAU summit in September 1967 Arab members 
had argued 27 that Israel had violated the integrity of an 
African state and Israeli occupation of "their territory 
was an affront to the OAU".28 For the African states "to 
fail to support Egypt was to question the letters on which 
the OAU Charter was written".29 
Although at the 1967 OAU meeting the Arabs had to restrain 
the m s e 1 v e s, t his was not the cas eat the UN. Par tic u 1 a r 1 y 
with the adoption of the Security Council resolution which 
declared the acquisition of territory by force as illegal, 
Arab arguments began to gain strength and influence 
African thinking. This is quite evident in the Tanzanian 
delegate's observation of the similarity between the 
situation in the Middle East and the vulnerability of 
African states to potential aggression from racist 
governments of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. 30 
The gradual change of mood amongst African states was 
quickened by Israeli preparedness to support the Biafran 
secession. Many Afr icans perceived this as another action 
undermining the territorial integrity of an African 
country. The growing national liberation struggle 
particularly in Guinea-Bissau brought the problem of 
aggression home. The Portugese regularly undermined the 
territorial integrity of neighbouring countries. This made 
African countries appreciate better the need to support 
the Arab cause to strengthen the principle of territorial 
integrity. Senegal was one such country whose territory was 
frequently subjected to Portugese incursions. The Foreign 
Minister of Senegal reflected African thinking when he told 
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the United Nations General Assembly that "neither side can 
invoke security reasons to seize or annex territories of 
other states".31 
The Af r ican recogn i tion of Ar ab and par ticular 1 y Egyptian 
arguments on the need for African support for the Arab 
cause was reflected in the growing strength of the 
decisions of the 1971 and 1972 CAU summits. These decisions 
supported the Egyptian position in the Middle East conflict 
and called for total Israeli withdrawal from 'all' Arab 
territories occupied since 5 June 1967. The June 1972 
decision was particularly strong as it reaffirmed "in the 
name of African solidarity .•. its effective support for 
Egypt in its legitimate struggle to restore the integrity 
of its full territory by all means".32 Establishing the 
applicability of a highly regarded African principle to the 
Middle East undermined Israel's legitimacy and mobilised 
support for the Arab cause. Although this process did not 
contribute directly to the Palestinian cause it did bring 
the Africans nearer to lending their support for this 
cause. The legitimisation of Arab demands for the return of 
the occupied territories was crucial in mobilising support 
for the political rights of the Palestinians. 
6.3.2 The Palestinian cause and anti-colonialism. 
Anti-colonialism and the struggle against racism have been 
central to both the Non-Aligned and the OAU. 33 The anti-
colonial dimension of the Non-Aligned ideology has played a 
leading role in determining the attitudes of the majority 
of Third World countries towards the colonial and racial 
problems of Afr ica. In Table 6.1 the average level of 
support for a standard anti-colonial position on all the 
relevant roll-calls is shown for various political 
groupings. 34 The results, which are for the years preceding 
and following the 1967 and 1973 wars, point towards the 
very high level of· support that anti-colonialism enjoyed in 
the Th i rd Wor 1d, through·out the 1960s and 1970s. The Ar ab 
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governments since as early as the Bandung Conference35 have 
tried to draw similarities between apartheid, imperialism 
and Israel in the hope of gaining support from the other 
Afro-As1'ans. 36 However, the l' k b 1n age etween the Palestinian 
cause and those causes covered by anti-colonialism was not 
immediately accepted. 
TABLE 6.1: Level of average anti-colonial voting scores * 
for groups of countries 
Political and Regional Groupings 
Assembly Latin Non Africans Asians Islamic 
Sessions America Aligned 
1966 72 % 89 % 84 % 82 % 88% 
1969 90 % 99 % 96 % 98 % 96% 
1974 94 % 99 % 98 % 98 % 100% 
(* Percentages are based upon countries meeting the 
minimum attendance levels.) 
The OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement did not share the Arab 
perception of a ideological linkage between the Palestinian 
issue and the colonial/racial problems of particularly 
Southern Africa until the late 1960s. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s the only occasion when Arab efforts to 
establish a link took a concrete form was at the meeting of 
the Casablanca Group in 1961. This meeting "linking the 
problem of Palestine with the general theme of the defence 
of independence and security on the African continent,,37 
denounced Israel as an instrument in the service of 
imperialism and neocolonialism. 38 The reluctance of 
Africans to discuss the question of Palestine, let alone 
its similarities with African colonial problems, forced 
Egypt to keep the Middle East away from the first and 
subsequent OAU summits during most of the 1960s. 39 
However, during the 1964 summit this did not prevent the 
Algerian President Ben Bella from making a direct 
comparision of the apartheid policy of South Africa and the 
racial discrimination that the Arab minority in Israel 
faced.40 Other Arab members drew similarities between the 
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roles of the newly formed PLA and that of African 
liberation movements. 4l 
The debate on the similarities between the situation in 
South Africa and Palestine amongst the Africans did not 
receive a great degree of attention until the OAU summit in 
May 1973. During the summit Arab governments, in 
particular the Algerian President, strongly argued that the 
Palestinian problem was a part of the African struggle 
against colonialism, imperialism and Zionism. He critised 
the discrepancy in African attitudes towards the problems 
of South Africa and Palestine when he declared that "Africa 
can not adopt one attitude toward colonialism in Southern 
Africa and a completely different one toward Zionist 
colonialism in Northern Africa".42 
One of the immediate consequences of the debate 
precipitated by the above argument was the adoption of a 
unanimously supported OAU resolution 
"calling on African nations to consider taking 
collective and individual steps, both political and 
economic, against Israel should that country persist 
in its ｲ･ｾｾｳ｡ｬ＠ to evacuate occupied Arab 
territories". 
This led the DAU for the first time to express their 
support for Palestinian rights when they declared the need 
to respect the inalienable rights of the Palestinians in 
the solution of the Middle East conflict. 44 Although this 
DAU decision on the Middle East was not as far reaching as 
the Algerian call for the outright suspension of 
relations 45 with Israel it still signified a change in 
African perception's of the Palestinian problem. 
In respect to the Non-Aligned Movement the developments on 
the question of cognitive similarities between the problem 
of South Africa and Palestine was quite different from the 
DAU. Primarily, as a result of a greater Arab presence and 
a more rad ical composi tion, the Palestinian issue had not 
only received early recognition but had also been defined 
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as a "struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism" 
since the 1964 summit. 46 This remained the position held by 
the Non-Aligned Movement without any significant change 
during the period between the Cairo and Algiers summits in 
spite of Arab efforts to convince the Non-Aligned of the 
strong similarity between the Palestinian problem and the 
Southern African problems. However, it was the adoption of 
the 'Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation' 
at the Algiers summit in September 1973 that signified a 
major change in Non-Aligned thinking towards the 
Palestinian problem .. In this Arab governments, in 
particular the Algerians, and the PLO played an important 
role, as throughout the Algiers summit they argued the 
similarities between colonialism, racialism and Zionism. 47 
In this Declaration the Non-Aligned recognised that 
"the case of Palestine is completely identical with 
the situation in South Africa, where racist and 
segregationist minorities have resorted to the ｳｾｾ･＠
methods of colonial domination and exploitation •.. " 
This unambiguous formulation of a cognitive linkage between 
the Palestinian and South African problems influenced Non-
Aligned attitudes towards Israel and the Palestinian cause. 
Firstly, Israel lost considerable status and legitimacy 
when the Pretoria-Salisbury-Lisbon military/political 
alliance against national liberation was extended to 
include Tel-Aviv. 49 Secondly, the Non-Aligned reaffirmed 
"the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian people 
against colonialism, Zionism and racism" and recognised the 
PLO as "the legitimate representative of the Palestine 
people and their legitimate struggle".50 
The change in Non-Aligned attitudes brought about by the 
linkage between the situation in Palestine and Southern 
A f ric a ext end e d bey 0 n d the rea 1 m 0 f ve r b a 1 po lit i cal 
support. The Non-Aligned Movement's decisions adopted at 
Algiers called on its members.to extent a wide range of 
measures, including the severance of diplomatic relations 
initially introduced to isolate Portugal, Rhodesia and 
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South Africa, to cover Israel too. Furthermore, the summit 
called on member states who still maintained relations with 
Israel 
"to work for a boycott of Israel in the diplomatic, 
economic, military and cultural fields and in the 
sphere of maritime and air traffic in accordance with 
the prov\\ions of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter". 
By adoPting these measures and invoking the provisions of 
Chapter VII the Non-Aligned expressed the severity of its 
stand and its intention to harmonise its policies towards 
the Palestinian problem with the ones towards Southern 
Africa. 
These developments within the Non-Aligned Movement, the 
October War and the alleged collaboration between South 
Africa and Israel during the war hardened the position of 
the OAU. At the emergency meeting of its Council of 
Ministers held in November 1973 in Addis Ababa, the OAU 
responded to the linkage between Southern Africa and the 
Palestinian problem in a much more strongly worded manner 
than at its summit in May of the same year. The meeting 
declared that the 
"open military collusion between the United States, 
Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia and Israel during the 
recent Middle East War further confirms the 
justification of the preoccupation of the African and 
A r abc 0 u n t r i e san d has fur the r s t r eng the n eg2 the i r 
conviction in the need for a common struggle". 
The OAU's new found belief in the perceived similarities 
between the imperialist and racist threats facing the 
Africans and the Arabs culminated in a calIon all member 
states and friendly countries to impose a total economic 
embargo and in particular an oil embargo against Israel, 
h d . 53 At t h Portugal, South Afr ica and Southern R 0 eSla. e 
ideological level, on the otherhand, it led to the 
description of the Palestinian problem as a struggle for 
self-determination against colonial and racial 
discrimination. 
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This change in the ideological outlook of the Non-Aligned 
and the Africans as expressed in the formal decisions of 
their respective forums was also reflected in their voting 
behaviour. A comparative analysis of the Third World voting 
behaviour gives an indication of the way in which attitudes 
towards the two issues have converged. 
The anti-colonial dimension of non-alignment had always 
upheld support for the struggles being waged against 
colonialism and racialism in Southern Africa. This 
continuous support for anti-colonialism as it relates to 
matters concerning Southern Africa was depicted in Table 
6.1. A large proportion of the Third World political and 
regional groupings under study have on the whole supported 
anti-colonialism. Whereas this had not been the case in 
respect to the Palestinian problem especially prior to the 
28th session of the General Assembly. 
TABLE 6.2: Distribution of Highly Anti-Colonialist 
and Pro-Palestinian Votes* In Each Group Across 
Three Sessions 
Assembly 
Sessions 
1969 
1973 
1974 
Political and Regional Groupings 
Latin IAfricans 
Americans! 
, 
, 
ｾＨｾＲＭＩｾＱｾＸｾＥＭＡｾＨＸｾＩｾＳｾｓｾＥ＠
(6) 50% ! (22) 100% 
(20) 95% 1(34) 97% 
, 
Asians 
(9) 69% 
(12) 86% 
(21) 96% 
Non-
Aligned 
(29) 69% 
(55) 98% 
(81) 99% 
Islamic 
group 
(24) 83% 
(32) 97% 
(31)100% 
--------- ----------,--------- ---------- -------- ---------
(* Percentages and fugures are based upon countries 
meeting the minimum ｡ｴｴ･ｮ､ｾｮ｣･＠ levels) 
However, as the Palestinian problem became integrated into 
anti-colonial thinking the voting behaviour of the Afro-
Asian countries began to change too. These countries 
started to extend their anti-colonial support for the 
Palestinian cause. Table 6.2 shows the number and 
percentage of countries which were adopting both a highly 
anti-colonial and a highly pro-Palestinian position. A 
growing proportion of Third World countries came to vote in 
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a manner suggesting an integration of the two dimensions at 
the United Nations General Assembly. (See Appendix II for a 
statistical analysis of the relationship between the two 
issues.) 
If Arab arguments on a successful exploitation of the 
principle of territorial integrity played an important role 
in raising questions about Israel's behaviour, the 
ideological linking of the Palestinian problem to 
colonialism, imperialism and racism faciliated the 
extension of political support for the Palestinian cause. A 
number of other linkages which had played a role in 
changing Third World perceptions and attitudes towards the 
Palestinian problem can be added to the above major ones. 
6.3.3 Bargain linkages 
Earlier on it was noted that one of the factors that 
contributed to Israel's high status in the Third World was 
her ability to make developmental and technical skill 
available to Third World countries. It was argued that the 
trading of developmental assistance in return for support 
for Israel constituted a bargain linkage which played an 
important role in denying Arab governments any substantive 
progress in their efforts to weaken the image of Israel. 
It is possible to identify a number of similar cases in 
respect to Arab efforts to mobilise support that could be 
likened to bargain linkages. However, it may be necessary 
to treat these bargain linkages with some caution. 
Although, these cases when studied individually may look 
like straight forward trade offs, they could also be seen 
as the natural manifestations of a political solidarity 
maintained by a common world outlook. 
One such bargain linkage is the striking deal reached 
between the Araband African governments at the 
extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in 
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November 1973. During this meeting the DAU called on its 
members to take "measures to put an end to Israel's 
defiance of the International Community"54 and invited its 
members and Arab states to impose an oil boycott of 
Po r tug a 1 , Sou t h A f ric a an d Rh 0 des i a as well a sIs rae 1 . 
Within days, the Arab governments at their own summit in 
Algiers reciprocated by adopting the DAU recommendations 
and announcing a programme to increase Afro-Arab 
cooperation, to severe relations with South Africa, 
Portugal and Rhodesia, and impose a ban on oil supplies to 
these countr ies. 55 
In isolation from its wider context this event may well 
appear to be the result of a conscious bargaining process 
whereby the Africans and Arabs have simply exchanged 
logistical support to weaken their respective enemies. Yet, 
such an approach would be too insufficient. In the 
immediate aftermath of the African severance of relations 
with Israel many have argued that this occurred as a result 
of Arab pressure resulting from their oil-based economic-
financial power. Such arguments hold the view that Africans 
broke diplomatic relations and came to support the Arabs 
because of expected/promised Arab economic rewards and not 
as a result of a 1egitimisation process. However, as Legum 
.argues 
"It cannot be convincingly argued that the reason for 
this breach was •.• fear of the Arabs" 'oil weapon' 
since the movement to break diplomatic relations first 
began to assume some significance in 1972, it 
escalated in September 1973, after the Summit of Non-
Aligned Countries in Algiers and reached its high tide 
on 5 November when no fewer than 17 countries broke 
with Israel. Therefore the decision to break came 
before the ·puni tive nature of oil sanctions had become 
manifest. There is no evidence to show that the Arabs 
had warned the African states of the economic 
consequences of any refusal to break with Israel as a 
direct pressure to compel them to ｙｩｾｬ､ＮＢ＠ Ａｾ＠ the 
reasons must be sought in other explanatlons • 
Without necessarily discounting the role of trade offs 
motivated by narrowly defined governmental considerations, 
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the Picture would not be complete without taking into 
account the influence of broader ideology on the 
perceptions and behaviour of its adherents. It has already 
been argued that non-alignment as an ideology does playa 
crucial role on most Third World foreign policies. It has 
also been pointed out that anti-colonialism as a central 
tenet of non-alignment has been extended to embrace the 
Palestinian cause. Hence this bargain linkage, in respect 
to the Palestinian problem, that could otherwise be seen as 
the product of expedient bargaining need to be put into the 
larger ideological context too. 
The third part of the mobilisation model examines the role 
of access i b iIi ty to the var ious Th ird Wor ld reg ional 
groupings in mobilising support for the Palestinian cause. 
It is this accessibility, conditional upon a conducive 
environment that has enabled first the Arab governments and 
then the PLO to argue their case and mobilise support for 
their cause. It is through a variety of access routes that 
the Arab governments and the PLO, the initiators, were able 
to bring the Palestinian problem to the attention of the 
Third World. Access to target actors gave them the 
opportunity to raise actor consciousness about the 
Palestinian problem and also establish linkages between the 
Palestinian cause and already legitimised and well 
supported principles and causes. It is the purpose of the 
following section to examine the role of accessibility in 
the mobilisation process. 
6.4 Accessibility 
In the introductory chapter it was noted that the ability 
of the Zionists to gain access to the domestic political 
systems of first Britain and then the US played an 
important role in mobilising support for the Zionist cause. 
S i mil a r 1 y, the con sci 0 usa n d rig 0 r 0 use f for t son the pa r t 
of Israel to establish strong diplomatic and economic links 
enabled her to gain direct access to a great number of 
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governments in the Third World. In early 1970 Israel had 
cooperation treaties with 33 Third World countries 57 and 
had 70 diplomatic representatives including non-resident 
ones.
58 The Israeli presence in certain countries 
particularly in the early 1960s was of such quality that 
Israeli ambassadors were reputed to have enjoyed immediate 
access to some African heads of state which included the 
influencial leader Nkrumah. 59 
No doubt Israel's strong diplomatic presence in Africa 
played a major role in frustrating Egyptian efforts to 
mobilise African supPort. A vivid example of the 
consequences of Israeli advantages, arising from the access 
to African governments she enjoyed, was evident in African 
reluctance to discuss and adopt decisions on the Middle 
East favourable to the Arabs at the 1958 Accra Conference 60 
and at the first OAU summit in 1963. According to Sawant 6l 
the exclusion of the Palestine question from the debates 
and decisions of these two conferences can be linked to the 
Israeli Foreign Minister's visit to Ghana in early 1958 and 
"the great deal of (Israeli) diplomatic spade-work" prior 
to the OAU summit cautioning African leaders against 
possible Egyptian moves against Israel. 
Indirect 
access 
Direct 
access 
Non -Violent 
means 
Arab Governments 
i.e Egypt, 
Algeria 
PLO participation 
PLO offices 
Violent 
means 
M.E. wars, 
armed 
struggle 
not used 
TABLE 6.3 Access Routes to Third World Agendas 
As the above matrix depicts, the Palestinians enjoyed a 
t through which they could reach the number of access rou es 
agendas of Third World governments and forums. Until the 
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early 1970s when the PLO began to be invited to the Islamic 
Conference Organisation, the Non-Aligned and the OAU 
meetings, and open offices in various Non-Aligned capitals, 
the Palestinian issue was brought up by Arab governments. 
In respect to violent access routes the Palestinians did 
not stage any violent acts that involved the Third World in 
any direct way. The two Palestinian hijackings that 
involved two African airports, Entebbe and Mogadishu, 
occurred well after African support for the Palestinian 
cause had been consolidated. However, the guerrilla warfare 
waged in Palestine did have an indirect impact as it helped 
the Non-Aligned countries to see similarities with national 
liberation struggles elsewhere. 
6.4.1 Indirect Access through Arab Governments 
From the very early days of the emergence of independent 
Afro-Asian countries Arab governments enjoyed certain 
advantages over Israel. Arab countries by their 
uncontroversial geographical and cultural location in 
Africa and Asia were readily accepted within the newly 
emerging Afro-Asian forums. The preparatory meeting for the 
Bandung Conference chose to invite Arab states rather than 
Israel at the end of a long debate over whether Israel 
could be regarded as an Asian country. The Bandung 
Conference set the trend for Arab participation in Afro-
Asian forums at Israel's expense. 
This gave the Arab governments the possibility of bringing 
the Palestinian question to the attention of an 
international forum outside the UN, where the item had been 
excluded from the Assembly's agenda since 1952. In respect 
to the significance of accessibility it is interesting to 
note that during the Bandung Conference a future leader of 
the PLO, Shukairy, too had the possibility of raising the 
Palestinian problem with the other delegates as a member of 
the Syrian delegation. 62 Even though the final wording of 
the Bandung resolution on Palestine never satisfied the 
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Ar ab governments, at least the other Afro -Asian coun tr ies 
had been exposed to the Palestinian problem and the 
issue of the rights of the Palestinians. This early 
exposure to the Palestinian question and the impact of the 
Suez War doubtlessly played a role in Israel's failure to 
set up extensive diplomatic relations with Asian countries. 
Israel's swift response to their exclusion from the Bandung 
Conference culminated in the establishment of an impressive 
Israeli diplomatic network, particularly in Africa. This 
diplomatic network, coupled with the striking of a 
successful linkage, where she offered wide developmental 
aid in return for African reluctance to support Egyptian 
arguments, undermined the Arab advantage based on access to 
Afro-Asian forums. Throughout most of the 1960s Egypt found 
its membership of the OAU of little use, as the OAU 
remained unwilling to discuss the Middle East in any way. 
ｎ･ｾｲｴｨ･ｬ･ｳｳＬ＠ Egypt, later joined by Algeria, continued in 
raising the question of Palestine and describing Israel as 
a colonialist and racist state. This was done in Nasser's 
belief that Africa would eventuallY discover what he saw to 
be the truth. 63 However, for this Arabs had to wait until 
the failure of the OAU mediation mission to the Middle 
East. The failure of this mission created a favourable 
environment for the cumulative efforts of Arab governments 
dur ing the 1960s to take effect. 
6.4.2 Direct Access to Multilateral forums 
The larger Arab membership and the more radical nature of 
the Non-Aligned Movement permitted the Arab governments to 
be more forceful. One of the consequences of this approach 
was that the PLO at an early stage gained access to the 
Non-Aligned meetings. The PLO was able to address the Non-
Aligned for the first time during the Consultative Meeting 
of the Non-Aligned in Belgrade in July 1969. 64 This meeting 
set a precedent and the PLO, together with other liberation 
movements, was invited to the Lusaka summit in 1970 as a 
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guest. 65 From then on the status of the PLO gradually 
increased. As a result of a strong Algerian initiative the 
PLO was granted observer status at the Algiers summit in 
1973 and full membership at the Lima Ministerial Meeting in 
1975. 66 
PLOts access to Non-Aligned delegates played an important 
role in mobilising full support for the Palestinian cause. 
It was at the Havana Coordinating Bureau meeting in 1974 
that the Non-Aligned expressed their full and unambiguous 
support for the Palestinian cause. In this case the role of 
accessibility is vividly acknowledged by a PLO diplomatic 
representative. 
" P a I est i n ian rep res e n t a. t i v e sac com pan i e d eve r y 
delegation and were able to talk to them effortlessly 
in their mother tongues - one positive result of the 
w 0 r 1 d -w ide P a I est in ian d i asp 0 r a. It ish a r d 1 y 
surprising, therefore, that the delegations were 
thoroughly immersed in the Palestinian problem".67 
6.4.2.1 Bilateral relations 
The establishment of the first bi-lateral relationship came 
in 1965 soon after the PLO was actually found.ed. That year 
the People's Republic of China granted the PLO the right to 
open an office with a quasi-diplomatic status. 68 The 
relative ease with which the PRC had made itself accessible 
was reflected in her position that saw the Palestinians "no 
longer as merely an international dispute over refugees, 
but as a manifestation of the national liberation struggle 
of a distinct Palestinian people".69 This early achievement 
in Asia was followed by North Korea and North Vietnams' 
preparedness to have relations with the PLO. Various PLO 
representatives including Arafat made frequent visits to 
China and North Korea throughout the early 1970s. This 
played an important role in the PLO expanding its own basis 
of Asian support particularly amongst radical governments. 
However, it was on1v from the early 1970s that the PLO 
began to open offices abroad and gain access to host 
governments in any significant way. 
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The first two black African countries to allow the opening 
of PLO offices were Uganda and Chad. Uganda, soon after it 
severed its relations with Israel, invited the PLO to take 
over the premises of the Israeli embassy.70 Similarly, 
Chad the third African country to break its diplomatic 
relations with Israel in December 1972 welcomed the PLO to 
open an office. 7l These were followed by invitations to 
open offices from Senegal, Guinea and Congo during 1973. 
Doubtlessly, at a time when Israel's influence in Africa 
began to diminish, the ability of the PLO to gain access to 
some African governments contributed to PLO's efforts to 
mobilise support for the Palestinian cause. It gave the PLO 
the opportun"ity to discuss the Palestinian problem with 
these host governments and seek their support in lobbying 
others. Furthermore, the PLO's presence in these countries 
gave the PLO representatives the possibility to caucus 
amongst the diplomatic corps, particularly in those 
capitals where it was accorded full diplomatic status. 
The number of PLO offices rapidly expanded following the 
Non-Aligned, OAU and ICO decisions calling for the 
severance of relations with Israel. This was also helped by 
the ICO decision in Lahore in February 1974 72 calling on 
its members to allow the PLO to open offices in their 
countries. A similar decision was adopted at the Non-
Aligned Coordinating Bureau Ministerial Meeting at Havana 
in March 1975. 73 The combined effect of these decisions, 
coupled with the Non-Aligned (August 1975) and Arab League 
(December 1975) decisions to accord full membership to the 
PLO, contributed to the expansion of the PLO offices 
abroad. As Table 6.4 depicts by 1984 the PLO had 45 offices 
in the various Third world countries. 
Although the opening of these offices was an indication of 
a certain level of support for the Palestinian cause it 
should not be treated simply as the end product of a 
mobilisation process. Instead, by allowing the PLO direct 
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access to these governments and regional forums, it gave 
the PLO a basis from which to continue and expand the 
mobilisation of support. The presence of PLO 
representatives in a country gave the PLO the possibility 
of both keeping the Palestinian problem on the public 
agendas of those countries and also continuing to 
strengthen the legitimacy of their cause. This was done in 
the belief that the opinion of the international community 
could help their struggle for self-determination morally as 
well as materially. 
Africa 21 Non -AI igned 41 
Asia 16 Islamic Group 16 
Latin America 8 Arab League 20 
TOTAL 45 
TABLE 6.4 PLO offices by Third World Regional 
and Political groupings74 
However, there were limits on how far governments were 
prepared to go along with the demands of the PLO. At the 
July 1975 OAU summit in Kampala, the PLO together with 
Libya lobbied for a decision to work towards Israel's 
expulsion from the UN. However, the majority of members 
supported by Egypt refused to endorse it. 75 Instead the 
summit adopted a much milder decision that called on member 
states 
"to take the most appropriate measures to intensify 
pressures exercised against Israel at the UN and other 
institutions including the possibility of eventually 
depriving it of its status as a member of these 
institutions.,,76 
Similarly the PLO initiative77 to persuade the Non-Aligned 
Movement to call sanctions against Israel faced 
difficulties. The August 1976 Non-Aligned summit in 
Colombo, noting the obstacle caused by US vetoes in the 
Security Council declined to go any further than the 
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earlier position taken by the OAO summit. 78 
These developments in many ways established the parameters 
within which the PLO could expect support. More 
interestingly the consequences of these developments for 
the PLOts behaviour reflect the dYnamic and interactive 
nature of the mobilisation process. The accessibility 
enjoyed by the PLO contr ibuted to the mobilisation of 
support for the Palestinian cause but this same 
accessibility put systemic pressure on the PLO to moderate 
its policies. As its international standing increased the 
PLO found itself revising some of its more radical 
attitudes and policies towards the solution of the 
Palestinian problem. 
One last way in which the PLO gained access to the Third 
World countries was as a result of its armed struggle. The 
use of violence by the PLO had two consequences. The 
spectacular hijackings mounted by the Palestinians 
attracted attention to the Palestinian problem. It put the 
Palestinian problem on the public agenda. Secondly, and 
more importantly, violence against Israel had a different 
impact on particularly African countries and those 
countries that achieved independence through armed 
struggle. This violence in Palestine made them aware of 
'another' armed struggle to which they could relate and 
with which they could sympathise. Establishment of the 
cognitive linkage between the problems of South Africa and 
Palestine aided this process. The Africans perceived 
growing similarities between the Israeli raids into refugee 
camps and on alleged guerrilla hide-outs and 
Portugese/South African raids into neighbouring African 
countries. 
6.5 Growth of Support amongst Third World groupings 
The final part of this chapter presents the growth of Third 
World support for the Palestinian cause as an outcome of a 
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mObilisation process, whose constituent parts have just 
been examined. Support for the Palestinian cause did not 
grow in a uniform manner across different Third World 
groupings. While the Non-Aligned and the ICO were more 
forthcoming, the OAU support came slowly and only in two 
stages. First with great reluctance the OAU changed its 
attitudes towards the Middle East conflict and the Arab 
cause. Only after it began to support the Arab cause in the 
Middle East conflict did the OAU begin to express separate 
support for the rights of the Palestinians. The least 
forthcoming Third World group was the Latin Americans. The 
regional forum for Latin America, the OAS, never adopted 
any decisions on the Palestinian problem. It was, only 
after 1973 that the Latin Americans too began to lend their 
support to the Palestinian cause. 
The growth of support for the Palestinian cause has been 
established in two ways. Firstly, the formal decisions and, 
where possible, the debates of the regional forums were 
studied. This was done in the belief that the change in the 
content and the wording of the decisions would reflect the 
changing position of these forums in respect to the 
Palestinian problem. Secondly, given the practical 
difficulties of examining the attitude and position of 
every individual government towards the Palestinian cause, 
an index of political support was constructed.79 
This index was based on a modified Lijphart ｦｯｲｭｾｬ｡＠ and 
gives agreement scores between Israel and every member of 
the Assembly on a set of selected roll-calls concerning the 
Palestinian problem. The scores range from 0.0 to 100.0 
where 0.0 indicates complete disagreement with Israel 
while, at the other end of the scale, a score of 100.0 
suggests full agreement with Israel. In view of the large 
number of scores generated for approximately 140 countries 
per session and the need to differentiate between one level 
of support and another, the results obtained from the index 
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were grouped into the below five different bands of 
support; 
> 0.0 and < 20.0 = highly pro -Palestinian 
> 20.0 and < 40.0 = medium pro -Palestinian 
> 40.0 and < 60.0 = intermediate 
> 60.0 and < 80.0 = medium pro-Israel 
> 80.0 and < 100.0 = pro-Israel. 
The discussion concerning the index as well as the setting 
of the above cut-off points can be found in Appendix II. 
6.5.1 Non-Aligned Movement 
The first Non-Aligned summit in September 1961 in Belgrade 
did express some support for the "full restoration of all 
the rights of the Arab people of Palestine".80 Yet, this 
brief reference to the relatively ambiguous term of 'all 
the rights' of the Palestinians fell short of what Nasser 
would have liked to see. In his address to the summit8l he 
strongly argued for the need to recognise the colonialist 
and imperialist nature of Israel. He had probably expected 
the adoption of a decision not very different from the 
relatively clearer and more elaborate Casablanca 
resolution. This resolution had condemned Israel's 
imperialism and had called for the restoration of "all the 
legitimate rights" of the Arabs of Palestine. 
This lack of commitment to the Palestinian cause was also 
evident in the way in which out of sixteen non-Arab 
delegations only one, Guinea (a member of the Casablanca 
group), referred to the problem of Palestine in their 
speech. 82 Nehru, one of the founding fathers of the Non-
ａＱｩｧｾ･､＠ movement too confirmed this trend. In his speech he 
did not include Palestine amongst the list of urgent 'ills' 
awaiting immediate attention. 83 Under these circumstances 
it would be difficult to say that the Palestinian problem 
held much salience for a sizeable proportion of the 
participants. The second summit in Cairo in 1964 brought 
the Non-Aligned nearer to Nasser's position when in two 
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short paragraphs the summit expressed support for the 
inalienable right of the Palestinians to self-determination 
in their struggle against colonialism and racism. 84 
When the Non-Aligned Movement was reactivated, after a lull 
of five years, a conspicuous increase in Non-Aligned 
support for the Palestinian cause began to occur. In the 
intervening years since the previous summit in 1964, the 
1967 war created a cognitive environment favourable to Arab 
mobilisation efforts. The war raised questions about Israel 
in the minds of increasing number of Non-Aligned countries. 
It enabled the Arab delegations to gradually develop the 
argument for the need to respect and express support for 
the principle of 'territorial integrity' and the 
'admissability of the acquisition of land by force'. The 
violation of these principles by Israel gave the Arab 
states the opportunity to substantiate their arguments 
about the imperialistic nature of Israel and lay the ground 
for the eventual establishment of the cognitive linkages 
between the Palestinian problem and the problems of 
Southern Africa. Furthermore, in this period the Non-
Aligned began for the first time to hear about the 
Palestine problem directly from the Palestinian themselves 
as the Non -AI igned became more and more access ible to the 
PLO. 
The beginnings of significant change in the attitude of the 
Non-Aligned towards the Middle East and the Palestinian 
problems were reflected in the decisions of the Lusaka 
summit in September 1970. In the first full resolution on 
the Middle East the Non-Aligned condemned Israel for its 
occupation of Arab territories and called on it to withdraw 
from these territories. Simultaneously they declared that 
"respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of 
Palestine is a prerequisi te to peace in the Middle East". 85 
These developments brought the Non-Aligned relativelY 
nearer to the positions held by the Arabs and the PLO. 
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Throughout the early 1970s the position of the Non-Aligned 
continued to harden. The failure of the OAU mission played 
a crucial role in mobilising solid Non-Aligned support for 
the Arab cause. This became quite evident in the decisions 
of the Algiers summit in September 1973 which expressed 
unequivocal support for Egypt, Syria and Jordan's "lawful 
struggle to regain by all means their occupied territories" 
and recommended hardening measures against Israel, 
including the severance of diplomatic relations. 86 
The decisive breakthrough in Non-Aligned support for the 
Palestinian cause carne during the Algiers summit. A number 
of factors played a crucial role. Firstly, by then the 
prestige of Arab countries had increased at the expense of 
I s rae 1, wit h who min c rea sin gnu m be r 0 f Non -A I i g ned 
countries were breaking relations. This development 
naturally began to lend increasing credibility to Arab 
arguments. This is well reflected in the preparedness of 
the Non-Aligned delegations to go along with the Algerian 
arguments on the similarities between the problems of 
Southern Africa and the Palestinian problem. The direct 
consequence of this was the inclusion of the Palestinian 
struggle amongst other national liberation struggles. 87 
Hence the Palestinian cause acquired a status similar to 
other liberation struggles. 
Secondly, the PLO as an observer was able to participate in 
the formal as well as informal deliberations of the summit 
and argue her own case. The impact of the PLO presence in 
the deliberations is reflected in the adoption of a 
reference of solidarity with the three PLO officals killed 
by the Israelis in Beirut, in the final declaration. 88 
Thirdly, the growing support for the PLO particularly in 
the occupied territories increased the status of the PLO in 
the eyes of the Non-Aligned Movement. This was vividly 
reflected in the summit's recognition of the PLO as "the 
leg i tima te represen ta ti ve of the Palestine people and 
their legitimate struggle ft • 89 
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T his b rea k t h r 0 ugh inN 0 n -A 1 i g ned sup p 0 rtf 0 r the 
Palestinian cause is also supported by their voting 
behaviour at the United Nations. As it can be seen from 
Table 6.5 the Non-Aligned attitude towards the Palestinian 
cause changed significantly. At the 24th session the Non-
Aligned Movement had been divided, particularly as a result 
o f so meA fro -A s ian me m be r s reI u c tan c e to sup p 0 r t the 
Palestinian cause. There was a significant minority of 
almost 10% which was fully supportive of the Israeli 
position. 90 However, this situation changed during the 
early 1970s and by the General Assembly's 28th session, 
held just after the Non-Aligned Algiers summit, an 
overwhelming majority of the Non-Aligned were strongly 
supportive of the Palestinian cause. This support reached a 
saturation point at the following Assembly session with 
only Nepal expressing less than full support. 
TABLE 6.5 Distribution of Non-Aligned Support 
General Assembly Sessions 
24th 28th 29th 
1969 1973 1974 
Highly pro -Pals. (31) 67% (57) 93% (54) 98% 
Medium pro-Pals. ( 2) 4% ( 4) 7% ( 1) 2% 
Intermediate ( 6) 13% 
Medium pro-Isr. ( 3) 7% 
Highly pro-Isr. ( 4) 9% 
TOTAL* 46 61 55 
(* Percentages and figures are based upon those 
countries meeting the minimum attendance levels) 
This strongly pro-Palestinian position at the UN found 
further expression at the Ministerial Meeting in March 1975 
in Havana. Until then the Non-Aligned had expressed its 
support for the "restoration of the Palestinian people's 
. . ,,91 
national rights ... and its right to self-determlnatlon. 
At Havana this support became quite elaborate and much 
clearer. In its first separate resolution on Palestine, the 
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Non-Aligned Movement having reiterated that the Palestinian 
struggle was an integral part of the world liberation 
movement, reaffirmed 
"its full and active support for the PLO in its 
struggle to restore the national rights of the 
Palestinian people, particularly their right to return 
to their homeland, the right to self-determination, 
sovereignty, independence and ｴｾ･＠ creation of a 
na tional author i ty, by all means". 9 
The wording of this paragraph suggests two changes in 
emphasis from prev ious Non -AI igned decis ions. Fi rs tl y, the 
meaning of the right to self-determination is clearly 
spelled out to mean "sovereignty, independence and the 
creation of a national authority". Secondly, throughout 
this resolution the Palestinians are referred to as 'the 
Palestinian people' rather than the 'Arabs of Palestine'. 
This doubtlessly signifies a complete change in Non-Aligned 
perception of Palestinians from displaced Arabs with 
ambiguous political rights to a distinct nation struggling 
for independence, a position argued and defended by the PLO 
since the late 1960s. 
6.5.2 The OAU support 
OAU support for the Palestinian cause did not come until as 
late as the Addis Ababa summit in May 1973. The OAU for a 
long time remained extremely reluctant to get involved in 
the Middle East conflict in any manner let alone the 
Palestinian problem. Although the Arab members tried to 
inject the Palestinian problem into the debates no formal 
decision was adopted until after the 1967 war. Even then 
the Africans faced the problem with some reluctance. This 
was quite evident in their refusal to take up a Somalia-
Guinea proposal to call an emergency OAU meeting. This 
ambivalance was also reflected in some African countries 
readiness to support a Latin American draft resolution 
during the fifth emergency session of the General Assembly 
in 1967. 93 This draft resolution which had stressed 
negotiations without prior Israeli withdrawal was strongly 
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opposed by the Arabs. Nevertheless, the first signs of 
change did begin to surface at the fourth OAU summit in 
Kinshasa in 1967. The Africans without expressing any 
particular position decided to work together within the UN 
to assist Egypt to secure the withdrawal of the Israeli 
forces. 
This development brought the Africans nearer to Egypt and 
culminated in their lending support for the Security 
Council Resolution 242. From then onwards Arab arguments 
based on the need to respect the basic OAU principles and 
the growing African recognition of the implications of the 
violation of these principles on African security began to 
gain ground over those who argued the need to keep the 
Middle East conflict outside African politics. 94 The 
breakthrough in the Afr ican stand towards the Middle East 
began to occur at the 8th summit in Addis Ababa in 1971. At 
this summit the OAU not only decided to intervene directly 
in the dispute but also, departing from previous practice, 
called on Israel to withdraw from all the three Arab states 
and not just Egypt. 
The failure of the OAU mission created a situation where by 
Arab arguments began to undermine Israel's grip over Africa 
maintained through bi-lateral relations. Arab arguments 
that had previously gone unnoticed,began to make an impact. 
During the 1973 summit the Algerian speech calling on 
Africa to establish some harmony in its attitudes towards 
the Middle East and Southern Africa was particularly 
influencial in swaying African opinion. Africa was finallY 
behind the Arabs in full force. It was only in such an 
atmosphere that the OAU expressed its support for the 
"inalienable rights of the Palestinian people". 
This African slowness in expressing support for the 
Palestinian cause is also reflected in their voting 
behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly. As Table 
6.6 suggests, until as late as the 27th session the 
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Africans had been divided over the Palestinian question. At 
the 24th session they appeared to be evenly split between 
those who were prepared to support the Palestinian cause 
and those aligning with Israel. During the 27th session 
although a large minority prefered to take a intermediate 
stand the rest of the Africans moved towards a distinctly 
pro-Palestinian position. This growth in support for the 
Palestinian cause quickly reached a saturation point when 
at the following session all Africans included in the 
statistical analysis (except Lesotho) became highly pro-
Palestinian. 95 
TABLE 6.6: Distribution of African Support for 
the Palestinian cause 
Highly pro -Pals. 
Medium pro -Pals. 
Intermediate 
Medium pro -I sr. 
Highly pro-Isr. 
TOTAL* 
General Assembly Sessions 
24th 
1969 
(10) 34% 
(2 ) 7% 
(5) 17% 
(4 ) 14% 
(8 ) 28% 
29 
26th 
1971 
(6 ) 23% 
(6 ) 23% 
(8 ) 31% 
(4) 15% 
(2) 8% 
26 
27th 
1973 
(13) 52% 
(2) 8% 
(10) 40% 
25 
28th 
1973 
(24) 96% 
(1) 4% 
25 
(* Percentages and figures are based upon those 
countries meeting the minimum attendance levels.) 
These changes in African attitudes as reflected in their 
voting behaviour were also portrayed in the decisions of 
the OAU. During the emergency meeting in November 1973 
African support, as expressed in OAU decisions grew 
stronger. This time the OAU expressed support for the 
Palestinian people's struggle for self-determination 
against colonialism and racial discrimination rather than 
the weaker reference to 'inal ienable rights'. However, at 
large the decisions adopted by this meeting were dominated 
by expressions of African solidarity with the Arab states 
and their growing ｾｯｮ｣･ｲｮ＠ for Arab-African cooperation to 
meet the threats caused by Israel, South Africa, Rhodesia 
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and Portugal. 
It was at the OAO meeting in July 1975 in Kampala that 
unequivocal support for the Palestinian cause was finally 
expressed. At this meeting the OAO for the first time 
adopted a separate resolution on the question of Palestine. 
The resolution, having reasserted its recognition of the 
PLO as the sole and legal representatives of the 
Palestinian people, declared its support for the 
Palestinian people's "right to sovereignty over their 
territory" and "their right to establish their independent 
authority".96 These decisions were in many ways adjustments 
to the earlier developments at the 29th session of the 
General Assembly and the Non-Aligned decisions of March 
1975. The OAO resolution on Palestine basically formalised 
the position taken by African countries in forums outside 
the ｾａｏＮ＠
6.5.3 The Islamic Countries 
Islamic countries had demonstrated strong solidarity with 
the Arab countries in opposing the adoption of the ON 
partition resolution in 1947. However, this solidarity 
became quickly eroded when, within a year of Israel's 
admission to the UN, three Islamic countries recognised 
Israel and two exchanged diplomatic representatives. 97 The 
early Islamic solidarity experienced further setbacks as 
all newly independent African Muslim countries, excluding 
the North African ones, established diplomatic relations 
with Israel. 
This lack of unity amongst Islamic countries was well 
reflected in their voting behaviour at the Onited Nations 
General Assembly. As Table 6.7 depicts most African Islamic 
countries remained uncommitted to thorough support for the 
Palestinian cause. Four of the two African countries who 
were supportive of the Israeli position at the 24th Session 
also had their embassies situated in Jerusalem rather than 
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Tel Aviv. 
TABLE 6.7 Distribution of Islamic Support at the 24th 
session by ICO and sub-qroup membership 
Highly pro-Pals. 
Medium pro -Pals. 
Intermediate 
Med i urn pro -I sr. 
Highly pro-Isr. 
TOTAL* 
ICO 
10 
3 
2 
2 
17 
Non-Arab 
Africans 
4 
3 
2 
2 
11 
Non-Arab 
Asians 
6 
6 
(* Results are for those countries meeting the minimum 
attendance levels) 
As a result of the AI-Aqsa mosque fire in Jerusalem, 25 
countries met in Rabat in September 1969. The conference 
adopted resolutions supportive of the international status 
of Jerusalem and the political rights of the Palestinians 98 
and as a result of Algerian and Egyptian efforts admitted 
the PLO as an observer. However, a Libyan proposal calling 
on Islamic countries to break relations with Israel was not 
conclusive as Turkey, Iran and African participants 
objected to this initiative. Hence, Islamic support for the 
Palestinian cause stopped short of censuring Israel. 
The situation began to change from the early 1970s. The 
first Islamic summit had led to the establishment of an 
Islamic Conference Organisation in March 1971. This 
organisation gave Arab governments and the PLO the 
possibility of mobilising support for the Palestinian cause 
by raising Islamic consciousness and solidarity. Even 
though, in December 1970 in Karachi the Foreign Ministers 
of Islamic countries had expressed support for the 
restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, 
it was not until after the October war that the majority of 
Islamic countries became prepared to radicalise their 
stand. By then the Islamic group had reached a very high 
degree of cohesion in their attitudes towards the 
Palestinian problem. Their voting behaviour at the 29th 
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session of the General Assembly suggest that all Islamic 
countries included in the statistical analysis fell in the 
highly pro-Palestinian band of support. This strong unified 
pro-Palestinian stand at the UN was also reflected in the 
decisions of the second Islamic summit in February 1974 in 
Lahore. 
At this summit members supported the right to self-
determination for the Palestinian people and called for the 
severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, the 
recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people and the opening of PLO offices. 99 This 
summit, given that the PLO has participated in the 
following ICO meetings as a full member, also appears to 
have granted the PLO the status of full membership. At the 
following Ministerial Meeting in Jeddah in July 1975 the 
strength of ICO support for the Palestinian cause went as 
far a s ad 0 p tin gaP L 0 -S Y ria n pro po sal call i n g me m b e r s to 
work towards the expulsion of Israel from the UN. However, 
this decision appears not to have received the support of 
Turkey, Iran and some African countries. lOO 
6.5.4 Latin Americans 
The least forthcoming Third World group in lending support 
to the Palestinian cause was the Latin Americans. In many 
ways this is not surprising. The Latin Americans had played 
a very crucial and decisive role in the adoption of the 
'Partition Resolution' in 1947. They were also quick to 
follow the lead of the US in recognising Israel, without 
even waiting for her admission to the UN. IOI By the late 
1960s, with the exception of three Caribbean countries, all 
Latin American countries had exchanged diplomatic 
representatives with Israel. 102 Eleven of them actuallY 
maintained embassies in Jerusalem, making the Latin 
Americans supportive of Israel's claim to Jerusalem as its 
capital. 
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This very strong pro-Israeli position can also be seen in 
their behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly. The 
Latin Americans played a leading role in the politics of 
the Emergency Special Session of the Assembly convened 
after the 1967 war. They tabled a draft resolution l03 
which was perceived as strongly pro-Israeli, as it did not 
make negotiations conditional upon complete withdrawal. As 
Table 6.8 shows, at the 24th session of the Assembly they 
were still overwhelmingly pro-Israeli with only Cuba taking 
a pro -Palestinian posi tion. 
TABLE 6.8 Distribution of Latin American Support 
Highly pro -Pals. 
Med ium pro -Pals. 
Intermediate 
Medium pro-Isr. 
Highly pro-Isr. 
TOTAL* 
General Assembly Sessions 
24th 
1969 
(1 ) 5% 
(5) 26% 
(4 ) 22% 
(9) 47% 
19 
29th 
1974 
(7) 43% 
(3 ) 19% 
(3 ) 19% 
(3 ) 19% 
16 
35th 
1980 
(20) 87% 
(1) 4 % 
(2) 9% 
23 
(* Percentages and figures are based upon countries 
meeting minimum attendance levels) 
This situation continued until the 28th session when Latin 
American support began to increase in favour of the 
Palestinian cause. The overwhelming majority of Latin 
Americans that became supportive were also members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement reflecting the role played by the Non-
Aligned in this development. 104 Through the Non-Aligned 
Movement Latin Americans became increasingly exposed to the 
Palestinian question. The Non-Aligned Movement constituted 
the only regional Third World political grouping active on 
the Palestinian question that allowed Arab governments and 
the PLO access to the La t in Amer icans. The Group of 77 and 
the OPEC are two other Third World political groupings that 
allow a similar access but these groups primarily operate 
on economic issues hence they have not been included in 
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this study. 
Furthermore, 
which the 
the Latin Americans witnessed the process by 
Palestinian cause became absorbed by anti-
colonial thinking. The 
Palestinian struggle 
cognitive 
and other 
linkage 
national 
between the 
liberation 
struggles against colonialism and racism played a crucial 
role in changing Latin American perceptions. The Latin 
Americans particularly those associated with the Non-
Aligned, in their voting at the UN had developed an anti-
colonial tradition. This pattern progressively expanded to 
include all other Latin Americans. The successful 
integration of the Palestinian cause into anti-colonialism 
doubtlessly helped the process by which particularly Non-
Aligned Latin Americans came to support the Palestinian 
cause. 
It was not until the 35th Assembly session in 1980 that a 
pro-Palestinian position amongst the Latin Americans 
emerged. It is interesting to note that some of these Latin 
American countries were regular participants at Non-Aligned 
summits as observers. The dramatic changes in the attitudes 
of Ecuador, Bolivia and Uruguay may well be attributed to 
their steady exposure to Non-Aligned arguments on the 
Palestinian question. 105 This Non-Aligned influence is to 
some extent also supported by the fact that the only two 
Latin American countries that did not support the 
Palestinian cause and instead held a 'balanced' stand were 
the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, both of which had no 
relations with the Non-Aligned and continued to maintain 
their traditionally close relations with the US. 
However, it should be pointed out that in general this late 
Latin American support for the Palestinian cause has never 
reached the levels attained by other Third World groups. 
Latin American support on this issue has mostly remained 
declaratory. Only Cuba and Guyana have followed Non-Aligned 
recommendations and severed relations with Israel. 
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Similarly only eight out of thirty Latin American countries 
have allowed the PLO to open offices. Jamaica a Non-Aligned 
country even turned down an official request by the PLO in 
1978 to open an office. l06 In general the Latin Americans 
have not seen their support for the Palestinian cause as 
incompatible with maintaining relations with Israel. But 
undoubtedly, the Latin Americans constitute the group that 
experienced the most dramatic change in their support for 
the Palestinian cause. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In general substantial Third World support for the 
Palestinian cause was not mobilised in any significant way 
until the early 1970s. Not surprisingly the Islamic 
countries were the first Third World political group to 
commit themselves to the Palestinian cause. They were 
promptly followed by the Non-Aligned. The relatively easier 
Arab and PLO accessibility to the respective forums of 
these two groups enabled Arab and Palestinian delegates to 
pursue their diplomatic efforts. These efforts benefited 
from developments in the Middle East that created a 
conducive environment such as the Middle East wars, the Al-
Aqsa mosque fire, the failure of the OAU mission etc ••• 
Particularly, in the case of the Non-Aligned the successful 
Arab/Palestinian campaign to integrate the Palestinian 
problem into the anti-colonial dimension of the Non-Aligned 
ideology benefited the Palestinian cause. These 
developments combined with inputs from the Palestinian 
level in the form of growing Palestinian consciousness and 
support for the PLO also played an important role in 
bringing about a significant change in Non-Aligned 
atti tudes and support. 
On the other hand, at the African level member Arab 
governments found a much less recePtive audience as the OAU 
throughout the 1960s remained reluctant to get involved in 
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the Middle East conflict. It was only in the face of 
continuous Arab efforts that the Africans inched towards a 
more active role that culminated in the OAU mission. The 
failure of this mission eventually led the Africans to 
recognise Arab arguments. In the end for most of the 
African governments it was the October war itself that 
finally swung the Africans firmly into the Arab fold. Once 
the Africans had sided with the Arabs on the Middle East 
conflict they also became more receptive to Palestinian 
demands for support. In this case the conspicuous growth in 
Non-Aligned support for the Palestinian cause, coupled with 
the steady erosion of Israel's status in the eyes of the 
Africans eventually ensured near unanimous support for the 
Palestinian cause. 
The Latin Americans were the very last Third World 
grouping to come out in support of the Palestinian cause. 
The Latin Amer icans in general had maintained strong ties 
with Israel especially at the bi-lateral level. The Non-
Aligned Movement seems to have played a central role in 
eroding the influence of Israel on Latin American 
perceptions of the Palestinian problem. This was 
particularly evident amongst those Latin Americans 
assoc ia ted wi th the Non -AI igned Movemen t. It appear s tha t 
this occured as a result of a socialisation process that 
precipitated the need to bring in line Latin American 
perceptions of the Palestinian issue with the rest of the 
Non-Aligned. This was reflected in the way in which Non-
Aligned Latin Americans constituted the first group of 
Latin Amer icans to lend their support for the Palestinian 
cause at the UN. The remaining Latin Americans joined ranks 
with the rest gradually. Here the growth in support at the 
UN and the legitimisation of the PLO as the representatives 
of the Palestinians may have played a role too. This point, 
that is the influence of systemic support on regional 
support, will be taken UP later on. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE 
AMONGST THE NORTHERN TIER COUNTRIES 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the mobilisation process amongst 
those groups of countries that do not belong to the Third 
World. In the context of economics these countries are 
often referred to as the 'developed world', the 'North' or 
the 'first and second worlds'. On the other hand, in the 
context of Cold War strategic and ideological issues these 
same countries together with a number of Third World 
countries are frequently referred to as belonging to the 
'Eastern and Western blocs'. In the ensuing analysis the 
composition of the non-Third World or the North is assumed 
to bet he sam e as the UN ' E a s t ern E u r 0 p e' and ' We s t ern 
Europe and Others' geographical groupings. The 'Western 
Europe and Others' Group which at the UN includes Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand is expanded, for the purposes of 
this study, to include the United States, too. This revised 
'Western Europe and Others' Group will be referred to as 
the 'Western Group' for brevity. 
As in the previous chapter here too the focus will be on 
the responses, coming from the governments belonging to the 
above two regional groupings, to the various demands put 
forward by Arab governments and the PLO in an attempt to 
mobilise support for the Palestinian cause. However, unlike 
in the previous chapter the analysis can not simply rely on 
group behaviour. This is because these two regional 
groupings do not have formal regional political 
insti tu tions whose scope incl udes the Palest in ian problem 
and whose decisions reflect the unanimous position and 
attitudes of its members. The nearest thing approaching an 
institution with a formalised regional decision-making 
mechanism, which covers the Middle East too, is the 
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European Community. Through 'European Political 
Cooperation' the EC tries to adopt and follow a common 
foreign policy. However, as the analysis will reveal, even 
then the decisions and declarations adopted as a result of 
this cooperation have not always reflected the stand of 
every individual participant but rather a minimum 
acceptable compromise. 
The lack of institutionalised group decisions on which to 
focus the analysis has necessitated the study of political 
statements and declarations made individually by most of 
these governments. These statements and decisions, in 
particular the ones made during the United Nations General 
Assembly debates were studied for changes in content and 
emphasis. This analysis was then combined with a 
quantitative analysis of these countries voting behaviour 
in the UN General Assembly. The index of political support 
constructed from the voting analysis was found to be 
particularly useful in identifying sub-groupings. However, 
this index of political support needs a word of caution. As 
a result of the nature of the content of the General 
Assembly resolutions the index is not refined enough to 
capture on its own the changing attitudes, particularly of 
the EC countries, in relation to the rest of the Assembly. 
Hence, the results emerging from these countries voting 
behaviour at the UN need to be carefully related to the 
political statements and actions made within and outside 
the UN. 
Before proceeding to the analysis of mobilisation of 
support for the Palestinian cause amongst the East and 
Western European Groups it might be useful to bear in mind 
a number of differences that separate these two groups from 
the Third World regional and political groupings in respect 
to the Palestinian problem. 
Firstly, some countries from both groups have had deeply 
entrenched historical interests in the politics and 
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economics of the Middle East in away no Third World country 
has had. This interest and involvement in the area has, in 
complex ways, influenced both the emergence of the 
Palestinian problem itself as well as attitudes held in 
these countries towards this problem. France and Britain as 
Mandate powers between the two World Wars and as countries 
with economic interests were closely involved in the 
politics of the region. After the Second World war these 
two countries were to some degree replaced by the US and 
the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1950s a multitude of 
factors ranging from domestic political to strategic 
considerations often involving matters of prestige and 
status have influenced the policies of these two 
countries towards the Palestinian problem as well as the 
actual problem itself. 
Secondly, a great number of the countries belonging to 
these two groups, as a result of their membership of the 
United Nations have been exposed to the Palestinian problem 
from its early days. At a time when an overwhelming 
majority of Asian-African countries were still colonies, 
these countries were participants to the General Assembly 
deba tes and roll-calls concer ning the Palestinian problem 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It was during this 
period that despite the Arab delegations protests these 
countries played a central role in the process that 
converted the Palestinian problem from a political one to a 
problem of resettling refugees. Hence countries from both 
groups carried on their perception of the Palestinian 
Que s t ion a s are f u gee pro b 1 em and the i rim age 0 f 
Palestinians as refugees well into the late 1960s. 
Thirdly, as a result of the Cold War the countries of the 
North have been split into two ideologically opposing 
groupings. This 
equivalent one 
sus t a in ed ide 0 log i cal d i vis ion, who s e 
can not find in the Third World, has 
limited the emergence of the kinds of interactions between 
the two groups that could have benefitted the Palestinian 
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cause. However, as the analysis below will suggest this has 
not necessarilly led to the development of two completely 
separate approaches to the Palestinian problem. Instead the 
attitudes of some of the countries of the Western group 
have over lapped wi th those in Easter n Europe. This is 
partly a result of the lack of unity within the Western 
group. 
In this context, the attitude of the Western group can be 
better characterised by a set of attitudes held by sub-
groups such as the Southern European countries, the Nordic 
countries, the EC and another group including the US, 
Canada and Australia. The differences in attitudes between 
these Western sub-groups are reflected to some extent in 
their voting behaviour but more sharply in their political 
statements and their relations with the PLO. In contrast 
the East Europeans have manifested a much more unified 
behaviour, particularly in respect to their voting 
behaviour at the United Nations. However, it should be 
noted that this strong cohesive voting behaviour has not 
always reproduced itself in the political statements and 
declarations eminating from individual East European 
countries. This was particularly evident in the earlier 
stages of the mobilisation process. 
7.2 Conducive Environment 
This part of the mobilisation process model looks at a 
number of structural changes and key events that have 
brought about an environment receptive to the aggregation 
of support for the Palestinian cause amongst the East and 
Western European countries. 
7.2.1 Structural Changes 
At this level of analysis there has been few significant 
structural changes that have occurred with particular 
consequences to the mobilisation of support for the 
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Palestinian cause. Unlike most of the Third World, after 
the Second World War, countr ies from the East and Western 
blocs developed extensive structures of communications and 
cooperation at both bi-lateral and multi-lateral levels. 
However, the concern and domain of these structures of 
communications and decision making mechanisms, particularly 
in the form of regional organisations, have been mostly 
centred around two sets of issues. 
The first set of issues have covered matters relating to 
the m a in ten a n ceo f the mil ita r y -p 01 i tic a 1 s tat u s -q u 0 
between the East and Western European groups. These matters 
have been dealt at the multi-lateral level by the 
respective organisations of the two military alliances. The 
second set of issues have encompassed matters of economic 
growth and economic integration. The regional organisations 
dealing with these issues have mostly concerned themselves 
with policies directed towards the promotion of greater 
economic growth and trade between member countries. 
Other than matters of developmental aid the agendas of 
these multi-lateral forums have not been receptive to items 
reflecting Third World demands for major changes in the 
international economic order nor to demands of political 
support for the resolution of a wide range of political and 
colonial problems of high salience to the Third World. It 
was only in the context of the United Nations General 
Assembly and then only since the early 1960s that both the 
East and Western Bloc countries became involved in these 
issues in any significant way. Until than the Western 
dominance of the General Assembly had prevented Third World 
attempts to introduce issues of concern to them to the 
agendas of the UN. 
7.2.1.1 European Political Cooperation 
It is against this background that the emergence of EPC and 
the Euro-Arab dialogue may be seen as important structural 
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developments that brought about a conducive environment in 
respect to the Palestinian problem. EPC emerged from the 
adoption of the 'Luxembourg Report' in October 1970, as an 
inter-governmental arrangement to consult and coordinate 
efforts on foreign policy matters. l Such matters had been 
deliberately left outside the scope of the Rome Treaty 
establishing the European Community. Hence, until EPC 
started Community countries were left to pursue their 
individual courses of action on foreign policy matters 
particularly in areas that fell outside the scope of the 
issues mentioned above. 
However, with EPC a new dimension was introduced to foreign 
policy making amongst EC countries. These countries began 
to work towards developing common approaches to a wide 
range of extra-EC political problems confronting them. The 
consequence of this has been that members have acquired the 
possibility to influence each other's attitudes and the 
decision making process. Furthermore, smaller and less 
active countries have been absorbed into this attitude 
formation and decison-making process on issues that 
otherwise would have not been on their agendas. This has 
forced such countries to confront these issues and take 
position on them often highly influenced by the 
socialisation process inherent in such group decision 
mak ing -processes. 
The consequences of EPC have been particularly stark in 
respect of the Palestinian Question. Countries such as 
France, Britain and Italy with a relatively more pro-Arab 
inclination since the 1967 war have left their mark by 
leading the formulation of a common EC stand much more 
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. France has played a 
central role in trying to counter balance US pressure for 
an Atlanticist position much less favourable to the 
Palestinian cause. EPC has also led pro-Israeli countries 
such as Denmark and Holland to become exposed to the 
Palestinian problem during EPC deliberations and adjust 
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their attitudes to the prevailing EC position. 2 
Furthermore, the particular way in which the EPC works, 
with its rotating chairmanship, and its demands for active 
involvement have forced countries, such as Ireland, with 
little interest in the Middle East to become involved. 3 The 
efficacy of this political socialisation process in 
bringing about attitudanal changes favourable to the 
Palestinian problem can probably be best substantiated by 
Israel's belligerence towards EPC. 4 The entry of Greece to 
the Common Market has also had its own impact on EC 
attitudes towards the Palestinian problem. As an already 
committed ally of the Palestinian cause and with her close 
PLO ties, Greece injected greater urgency to the ongoing 
debate on the definition of the political rights of the 
Palestinians and the status of the PLO. 
Overall the significance of EPC arises from the fact that 
it has become a forum whose agenda has included the 
Palestinian problem. Hence it has opened the possibility of 
debates and discussion on the Palestinian Question to take 
place, exposing participants to views which have come to 
condition their perceptions of the Palestinian problem and 
their attitudes towards the Palestinian cause. EPC has also 
become a tangible multilateral decision-making forum to 
which Palestinians and Arabs have tried to gain access 
directly or through the Euro-Arab dialogue. 
7.2.1.2 The Euro-Arab dialogue 
The in i t i a t ion 0 f the E u r 0 -A r a b d i a log u e can a 1 sob e see n 
as a significant development that has contributed towards a 
conducive environment for the mobilisation of European 
support. This dialogue, which can be seen as "a 
manifestation of the EPC machinery at work", originated from 
the European Community Summit in Copenhagen in December 
1973 attended by four Arab Foreign Ministers. 5 However, as 
a result of various complications encountered during the 
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establishment of the institutions of the dialogue, it was 
not until June 1975 that the Euro-Arab dialogue finally got 
underway. 
The Arabs, just as in the case of Africa, had been wanting 
to get Europe involved in the Middle East problem. Since 
the 1967 war, this view was held in the belief that once 
involved Europe would develop an approach independent from 
the pro-Israeli position of the US. 6 It was the 1973 war 
that brought about certain changes that increased the 
salience of the Middle East to the Europeans. The Arab oil 
embargo and the ensuing oil price increase quickly 
precipitated changes in the structures of the pre-1973 
political and economic relations between Europe and the 
Arab world. The demonstrative effect of the ability of Arab 
governments to control oil supplies and the significant 
increase in their purchasing power forced many European 
governments and the EC to change their position on the 
weight of the Middle East in their foreign policies. 
I tis in t his c 1 i mat e t hat the E u r 0 -A r a b d i a log u e was 
launched. Inspite of its vague terms of reference 
reflecting a compromise between a European desire to limit 
the dialogue to commercial matters and Arab governments 
insistence for a broader scope, the dialogue did provide a 
setting within which the Europeans came to face the 
Palestinian problem. This was, for example, well 
highlighted by the crisis that the composition of the Arab 
delegation precipitated. Arab governments insistence on 
including a separate PLO representation in the delegation 
created an embarrassing problem of diplomatic recognition 
for the EC. It was after lengthy consultations led by the 
Irish chairman that a solution acceptable to all was 
reached.7 Accordingly future meetings would be attended by 
a European and an Arab delegation rather than separate and 
individual country delegations. 
This problem right from the onset forced the EC to confront 
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the Palestinian problem and form opinions in respect to the 
rights of the Palestinians and the status of the PLO, a 
matter until then largely ignored. This particular problem 
also shows the influence that the dialogue can have on the 
perceptions of smaller EC members. On the European side, 
the problem of Palestinian representation had been handled 
by the Irish premier Kennedy. Until then the Middle East 
had not been a primary concern for his country's foreign 
policy. Yet, the Irish Premier, in his capacity as the 
chairman of the EC members found himself exposed to the 
Palestinian problem as he struggled to find a solution to 
the representation problem. The experience undoubtedly 
influenced the Irish government's perception of the 
Palestinian problem. 
Hence, the Euro-Arab dialogue and the far reaching 
structural changes in the nature of the relationships 
between Europe and the Arab world from which this dialogue 
emerged was another significant factor contributing towards 
a conducive environment for the mobilisation of support for 
the Palestinian cause. 8 
7.2.2 Key Events 
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, as the 
attrocities committed against the Jews in Axis-occupied 
Europe became fully known, feelings of shame and guilt 
amongst Europeans became particularly strong. As a result 
of these feelings combined with the misery suffered by 
Jewish displaced persons in European refugee camps, an 
environment germane to Zionist efforts to gain support for 
the establishment of a Jewish homeland emerged. The impact 
of the Holocaust and the sufferings of the Jewish displaced 
persons on the political process which culminated in the 
eventual establishment of Israel as a safe homeland for 
Jews have been studied and noted earlier on. 9 It is 
possible to identify a series of key events that, in a 
similar way to the Holocaust, have contributed towards the 
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emergence of an environment receptive to Arab and 
Palestinian demands, even though clearly none of these 
events were comparable to the Holocaust. 
7.2.2.1 Arab Israeli wars 
The most dramatic of all the key events were the 1967 and 
1973 Arab-Israeli wars. The 1967 war did not produce a 
direct response towards the Palestinian issue either in 
Eastern or Western Europe, but overall it did bring both 
sides much closer to the Arabs. As a result of the 1967 war 
the Soviet Union and the East Europeans broke relations 
wit hIs rae 1 and t h r e w the i r dip 10m a tic and po 1 i tic a 1 
support behind the Arab side. Yet, this did not immediately 
cUlminate in a climate receptive to Palestinian demands. 
The first signs of a significant increase in East European 
receptiveness to such demands did not emerge until the 
period immediately preceding the 1973 war. 
Firstly, the eviction of the Soviets from Egypt in July 
1972 with the PLO's growing political ascendancy in the 
area increased the interest of the Soviet Union in the 
Palestinian problem. lO Secondly, a number of East European 
countries made themselves conspicuously more accessible to 
the visits of PLO delegations and became supportive of the 
Palestinian cause. Hence, the October war came as an event 
that accelerated and deepened East European move nearer to 
the Palestinian cause. One direct consequence of the 1973 
war was to force the Soviets to take a lead in attempts to 
find a negotiated solution to the Palestinian problem by 
putting forward the idea of a 'mini-state' at the Geneva 
Conference in December 1973.11 
The 1967 war had less of a direct impact on Western 
European attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
only perceptible and significant change came from France. 
PreviOusly a strong ally of Israel, France under De 
Gaulle's leadership moved much closer to the Arabs as the 
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French government began 
military and political 
to withdraw its traditional 
support for Israel. 12 The 
significance of this move becomes clearer as France became 
one of the first leading members of the EC to advocate an 
approach more sympathetic to Palestinian demands. However, 
indirectly the 1967 war did prepare the basis for important 
perceptual changes in for the rest of Western Europe. 
Firstly, as a result of the decisive Israeli victory in the 
1967 war Israel ceased to be the 'underdog' surrounded by 
bell igerent and numer ica11y super ior Arab countr ies. 
Secondly, in the face of this victory, Israel's reluctance 
to show magnanimity and compromise for achieving a 
reasonable settlement undermined European perceptions of 
Israel as 'one of us' ready to share the spirit of 
compromise that had come to characterise European politics 
in the post Second World War era. 
The impact of these two factors on West European thinking 
is quite evident from the importance they came to attach to 
Resolution 242 and the efforts of Jar,ring to mediate in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. At the European Community level this 
was reflected in the adoption of the Schumann Report by the 
European Ministers on May 1971 which clearly stated the 
unacceptabi1ity of Israel's continued occupation of Arab 
territories and any changes to the status of these 
territories. 13 Probably the significance of the change in 
the cognitive environment of European decision-makers 
brought about by the 1967 war and the failure of the post-
war diplomacy is best demonstrated by the hostility the 
Schumann Report received in Israel. Nevertheless, it was 
not until after the 1973 war that a environment more 
conducive to the mobilisation of European support 
specifically for the Palestinian cause emerged. 
Although France, later joined bv Britain, had been arguing 
for the need to develop a common approach to the Middle 
East conflict it was the 1973 war that eventually jolted 
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the EC into action. The war together with Arab oil 
production cuts generated a degree of urgency which led to 
the adoption of a common approach to the Middle East whose 
content put the EC on a platform much more receptive to 
Arab and Palestinian demands than in previous times. 
As it can be seen' these two Arab-Israeli wars had a kind of 
cumulative impact on the emergence of a conducive 
environment. First, in Eastern Europe and to a much lesser 
extent in the West the 1967 war produced an atmosphere more 
receptive to Arab demands. And then the 1973 war built on 
this by duplicating the process this time in respect to the 
Palestinian problem. There were a number of other events, 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s in the Middle East 
that further improved the conduciveness of the environment 
within which Arab and Palestinian efforts towards the 
mobilisation of support had already made some progress. 
7.2.2.2 Other key events 
One such event was the formation of the Likud government in 
June 1977 under the leadership of Begin. Begin's personal 
past confrontations and conflict with various European 
governments and his expansionist approach towards the 
occupied territories contributed to an increase in Europe's 
receptiveness to Palestinian demands and arguments. 14 This 
greater receptiveness is reflected in the EC's growing 
preparedness to respond to Palestinian efforts to mobilise 
support for a 'mini-state'. It was with the coming to power 
of Begin that the EC began to debate what form the 
expression of the political rights of the Palestinians 
should take. The re-election of Begin in June 1981 and his 
commitment to Eretz IsraelIS made the EC even more 
sceptical about Israel's goodwill. This brought Europe 
closer to the Palestinians as evidenced in an increase of 
semi-official contacts between the PLO and the EC. 
The signing of the Camp David agreements in March 1979 was 
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another event that brought the EC closer to the Palestinian 
cause. The consensus amongst the members of the EC was that 
these agreements were a positive development albeit a 
partial one. 16 These agreements it was believed would not 
be complete until the views of the Palestinians were taken 
into consideration. The Autonomy plan was seen as 
inadequate and the extremely narrow Israeli interpretation 
of the meaning of autonomy was criticised. These points 
were reflected in the 26 March 1979 Paris Declaration which 
expressed the need to include P.alestinian representatives 
in negotiations and the right of the Palestinians to a 
homeland. 17 
Furthermore, the aftermath of Israel's 1978 military 
operation in Southern Lebanon, with its damaging 
consequences for Palestinians, and the continued policy of 
expanding Jewish settlements, together with a conspicuous 
reluctance to maintain meaningful talks, created an 
environment within which the urgency and relevance of 
Palestinian arguments and demands became very strong. It is 
against this background that the mObilisation process that 
culminated in the lauching of the 1980 Venice Declaration 
with its reference to "the right of Palestinian people to 
self-determination" and to "the need to associate the PLO 
with a comprehensive ｳ･ｾｴｬ･ｭ･ｮｴＢ＠ became possible. 
The early events mentioned above led to the opening of a 
European debate on the Arab-Israel conflict followed by 
others that eventually paved the way for the recognition of 
the Palestinian dimension of this conflict. By the late 
1970s these events had led the EC into an environment in 
which they had come to support the political rights of the 
Palestinians and the role of the PLO in a comprehensive 
settlement. However, the definition of the political rights 
of the Palestinians never went as far as a clear EC 
announcement in favour of the establishment of a 'state'. 
Similarly, the EC remained openly reluctant to recognise 
the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. It 
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was a series of events in the 1980s which began to push a 
growing number of EC members towards a more radical stand. 
The Israeli annexation of Jerusalem in June 1980 and the 
Golan Heights in December 1981 were two such events. These 
events threw serious doubts on the possibilities of 
achieving a comprehensive settlement based on Israeli 
withdrawal from all occupied territories and the resolution 
of the Palestinian problem. Israel appeared extremely 
intransigent and the credibility of its willingness to 
achieve a negotiated peace suffered. But probably the event 
that shook European governments and public the most was the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
The invasion, the seige of Beirut and the Sabra Chatila 
massacres kept the Palestinian problem for many months on 
the formal and public agendas of European countries. The 
Palestinian problem regained particular urgency and 
salience for the EC. This urgency was reflected in the 
European support given to a French-Egyptian initiative at 
the Security Council in June 1982 and in the EC Foreign 
Ministers Declaration in September 1982.18 The public on 
the other hand was engulfed with outrage and felt that 
"more urgently then ever, a homeland in Palestine is what 
they (Palestinians) need.,,19 
The 'conducive environment' as constituted by the above 
structural changes and events is dynamic as well as 
cumulative in nature and interacts with other parts of the 
mobilisation process. This can be observed quite clearly 
from the way the EC responded to each set of events. The 
1973 war and the structural changes associated with it 
created an environment which gave the Arabs a greater say 
and led to the recognition of the 'legitimate rights' of 
the Palestinians. The following set of events each in turn 
put the EC and other Europeans into environments 
characterised by growing receptiveness to Arab and 
Palestinian efforts. The importance of these events ar ise 
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from the way they affected the general perceptions which 
became a part of the environmental structure within which 
foreign policy decision makers operate. 
The Euro-Arab dialogue and particularly the events of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s enabled the PLO to gain direct 
access to a wide range of governments. Similarly these 
events also opened up the possibility of certain 
legitimising linkages to develop between certain set of 
values of high standing and the situation in the Middle 
East. Israeli policies and acts in the occupied territories 
in relation to in'ternational law became increasingly 
difficult to ignore. Also these events made it possible to 
evaluate the plight and suffering of the Palestinian people 
under Israeli occupation in relation to principles of 
justice and human rights. This enabled the Palestinians to 
argue the legitimacy of their case and gain support for 
their case. Undoubtedly the growth in support of the PLO 
and the Palestinian case in other different parts of the 
world dio also contribute towards a greater conducive 
environment for change to occur amongst the Northern 
countries. 
7.3 Cognitive and Other Linkages 
In the introductory chapter it was pointed out that the 
cognitive linkage between the solution of the problem of 
Jewish displaced persons in Europe and the establishment of 
a Jewish state had played an important role in mobilising 
support for the Zionist cause. Similarly, in chapter five 
the role of widely legitimised principles central to the 
Third World thinking about state-to-state relations, (such 
as 'respect for territorial integrity' and the 
'inadmissability of the acquistion of territory by force'), 
together with the integration of the Palestinian cause into 
anti-colonialism, in mobilising support for the 
Palestinians was noted. It is difficult to find one or two 
common cognitive linkages that have influenced Northern 
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perceptions of the Palestinian issue. Instead there are a 
diverse set of linkages that appear to have influenced 
individual governments or small groups of governments in 
different ways. 
7.3.1 Anti-colonialism and Anti-imperialism 
These two concepts have played a crucial role in mobilising 
support amongst East European and, to a lesser extent, some 
Western countries. The East European countries have had a 
long record of involvement in the politics of 
decolonisation, particularly at the UN. The nature of 
Marxist ideology, which plays a certain role in East 
European foreign-pol icy-making, encourages support for 
anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. Hence, those 
situations that became perceived as anti-colonial and anti-
imperialist struggles have usually received the political 
support of East European governments. In East European 
governmental circles the territorial gains of Israel 
resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
conspicuous US support for Israel generated sympathy for 
Arab allegations of the 'imperialistic and expansionist 
nature of Israel'. 
The struggle waged by the Palestinians against Israel 
became to be seen as one against imperialism, a legitimate 
national liberation struggle worthy of political support. 
This was expressed quite clearly in a Warsaw Pact 
resolution of November 26, 1969 that spoke of the "anti-
imperialist national liberation struggle of the Arab people 
of Palestine" and a similar position received Soviet 
support in December 1969. 20 This position of the East 
Europeans is amply supported by their strong anti-
colonialist and pro-Palestinian voting. 
For at least some East European countries it might also be 
possible to include the resurgence of anti-semitism as a 
factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is evident in the 
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way in which the "Arab-Israeli wars of June 1967 pushed the 
Jewish problem into the forefront of Czechoslovak and 
Polish political life".2l The identification of Jewish 
communities with the Israeli victory put them into conflict 
with the governments of these two countries and their 
communist parties which had joined ranks with the Soviet 
Union in condemning Israel as the aggresor. 
This conflict contributed to the view held by some 
governmental circles which attributed the political unrest 
of 1968 in both Poland and Czechoslovakia to an 
'imperialist, revisionist and Zionist plot,.22 This frame 
of mind which attributed some of the domestic political 
problems to the 'disloyalty of Jewish communities and to 
Zionism' facilitated the assessment of the situation in the 
Middle East in a manner favourable to the Arabs. The Arabs 
became to be seen as the victims of 'Israeli imperialism 
and Zionism'. 
There are a number of Western countries for whom anti-
colonialism too played a certain role in moulding their 
attitude towards the Palestinian problem. These were some 
of the Scandinavian countries, Greece, Spain, Malta and 
Turkey. They tended to come from the fringes of European 
politics, in the sense they were not involved in the 
politics of the EC and lacked a political tradition as a 
colonial power. Since the early 1960s they have pursued 
foreign policies supportive of the rights to self-
determination and of colonial peoples to struggle for 
independence. This is to a limited extent evident in their 
voting behaviour at the UN, which suggests a relatively 
anti-colonial position particularly in relation to the 
other countries in the Western European group. 
Some of these countries have come to perceive similarities 
between the Palestinian situation and struggles for 
independence. A growing relationship between a strong anti-
co16nial voting and support for the Palestinian cause may 
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well be indicative of this cognitive linkage. However, the 
results of this statistical analysis must be handled with 
caution. Unlike in the case of the Third World there is a 
lack of systematic evidence in the form of common 
declarations that unequivocally supports such a cognitive 
linkage. 
Spa in, Ma 1 ta, Gr eece and Tur key ar e one group of such 
countries. Turkey's perception of the Palestinian struggle 
and its similarities to other anti-colonial struggles may 
well have been influenced by the debates and the decisions 
of the Islamic group. In a similar way Malta is a member of 
the Non-Aligned movement which has endorsed and supported 
the Palestinian cause as an anti-colonial cause. Spain has 
traditionally held very close and friendly ties with the 
Arab world. It has had a long record of policies in support 
of Arab and African decolonisation. Hence, it has been more 
open to Arab and Palestinian arguments. Similarly Greece 
too has maintained strong ties with the Arab world. In 
strong expressions of solidarity with the Arabs, they voted 
against the Partition Plan in 1947 and were strongly 
critical of the Suez intervention. Greece's perception of 
the Palestinian problem is also influenced by the 
similarities it draws between the occupation of Palestine 
and Cyprus. This is further strengthened by strong feelings 
of anti-Americanism. 23 
To the above countries one add Sweden, Finland and to a 
lesser extent Ireland. They have exhibited a voting 
behaviour which somewhat suggest similar levels of support 
for anti-colonialism and the Palestinian cause. Although 
all Scandinavian countries have been supportive of anti-
colonialism in their voting behaviour it is only Sweden and 
Finland that have voted in a manner that suggests the 
possibility of a cognitive linkage between anti-colonialism 
and the leg i tim isa tion of the Palestin ian cause. The 
different behaviour of the other Scandinavian countries on 
the Palestinian issue may well be induced by their 
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involvement in the politics of NATO and the EC. This may 
have restrained them from developing a cohesive Nordic 
approach towards the Palestinian issue complementing their 
approach to colonial matters. 
Ireland's colonial background and its experience of 
partition has made it much more sensitive to Third World 
struggles for self-determination and the problems of 
dispossed peoples. 24 Irish support for Egypt during the 
Suez crisis and for the Algerian liberation struggle 25 can 
be seen as early manifestations of this anti-colonial stand 
favouring the Arab world. 26 Undoubtedly the same feelings 
may have played a role in the conspicuous growth of Irish 
support for the Palestinian cause ,during the 1970s. 
For·the rest of the Western group the role of a cognitive 
linkage between anti-colonialism and the Palestinian cause 
in mobilising support for the political rights of the 
Palestinians appears to be weak. This is because countries 
falling into this group have voted in four separate ways on 
both issues. There are those countries such as Britain, 
France and Austria who have tended to be relatively more 
supportive of the Palestinian cause than of anti-
colonialism. At the opposite end of the spectrum are those 
Scandinavian countries that are strongly supportive of 
ant i -c 0 1 0 n i ali s m but not 0 f the Pal est in ian c a use. The US 
is the only country that has corne to vote strongly, pro-
Israeli and pro-colonial particularly since the 29th 
session of the General Assembly. Finally, there are those 
countries, mostly EC members, that have voted neither 
against nor in support of either issue. 
7.3.2 Linkages derived from legal principles 
Countries belonging to the Western group have a strong 
tradition in international law and in the promotion of it. 
A number of international legal principles such as the 
'inadmisability of the acquistion of territory by force', 
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'respect for the territorial integrity of states' and 
particularly those principles that make up human rights law 
have come to influence European perceptions of the Arab-
Israeli conflict and Israeli practices. Since the 1967 war 
Western attitudes influenced by these principles 
increasingly benefitted the Palestinian cause. 
During the period prior to the 1967 war one of the major 
base of previous European support for Israel, such as 
during the Suez war and Nasser's blockade of the straits of 
Tiran, had been based on arguments derived from the need to 
respect the existing international order governing 
navigation through international waterways.27 However, 
with the 1967 war the primacy of legal principles that 
favoured Israel became quickly eroded. Pr inciples such as 
'respect for the territorial integrity of states' had 
become generally accepted in the Third World and were 
expressed in the decisions of the Bandung Conference, the 
Non-Aligned meetings and the DAU Charter. Although these 
principles originated from the Third World, it was partly 
in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict that they 
became legal norms also recognised by the Europeans. In an 
increasingly anti-colonial world these principles came to 
undermine and replace the old 'right to sovereignty by 
conquest' . 
It is in the light of these developments that the 
significance of the unanimous European support for 
Resolution 242 should be seen. Since the adoption of this 
resolution the West and particularly the EC has regularly 
reiterated the necessity for Israel to withdraw from the 
occupied territories and the need for all countries in the 
area to respect each others sovereignty. Many Arab 
governments readiness to accept Resolution 242 compared to 
Israel's reluctance to respect these principles by not 
showing any genuine interest to withdraw from the occupied 
territories weakened the earlier support that Israel had 
enjoyed. More importantly these measures created doubts in 
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the minds of Europeans as to whether Israel genuinely meant 
to achieve lasting peace through negotiations. Hence, the 
continued violation of the above principles led Europe to 
question its support for Israel and become more open to 
Ar ab argumen ts. 
The increasingly substantiated Israeli violation of human 
rights in the occupied territories too appears to have 
played a role in changing European attitudes towards the 
Palestinian problem. Israel in the 1950s and 1960s had 
gained the admiration of large sections of the European 
public as well as governments. This admiration in general 
was based on the image that Israel projected of an 
egalitarian and socialist society. Israel was perceived as 
a bastion of democracy in the midst of a repressive Middle 
East, dominated by Nasserism and feudal monarchies. 
However, Israeli governmental and military policies in the 
occupied territories gradually eroded this image. The 
arbitrary nature of the behaviour of Israeli authorities 
became increasingly difficult to accept. Groups inside 
Israel and in Western Europe began to express growing 
concern about the violation of various aspects of the 
Geneva Conventions and the systematic undermining of the 
principle of 'rule of law' so central to Western political-
legal thinking. 28 This gradually eroded Israel's legitimacy 
in the occupied territories and enabled the West to 
sympathise with the plight of the Palestinians, their 
frustration and at times their use of violence towards the 
authorities. 
Furthermore, similarities, however superficial, have been 
drawn between Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation 
and resistance to the German occupa tion dur ing the Second 
World War. Particularly, in the eyes of East Europeans, the 
French, the Spanish and the Greeks the violence perpetrated 
. . ｾｾＦＶｴｨ＠by the Palest in ians in the occupied ter r 1 tor lesL e 
natural outcome of foreign occupation. The people involved 
in this violence were referred to as 'resistance fighters' 
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or 'partisans' rather than terrorists. 29 This at least in 
the eyes of these governments signified an increase in the 
perceived status of Palestinian guerrilla fighters. The 
overall affect of this process, more importantly, was its 
contribution to a change in the perception of the 
Palestinian problem from being merely a refugee problem to 
a problem of a people resisting occupation in a struggle to 
achieve self-determination. 
7.3.3 Bargain Linkages 
The conspicuous change in the European approach towards the 
Arab-Israeli conflict has often been attributed to Arab oil 
power and to the dictations of European economic interests 
in the area. 30 On its face value, the announcement of the 
first joint EC Declaration of November 6 1973, in the 
immediate aftermath of Arab oil production cuts and 
embargos, may appear to lend some credit to such an 
argument. This declaration reflected a number of 
significant changes in the EC approach to the Arab-Israeli 
problem. Firstly, it was the first time that the EC was 
taking a common approach towards the Middle East and 
expressing the need to take an active role in search of a 
comprehensive settlement. Secondly and most importantly for 
the first time the EC referred to the 'legitimate rights of 
the Palestinians'. Thirdly, it suggested the need of 
Israeli-Arab negotiations to take place within a UN 
framework, a position strongly opposed by Israel. 
Fourthly, this declaration stressed the ties between 
Western Europe and the Eastern Mediterrenean, and expressed 
interest in developing these ties, paving the way to the 
Euro-Arab dialogue. 
To attr ibute this declaration, which received the welcome 
of the November 1973 Arab summit in Algiers and the very 
strong disapproval of Israe1 31 , to a straight forward 
bargain linkage between Arab governments and the EC whereby 
Europe was guaranteed oil and access to Arab markets in 
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return for EC support for the Palestinian cause would be an 
oversimplification of a complex relationship between the EC 
and the Arab world. The oil crisis demonstrated 
"in a dramatic way the connection between economic and 
politics questions in international relations. For 
Western Europe, the energy problem is economic in one 
sense, but it is also political in that the needed 
petroleum ﾧｾｳｯｵｲ｣･ｳ＠ are largely under Arab 
sovereignty". 
It would be difficult for the EC to maintain stable and 
healthy commercial relations with the Middle East without 
taking account of the political concerns of the actors in 
the area. 
The EC, with the adoption of the Schumann Report on May 
1971, had already recognised some of the concerns of the 
Arab countries by calling for the withdrawal of Israel 
from the occupied territories. Furthermore, most EC 
countries including traditionally pro-Israeli ones were 
moving towards recognising the political rights of the 
Palestinian people before the adoption of the November 
1973 Brussels Declaration. The Netherlands, ironically the 
primary target of the oil embargo in Europe, had 
acknowledged the political dimension of the Palestinian 
problem as early as November 1970. 33 Belgium too had 
followed a similar pattern of behaviour and by October 1972 
it was expressing its concern for the future of the 
Palestinian people. 34 Both France and Britain, principal 
archi tects of the Brussels Declaration, had supported the 
'rights and legitimate aspirations' of the Palestinians in 
a draft Secur i ty Council resolution in the summer of 
1973. 35 French Minister of State, J.Lipkowski in Kuwait in 
April 1972 noted that 
"France would not recognise any solution that does not 
recognise the human and political rights which will 
establish the ･ｸｩｾＶ･ｮ｣･＠ of the rights of the 
Palestinians people." 
Furthermore, in this declaration the EC stopped well short 
of Arab and Palestinian demands. The recognition of the 
Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
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legitimate rights of the Palestinians did not meet 
Palestinian demands for a Palestinian state. It took almost 
a decade for most European countries to begin to support 
unambiguously the right of Palestinian people to self 
determination. And this was only as a result of a dynamic 
process, rather than solely a bargain linkage. A process 
which took Europeans through various stages of the 
definition of the 'legitimate rights of the Palestinians'. 
In the matter of the diplomatic recognition of the PLO too, 
the EC remained reluctant to meet Arab demands and at no 
point has the EC waivered from its position of support for 
the Israeli state. All support that the EC has given to 
Palestinian political rights have always been conditional 
on the recognition of Israel's existence. In many ways the 
Europeans have skillfully exploited the significance that 
Arab governments and Palestinians have attached to European 
support in trying to moderate the PLO and some Arab 
governments. The moderating influence that the mobilisation 
process has had on the PLO will be taken up in the 
concluding chapter. 
However, probably the most authoritative statement 
undermining the credibility of an argument attributing 
European support for the Palestinian cause purely to 
economic considerations came from an old ally of Israel. 
Germanv's Foreign Minister Genscher, in an explanation of 
his government's support for the principle of Palestinian 
self-determination, noted that a settlement of the problem 
was of vital concern to Europe "even if the Arab ｳｾ｡ｴ･ｳ＠
exported nothing but water".37 Hence the role of economic 
considerations leading to bargain linkages should be seen 
in conjuction to the other cognitive factors that have 
influenced European perceptions of the Palestinian problem 
and their attitudes towards its resolution. All in all, 
this bargain linkage precipitated a process of closer 
dialogue between the Arabs and Europe which, despite early 
reluctance, put the Palestinian problem firmly on the 
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agenda of the EC. 38 
7.3.4 Linkages to domestic politics 
Western states are not monolithic actors in world politics. 
Many groups contribute towards the foreign policy making 
process in these countries. In the case of foreign policy 
making on the Middle East, some of them such as those 
representing the interest of oil companies and certain 
sections of the industry may be keen to promote bargain 
linkages in an effort to secure good relations with Arab 
governments. On the other hand other pressure groups such 
as human rights groups, or trade unions will rely on 
cognitive linkages. In their attempt to persuade a 
government they will use arguments legitimising the 
Palestinian cause by establishing linkages between the 
Palestinian problem and various highly prestigious 
principles central to political thinking in the West. 
Similarly, there will be a variety ｯｾ＠ groups arguing the 
case of Israel, such as Jewish groups or socialist groups 
that identify with the dominant ideology in the Israeli 
political system. The aggregate impact of these pressure 
groups, together with governmental factors, such as 
organisational and bureaucratic politics, and environmental 
factors, such as regional and international commitments and 
demands, will determine a governments foreign policy on the 
issue. However, there are situations when domestic politics 
surrounding pressure group feature so heavily in a 
governments foreign policy behaviour that it becomes 
possible to talk about clear linkages between domestic and 
foreign policies of a country on the issue. 
Linkage politics, as noted in chapter three, was a term 
introduced to conceptualise the relationship between the 
domestic political environment of a state and its 
international environment. Literature that was precipitated 
by Rosenau's work has mostly concentrated on linkages 
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eminating from the international environment to the 
domestic environment or on linkages between domestic 
political systems. 39 
"The idea of linkages as a way of organising data may 
be extended to include links in the opposite 
direction, from within state systems to their 
environment. Much less attention has been paid to this 
aspect of the concept. If the international arena is 
conceived of in systemic terms ... then sub-systemic 
out put sc 0 u 1 d be see n in t e r m s 0 f the i rim pac t e i the r 
on state systems or on a variety of behavioural 
systems."40 
The impact that the Jewish community in the US has on US 
foreign policy making and the international system can be 
seen as one such linkage. Since the early 1940s the Jewish 
community and the Zionist lobby in Congress has had a 
significant say in US policy making towards the Middle 
East. The existence of the Jewish lobby has become a 
s t r u c t u r a 1 f eat u reo f the US do me s tic po 1 i tic a 1 s y s t em. It 
operates through a process of domestic bargain linkages 
which often generate inputs for the international political 
system. Although this linkage was to some extent weakened 
during and in the aftermath of the Suez war it has gained 
increasing strength since the 1967 war. It has featured 
prominently in presidential election campaigns, in 
Congressional poli tics over var ious aspects of the Middle 
East issue and in the gover nmen t' s foreign pol icy dec ision 
making on the Palestinian problem. 
However, this linkage especially since 1967 can also be 
likened to Roseanu's 'penetrative linkages'. Such linkages, 
according to Roseanu, consist in processes whereby actors 
from outside one state participates directly in the 
politics of that country.4l Israel, it can be said, through 
the intermediaries of an active Jewish community and a 
Zionist lobby in Congress is able to bring about such 
linkages and influence US governmental policy. This is well 
demonstrated, for example, by the way in which Carter's 
peace plan, announced in March 1977, evoking the idea of a 
'homeland' for the Palestinians had to go through a number 
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of revisions as a result of Jewish-Israeli intervention. 
Similarly, the US delegation at the UN too faced the 
consequences of such linkages. A.Young after an 
unauthorised meeting in July 1979 with the PLO 
representative at the UN was forced to resign as a result 
of mounting Jewish pressure. In a later incident after the 
US delegation cast an affirmative vote in favour of a 
Security Council draft resolution strongly critical of 
Israel settlement policies, President Carter "as a result 
of protest from Israel and her supporters announced that 
the vote had been a mistake". 42 Never theless, in spi te of 
Israel's direct and indirect influence on the formation of 
US perception and attitudes towards the Palestinian problem 
it would be erroneous to attribute US foreign policy in the 
Middle East solely to this factor. 
Before examining the role of strategic linkages in attitude 
formation toward the Middle East, the role of European 
socialist and labour parties in providing greater 
accessibility for Israeli views and a basis for favourable 
cognitive linkages with these views needs to be mentioned. 
In the 1950s and 1960s Israel in the eyes of the Socialist 
International, an international non-governmental 
organisation composed of the many socialist and labour 
parties of Europe, held a special status. The moral impact 
of the Nazi atrocities on the European socialist movement 
together with the fact that 
"Young Israel was seen by European socialists as a 
realization of the socialist dream: a state based on 
social democratic principles and led by a social 
democratic movement, fullfilling the principles of 
freedom, justice and equality" ensured this status.,,43 
This status enabled the often Labour led Israeli government 
to enjoy the support and solidarity of the Socialist 
International on the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout this 
period. However, this favourable image became gradually 
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eroded as the membership of the Socialist International 
began to include groups from the Third World and anti-
colonialism became absorbed in its ideology.44 This 
culminated in the Socalist International revising its 
perception of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
7.3.5 Strategic linkages 
Traditional theory in international relations makes power 
and power maximisation central determinants of state 
behaviour. Accordingly US and Soviet foreign policy 
behaviour in the Middle East would be explained in terms of 
this region's place in th.e overall global security 
considerations of both countries. The US would be expected 
to follow a foreign policy towards the Middle East whose 
pr imary concern would be to check Soviet expansionism, to 
protect vital oil fields and to maintain the strategic 
global status-quo. Such a foreign policy would take the 
form of strengthening local allies of the US and improving 
US capabilities to project military power to the area to 
meet any direct or indirect Soviet threat. The Soviet Union 
too would be expected to behave no differently. Its primary 
concern would be to try to expand its base of influence in 
an attempt to undermine the US position in the area. All 
this would be done in the name of maximising a super 
power's national interest, defined in terms of power • 
• 
. 
Undoubtedly such global strategic/security considerations 
do enter the minds of foreign policy makers on the Middle 
East particularly those from the US and the Soviet Union. 
Both the Global Poli tics approach and the Realists would 
breakdown such strategic consideration into three possible 
constitutent parts 
i) prestige/status, 
i i) economic, 
iii) military/security considerations. 
For the Realists prestige will be seen as a reflection of a 
countries 'power' usually associated with its military 
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capabilities. On the other hand, for the Global Politics 
approach an actor's prestige can also be derived from 
sources other than military capabilities, as in the status 
given to the Pope. In this light the first consideration 
can be seen as an attempt on the part of the foreign policy 
makers to maintain a high status and prestige in the eyes 
of their allies in the area. This is often done by aiming 
to generate some degree of cognitive congruence over 
priority problems of the area and the means to resolve 
them. The US promotes the threat of Soviet expansionism and 
communism as the major problem of high salience. This 
determines her foreign policy options. It helps the US to 
justify its strong support for Israel, to mobilise support 
from moderate governments in the area and to promote a 
piecemeal approach to the solution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. However, although this is a position advocated by 
Israel it is not one that is shared by Arab governments. 
The lack of congruence over the Soviet threat to the Middle 
East was illustrated by Qatar's Information Minister when 
he accused the US of "trying to sell us the idea of danger 
in Afghanistan but I think Jerusalem is nearer than 
Kabul.,,45 
In a similar way the Soviet Union too aims at achieving 
firm relations with allies, through the instrument of a 
policy having cognitive congruence with those in the region 
by depicting Israel and the US as major threats to the 
area. 46 It has projected the struggle against the US and 
Israel as an anti-imperialist and anti-Western one and has 
sought to gain the allegiance of what it perceives to be 
progressive forces, which" since the early 1970s have come 
to include the PLO. 47 The Palestinian issue has steadily 
gained greater centrality and has become the major problem 
with high salience for whose solution the Soviets have 
supported a comprhensive settlement. The high level of 
activity that has surrounded the Soviet government's desire 
to be involved in such a settlement can be attributed to 
prestige considerations. As Golan notes, 
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" •.• the Soviets have used their stances on the 
Palestinian issue to enhance Moscow's position in the 
Arab world and increasingly to counter u.s. inroads, 
Successes, or potential successes in the Middle 
East".48 
The role of economic considerations in the Middle East is 
probably more central to US foreign policy making than the 
Soviet Union's. Ii is a consideration that needs to be seen 
in relation to the earlier one. As important as the 
prestige element of checking a Soviet threat is the need to 
protect the economic resources of the area and ensure the 
accessibility of the local market to US goods and capital. 
At the strategic level this is felt in the belief that the 
loss of the area to the Soviets would endanger the 
continuity of the Western way of life. However, the foreign 
policy options emerging as a result of economic 
considerations conflict with the ones from the earlier 
considerations. These options dictate the need to give 
greater importance to the concerns of those -governments 
with economic leverage resulting from their control over 
oil supplies. The slow and painful way in which the 
Palestinian dimension of the Middle East problem has 
acquired greater attention in US foreign policy could be 
attributed to this conflict. 
US military strategic considerations in the area are 
complex and at times conflicting. The credibility of the US 
argument of impending Soviet threat is attempted to be 
maintained by an active US involvement in the defence of 
the area. This is done in two ways: firstly by maintaining 
a US military presence, particularly a naval one in the 
area and secondly by equiping the national defence forces 
of moderate friendlY regimes. However, the latter one is 
seriouslY undermined by the politics surrounding US 
commitments to Israel. This in turn weakens US credibility 
and goodwill in the eves of moderate Arab governments. 
Furthermore, these military considerations condition U.S. 
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attitudes towards the PLO. The PLOws strong ties with the 
Soviet Union and Syria coupled with the real and proclaimed 
threat the PLO constitutes towards Israel, culminates in US 
reluctance to recognise and maintain relations with the 
PLO. This close Soviet connection too conditions the US 
stance against the idea of a Palestinian state as it "fears 
that such a Palestine state would become the Cuba of the 
Middle East".49 
The Middle East historically for reasons of geographic 
proximity and military exposure has featured heavily in 
Soviet security considerations too. 50 The Soviet Union has 
perceived Western and US presence in the area a threat to 
her security. In the late 1950s and through the 1960s 
ideological linkages had ensured the Soviets a string of 
allies in the Middle East. These ideological affinities and 
anti-Westernism had played an important role in the Soviet 
stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, it was the 
loss of Egypt in 1972 in this context that to some degree 
increased the sal ience of the Palestinian problem and the 
PLO. The PLO became an important means of maintaining some 
influence in Arab politics. 
Yet, inspite of the advantages of having the PLO as an ally 
the Soviet Union has been surprisingly cautious in its 
military and political support. It was only in the 1980s 
that the Soviets began to talk about a Palestinian state 
and granted the PLO full diplomatic status. In a sense the 
PLO and the Palestinian issue was seen more from a 
political point of view rather than a military one. It is 
doubtful whether the Soviet government considered the PLO 
as a serious military ally. This is well reflected in their 
reluctance to give military assistance to the PLO in an 
overt and consistent manner. 5l 
A set of different linkages played a certain role in the 
way Northern countries approached the Palestinian problem. 
The cognitive linkages contributed towards the 
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legitimisation of the Palestinian cause and provided the 
justification for lending support for the rights of the 
Palestinians. For the Europeans bargain linkages increased 
the ｳｾｬｩ･ｮ｣･＠ of the area and its problems that make the 
area unstable. In the case of the US domestic linkage 
politics and strategic considerations have conditioned its 
perception of the Palestinian problem. It has made the US 
less accessible and less responsive to the efforts of the 
Arabs and Palestinians to mobilise support. 
7.4 Accessiblity 
This section looks at the role of accessiblity to the 
agendas and decision makers in East and Western Europe in 
the mobilisation process. In 1947 the ability of Zionists 
to reach and address themselves to Western governments in a 
very effective way played a crucial role in mobilising 
support for the establishment of a Jewish state. In 
contrast this ability was conspicuously absent in Arab 
counter efforts. This lack of Arab accessibility compared 
to the Zionist one in Britain is aptly recalled by Lord 
Mayhem, 
"Compared with the Zionists, they (the Arabs) were 
separated by the totally different culture, and 
procedure and politics of their countries and ours. If 
they did make somekind of a submission in writing, it 
would be wrongly worded the arguments would be wrong, 
it would be sent to the wrong person. Whereas, 
of course the Zionist lobby was right in among British 
politics and there were Zionists so close to the 
cabinet that there had been instances where cabinet 
ministers actually telephoned the results ｯｦＵｾ＠ cabinet 
meeting straight to the Zionists concerned". 
As the below matrix depicts, the Palestinian issue reached 
the European agendas in a number of ways. In the period 
between the 1967 and 1973 wars some Arab governments tried 
to push the Palestinian issue on the European agendas. 
Neither the East nor the West responded to it in any 
particularly favourable way. It was only in the aftermath 
of the 1973 war that the PLO began to gain access to 
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Eastern followed by Western governments. Violence both at 
the local and international levels played a certain role 
too in raising the Palestinian issue on public as well as 
formal agendas. Violence at the local level amongst East 
European and some Western countries came to be seen as a 
legitimate struggle against occupation and the reprisals 
: Non-violent : Violent I I 
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Table 7.1: Access Routes to European Agendas 
precipitated by it led to condemnations. But it was the 
hijackings of aircraft belonging to Western airlines that 
brought the Palestinian issue on Western public and formal 
agendas in a spectacular way. 
7.4.1 Nonviolent access routes 
7.4.1.1 The European Community 
After the 1967 war Europeans remained outside the politics 
of the Middle East. Mostly they confined themselves to 
supporting US and Security Council efforts to find a 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was only with the 
gradual development of EPC that the EC countries began to 
show some interest in developing a common approach towards 
the Middle East. The development of the first signs of a 
common approach was influenced by the pro-Arab disposition 
of France and the growing contacts with the Arab world, 
particularly since the change in Egypt's traditional anti-
Weste r n stance. One tang ible resul t of these developmen ts 
was a European Ministerial agreement achieved over the 
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Schumann report. Although the report did take up the Arab 
cause the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict remained unrecognised. 
It was only after the October war that the Arabs gained 
significant access to the European political system. The 
Brussels Declaration of November 1973 brought the EC 
significantly closer to the Arab world and precipated the 
setting up of the Euro-Arab dialogue. This dialogue 
significantly increased Arab accessibility to the European 
scene. Once an Arab demand to include the PLO in the 
dialogue as a separate independent participant was 
resolved, the PLO was able to participate as a member of a 
unified Arab delegation allowing the Palestinians to have 
contacts with high ranking officials and politicians in 
Rome, Brussels, Bonn, Paris and other European capitals. 53 
This opened the possibility for the Palestinians to take up 
their problems directly with their European counterparts. 
Following the substantial increase in the PLO status in 
world politics in 1973 and 1974 more direct contacts 
between the West and the PLO gradually developed. Most of 
the early contacts were of an informal kind. In late 1974 
in an atmosphere generated by Arafat's appearance at the UN 
General Assembly and the adoption of resolutions supportive 
of the Palestinian cause numerous Western politicians, in 
particular from Britain and West Germany, met with 
Arafat. 54 During the same period France went further and 
was the first EC country to have direct official contacts 
with the PLO. In October 1974 the French Foreign Minister 
met Arafat in Beirut and promised support for the PLO in 
return for moderation in the PLOts policies. 55 This 
encounter undoubtedly influenced France's voting behaviour 
at the UN and led Giscard D'Estaing to note that 
"The key to the problem is the understanding that 
there can be no durable peace in the Middle East if 
there is no just settlement of the Palestine question. 
Once the international community has recognised the 
existence of a Palestinian people, what is the natural 
aspiration of this people? It is to have a 
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homeland".56 
Unlike her French partner Britain throughout the 1970s 
maintained the position of not having contacts at or above 
the ministerial level. Its contacts were limited to the 
ones taking place between the PLO and the British embassy 
in Beirut. 57 A slight change occured in this policy as an 
EC consensus supportive of an eventual inclusion of the PLO 
in a negotiation process emerged. As a consequence of the 
Venice Declaration the EC in an attempt to moderate the PLO 
and prepare the way towards a comprehensive settlement, 
dispatched Gaston Thorn in August 1980 and then Van der 
Klaauw in April 1981 to the Middle East. Both EC leaders 
met and had discuss ions with Y.Arafa t. 
The minor change in Britain's policy towards contacts with 
the PLO came between these two visits. In early 1981 Sir 
J.Graham, Deputy Permanent Under Secretary, went to Beirut 
to meet Arafat. The purpose of the meeting was to maintain 
the momentum in EC efforts and also pave the way to Lord 
Carrington's expected 
presidency of the EC 
meeting with 
in the second 
A r a fat d uri ng his 
half of the year. 
However, as a result of Lord Carrington's resignation over 
the Falkland's crisis this encounter never materialised. 
His succesor F.Pym, although he expressed support for a 
Palestinian state as one possible way of fullfilling the 
Palestinian right to self-determination,58 never showed 
Lord Carrington's disposition to meet Arafat or other PLO 
officials. 59 In a reversal of policy in late 1982 the 
British government made itself even less accessible to the 
PLO when it refused to meet Arab League delegation led by 
the PLO during their tour of permanent members of the 
Sec uri t y Co u n c i 1. 60 S inc e t h en B r ita in has m a i n t a in ed its 
policy from the 1970s and has kept its contacts with the 
PLO at a low level with only one meeting at a ministerial 
level that took place in April 1983 in Tunis between 
Mr.Hurd, Minister of State and F.Kaddoumi. 6l 
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7.4.1.2 Other Europeans 
The PLO gained access to Europe outside the EC more 
readily. Particularly, through F.Kaddoumi, Head of the 
Political Department of the PLO, regular contacts were 
developed with Finland, Sweden, Austria, Portugal, Spain, 
Malta, Greece and Turkey. As a result of these contacts the 
PLO opened offices in all of these countries. With the 
exception of the Scandinavian countr ies and Portugal, the 
PLO was recognised as the sole representative of the 
Palestinians and its representatives were granted 
diplomatic status. This gave the PLO a significant 
political advantage considering that some of these 
countries maintained no or low key relations with Israel. 
Furthermore, Kaddoumi's good relations with Kreisky, the 
Austrian Chancellor, was of particular 
gaining the support of the Socialist 
significance in 
International. 62 
Similarly, Kreisky appears to have helped to maintain an 
'indirect dialogue' between the PLO and the US in the late 
1970s. 63 
7.4.1.3 The United States 
The most inaccessible government for the PLO has been the 
US. This government has consistently maintained the 
position of not having any relations with the PLO as long 
as the latter does not recognise Israel. This has been 
formally expressed in a gentelman's agreement reached 
between Kissinger and the Israeli government at the time of 
the signing of the Sinai disengagment agreement on 1 
September 1975. Nevertheless, in spite of this 
uncompromising public position the US has had some 
unofficial contacts with the PLO. 
The first contacts between the US and the PLO were 
developed by Senators. Senator McGovern, Chairman of the 
Middle East Subcommittee of the US Senate Committee on 
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Foreign Affairs met Arafat in April 1975 and envisaged the 
possibility of an eventual independent Palestinian state. 
The following year Senator Stevenson held talks with Arafat 
in February 1976. He came back with ｯｾｳ･ｲｶ｡ｴｩｯｮｳ＠ of alleged 
moderation in Arafat's position towards the solution of the 
pro b 1 em. 64 The s e vis its may well h a ve con t rib ute d to 
certain perceptual changes that partially precipitated a 
sudden upsurge of unofficial contacts between US officials 
and the PLO. 
As early as June 1976, prior to a Security Council vote on 
a resolution calling for a Palestinian entity, US officials 
held talks with F.Kaddoumi. 65 Although at first denied by 
Kissinger, these contacts should be seen in the light of 
Saunders, (the Assistant Secrectary of State for the Near 
East and South Asian affairs) recognition of the centrality 
of the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
as well as the publication of a report prepared by the 
Brookings Institution which noted the need to recognise the 
Palestinian right to self-determination and the need for 
credible Palestinian representatives. 66 This report 
influenced the Carter administration's policy towards the 
Palestinian problem too. Hence a further series of 
unofficial contacts took place including a meeting between 
Carter and a PLO representative during a UN reception in 
March 1977. 67 To these contacts one can also add the visits 
of various US senators and congressmen to Beirut. 68 
These contacts may well have been caused by the 
disagreement between the US and Israel when the US 
expressed preparedness to accept the FLO as the 
representative of at least a substantial proportion but not 
the exclusive representative of the Palestinians. 69 Another 
source of disagreement was the administration's assessment 
that "without the PLO cooperation, it would be difficult 
perhaps impossible to solve the problems of the region".70 
In 1978 these contacts included meetings between Arafat and 
various Congressmen as well as Saunders' visit to the 
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Middle East. 7l Congressman P.Findley, on his return from 
direct talks with Arafat in November 25, 1978 claimed that 
Arafat was prepared to recognise Israel in return for a 
Palestinian state and called the September 28 Saunders' 
statement that the US could establish direct contacts with 
the PLO if it recognised and accepted both Resolution 242 
and Israel existence to be put into ･ｦｦ･ｾｴＮＷＲ＠
The following year these semi-official contacts received 
particular publicity when in August it was revealed that 
A.Young, the head of the US delegation to the UN, had held 
a private meeting with the PLO ｲ･ｰｲ･ｾ･ｮｴ｡ｴｩｶ･Ｎ＠ The incident 
eventually led to A.Young's to resignation to demonstrate 
US commiment to the promise made to Israel in September 
1975.73 Although the public position of A.Young and the US 
administration was that the discussions were confined to 
p'rocedural matters concerning a Security Council meeting, 
Young's efforts were directed more towards finding "a 
common ground for an Arab-American resolution supporting 
both Israeli security and Palestinian rights". 74 
In spite of this public rebuke given to the idea of having 
contacts with the PLO, the Young affair was seen as being 
beneficial by Arafat. He alleged that the incident made the 
American community, particularly the blacks more aware of 
the Palestinian problem. 75 Hence even though the PLO lacked 
direct and formal access to the US government the 
Palestinian problem found its way to the formal and 
particularly public agendas of the US. And as Campell has 
noted it was lIat or near the top of the Carter . 
administration I s foreign policy agenda II. 76 
7.4.1.4 The Soviet Union 
The PLO gainen direct access to the Soviet government at a 
surprisingly slow rate. The Soviets throughout the 1960s 
had treated the ｐ｡ｬ･ｳｴｩｾｩ｡ｮｳ＠ as refugees77 and had favoured 
a negotiated political solution to the Arab-Israeli 
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conflict. This position had even led the Soviet Union to be 
critical of early military activities of Palestinian 
groups.78 Arafat's first contact with the Soviets came in 
July 1968 when he accompanied Nasser to Moscow. This first 
contact does not appear to have inspired any particular 
Soviet support or change of policy in favour of Arafat and 
the Palestinian resistance movement. This Soviet attitude 
was strongly reflected in their refusal to support 
Palestinian guerrilla groups' demands for international 
legal status at the International Red Cross in Istanbul in 
September 1969.79 
The second Arafat visit occurred at a period when Soviet 
attitudes towards the Palestinian problem were going 
through a gradual change as reflected in Kosygin's 
reference in December 1969 to the struggle of the 
Palestinians as a just national liberation and anti-
imperialist struggle worthy of support.80 As the new head 
of the PLO Arafat and his delegation visited Moscow at the 
'unofficial' invitation of the Soviet Committee of 
Solidarity with Asian and African countries. 81 A similar 
PLO delegation visited Hoscow again in October 1971. 
Although both visits received wide coverage in the Arab 
world and were seen as a sign of growing international 
recognition they did not bring about any particular change 
in Soviet behaviour towards the Middle East-other than the 
change reflected in Kosygin's remark and permission for 
'unofficial ' contacts. 
A fourth visit occurred in July 1972 soon after Nasser's 
death at a time when Egypt had started to weaken its ties 
with the Soviet Union. A change in Soviet attitude was 
reflected in her readiness to express support for 'the 
legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine' and 
promised military aid to the PLO. 82 Even though the PLO 
admitted to having differences on various issues with the 
USSR83 it was after this particular visit that the 
Palestinian issue began to take a concrete form on Soviet 
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public and formal agendas. Arafat went to the Soviet Onion 
in late November 1973 where he was for the last time 
received on an 'unofficial' basis. During this meeting the 
Soviets appear to have tried to put pressure on Arafat to 
participate in the Geneva Conference and accept the idea of 
'mini state' and at the same time promised its support for 
the Palestinians and described the PLO as lithe only 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people". 84 
However, this position did not culminate in a Soviet 
official recognition of the PLO as the sole representative 
of the Palestinian people., A status conferred on the PLO by 
the Non-Aligned and the Arab League earlier in the year. 
The move towards the establishment of official ties came in 
Harch 1974 when Grornyko "extended to Arafat the latter's 
first official invitation to the Soviet Union from the 
Soviet government. 1I8S Arafat's visit was preceded by wide 
media coverage of the international recognition received by 
the PLO. Arafat and his delegation arrived in Moscow in 
August 1974 and were met by Boris Ponomarev, a politburo 
member and Head of the CPSU International Department. At 
the end of the visit the Soviet's recognised that the PLO 
had been widely recognised as 'the sole legitimate 
representative of the Arab people of Palestine' and agreed 
to allow the PLO to open an office in Moscow. 86 
Although Arafat, on his way back from attending the General 
Assembly in 1974, met with Gromyko and the Soviet premier 
Kosygin, implying a further increase in the status of the 
contacts, a formal Soviet recognition of the PLO as the 
'sole representative of the Palestinian people' however, 
did not come until November 1978.87 Until then the Soviet 
Union behaviour and policy suggested a 'de facto' 
recognition of the PL088 particularly strengthened by 
Brezhnev's reference to the PLO as the 'head' of the 
Palestinian people's struggle during his meeting with 
Arafat in March 1978.89 Nevertheless, even this degree of 
accessibility to the Soviet Union carried importance for 
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the PLO particularly in relation to the us. 
The American awareness that this PLO accessibility to the 
Soviets worked in both ways and that it could enable the 
Soviets to exert influence in favour of a political 
settlement appears to have made the US more flexible. This 
is reflected in the TJS-USSR statement of 1 October 1977. 
The statement called for a comprehensive settlement 
"incorporating all parties concerned and all questions" 
such as "the resolution of the Palestinian Question 
including the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" 
and "for ensuring the participation in its (Geneva 
Conference) work of the representatives of all parties 
involved in the conflict including those of the Palestinian 
people. ,,90 
It was in October 1981 that from the PLO's point of view 
the major breakthrough carne about when the PLO was granted 
full diplomatic status at the end of Arafat's state visit 
to the Soviet Union. Arafat recognised this when he said, 
"I consider this visit the most important visit I have 
ever made to the Soviet Union. What happened in Moscow 
is the main event of the year for the Palestinian 
people ... The recognition of our office in Moscow as a 
fully fledged diplomatic mission is a message 
addressed to the whole world by the other superpower -
I am not saying the first or second. This means that 
the Palestinian people have fully asserted their 
･ｸｩｳｴｾｲ｣･＠ and cause on the political and international 
map. " 
The Soviet Union may have had its own considerations for 
this particular move 92 but the significance of this outcome 
lies in the fact that the PLO had gained formal and direct 
access to an influencial actor in the politics of the area. 
7.4.1.4 Eastern Europe 
The East Europeans, with the exception of Romania, broke 
diplomatic relations with Israel after the June war of 
1967. This was none as an expression of solidarity with the 
246 
Arab countries. This, however, did not immediately change 
the East European treatment of the Palestinian Question as 
a refugee problem. In an attempt to change this, the PLO 
from the early 1970s tried to gain access to East Europe. 
The responses of the East Europeans were varien. 
The first contacts were of an 'unofficial' nature mostly 
between East European trade unions and various groups from 
the Palestine resistance movement. Bulgarians and 
especially East Germans appear to have played a leading 
role in expanding these contacts with Palestinian 
representatives during 1972. 93 By early 1973 these 
'unofficial contacts' began to turn into visits that 
included Arafat too. One such visit occured in February 
1973 when a PLO delegation visited both Bulgaria and East 
Germany.94 In Bulgaria the visit received some official 
character when Arafat was met by the Secretary General of 
the Bulgarian Communist Party.95 
The first official Arafat visit to East Germany, on the 
other hand, came in July 1973.96 The way for this visit was 
prepared by an East German delegation that came to have 
talks with Arafat. 97 The consequence of this first visit to 
East Germany is significant in a number of ways. The visit 
and the Palestinian problem received wide media coverage 
putting the Palestinian cause on the public agenda. 
Secondly, Arafat was received by Honecker with whom he 
signed an agreement which allowed the PLO to open its first 
office in East Europe. 98 This recognition granted to the 
PLO is particularly significant considering that the PLO 
had not yet been recognised by the Arab League as the 'sole 
representative of the Palestinian people'. 
In marked contrast to its accessibility to Bulgaria and 
East Germany the PLO could not develop any meaningful 
contacts with the other East Europeans until after the 1973 
war. The first breakthrough for the PLO came with Romania, 
when Romania agreed to allow the opening of an PLO 
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office.99 This cievelopment had particular significance as 
Rumania less than two years before had received Golda Meir 
of Israel and during the visit there had been no reference 
tothe rights of the Palestinians. lOO The significance of 
this development was further highlighted when before 
Arafat's visit to the UN, the Romanian Foreign Minister's 
visit to Israel was concluded without the announcement of a 
joint communique as a result of deep differences between 
the two countries over the Palestinian problem. lOl 
In the case of other East Europeans the first official 
contacts occured in June 1974 when all East European 
ambassadors in Damascus had talks with Arafat. 102 These 
talks may have provided the basis for the preliminary 
arrangements that culminated in a major PLO tour of Eastern 
Europe in August-September 1974, as a part of a major PLO 
world wide campaign to mobilise support for the Palestinian 
position at the coming 29th General Assembly session. 103 
The East Europeans did lend their full support for all the 
resolutions supporting the Palestinian cause including 
their right to national independence and sovereignty. 
However, how far one can attribute this to the PLOt s 
campaign is much more difficult to establish. Nevertheless, 
these developments did pave the way to the eventual 
establishment of .official relations wi th the PLO. The PLO 
was allowed to open an office in Hungary in September 1974 
followed by the ones in Czechoslovakia and Poland in May 
1975 and March 1976, respectively. 
The increase in status and frequency of PLO contacts with 
Eastern Europe strongly coincides with a growth in East 
European support for the Palestinian cause. However, how 
much of this can be directly attributed to the PLOt s 
accessibility to the East Europeans governments is very 
difficult to say. The early unofficial contacts between 
Palestinian representatives and Bulgarian/East German trade 
unions must have played a certain role in the formation of 
a public opinion about the Palestinian problem followed by 
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the eventual introduction of the problem to the attention 
of the government. However, to these informal Palestinian 
contacts one must also add the role of Arab governments 
with strong ties, such as Syria and Iraq in raising the 
problem with East European countries. It may not be a 
coincidence .that early breakthrough's in East European 
governmental support for the Palestinian cause have tended 
to be announced during official talks between these 
countries. I04 
Yet, probably the most difficult factor to assess is the 
role of the Soviet Union in this process. The peculiar 
relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
that is widely claimed to allow the Soviets a great say in 
these countries foreign policies, has led to assertions 
that East European attitudes towards the Palestinian 
Question are more or less a direct result of Soviet 
directives. IDS Such assertions are the product of implicit 
ideological and/or theoretical dispositions which are 
methodologically difficult to establish or for that matter 
refute. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to test the 
validity of such assertions. Suffice it to say no doubt the 
Soviet Union, just as the United States, has a capability 
to mobilise greater resources in aggregating support for 
its positions. This may have played a certain role in 
determining East European attitudes and decisions on these 
issues. However, it would be wrong to assume that this flow 
of influence is one way at all times and that the Soviet 
decision making process is a closed system completely 
insensitive to inputs from its environment. It becomes 
rather difficult to substantiate such an assumption 
considering that, as it emerges from the discussions above, 
most East European governments have been systematically a 
head of the Soviet Union, particularly in their recognising 
the PLO as 'the sole representative of the Palestinian 
people'. The world of politics is much more complex and 
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warrants a model less simplistic than one that is based on 
conception of hard shelled monolithic states deriving their 
influence solely relying on 'power'. 
7.4.2 Violence as an access route 
Both local and international violence played a role in 
bringing the Palestinian problem to the attention of 
Europeans. Early Palestinian resistance acts had received 
｣ｲｩｴｩ｣ｩｾｭ＠ from the Soviet Union. However, from the late 
1960s onwaras the Soviet Union joined ranks with some East 
Europeans in lending public support for the resistance 
activities of Palestinian guerrillas. As Golan notes, 
"A decided stamp of approval was gi ven when the 
Soviets began to use the word 'partisans' in 
connection with these operations, explaining that the 
Palestinian actions were legitimate acts of self-
defence similar to the resistance movements in Nazi-
occupied territories during World War Two. ,,106 
The East Germans and Bulgarians too referred to Palestinian 
guerrila operations as 'partisan acts,107 and the East 
German Foreign Minister in November 1972 affirmed "the 
legality of the struggle of the Palestinian resistance 
movement, which is aimed at the reestablishment of the 
rights of which the Arab people of Palestine have been 
deprived".108 The Hungarians appear to have been less keen 
to share the views of their neighbours. At least on one 
occasion strong criticism was expressed.109 The Czechs on 
the other hand seem to have steered a middle course as 
reflected in a Czech daily, 
"Although it is sometimes impossible to agree with all 
methods used by some parts of the Palestinian 
resistance movement, nobody can deny the Palestinians 
the right to struggle for their really vital 
demands. nllO 
Overall, local violence in the form of Palestinian 
guerrilla operations and Israeli reprisals appears to have 
brought the Palestinian issue to the public agenda and in 
the case of most East European countries, through the 
cognitive linkages based on the legitimacy to resist 
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against occupation the Palestinian struggle, gained 
political support. 
In the case of Western Europeans, in particular the EC 
countries and the US, it was the hijacking of international 
airliners in the late 1960s and early 1970s that brought 
the Palestinian problem to the attention of the public and 
governments. The nature of the events that involved Western 
airliners ensured wide media coverage. Although these acts 
were met in general with public condemnation it did also 
bring the motives behind these actions to the public. The 
fact that these hijacking involved air-planes and 
passengers from the West created an atmosphere of crisis 
for the involved governments. The grievances expressed by 
the hijackers became items on the very top of the formal 
agendas, at least for the duration of the crisis. The 
problem of hijackings actually precipitated a Security 
Council meeting in September 1970 called by the US and 
Britain. lll 
The problem of hijackings had already been taken up by the 
General Assembly in 1969 at the urging of the IFALPA. 112 
Consequently, in the early 1970s a series of meetings 
occurred in attempts to control and prevent such 
occurences. 113 As Mortimer notes, 
"Just as de Gaulle with his infuriating and absurd 
obstinacy managed to keep France on the political map 
of the world during the Nazi occupation, so the PLO 
resistance groups with all their terrorism and 
posturing have kept Palestine on the map - indeed have 
put it back there after a period when its existence 
even as a geographical eXfaession had virtually lapsed 
outside· the Arab world."l 
Local violence did not effect Western Europe in a major way 
until the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions of Lebanon. Both· 
invasions were seen as unjustifiable and disproportinate 
retaliations to isolated acts of terrorism leading to 
unnecessary and unacceptable levels of human sufferings. 
The 1982 invasion of Lebanon brought the Palestinian 
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problem, particularly during the seige of Beirut and the 
massacres in refugee camps, to the attention of the public 
in a very effective way to the extent of even awakening the 
unquestioning Jewish US public. llS In Western Europe the 
invasion was taken up formally by governments as well as 
the EC and the European Parliament. The European Council in 
June 1982 adopted a lenghty declaration that condemned the 
Israeli invasion and stressed the linkage between 'Israel's 
long term security' and the need to satisfy 'the legitimate 
aspirations of the Palestinian people', which must be able 
'to exercise its right to self-determination,.116 Although 
the statement wording was milder than the Venice 
Declaration a number of countries such as France, Greece 
and Ireland had wanted to see a stronger statement with 
reference to a "state formula of their choice".117 
France in an attempt to preak the deadlock and the lack of 
meaningful European initiative went even further and 
presented a Franco-Egyptian draft resolution in the 
Security Council on 28 July 1982.118 The draft expanded on 
Resolution 242 and called for "mutual and simultaneous 
recognition of the parties concerned" and accepted the 
existence of the PLO without granting it official status. 
This draft resolution although it was not adopted did 
receive the support of the Tenl19 and reflects the role of 
local violence in bringing the Palestinian question to the 
agenda of the Security Council in a way which was very 
different from previous occasions. 
The invasion also precipiated a major reaction from the us 
government in the form of an acknowledgment of the 
centrality of the Palestinians problem and its linkage to a 
secure Israel. Reagan noted this when he accepted that 
"The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality 
in this region. The departure of the Palestinians from 
Beirut makes even more dramatic than ever the lack of 
a homeland for the Palestinian people. The 
Palestinians are convinced that their problem is more 
than a refugee problem". l20 
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7.5 Growth of Support 
In this concluding part of this chapter the change in 
attitudes towards the Palestinian problem and the growth in 
support amongst East and Western European countries will be 
examined. This change should be seen as the outcome of a 
dynamic mobilisation process whose constitutent parts have 
been introduced in the preceding sections. A similar method 
to the chapter looking at the mobilisation process amongst 
Third World groupings has been employed to substantiate the 
change in European perceptions of the Palestinian problem. 
Firstly, the content of political statements made by major 
governments and the EC have been examined to establish 
whether a change in attitudes and declared support has 
occurred. Secondly, an index of political support 
constructed from these countries voting behaviour at the UN 
has been used to supplement the above analysis. However, in 
this chapter the index of support for the Palestinian cause 
will not be used in an extensive way. Its use will be 
limited to a few countries mostly outside the EC. This is 
because this index eventhough is very informative and 
useful in summarising the behaviour of the relatively 
larger Western Group it nevertheless needs to be taken with 
some caution, particularly in the case of Eastern Europe. 
The index suggests very strong and cohesive East European 
support for the Palestinian cause throughout the period 
under study. This lack of change "in East European voting 
behaviour as reported by the index is misleading in two 
ways. Firstly, during the first half of the mobilisation 
process East European attitudes developed differently 
whereby one group of East European countries reached peak 
support well before others. Secondly, East European support 
did not reach the levels suggested by the index until well 
into the 1970s. On the other hand, in the case of the 
Western Group; although the index captures the disunity as 
well as the sub-groups in a reasonably accurate way but in 
certain cases it underrepresents the actual level of 
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political support for the Palestinian cause. 'l'his is 
because in the case of some European countries their 
progressively increasing support for the Palestinian cause 
has not been reflected in their voting and hence in the 
index. 
7.5.1 Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war the 
East Europeans, except Romania, broke their diplomatic 
relations with Israel in an expression of political 
solidarity with the Arab world. However, a survey of East 
European and Soviet commentaries on the war indicate"no 
refrence to the rights of the Palestinians.12l 
"For almost twenty-five years, East European countries 
made no use of the terms "Palestine" or "Palestinian. 
Whenever the subject of the Middle East conflict was 
treated, it was invariably "refugees" and not 
" Pal est i n i an s " for who m con c ern 0 r pit Y we r e 
expressed".122 
The Soviets too did not refer to the rights of the 
Palestinians other than their rights as refugees. This was 
quite evident in a Soviet sponsored peace proposal in early 
1969 which referred to the right of the Arab refugees to 
return to their homes. 123 However, towards the end of the 
same year the situation began to change. In November 1969 
in a Warsaw Pact Declaration the East Europeans recognised 
the political nature of the Palestinian problem and 
declared it as a national liberation struggle.124 
This breakthrough in East European perceptions of the 
Palestinian Question should be seen in the light of two 
developments. Firstly, at the local level Palestinian 
'" guerrilla groups had intensified their use of violence and 
hecome more assertive. Secondly, the Palestinian resistance 
movement appeared to be gaining support amongst the 
Palestinians particularly after the Karameh battle in March 
1968. The linkage between this violence and the change in 
Soviet perception was noted by Kosygin in December 1969, 
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liThe Soviet people consider the struggle of the 
Palestinian organizations for the liquidation of the 
consequences of aggression, in the situation where the 
Israeli aggression continues, as a just national 
Ｑｩ｢･ｦｾｾｩｯｮ＠ and- anti-imperialist struggle and supports 
it". 
Furthermore, at the international level the political 
rights of the Palestinians were making their first 
appearences in the debates and decisions of the UN General 
Assembly. East European delegations participated in the 
relevant debates and lent their full support to the 
resolutions ensuring their adoptions with narrow margins. 
From 1969 onwards, although East European voting behaviour 
was highly cohesive and they remained the only group in 
full agreement with the Arabs, their behaviour outside the 
UN suggested a different picture. 
An analysis of East European statements made in relation to 
the political rights of the Palestinians, particularly 
their right to establish a state and their behaviour 
towards the PLO suggest that East European atti tudes 
developed along more or less two separate lines until they 
converged towards ,a unified position by the mid-to the late 
1970s. The first approach emerged amongst East Germans and 
Bulgarians, subsequently to be joined by Romania and 
Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria and East Germany became the first 
countries to refer to the Palestinians as a 'peop1e' and 
develop contacts with the Palestinians and the PLO.126 This 
occurred from early 1972 when other East European countries 
such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland continued to 
ignore the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-I sraeli 
conflict127 , and the Soviet Union limited itself to 
expressing support for the restoration of the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinians. 128 Bulgarian and East German 
contacts with the Palestinians quickly intensified. 
According to one commentary in the Middle East in early 
1973 the East Germans went as far as expressing support for 
the establishment of a democratic 'Palestinian state' 
• I d' . t t B 1 . 129 dur1ng Arafat s secon V1S1 0 er 1n. 
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As promised during Arafat's visit to lobby the East 
Europeans, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in their 
speeches at the 29th session of the General Assembly 
unambiguously referred to the Palestinians right to an 
independent state. 130 The position of East Germany was 
rather confusing. In spite of the alleged support expressed 
for a Palestinian state the East Germans were more 
restrained at the UN. There they referred to lithe lawful 
right of the Palestinian Arabs to their own statehood".131 
This wording was rather similar to the Soviet one132 which 
fell short of an unambiguous support for a state. However, 
this situation changed when two days after the adoption of 
Resolution 3236 (XIX) the East German leader Honecker spoke 
of lithe right of the Arab people of Palestine to found an 
independent state".133 
The situation with the remaining East European countries 
Poland and Hungary was somewhat different. Even though 
these countries had voted in favour of Resolution 3236 
(XIX) they remained reluctant to express public support for 
a 'Palestinian state' and recognised the PLO as 'the sole 
representative of the Palestinians'. Poland during the 
debates only referred to lithe legitimate rights of the Arab 
people of Palestine to self-determination and existence as 
a nation". 134 Hungary expressed support for the "creation 
of an independent Palestinian national power".135 During 
the visit of Arafat to Hungary in October 1974 the 
Hungarians were reluctant to go any further than speak of 
lithe creation of an independent Palestinian national 
rule",136 and not surprisingly did not put into effect 
their alleged promise to allow the PLO to establish a 
mission in Budapest.137 
Developments at the UN, in other East European countries 
and frequent PLO visits appear not to have impressed the 
Hungarians as during Arafat's visit in late November 1975 
they did not go any further than support "the restoration 
of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian 
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people". 138 If it was not for the eventual opening of the 
PLO office in October 1975 it would even have been possible 
to suggest, from the wording of the November statement 
that the Hungarians had to some degree retracted from their 
earlier position. Poland too followed a similar pattern, 
allowing the PLO to open an office only as late as March 
1976 hence becoming the last East European country to do 
so.139 
The Soviet Union in spite of its strong support for the 
Palestinian cause at the UN has rather hesistantly140 come 
to recognise the right of the Palestinians to establish a 
state and also recognise the PLO as their sole 
representative. The Soviets in 1971 have been noted to have 
responded sceptically to the idea of a separate Palestinian 
state, particularly if it is to be created at the expense 
of Israel.14l The Soviet Union's position towards Israel's 
right to exist has been probably one of the most consistent 
features of its policies towards the Palestinian problem 
and has conditioned its attitudes towards the 
Palestinians' right to self-determination. This is evident 
from the way in which Soviet support for Palestinian self-
determination began to emerge along with Soviet efforts to 
influence the PLO to accept the idea of a mini-state,142 in 
the immediate aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the first public 
references to a Palestinian state by high Soviet officials 
began to occur after the 12th PNC's decision to endorse the 
idea of a mini-state.143 
However, to the PNC decision one must also add the role of 
Arafat's visit to ｾｩｯｳ｣ｯｷ＠ in July-August 1974 and his 
. ., . b' 1" S 't t 144 d1scuss10ns w1th Ponomarev 1n mo 1 1s1ng OV1e suppor. 
It was in this climate that in 8 September 1974 that the 
Soviet president Podgorny referred to the need to take into 
account the right of the Palestinians "to establish their 
own statehood in one form or another" in the context of 
finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 145 
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However, it was only after the Arab League decisions at 
Rabat and the adoption of Resolution 3236 (XIX) that the 
ambiguity in Podgorny's reference to "a statehood in one 
form or .another" was removed by Brezhnev, who on 26 
November unambiguously referred to the rights of the 
Palestinians to a state.146 
As Golan notes, 
" ... from the close of 1974 onward the official Soviet 
position consistently called not only for ensurance of 
the Palestinians' legitimate -sometimes inalienable -
national rights, but specified these as the right to 
self-determination and the establishMent of their own 
state. 11141 
However, even though the Soviets did refer to the right of 
the Palestinians to their own state, as Yodfat points out 
(in reference to the wording of Brezhnev speech to the 25th 
CPSU Congress in February dealing with the Palestinian 
problem) the Soviets consciously appear to have refrained 
from actually calling for the establishment of such a 
state. 148 Eventual Soviet support for a Palestinian state 
came only at the end of a series of Arafat's visits to 
Moscow between April 1977 and November 1979 and in a 
conducive environment brought about by the announcement of 
the Camp David agreements in March 1979.149 The communique 
concluding Arafat's visit on November 1979 resolved both 
the issue of support for a Palestinian state and the 
related matter of the recognition of the· PLO as the 'sole 
. fl" • 150 Th S . t t ｲ･ｰｲ･ｳ･ｮｴ｡ｴｾｶ･＠ 0 the Pa ･ｳｴｾｮｾ｡ｮｳ＠ . e ｯｶｾ･＠ suppor 
became even clearer when Gromyko at the end of the US-
Soviet summit in Vienna in June 15-18 1979 called for a 
Palestinian state.1S1 
7.5.2 Western Europe 
7.5.2.1 The European Community 
During the period.under study the size of the EC increased 
from six to nine then to ten. It would be difficult to take 
the evolution of each country's attitude towards the 
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question of Palestine separately. Instead the EC countries 
will be examined as a group and their declarations will be 
used as a basis for determining their position on the 
issue. However, where there have been major departures from 
the common EC position this will be mentioned. The index of 
political support, although it has to be taken with some 
caution when used for measuring EC support for the 
Palestinian cause, has been particularly useful in 
determining those countries undermining EC cohesion. 
In the aftermath of the 1967 war the EC like other West and 
East European countries saw the Palestinian problem 
exclusively as a humanitarian problem concerning 'Arab 
refugees'. This was strongly reflected in the Schumann 
report of 13 May 1971. This report defined EC policy 
towards the Middle East conflict refering to the 'Arab 
refugees' and their right either to return to their home 
or to be indemnified. 152 The report did not suggest a 
perceptible change in the common position of the EC. 
However, the situation by the time of the next EC 
declaration changed substantively. This change was 
precipitated by developments in the Middle East, such as 
the October 1973 war, the growth of Palestinian natioalism, 
the oil embargo as well as greater Arab accessibility and 
the enlargement of EC which brought in two relatively pro-
Arab countries Britain and Ireland. 153 The EC in November 
1973 adopted a French-British sponsored text lS4 that 
recognised 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinians' by 
expressing the need to take these rights into consideration 
in a global settlement. This change is also reflected in 
the voting behaviour of the EC members. They moved from a 
position of support for Israel at the 24th General Assembly 
session to a balanced position at the 28th session. 1SS 
The period between November 1973 and the next EC 
Declaration in December 1977 was one of substantive change, 
particularly in respect to what form the 'legitimate rights 
of the Palestinians' was to take. The French, who in their 
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voting during the 29th session had taken a relatively pro-
Palestinian position, defined these rights in a way that 
led it to note the need to take into account 'the 
legitimacy of a Palestinian homeland',156 while Britain 
limited itself to stressing the need "for any settlement to 
provide for a personality for the Palestinian people". 157 
Italy and Netherlands for their part noted the need for the 
Palestinian people to express their 'national identity,158 
and Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister spoke of 
allowing "for the right of self- determination of the 
Palestinian people including the right to establish a State 
authority ... 1I159 
The vagueness inherent in these references to a 'homeland', 
'national identity' and 'a state ｡ｾｴｨｯｲｩｴｹＧ＠ was to a 
certain degree resolved when the London Declaration of the 
EC in December 1977 stated that the realisation of 
"legitimate rights of the Palestinians should take the form 
of a homeland for the Palestinian people". The reference to 
a homeland at least for some Jewish circles was synonymous 
to a 'state'. This is not surprising considering that the 
history of the establishment of Israel was marked by the 
Zionist movement's struggle to mobilise support for a 
'Jewish homeland' that eventually came to mean a state. 
However, at the time of the London declaration for the EC 
members the linkage did not necessarily exist. This is 
reflected in the observation of Dr.Owen, the British 
Foreign Secretary, that liThe statment was not referring to 
a Palestinian state. It was referring to the need for a 
Palestinian homeland."160 This is further strengthened when 
Crossland spoke of "a land for the Palestinians, not 
neceassarily a sovereign state but a place where they will 
f . ff' II 161 be free to look a ter ｴｨ･ｾｲ＠ own a ｡ｾｲｳＮ＠
The period after the London Declaration became one during 
which EC countries edged their way closer to the 
Palestinian cause and the PLO. The PLO gained increasing 
access through the Euro-Arab dialogue as well as directly 
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to European countries. Although no EC country went as far 
as recognising the PLO, there was a growing realisation of 
the need to include the PLO in efforts to find a 
comprehensive settlement for the Hiddle East conflict. This 
became particularly conspicuous in the immediate aftermath 
of the announcement of Camp David agreements. The Europeans 
found these agreements as a positive, but inadequate, 
development particularly in respect to the conspicuous 
exclusion of the Palestinians. 
The speech of O'Kennedy, the Irish Foreign Minister and 
spokesman for the EC , at the 34th session of the UN General 
Assembly carne as a turning point. 162 In this speech the EC 
for the first time officialy brought up the role that the 
PLO could play in attempts to achieve peace in the Middle 
East. l63 The need to include representatives of the 
Palestinian people in negotiations had been mentioned 
before in the London Declaration as well as in the 
Declaration put out by the EC on 26 March 1979 right after 
the Camp David agreements. However, the speech was the 
first time that the name of the PLO had been raised. At the 
same time the EC had also been facing increasing pressure 
from the Arabs to get involved in efforts to achieve a 
comprehensive peace. 
Simultaneaously, for their part the EC was interested in a 
move that would encourage more moderate Arab governments to 
join in. 164 This pressure towards a more active role, the 
weaknesses of the Camp David agreements and the growing 
realisation of the need to involve the PLO in future 
negotiations culminated in the Venice Declaration of 13 
June 1980. The declaration noted a readiness to work in a 
more concrete way toward peace and the need to associate 
the PLO with negotiations. Furthermore it stressed that 
"A just solution must finally be found to the 
Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of 
refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious 
of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by 
an appropriate process defined within the framework of 
the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully 
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its right to self-determination."165 
In less than a decade the EC changed its group perception 
of the Palestinians from 'Arab refugees' to that of the 
Palestinian people entitled to self-determination. However, 
the Venice Declaration remained ambiguous on whether self-
determination meant the establishment of a state, although 
Greece, France and Ireland had wanted to see a clear 
reference to 'a state formula of their own choice',166 
Cheysson in the aftermath of his meeting with Arafat 
reiterated France's support for Palestinian self-
determination and made remarks alluding to the 
establishment of an eventual Palestinian state. 167 On 14 
December 1981 Cheysson's position became clearer when he 
declared that one of the main principle of his government's 
approach to the Middle East was based on the Palestinian 
right to a state.168 
Since 1980169 the EC has not made a declaration in support 
of a state. However, the European Parliament in the 
aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the seige of 
Beirut went beyond the position of the EC Council of 
Ministers and expressed support for the eventual creation 
of a Palestinian state.170 
Even though the EC has not come in support of a Palestinian 
state in an unambiguous manner, the extent of the change in 
the EC's perception of the Palestinian problem and its 
support for the political rights of the Palestinian people 
is often underestimated. These two significant changes have 
been blurred by two European demands. Firstly, the EC has 
supported the political rights of the Palestinians without 
prejudice to Israel's existence in its pre-1967 borders, a 
position not very unlike the East Europeans. It is in this 
respect that the index of support for the Palestinian cause 
does not do justice to the EC support. The relatively low 
reading for the EC on the index is because the wording of 
the resolutions on which the roll-calls are based have 
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often not included an adequately clear and explicit 
reference to Israel's right to existence. Secondly, the EC 
countries have consistently demanded from the PLO that it 
should recognise Israel, express support for a political 
solution and denounce violence. It has tried to use the 
issue of recognition as a separate leverage on the PLO 
again giving to the unexperienced eye the impression that 
the EC is far from supporting the rights of the Palestinian 
people. 
7.5.2.2 Other Europeans 
In respect to this research West European countries outside 
the EC can be grouped into two. The Mediterrenean countries 
together with Austria form a reasonably cohesive group 
characterised by conspicuous support for the Palestinian 
cause and the PLO. On the other hand the Scandinavian 
countries can be sub-divided into two. The first sub-group 
has Sweden and Finland that follow a policy closer to the 
Southern European countries particularly at the UN. The 
second sub-group with Norway and Iceland are somewhere 
between the EC stance and the US position. 
Table 7.2 depicts the way in which the Mediterranean 
countries have gradually coalesced around a position highly 
supportive of the Palestinian cause which after the 29th 
session of the General Assembly included the right of the 
Palestinians to self-determination. Spain, Greece and 
Turkey have followed the development of the Palestinian 
issue at the UN from a highly supportive stance. 171 
Portugal after the 1974 change in regime joined ranks at 
the 29th session. 
The matter of the recognition of the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people is another common 
denominator for the South European countries. These 
countries together with Finland voted in favour of 
resolutions inviting Arafat to the UN and granting the PLO 
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observer status. However, these countries did not develop 
official relations with the PLO until the late 1970s. It 
was the Spanish government that became the first European 
country to receive Arafat officially shortly followed by 
Turkey.172 In Greece Papandreau in his first day in office 
invited Arafat on an official visit in October 1981. The 
PLO maintains diplomatic missions, of varying and at times 
unclear status, in all these countries except Portugal. 173 
24th Session 29th Session 35th Session 
1969 1974 1980 
Spain, Spain, Spain, tialta, 
Highly Greece, Portugal, Portugal, 
pro- Turkey Finland, Greece, 
Pals. Turkey Turkey 
Hedium Austria, Austria, 
pro- Sweden, Sweden, 
Pals. New Zealand Finland 
6fl,U..ft. 
Inter Australia Canada 
mediate New Zealand 
Austria, Norway 
ｉｾＬ＠ Norw4.J 
Medium Finland, Sweden Norway, 
pro- Iceland, Iceland, Australia 
Israel Portugal, Canada 
Austrlia 
/'JewZeAU,J.. 
Highly 
pro- US, Canada US US 
Israel 
Low 
attenders Malta Malta 
Table 7.2: Distribution of support across sessions 
for countries outside the EC 
The Scandinavian countries in their voting behaviour on the 
Palestinian question at the 24th session of the General 
Assembly were generally supportive of the Israeli position. 
It was during the period preceding the 29th session that 
Scandinavian attitudes began to change. As Table 7.2 
suggests Finland and Sweden at the 29th session became 
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supportive of the Palestinian cause while Norway and 
Iceland continued to maintain their earlier positions. 
Sweden's behaviour at the UN Security Council is 
particularly remarkable too. In December 1975, during the 
vote on whether to allow the PLO to participate in the work 
of the Security Council Sweden cast the only Western vote 
that settled the matter in favour of the PLO. 174 Sweden 
and Finland unlike the other Scandinavians have not 
hesitated to project their anti-colonial values to the 
Palestinian problem. However, in the case of Norway and 
Iceland military alliance commitments may well have 
restricted their foreign policy options on the Middle 
East. 175 
The Nordic Council statement of 27-28 March 1980 on the 
Middle East has a strong resemblance to the Venice 
Declaration. The content of this statement suggests the 
possibility of a compromise brokered by Denmark to bridge 
the gap between Sweden and Finland on the one hand and 
Norway and Iceland on the other. 176 This possibility is 
strengthened because Denmark appears to be holding the 
middle ground between the two groups, particularly since it 
declared that the Venice Declaration did not imply a 
recognition of a Palestinian state. 177 Such a position is 
roughly mid-way between Norway's US-like position 
expressing support for the "legitimate interests and rights 
of the Palestinians .. 178 and Sweden and Finland who in their 
1980 voting have demonstrated a position more supportive of 
the Palestinian cause, not unlike France's position. 
7.5.2.3 Others 
The remaining countries within the Western group are 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and most importantly the US. 
Unlike the other three the US has been involved in the 
Palestinian problem from its early days. During the Second 
World War the US became a commited supporter of the Zionist 
cause. Once established the US developed close ties with 
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Israel. Although, the us had strongly lobbied in favour of 
the partition of Palestine into two seperate states, in the 
aftermath of the establishment of Israel the Arabs of 
Palestine became perceived as refugees. The US maintained 
this image of the Palestinians as refugees well into the 
1970s becoming the last and most reluctant Western country 
to recognise the minimum of the political rights of the 
Palestinians. 
The first suggestion that the Palestinian problem for the 
US may be something more than one of ｲ･ｦｵｧ･ｾｳ＠ came in 24 
June 1973. The communique iss ued at the end of Bre zhnev' s 
visit to the US noted that a Middle East settlement 
"should take into due account the legitimate interests of 
the Palestinian people".179 Eventhough the reference was to 
the milder I interests I rather than I rights I, the problem 
had nevertheless been put on the agenda and the Palestinian 
Arabs had been referred to as 'the Palestinian people ' 
rather than 'Arab refugees ' . However, the US· did not 
hesitate to veto a Security Council draft resolution noting 
the need to take the legitimate aspirations/rights of the 
Palestinians into account in the resolution of the Middle 
East conflict. The US, after the 1973 war continued to 
remain unimpressed by the growing recognition of the 
political rights of the Palestinian people and the PLO. The 
position of the US as elaborated by Kissinger was that the 
problem was one to be settled between Israel and Jordan, 
and that recent developments favouring the Palestinians 
were impediments to the achievement of peace between Arab 
states and Israel. 
A major breakthrough in US perceptions came on 12 November 
1975 when Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
East and South Asian Affairs, noted 
lithe legitimate interest of the Palestinian Arabs must 
be taken into account in the negotiations of an Arab-
Israeli peace.In many ways, the Palestinian dimension 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that 
conflict". 1BO 
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The Carter administration began office at a time when the 
Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict had also 
been recognised by a report prepared by the Brooking s 
Institute in December 1975. 181 The report was prepared by a 
panel which included persons that later became members of 
the Carter administration. The report stressed the 
importance of taking into account the Palestinian right to 
self-determination in a viable peace settlement in the 
Middle East. The report had two possible scenarios. The 
first one suggested a Palestinian state and the second a 
Palestinian entity associated with Jordan. It was the 
second one that appear to have won the interest of the 
Carter administration. 
This was reflected in the emergence of what has become 
known as the Carter plan. 182 The plan was summarised by 
Rouleau as, 
"A homeland would have to be set apart for the 
Palestinian people. It would be either on an 
independent entity (a solution Carter is said to have 
misgivings about, because of the opening it would 
provide for Soviet infiltration) or an integral part 
of Jordan, or again a component state of a federation 
along with Jordan and Syr ia II .183 
However, in the face of mounting Jewish pressure184 Carter 
had to make it quite clear that his reference to a 
Palestinian entity or homeland did not add up to an 
acceptance of the Palestinian right to self-determination. 
In an interview given on the eve of Israel's 30th 
anniversary he plainly said "my belief is that a permanent 
settlement will not include an independent nation on the 
West Bank" and declared "I have never favoured an 
independent Palestinian state".lS5 
This retraction on the part of the Carter administration 
did not come as a surprise at least to F.Kaddoumi, Head of 
the Political Department of the PLO. In an interview 
Kaddoumi maintained that the 'Carter Plan' in his view had 
already reflected a certain degree of retraction from the 
Saunders statement. This statement's reference to the 
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legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people was found 
by Kaddoumi to be much stronger than the Carter reference 
to 'a homeland for the Palestinians'. Kaddoumi noted he 
would have liked to see Carter refer to the "national 
homeland for the Palestinian people" .186 
During the Camp David peace process repeated references to 
the 'concerns of the Palestinians' did not go as far as 
recognising the political rights of the Palestinians in an 
unambigous manner. In Septemper 1978 there was a framework 
agreement arrived at between President Carter, President 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to recognise the legitimate 
rights of the Palestinian people and their just 
requirements and the determination to achieve full autonomy 
for the inhabitants. The negotiations as prescribed by the 
framework did not get anywhere as the parties remained 
deeply divided on what 'full autonomy' entailed and on who 
was to represent the Palestinians.187 
In spite of a growing realisation, particularly amongst 
State Department officials and some politicians, of the 
need to include the PLO in efforts to achieve a settlement 
in the Middle East,188 domestic political considerations 
have prevented the US administration from introducing major 
changes to its foreign policy on the Palestinian problem. 
The constraining role of this domestic linkage on the US 
administration's options is well demonstrated by Carter's 
unrestrained reference on his return from Sadat' s funeral 
to the need to include the PLO in efforts to resolve the 
Palestinian problem. 189 This was in marked contrast to the 
requirments of an election campaign that had led President 
Carter, only a few months earlier on 25 February 1980, to 
stress his opposition against an independent Palestinian 
state and the recognition of the PLO. 190 
The late 1970s, nevertheless was a period when the 
Palestinian problem was high on the US administration's 
foreign policy agenda. This was a period which saw a marked 
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increase in 'unofficial' contacts with the PLO in an 
attempt to persuade the PLO to accept Resolution 242 to 
enable it to play its role to settle the Palestinian 
• problem. Furthermore this was also a period when 
Disagreements between the US and Israel now appeared 
on a wide range of issues.The US, criticising Israeli 
raids on Palestinian bases in Southern Lebanon, said 
that Israel 'may have' broken the US law by using 
American supplied weapons for other than defensive 
puposes. Dissatisfaction was expressed about Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank and the slow progress of 
autonomy talks. President Carter compared Palestinian 
organizations with the US civil rights movement. 1I191 
This probably was the period when the PLO achieved its 
highest standing in the US. This was evident in the US 
administration desire to see the PLO involved in a 
negotiation process and in the implementation of ｴｨｾ＠
'autonomy plan' that would .emerge from it. However, in the 
end as Yodfat notes as a resul t of a combination of factors 
ranging from PLOss inflexibility to Israel's threat to 
withdraw from the autonomy negotiations the US 
administration fell back to i ts traditionally pro-I sraeli 
stand. 192 
It is interesting to note that it was another dramatic 
event of the scale of the Israeli besiege of Beirut and the 
Sabra-Chatila massacres coupled with the new Reagan 
administration's commitment to anti-communism, which 
accentuated the need to improve relations with the Arab 
world, that produced the most far reaching US peace plan so 
far. The Reagan plan, as it was called, recognised the lack 
of a homeland for the Palestinian people hence the need to 
attain autonomy for the Palestinians in association with 
Jordan. He made it quite clear that this did not entail a 
state but simultaneously he announced the categorical 
rejection of annexation. IIIn comparison with the 
traditional position of the US, Reagan's speech constituted 
a turning point in the American Palestinian problem ll • l93 In 
spite of this development the US, during the period under 
study, has remained strongly pro-Israeli ｾｮ､＠ has 
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consistently stopped short of recognising 'the Palestinian 
people's right to sel-determination' . 
Of the remaining three countries, in this group, Australia 
and Canada have held attitudes towards the Palestinian 
problem not unlike the US, while New Zealand has gone in a 
very di fferent direction. Al though, Canada, in its voting 
behaviour between 1969 and 1980 moved from a strongly pro-
Israeli position to an intermediate one, this 
transformation did not reach a point of a clear and an 
unambiguous recognition of the Palestinians I right to self-
determination. Instead the Canadian delegation's speech at 
the Seventh Emergency Special Session of the Assembly did 
not go any further than expressing the view that any 
settlement of the Palestinian problem would have to take 
II into account the existence of a Palestinian national 
consciousness, and unless there is a recognition of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, peace will not 
prevai 111 .194 Furthermore, this speech did not seem to 
envisage any role for the Palestinians in a negotiation 
process to reach such a settlement. 
The Australians too appear to have taken a similar 
position. Except during the 29th session of the Assembly 
when the Australian delegation referred to his governments 
support for the applicability of "the principle of the 
right of peoples to self-determination and independence" to 
the Palestinian Arab people they have in their voting 
. .. d II" t . 1 9 5 Th . . behav10ur ma1nta1ne a pro- srae 1 POS1 10n. 1S 1S 
particularly evident in the way in which the Australian 
delegation to the 30th session of the General Assembly 
retracted from its position in 1974 and was not prepared to 
endorse anything stronger than "the need to recognise and 
respect the legitimate rights of the Palestinians" in 
achieving an eventual settlement. . 
It is New Zealand that experienced a significant change in 
its attitude towards the Palestinian problem. While New 
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Zealand, together with the US, Canada and Australia, had 
voted strongly pro-Israeli at the 24th session of the 
General Assembly in 1969 by the 29th session this stance 
had changed quite dramatically. This was reflected in their 
preparedness to support the resolutions inviting Arafat to 
address the Assembly and granting the PLO permanent 
observership. This change in attitude had consolidated 
itself to such an extent that by 1980 the New Zealand 
delegation was prepared to argue that 
"Palestine is not simply a refugee problem. It is also 
a political problem for which a political problem must 
be found. The search for a solution must involve the 
participation of the Palestinian people, including the 
PLO, a long with the other parties directly concerned. 
The rights of the Palestinian people include the right 
of self-determination. That is not something as 
limited as local autonomy. It means that the 
Palestinians must have the right to set up an 
indepedent Arab State of Palestine, as was envisaged 
in the 1947 partition resolution, if that is their 
wish".196 
7.6 Conclusion 
As it has been suggested in the preceding sections both the 
Western and East Europeans governments continued, to 
perceive the Palestinian problem as a refugee problem 
subsumed within the Arab-Israeli conflict well into the 
late 1960s. Furthermore, the perceptual changes towards the 
Palestinian problem that then followed did not develop in 
an uniform manner in both regions. 
In Eastern Europe Bulgarians and East Germans were the 
first that began to respond to Arab and Palestinian efforts 
to mobilise support. In spite of their very cohesive and 
pro-Palestinian voting at the UN, it was not until mid-
1970s that a general East European consensus supportive of 
a 'Palestinian state' and of the PLO as the 'sole 
representative of the Palestinian people' emerged. For the 
East Europeans cognitive linkages based on particularly 
anti-colonial and anti-imperialist thinking played an 
important role in the process that altered their 
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perceptions of the Palestinians from being refugees to 
being a people fighting a national liberation struggle. 
Palestinian violence at the local level played a certain 
role in bringing about this breakthrough. 
The countries within the Western group too saw the 
Palestinians as refugees in the aftermath of the 1967 and 
the changes in attitudes within the group was even more 
diverse and also in some cases slower and more limited than 
the East Europeans. Firstly, within this group there were 
Southern European countries, to some extent joined by 
countries such as Finland, Sweden and Austria, that lent 
full support to the Palestinian cause on the one hand, and 
countries such as the US, Canada and Australia which 
remained very reluctant to recognise anything stronger than 
'the legitimate rights and interest of the Palestinians' on 
the other. In the case of the first group cognitive 
linkages based on anti-colonialism and geographical 
proximity contributed to their preparedness to go as far as 
supporting a 'Palestinian state' and recognising the PLO. 
While in the case of the US domestic political 
considerations coupled with strategic ones made the change 
in governmental attitudes much more limited. 
Secondly, the position of the EC which included some 
traditionally pro-Israeli countries experienced a very slow 
change in opinion. This change is reflected in the 
difference between the contents of the Schumann Report of 
May 1971 which did not recognise the Palestinian dimension 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the June 1980 Venice 
Declaration recognising the Palestinian right to self-
determination and the need to include the PLO in any 
settlement effort. This change was also marked by a 
relative increase in the cohesion of the group. The group 
which once included pro-Israeli and relatively pro-Arab 
countries together with uncomitted members, as a result of 
EPC and the Euro-Arab dialogue developed a more unified 
posi tion increasingly favourable to the Palestinian cause. 
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However, this relatively more cohesive and pro-Palestinian 
position did not reflect itself in the EC countries voting 
behaviour at the UN. This is because some members would not 
support resolutions recognising the political rights of the 
Palestinians without a clear reference to Israel's right to 
existence within recognised borders, while others were 
content just like the East Europeans, with an implicit 
recognition of Israel's rights. 
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CHAPTER 8 
MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT AT THE UN LEVEL 
8.1 Introduction 
So far we have examined the mobilisation process across 
local and regional levels of analysis. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to extent the analysis of the growth of 
support for the Palestinian cause to our final level of 
analysis, the global level. In the case of previous levels 
of analysis, where possible, attention was focused on the 
agendas of the regional organisations and their decisions 
relating to the Palestinian problem. At the global level 
the United Nations with its near universal membership and 
its agenda, which covers a wide range of issues, appears 
to best represent this level of analysis. It is, in 
particular, to the General Assembly and the Security 
Council that attention will be directed. It is the politics 
that surround the changes in the content of the agendas of 
these main organs and the outputs that emerge from these 
organs that will constitute the basis for the analysis. 
The introductory chapter briefly looked at the Palestinian 
question in its early days at the UN. An attempt was made 
to point to some of the processes that gradually led the UN 
of the time to define the Palestinian problem as a problem 
of refugees. The occasional challenges made by Arab 
countries, attempting to undermine this definition went 
unheeded. All in all, this refugee image remained firm in 
the minds of many until the late 1960s. The first 
challenges from non-Arab delegations began to surface 
during the debates on the June 1967 war in the Middle East. 
Hence, the analysis of the mobilisation process that 
eventually changed the definition of the Palestinian 
problem from one of refugees to one of self-determination 
will begin from 1967 and cover the period up to 1980. 
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The year 1980 was chosen for substantive as well as 
practical reasons. By 1980 an overwhelming majority of the 
UN had come to favour the Palestinian right to self-
determination and a general consensus had developed on the 
inadequacy of the provisions of the Camp David agreements 
. 
relating to the rights of the Palestinians. This was also 
the year when the last major regional grouping, the 
European Community, formally joined ranks in recognising 
the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. 
Similarly it was in 1980 that the Latin Americans reached a 
high degree of cohes ion in their support for the 
Palestinian cause. The practical reasons, on the other 
hand, emanate from the unavailability of post-1980 voting 
data in a machine readable form, when this research project 
was started. 
8.2 Conducive Environment 
The first task of this chapter will be to identify a series 
of developments during the 1960s at the United Nations that 
has brought about changes in the structure of the UN 
political system making it more conducive to the 
mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause than the 
one which existed in the 1950s. There were four such 
developments. These were firstly, the growth of Third World 
membership at the UN; secondly the formal and structural 
changes within the UN affecting decision making: thirdly 
the emergence of various political groups to coordinate 
Third World efforts to influence this decision-making 
process and finally the recognition of national liberation 
movements as legitimate participants in the work of the UN. 
8.2.1 Growth in Third World membership 
When the UN came into being it was an organisation 
dominated by what was known as the Western Bloc. The 
Western Bloc, which included the Latin Americans too 
commanded a majority of the membership well into the late 
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1950s. This influenced both the nature of issues that were 
taken up by the UN as well as the resulting decisions. 
During the first decade the UN agendas remained dominated 
by items that reflected the high salience of the Cold War 
to the majority of the membership. In a similar way 
decisions on this issue tended to be determined by the 
• 
almost automatic majority that the Western bloc could 
master. 1 
Years I Latin Western Eastern Asia I Africa ITotall 
I America Europe Europe (Arabs) I (Arabs) I I 
1945 20 39% 14 27% 6 11% 8{4) 16% 3(1)6% 51 
1950 20 33% 17 28% 6 10% 14(5) 23% 3(1)5% 60 
1955 20 26% 23 30% 10 13% 19(6) 25% 4(2)5% 76 
1960 20 20% 23 23% 10 10% 21(5) 21% 25(5)25% 99 
1965 22 19% 24 20% 10 9% 25(7) 21% 36(6)31% 117 
1970 24 19% 24 19% 10 8% 28(8) 22% 41(6)32% 127 
1975 27 19% 25 17% 11 7% 35(12)24% 46(8)32% 144 
1980 29 19% 25 16% 11 7% 38(12)25% 50(9)33% 153 
TABLE 8.1: Change in Distribution of United 
Membership by Region between 1945-19802 
Nations· 
As Table 8.1 depicts the composition of the UN began to 
change from 1955 onwards as Afro-Asian countries joined the 
UN in increasing numbers. A particularly dramatic increase 
occurred in 1960 when 17 newly independent countries became 
members. It is not surprising that this was also the year 
that saw the adoption of the "Declaration On The Granting 
Of Independence To Colonial Countries And Peoples". This 
was in many ways an indication that decolonisation was 
becoming an issue of high salience to a growing number of 
members and hence a dominant i tern on the agenda of the UN. 3 
One of the consequences of the growing salience of 
deco1onisation was that issues that could be treated as 
problems of deco1onisation stood a better chance of 
receiving attention and benefiting from the prestige that 
anti-colonialism offered. It is mostly in this context that 
the growth of Third World membership provided a more 
favourable basis for the mobilisation of support for the 
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I 
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Palestinian cause. The high salience of decolonisation to 
the Assembly meant that issues perceived to be of a 
colonial nature stood a better chance of being put on the 
agenda. 
The Arabs had always seen the problem of the Palestinians 
as a product of the denial of the Palestinian Arabs of 
their right to self-determination. However, during the 
1950s when the UN remained dominated by the West, they 
could not get the Assembly to consider the problem within 
that context. It was after the fifteenth session as the UN 
began to pay growing attention to decolonisation that the 
Arabs and later the Palestinians had a potentially more 
favourable environment to work in. The problem then 
remained a matter of convincing the Assembly of the 
appropriateness of treating the Palestinian problem as one 
covered bydecolonisation. 
Another consequence of the growth of the Third World 
membership was that it precipitated certain structural 
changes within the UN that contributed favourably to 
putting issues of interest to the Third World on the formal 
agenda. This occurred as a result of the reallocation of 
the distribution of seats in various organs of the UN. 
8.2.2 Changes in the distribution of elected posts 
The Assembly elects the countries to fill the seats of the 
elected-bodies of the UN as well as the President and Vice-
Presidents of the Assembly and the Chairmen of the Main 
Committees. One major consequence of the growth of Third 
World membership has been an increase in demands for better 
Third World representation on these elected posts. 
Previously, the distribution of the elected posts of the 
General Assembly and non-permanent seats on the Security 
Council tended to favour Western and Latin American 
countries. 4 These increased demands culminated in the 
adoption of a series of resolutions that changed this 
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situation. ResOlution 1990 (XVIII) in December 1963 
increased the number of Vice-Presidents and reorganised 
their distribution across geographical regions in a way 
that allowed greater Third World representation. The same 
resolution also rearranged the distribution of main 
committee officers. These changes are depicted in Table 
8.2 and 8.3. 
Table 8.2: Geographical distribution of Vice-Presidents 
before and after Resolution 1990 (XVIII) 
Africa and Asia 
Latin America 
East Europe 
Western and others 
Permanent members 
TOTAL 
Before 
4 
2 
1 
2 
5 
13 
After 
7 
3 
1 
2 
5 
17 
Table 8.3: Distribution of Main committee Chairmanships 
before andafter Resolution 1990(XVIII) 
Africa and Asia 
Latin America 
East Europe 
Western and others 
TOTAL 
Before 
2 
2 
1 
2 
7 
After 
3 
1 
1 
1 
6* 
* (The seventh chairmanship rotates every alternate year 
between representatives of states belonging to second and 
third groups). 
These changes appear to have had two consequences for the 
politics of the General Assembly. Firstly, it changed the 
composition of the General Committee from a rather Western 
dominated body to one with enlarged representation for the 
Third World. The General Committee, composed of the 
President of the Assembly, the Vice-Presidents and the 
Chairmen of the Main Committees, is important because it 
makes recommendations to the Assembly regarding the 
adoption of the agenda, the allocation of items and the 
organisation of work in the Assembly and its Main 
Committees. 
It is particularly in respect to the politics of the 
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inclusion or exclusion of certain items and the allocation 
of the agenda items to various parts of the Assembly that 
the composition of the General Committee can play a 
significant role. A General Committee with a larger Third 
World representation will naturally act more favourably 
towards matters of greater concern to the Third World. The 
General Committee's decisions on the agenda, conditional 
upon Assembly approval, will determine "whether a 
particular item will go through the remaining ... phases of 
"parliamentary diplomacy" and be considered by the 
Assembly".5 
Secondly, although the influence that presiding officers 
have on the course of debates and decision making is 
difficult to ascertain, these officers particularly the 
chairmen of the Main Committees can exercise a certain 
degree of influence in steering a debate particularly 
thrC?ugh in the handling of important ｰｲｯ｣ｾ､ｵｲ｡ｬ＠ matters.6 
Similarly, the President of the Assembly can at times take 
certain initiatives with significant political 
consequences. One example of this was the ruling by the 
Algerian President of the 29th Assembly that amounted to 
the suspension of South Africa from the work of the General 
Assemb1y.7 During the same session the President did not 
hesitate to ensure that the Chairman of the PLO, Y.Arafat, 
be escorted from the rostrum by the UN Chief of Protocol, 
an honour usually reserved only for. heads of states.8 
Another structural change was precipitated by Resolution 
1991 (XIII) which enorsed Third World demands for more 
equitable representation on the Security Council. The 
resolution not only increased the number of non-permanent 
seats from six to ten but also introduced for the first 
time a formalised geographical distribution of elected 
seats. Previously the seats were distributed according to a 
'gentleman's agreement' reached during the first session of 
the Assembly.9 From its early days this formula became a 
source of problems as the West in the context of the Cold 
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War employed the agreement, 
lito have the Security Council so constituted that 
there are always seven members which can be relied 
upon to stand together in the case of threats to the 
peace and which, should the Security Council be unable 
to act because of the veto, would vote in favour of an 
emergency special session of the Assembly under the 
"Uniting for Peace" resolution". lO 
However, it was not the Soviet bloc challenges to the way 
the 'gentleman's agreement' 
undermined this arrangement. 
was being interpreted that 
Instead it was the inability 
of the original pattern of geographical distribution of 
seats to accomodate a growing number of Third World 
countries that led to the adoption of Resolution 1991 
(XIII).ll This resolution rearranged and formalised the 
geographical regions into Western Europe and others, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa-Asia, allotting 
five seats to the last group. This change in the arithmetic 
of seat distributions appears to have influenced Security 
Council decision making in a number of ways. 
Firstly, seven seats gives the Third World the possibility 
of commanding adequate votes to block majority decisions. 
Conversely and more importantly, the Third World with the 
support of only two other members can achieve a majority.12 
This has made Third World views highly influential in 
relation to procedural decisions which require only simple 
majorities without the veto being usable. This advantage, 
in the context of the Palestinian problem, was well 
demonstrated when the Security Council in December 1975 
invited the PLO to participate in the work of the Security 
Council. In this case the significance of Third World 
membership of the Security Council is made even more 
striking, as it was at the request of the representatives 
of Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania, Cameroon and Tanzania that the 
FLO was invited "with the same rights confered upon a 
Member State invited to participate under rule 37".13 
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8.2.3 Emergence of Political Groupings 
Another important aspect of the growth of Third World 
membership at the UN was the strengthening of existing 
political groupings and the emergence of new groupings 
with Third World membership. A number of scholars have 
studied and identified various types of groupings operating 
within the United Nations General Assembly.l4 It is not the 
purpose of this study to list and examine the operation of 
these political groupings. Instead it is the manner in 
which the emergence of Third World political groupings has 
contributed towards a more conduci ve environment for 
mObilising support for the Palestinian cause that is of 
interest. 
According to Kaufmann groups at the UN perform a wide range 
of functions that include; 
a)lITo exchange information on 
agenda ll 
all or part of the 
b)IITo develop common general-positions on important 
agenda items II. 
c) liTo undertake joint action for or against a 
proposal. illS 
These functions enable group members to pool resources for 
an effective voice in General Assembly decision making. The 
existence of political groupings provide for members the 
possibility to raise issues of high salience to them and 
seek the cooperation of the group. The group hence plays an 
important role as an access route to the larger assembly. 
Furthermore, once the position professed by a member (or a 
sub-group) has been adopted, the particular member (or sub 
group) can benefit from the capacity of the whole ｰｯｬｩｾｩ｣｡ｬ＠
group to lobby other political groups and members of the 
Assembly. 
The possibility of lobbying other groups becomes 
particularly facilitated when there are political groupings 
with overlapping membership. For example, the Latin 
American group is not directly accessible to the Arab 
297 
countries. However, growing Latin American membership in 
the Non-Aligned group has opened the possibility for the 
Arabs to gain access to the larger Latin American audience. 
Similarly, the Afro-Asian and Islamic Groups constitute a 
channel through which Arab representatives can influence 
the position of the Turkish delegation who in turn may have 
an impact on the West European group in which it also 
participates. The same things can be said for the 
overlapping memberships of the Afro-Asian/Non-Aligned 
Groups with the Commonwealth Group. 
Another important aspect of overlapping membership is that 
it can facilitate the development and recognition of common 
political values. These values then play a crucial role in 
guiding group perceptions and attitudes toward issues of 
concern to various groups. This process as it unfolds 
culminate in the emergence of cross-cutting loyalties and 
hence form a crucial basis for the mobilisation of support. 
The ability to have access to these groups then will give 
countries seeking support the possibility of arguing the 
applicability of shared political values to particular 
cases. 
It is these aspects of political groupings with Third World 
membership that contribute towards a conducive environment 
at the United Nations. Firstly, it· provides a net-work of 
contacts and channels of influence. Secondly, it offers the 
possibility of pooling resources for a more effective say. 
Thirdly, it provides commonly shared political values that 
can help to legitimise certain positions in relations to 
others or earlier ones. 
8.2.4 National Liberation t-1ovements and the UN 
A final factor that contributed towards a conducive 
environment for the mobilisation of support for the 
Palestinian cause was a growing acceptance that non-
governmental actors, in particular national liberation 
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movements had a legitimate and desired role to play in UN 
politics. The background or basis for direct national 
liberation movements participation can be traced to the 
adoption of Resolution 1514 and the reluctance of Portugal 
and South African governments to accept eventual 
independence for African territories ,under their control. 
This situation in South Africa was further aggravated by 
their discriminatory racial policies against African 
people. 
The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in the wider 
context of deco1onisation had already developed a practice 
of granting hearings to petitioners.16 However, it was not 
until the late 1960s that direct contacts between the UN 
and the national liberation movements began to develop. The 
basis of these developments lay in the contacts between the 
Special Committee on Deco1onisation and national liberation 
movements during its visits to Africa and particularly in 
a Bulgarian initiative17 calling for a more active UN 
involvement in the process of deco1on"isation. The Bulgarian 
initiative culminated in the adoption of Resolution 2311 
(XXII) which opened the way to contacts between the UN 
specialised agencies and the national liberation movements. 
The Special Committee for its part adopted, after contacts 
with African liberation movement leaders in September 1970 
a programme for the 10th anniversary of the adoption of 
Resolution 1514 in 1960.18 
This programme, inter alia, called for the participation of 
liberation movements in UN proceedings related to their 
countries. The endorsement of these points by the General 
Assembly laid the ground for further developments in the 
following two sessions. l9 Firstly, UN agencies were called 
on to examine procedures for national liberation movements 
participation and secondly Resolution 2874 (XXVI) prepared 
the way for these movements to obtain observer status at 
the General ASSembly.20 It was the Special Committee that 
first invited the liberation movements to participate in 
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its deliberations 21 and then its chairman suggested22 that 
the movements be allowed to participate in the work of the 
Fourth Committee as observers. These developments ,were 
subsequently endorsed by the Assembly in 1974 when an 
invitation to all liberation movements recognised by the 
OAU to participate in the work of its Main Committees and 
subsidary bodies was adopted. 23 
The strength of the consensus amongst a large majority of 
the UN membership favouring the participation of the 
national liberation movements centred around the problem of 
whether the governments of Portugal and South Africa did 
represent the African people under their control. An 
overwhelming majority of the Assembly held the view that 
these governments lacked the legitimacy to represent the 
African people and that as reflected in Resolutions 2878 
(XXVI) and 2795 (XXVI) liberation movements were 
increasingly seen as the representatives of these people. 
This position also found vivid expression in the Assembly's 
rejection of South Africa's credentials between 1970-74 and 
the eventual denial of this delegation's right to 
participate in the work of the Assembly.24 Similarly during 
the 28th session of the Assembly ｐｯｲｴｵｧｾｬＧｳ＠ credentials 
were accepted on the understanding that it only represented 
continental Portugal. 25 It was against such a background 
that the national liberation movements' role as 
representatives of the Southern African people gained 
acceptance and culminated in the granting of observer 
status. This enabled representatives of the national 
liberation' movements to gain direct access to the decision-
making process of the General Assembly as well as 
contribute towards the efforts of various parts of the UN 
to ensure the implementation of Resolution 1514. 
8.2.5 The Impact of the Structural Changes 
These four major developments that have been examined in 
respect to a conducive environment are important for the 
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mobilisation process in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
growth in Third World membership and the changes in certain 
aspects of the structure of the General Assembly and the 
Security Council were significant because they broadened 
the basis of potential allies for Arabs and also enabled 
both Arabs and Third World delegations to have a greater 
say in the politics of the UN. Secondly, the emergence of 
political groupings opened the possibility for the Arabs 
and later on the Palestinians to gain access to growing 
number of delegations. It enabled them to caucus the non-
Arab membership of these groupings. It also opened, for the 
Arabs and Palestinians, the possibility of contributing 
towards the development of ideological guidelines for the 
inclusion and processing of various issues on the agendas 
of the UN. Thirdly, the gradual incorporation of national 
liberation movements in the work of the UN set a precedent 
for the PLO's eventual participation, allowing it to gain 
access to various parts of the UN and hence have a direct 
impact on the politics of the Palestinian problem. 
Before ending this first part of the mobilisation process 
model as it applies to the UN it must be noted that the 
above developments brought about a conducive environment 
and did not necessarily generate instant support. Take for 
example the sudden increase in Third World membership in 
1960 and the adoption of Resolution 1514. This did not 
translate itself into immediate support for demands made by 
the Arabs. At the sixteenth session of the Assembly, this 
was reflected quite starkly in the reluctance of some 
African and most Latin American countries to support the 
Arab position in relation to the situation in Algeria. 
These countries preferred to abstain on a First Committee 
resolution calling for resumed negotiations for an 
independent, territorially unified Algeria. 26 Similarly at 
the eighteenth session the Arabs failed in mobilising 
adequate African and Latin ｾｭ･ｲｩ｣｡ｮ＠ support to have Oman 
labeled as a colonial territory under resolution 1514 (XV). 
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Hence the conducive environment as described should not be 
equated to support itself. Instead it should be seen as a 
series of structural changes that has increased the chances 
to generate support for the Palestinian cause by allowing 
Arab/Palestinian access to a potentially favourable 
audience and argue in favour of cognitive linkages 
between the Palestinian issue and other issues already 
enjoying the UN's support. It is the purpose of the 
following two sections to examine those aspects of the 
mobilisation process at the UN. 
8.3. Accessibility 
8.3.1 Indirect Access 
When the Palestinian problem first came to the UN the 
Palestinian Arabs had enjoyed indirect access to the UN 
through Arab countries that tended to support their 
cause. 27 However, once the Palestinian Question at the 
United Nations lost, in the early 1950s, its political 
dimension it became very difficult for the Arab delegations 
to maintain debates on the political rights of the 
Palestinian Arabs let alone ensure recognition for their 
rights. There were not many non-Arab countries that would 
raise the political aspects of the Palestinian problem. 
This situation remained unchanged until the late 1960s when 
some African and other non-Arab Islamic countries began in 
their speeches to make references to the rights of the 
Palestinian Arabs. 28 One such country was Mali, whose 
delegation during the Security Council debates on the 
Middle East war of- 1967 was the only member of the Council 
to refer to the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 29 Yet, it was not until the 24th session of the 
Assembly that this growing recognition of the political 
dimension of the Palestinian problem gathered adequate 
strength to translate itself to the adoption of a 
Resolution recognising Ithe inalienable rights of the 
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Palestinians' . 
To these delegations' role one must also add members of the 
Secretariat that during this initial period enabled the 
Palestinian Arabs to gain indirect access to the Assembly. 
A remarkable development in respect to bringing the 
political aspects of the Palestinian problem to the 
attention of the Assembly came in 1968 when the Secretary 
General in his address to the Special Political Committee 
deplored the inability of the General Assembly to take any 
significant steps towards a solution of the problem of 
Palestine refugees who still, he noted, "had no homeland, 
no future and no hope". 30 The Commisioner General of UNRWA 
in his report in 1969, using cautious language, noted the 
political aspect of the unrest and frustration observed in 
UNRWA's camps 31 and added that there seemed to be a need to 
consult the representatives of the refugees. 32 
The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices 
Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the 
Occupied Territories set up in December 1969 was another 
body that allowed the Palestinians to have indirect access 
to the UN. 33 This Committee during its visits to the Middle 
East interviewed and consulted many Palestinian Arabs. 
Their first report reflected the frustration felt by the 
Palestinian Ar,abs of living under occupation without 
enjoying the right to self-determination.34 
The impact of the reports prepared by UNRWA and the 
Special Committee should not be underestimated. These 
reports, during their discussion by the Assembly, injected 
new and particularly detailed information on aspects of 
Palestinian life in the refugee camps and the occupied 
territories into the general debate on the Palestinian 
problem. By exposing delegations to new aspects of the 
Palestinian problem and forcing them to develop and express 
opinions, the information presented tOOK the content of the 
Assembly debates on the Palestinian problem well beyond the 
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usual deliberations on the narrow humanitarian and 
technical aspects of the refugee problem that had 
characterised most of the earlier debates. 
8.3.2 Direct Access 
The Palestinian Arabs beside this indirect access had also 
experienced direct access to the UN soon after the 
Palestinian Question was brought to the attention of the 
UN. The Arab Higher Committee together with the Jewish 
Agency had been invited to participate in the work of the 
Assembly concerning the Question of Palestine. 35 However, 
this situation did not last very long. Once Resolution 181 
(II) was adopted, Palestinian Arabs speaking on behalf of 
their own political organisations did not reappear until 
1965. The Special Political Committee of the Assembly, 
which traditionally has debated issues pertaining to the 
refugees in the Near East, began, after a long procedural 
debate, to invite the PLO and another group of Palestinians 
calling themselves the Palestine Arab Delegation to address 
the Committee. The PAD had already been receiving such 
invitations since November 1960. The delegation was 
composed of individuals who claimed to represent 
Palestinian Arab refugees. One such person was I.Tannous 
who since the 7th session of the Assembly had been 
appearing before the Special Political Committee. 36 
The invitations to the PLO and the Palestine Arab 
Delegation were extended on the clear understanding that it 
did not imply recognition of the organisations and they 
were limited simply to addressing the Special Political 
Committee of the Assembly.37 It nevertheless did give 
representatives of these organisations the possibility of 
expressing the views of the Palestinian Arabs and 
participate in the more informal aspects of the politics 
surrounding the debate. 
The direct participation of the representatives from these 
304 
two organisations affected politics at the General Assembly 
in the two ways. Firstly, both delegations injected the 
political dimension of the problem into the debates and 
contributed towards the radicalisation of opinions and-
views on the Palestinian question. This to a certain extent 
was reflected. in the increasing number of Arab, followed by 
Islamic and African, countries systematic references to the 
colonial nature of the problem and the Palestinian Arabs 
rights to self-determination. Secondly, as Table 8.4 
depicts the number of delegations sponsoring the renewed 
requests each session to invite the PLO steadily increased. 
This growing support for the PLO to address the SPC 
prepared the way for the eventual granting of observer 
status to the PLO. 
TABLE 8.4: Number of Countries Sponsoring PLO's 
Participation in the Work of the SPC 
1965 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Arabs 13 14 17 18 18 19 
Asians 3 8 10 9 9 
Africans 6 5 7 27 29 
L.Americans 1 1 2 6 4 
East Europe 2 10 10 11 10 
West Europe 1 
TOTAL 13 26 41 47 71 72 
It has already been noted that the General Assembly had 
began to look favourably to the participation of African 
national liberation movement in the work of the UN. The 
adoption of Resolution 3118 (XVIII), 12 December 1973, had 
led various specialised agencies to introduce measures to 
allow for the participation of African liberation movements 
in their work. 38 These measures had enabled the PLO to be 
invited as an observer to several UN specialised 
agencies. 39 However, the major breakthrough, which 
naturally was influenced by the above developments as well 
as the growing status of the PLO in other regional 
organisations, came about as a result of the adoption of 
Resolutions 3210 (XIX) of 14 October 1974 and 3237 (XIX) of 
22 November 1974. These two resolutions amounted to the 
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granting of a status of observership that went beyond the 
privileges enjoyed by other national liberation 
movements. 40 
Unlike the other national liberation movements, this status 
gave the PLO the possibili ty of participating in all 
sessions and debates of the Assembly. In practice, this 
came to include the right to make speeches, to circulate 
and receive documents, and to table draft resolutions with 
the cooperation of 'friendly' delegations. Although this 
status did not include the right to vote, it nevertheless 
opened the way to participation in and to influencing all 
stages of decision making at the Assembly. Furthermore, 
this status also allowed the PLO to bring up the issue of 
Palestinian rights in relation to other items on the 
agenda, such as matters concerning Southern Africa, and in 
the context of forums of specialised agencies. 
Beside the General Assembly, the Security Council is the 
other major main organ to which the PLO gained access. The 
PLO's participation in the work of the Security Council was 
first endorsed in the November 1975 majority statement 
delivered by the President of the Council which noted that 
the PLO would be invited to the next meeting of the 
Council.4l The nature of the PLO's participation, which was 
not clarified, became a highly contested issue when the 
Council next met in December 1975. 42 After a long 
procedural debate and by a vote of 9 in favour to 3 
against, with 3 abstentions, it was agreed that the PLO 
would be invited to the debates with "the same rights of 
participation as are conferred when a Member State is 
invited to participate under rule 37".43 This practice 
which was then repeated on numerous occasions enabled the 
PLO to participate in the Security Council debates 
concerning the Middle East and the rights of the 
Palestinians. 44 Although none of these meeting adopted 
resolutions recognising the political rights of the 
Palestinians, it nevertheless gave the PLO the possibility 
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of interacting directly with other representatives present 
at the Security Council debates. 
There are a number of advantages attached to having access 
to the Security Council. Firstly, unlike the General 
Assembly, the Security Council is organised in such a way 
that makes it possible to function continuously. This 
enables members of the UN to call for the convening of the 
Council practically at any time. Secondly, the role and the 
status of the Security Council within the UN and world 
politics gives issues brought to its attention an enhanced 
urgency and pUblicity. Thirdly, direct access to the 
Security Council gives the African liberation movements, 
and the PLO in particular, practical advantages, such as 
informal consultations, that are so crucial to the 
decision-making process at the Security Council. Especially 
given that, 
IIWestern Ambassadors regularly consult the 
representatives of the liberation movements at the 
United Nations, although some cautious ones, to avoid 
semblance of official recognition, send their deputies 
instead ll • 45 
A dramatic consequence of the PLOts ｰ｡ｾｴｩ｣ｩｰ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ in these 
consultations occurred when Andy Young the US 
representative and the impending President of the Council 
for August 1979, held a private meeting with the PLO 
representative in July that, in face of Israeli protests 
culminated in his resignation.46 Finally, the participation 
of an increasing number of Third World countries not 
members of the Council opens the possibility for national 
liberation movements and the PLO to benefit from the 
publicity and pressure eminating from political solidarity 
often expressed by these countries. 
8.3.3 Local and International violence 
Violence was another access route to the United Nations 
agenda for the Palestinian problem. From 1965 local 
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violence by the Palestinian resistance movement directed 
towards Israel from neighbouring countries and 
international violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
led to the frequent calling of Security Council meetings. 
During these meetings the Arab delegates were able to bring 
up and argue the point that the political dimension of the 
Palestinian problem was the cause of this violence. The 
membership of the Council became particularly receptive to 
these arguments after the 1967 Middle East War. Until then 
most of the members of the Council had gone along with the 
Israeli position that armed operations into Israel were 
breaches of armistice agreements between her and 
neighbouring Arab countries. However, in the aftermath of 
the 1967 war a different climate emerged which made Arab 
arguments, that portrayed these operations as reactions to 
alien domination, more acceptable. 
Armed Palestinian operations at the local and international 
levels was also brought up during the discussions of the 
agenda item on the 'Implementation of the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples'. One tangible consequence of these discussions was 
reflected in the adoption by the Assembly Resolution 2649 
(XXV) which recognised the legitimacy of the struggles of 
peoples under colonial and alien domination and condemned 
"those Governments that denied the right to self 
determination of peoples recognized as being entitled to 
it, especially the peoples of South Africa and 
Palestine".47 The phrase 'alien domination' which had not 
been included in the previous session's resolution on the 
same issue is generally agreed to have been especially 
introduced to cover the Palestinian case. 48 
Furthermore, the use of international violence by the 
Palestinian resistance movement was a major factor that 
gained the Palestinian problem access to the Assembly's 
Legal Committee and Plenary debates on terrorism in 1972.49 
Some delegations referred to aspects of the Palestinian 
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problem that related it to recognised national liberation 
struggles elsewhere. One such country was Algeria which 
played a major role in the eventual adoption of the 
Resolution stressing the legitimacy of national liberation 
struggles. 50 
These three different sets of access routes enabled the 
Palestinian.problem to appear on the agendas of the UN. 
This played an important role in increasing the awareness 
of delegations of the issue and also brought about the 
possibility of working towards cognitive linkages with 
other legitimised issues. This in itself contributed to 
influencing the perceptions of growing numbers of 
delegations in such away that it led them to apply their 
criteria-of legitimacy during the mobilisation of support 
for the Palestinian cause. 
8.4 Cognitive Linkages 
In the previous chapters the role of various cognitive 
linkages in the development of Third World, Eastern and 
Western European attitudes favourable to the Palestinian 
cause was closely examined. Particular importance was given 
to the growing assertion of similarities between the 
situation in Southern Africa and the Palestinian problem. 
This it was argued played a significant role in extending 
anti-colonial support for the Palestinian cause. In an 
effort to substantiate this observation an analysis of the 
decisions of various regional organisations on this matter 
was supplemented by a quantitative analysis of voting at 
the United Nations General Assembly concerning the 
relationship between the two issues. 
This section, to avoid any duplication, will primarily 
examine the decision-making process that extended the 
coverage of the decolonisation struggle to include the 
Palestinian cause. Therefore, the emphasis will be on the 
inputs, in the form of significant speeches and draft 
309 
resolutions, into the decision-making process and emerging 
outputs in the form of adopted resolutions, rather than an 
analysis of each delegation's voting behaviour. This has 
already been done in Appendix II and the results have been 
used in the previous chapters. 
The fifteenth session of the General Assembly was a crucial 
year in the struggle against decolonisation and in the 
development of anti-colonial thinking because it saw 
seventeen newly independent countries join the UN as well 
as the adoption of Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries. This 
resolution, which was also known as the Declaration on 
Decolonisation, noted that "All peoples have the right to 
self-determination" and proclaimed "the necessity of 
bringing to a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism 
in all its forms and manifestations".51 The adoption of 
this resolution without any opposition is generally 
regarded as an indication of the change in attitudes 
towards the right to self-determination in the UN and also 
a landmark in the recognition of the growing legitimacy of 
the struggle for decolonisation. 52 
This Declaration precipitated a series of decisions and 
measures which granted particular support and legitimacy to 
the struggles of the peoples and national liberation 
movements against the situation arising from the policies 
of the Portugase, South African and Rhodesian governments. 
The Palestinian struggle remained excluded from this until 
1970.53 This is no surprise considering that as late as in 
1967 the Assembly still considered the Palestinians as 
refugees and victims of the conflict between Israel and the 
Arab states. This attitude is quite conspicuous in an 
Indian diplomats criticisms, during the Emergency Special 
Session, of Arab intransigence and his treatement of the 
refugee problem as a natural outcome of war. 54 He argued 
for the need lito offer realistic assistance to resettle the 
Arab refugees" and claimed that 
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"in human terms this is no means an insoluble problem. 
As we observed the number of refugees is nowhere 
nearly as large as those in other parts of the world. 
Moreover, there are underpopulated areas in the Middle 
East.,,55 
Hence, the Palestinian problem in he eyes of many 
delegations remained a by-product of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. This re fugee status for the Palestinians was 
reinforced by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 
242. 
Those Palestinian representatives allowed to address the 
Special Political Committee had since 1963 been arguing the 
need for the Assembly . to recognise their political rights 
as a people. The consequences of the 1967 war added a 
greater urgency and precipitated two developments. Firstly, 
during the 22nd session of the Assembly the Palestinians 
argued that their problem was not one of refugees but one 
resulting from the denial of their right to self-
determination guaranteed by the Charter as well as the 
Declaration on Decolonisation. 56 The second development 
occurred during the following session when they, with the 
added confidence of increased resistance activities in 
Palestine, 57 took their arguments one step further by 
drawing similarities between their struggle and the 
struggle of the various Afro-Asian peoples against colonial 
and foreign occupation. 58 A number of Arab delegations 
particularly from radical Arab countries argued along 
similar lines both at the Security Council and the General 
Assembly. 59 
Although the 24th session saw an intensification of the 
arguments stressing the anti-colonial nature of the 
Palestinians struggle for self-determination, it was not 
until the 25th session that this became recognised by the 
Assembly. During the deliberation on the agenda item 
entitled "Implementation of Recommendations of the 
International Conference on Human Rights" the Third 
Committee recommended to the Assembly an Afro-Asian 
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resolution which, inter alia, condemned governments which 
deny the right to self-determination to peoples "recognized 
as being entitled to it, especially the peoples of Southern 
Africa and Palestine.,,60 The inclusion of the word 
"Palestine" had been challenged by Israel but at a 
subsequent vote requested by Costa Rica on the whole phrase 
lIespecially by the peoples of South Africa and Palestine ll 
was then retained by a vote of 49 in favour to 22 against, 
with 35 abstentions.6l According to Mallisons, the 
Illegal effect of this significant resolution is that 
the prior resolutions setting forth the basic right of 
self-determination, resolutions 1514 and 2625 ... , are 
now specially applicable to the Palestinian people"62 
Some further weight to the linkage between colonial 
struggles and the Palestinian one was added when the 
Assembly at the recommendation of the Fourth Committee 
adopted Resolution 2708 (XX), on 14 December 1970, which 
reaffirmed the Assembly's "recognition of the legitimacy of 
the struggle of the colonial peoples and peoples under 
alien domination to exercise their right to self-
determination". The phrase "alien domination" was inserted 
at the request of the Afghan delegation and was generally 
meant to cover the Palestinian people. 63 It was during the 
following session that the Assembly endorsed "the legality 
and the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian 
people for self-determination" in an explicit manner when 
it adopted Resolution 2787 (XXVI), on 6 December 1971.64 
Beside the incorporation of the Palestinian people's 
struggle into decisions supportive of national liberation 
struggles in Southern Africa by the 26th session, non-Arab 
delegations, too, began in their speeches to note 
similarities between the regimes of South Africa and 
Israel. The Byelorussian representative drew parallels 
between what they described as 'the policies of racial and 
national superiority' pursued by South Africa and by 
Israel. He noted that Israel was pursuing a policy similar 
to the policy of Bantustans in South Africa.65 However, the 
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most dramatic development in respect to the assertion of 
similarities between South Africa and Israel carne in 1973. 
Firstly, Resolution 3175 (XXVIII), of 17 December 1973 
that had been sponsored by Non-Aligned countries, became 
very critical of Israelis policies in the occupied 
territories and in its last paragraph declared that the 
principles mentioned in the resolution were applicable to 
'all states, territories and peoples under foreign 
occupation, colonial rule and apartheid ' . Secondly, the 
political implications of the last paragraph suggesting 
similarities between the situation in Israeli occupied 
territories and that in South Africa was further 
strengthened when the representatives of Upper Volta asked 
for a separate vote and declared the purpose of the vote to 
be a means for identifying the unshakable supporters of 
Portugal and South Africa. 66 Ninety four countries 
supported the motion while Israel, Nicaragua, Portugal and 
the US opposed it. In the light of this it is not 
surprising that a large number of African and Asian 
countries supported the inclusion in Resolution 31S1G 
(XXVIII) of an amendment condemning the "unholy alliance 
between Portugese colonialism, South African racism, 
zionism and Israeli imperialism".67 
The establishment of cognitive linkages between the 
problems of South Africa and Palestine was a major factor 
that contributed to the growth of support for the 
Palestinians. For the Third World, East Europeans and some 
West Europeans anti-colonialism as a belief system had 
become a primary source of reference in defining their 
attitudes towards a variety of problems. Once similarities 
between the situation in the occupied territories and 
particularly South Africa were accepted a growing number of 
delegations began to apply their anti-colonial criteria to 
their perceptions and decisions concerning the nature of 
the Palestinian problem. In that context the Palestinian 
problem ceased to be a refugee problem. Instead it became a 
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problem of a people struggling to achieve self-
determination not unlike the national liberation struggles 
of various peoples in Southern Africa. 
Furthermore, the policies of Israel particularly in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip became increasingly seen as 
policies designed to deny the Palestinians their right to 
self-determination. This contributed towards a change in 
Third World perceptions of Israel. Furthermore, links 
between Israel and South Africa became increasingly singled 
out for criticism as signs of an alliance to perpetuate 
repression in these two parts of the world. These points 
were expressed in a stark manner in Resolution 3324 E 
(XXIX) which condemned relations between the two countries 
and received the 6verwhelming support of the Third World 
with the exception of a few Latin Americans. 68 As Israel 
became more and more likened to South Africa, its 
favourable image became eroded at the cost of increased 
support for the Palestinian cause. The process gained so 
much strength that to continue to support Israel while 
condemning South Africa became a source of anomaly in 
itself, a position incompatible with anti-colonial thinking 
and behaviour.69 
8.5 Growth of Support 
8.5.1 The Period from 1947 to 1967 
The political rights of the Palestinian Arabs on a part of 
Palestine had been recognised by Resolution 181 (II), 
however, very quickly these rights drifted into obscurity. 
By the third session of the Assembly, the Palestinian 
Ouestion was being tranformed from one that sought a 
'future government of Palestine' to one that sought a 
solution to the refugee problem as defined in Resolution 
194 (III). However, the Assembly did not stop there, during 
the fifth session it adopted Resolution 394 (V) that 
recommended a solution to the 'refugee problem' not through 
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repatriation but by resettling substantial numbers of 
Palestinian Arab refugees. This new position was much 
closer to the Israeli one that claimed the Palestinians 
had the whole Arab World to settle in. By the seventh 
session the process of redefining the issue reached a 
climax when 'the Question of Palestine', an agenda item 
that had originally symbolised the search to satisfy the 
political aspirations of both the Palestinian Arabs and 
Jewish people, was dropped. 70 The Western European and 
Latin American members even attempted to invalidate the 
applicability of previous UN resolutions particularly 
Resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (111).71 Although this attempt 
failed in practical terms the Western countries had set the 
parameters defining the problem. 
In the mid-1960s there had been some signs of the 
beginnings of a change in attitudes towards the acceptance 
of the definition of the Palestinian problem in its 
prevailing form. The Palestinian Arabs had began to appear 
before the Special Political Committee and argue strongly 
in favour of the political nature of the refugee problem. 
Their arguments by the 20th session had gained some ground 
as Afghanistan and Malaysia sponsored a draft resolution 
favourable 'to the Palestinian Arabs. 72 However, in general 
the Assembly, including many Africans, remained reluctant 
to recognise the Palestinian problem as anything other than 
an off-shoot of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is strongly 
reflected in the way in which some Africans did not 
hesitate to join West European countries in supporting the 
idea of direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, during the 
eighteenth session.73 
Furthermore, the 1967 war in some ways reinforced in the 
eyes of the majority of the Assembly the centrality of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Lall in his study of the speeches of 
the delegates during the Fifth Emergency Special Session in 
1967 identified seven different approches towards the 
possible solution of the crisis.74 Mostly, these approaches 
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related to posi tions taken on matters concerning the 
withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories, the means 
of achieving a just and durable peace, and the issue of 
freedom of navigation through the straits of Aqaba. None of 
these approaches tackled the Palestinian question in a form 
other than the expression, particularly on the part of West 
European and Latin American delegations, of humani tarian 
concern for the refugees. 75 
The Arabs, on the other hand, during the deliberations of 
the Emergency Special Session, did not separately 
articulate the political rights of the Palestinian Arabs. 76 
Although in the past there had been some references on the 
part of Arab representatives to the right of self-
determination of the Palestinian Arabs it seemed these 
rights were not taken up separately.77 Instead they were 
subsumed within the uncompromising challenge offered to the 
very existence of Israel whose presence in their midst was 
described as an aggression. 78 However, during the Security 
Council deliberations in November 1967 this situation began 
to change as the political rights of the Palestinians 
received greater attention from Arab delegations. 
In this, the role of the Arab Summit at Khartoum in August 
1967 needs to be noted. The Arab Summit, after an eventful 
debate centred around the Palestinian problem, had adopted 
a resolution that determined the guidelines for future 
policies towards Israel, which amongst other points 
included "an insistence on the rights of the Palestinian 
people in their own country".79 It was against this 
background that Egypt forcefully argued that the central 
issue in the Middle Eastern Conflict was the expulsion of 
the people of Palestine and the need to ensure 'the 
Palestinian Arabs' right to self-determination,.80 This 
line of argument received only some support from the Mali 
representative which called for the need to restore the 
inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. Hence there 
was inadequate support to influence the content and 
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eventual adoption of Resolution 242, which continued to 
treat the Palestinian problem as a by product of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 
8.5.2 The period between the wars of 1967 and 1973 
8.5.2.1 The Security Council 
The period between the two Middle Eastern wars was marked 
by a rapid change in attitudes towards the nature of the 
Palestinian problem. The Palestinian problem from as early 
as 1968 began to occupy the attention of various parts of 
the UN. The increased resistance operations of the 
Palestinian guerrilla groups and Israeli reprisals led to 
numerous Security Council meetings precipitating debates on 
the causes of violence in the area. 81 Growing number of 
non-Arab delegations participating in the debates argued 
that the acts of violence were a natural reaction to 
occupation.82 Some African delegations joined the Arabs in 
arguing that resistance operations represented the 
Palestinians' struggle to achieve their right to se1f-
determination while Israeli reprisals reflected the 
colonial nature of its regime.83 By 1973 there was general 
agreement amongst even some permanent members of the 
Security Council that the Palestinian problem was political 
in its essence and hence Resolution 242 needed to be 
modified to accomodate this.84 
These developments took a concrete form during a Security 
Council debate in June 1973. At this meeting, which was 
attended by a large number of African countries, in itself 
a sign of the increasing salience of the Palestinian 
problem to the Third World, a Non-Aligned sponsored draft 
resolution, was tab1ed. 85 The resolution, inter alia, 
expressed its conviction that a just and peaceful solution 
to the' problem of the t1idd1e East could be achieved only on 
the basis of "respect for national sovereignity, 
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territorial integrity, the rights of all states in the area 
and for the rights and legitimate aspirations of the 
Palestinians". 86 The draft resolution which reflected a 
compromise between the position of radical Arab countries, 
such as Algeria and Syria, and the content of Resolution 
242 failed when the US cast the only opposing vote.87 
8.5.2.2 The General Assembly 
The General Assembly became the forum within which various 
aspects of the Palestinian problem was debated, views 
expressed and opinions formulated, culminating in the 
growth of support for the Palestinian cause. The 
deliberations surrounding, particularly the agenda item 
entitled "Assistance to refugees in the Near East" 
transformed the Special Political Committee into a major 
forum for the discussion of the political aspects of the 
Palestinian problem. This became quite evident during the 
24th session of the Assembly. Until then the resolutions 
recommended by the Special Political Committee had not gone 
beyond the expression of support for the refugees' right to 
return to their homes. 
It was at this session that the arguments put forward by 
the Palestinian Arabs and Arab dele9ations stressing the 
poli tical nature of the Palestinian problem began to bear 
fruit. Firstly, a number of non-Arab delegations made 
speeches indicating the change occuring in attitudes held 
towards the Palestinian problem. This is probably best 
reflected in the position taken by France and the Soviet 
Union. Both delegations, while continuing to express 
support for Resolution 242, . also acknowledged the 
essentially political nature of the Palestinian problem.88 
The Soviet Union went even further and, for the first time, 
noted that the Palestinian Arabs had the right to exercise 
self-determination as much as Israel had the right to 
exist. 89 Secondly, the Assembly saw the adoption of 
Resolution 2535 B (XXIV), om 10 December 1969. Even though 
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this resolution was adopted with a very small majority, it 
ｮ･ｶｾｲｴｨ･ｬ･ｳｳ＠ was the first resolution to explicitly refer 
to 'the inalienable rights of the Palestinians'. 
At the 25th session the Assembly in Resolution 2672 C (XXV) 
of 8 December 1970 expanded the 'inalienable rights' of the 
Palestinian people to include the right to self-
determination and in Resolution 2628 (XXV) of 4 November 
1970 declared the need to respect the rights of the 
Palestinian people in establishing a just and lasting peace 
in the Middle East. This session also saw the Palestinian 
problem taken up by the Third Committe during its 
deliberation of the agenda item concerning the 
implementation of the recommendations of the International 
Conference on Human Rights. On the recommendation of the 
Third Committee the Assembly adopted Resolution 2649 (XXV) 
of 30 November 1970 which extended the application of the 
Declaration on Decolonisation to the Palestinian problem by 
recognising the Palestinians as a people entitled to self-
determination. 
Between the 24th and 28th sessions of the Assembly the 
content of resolutions supportive of the political rights 
of the Palestinians became more and more comprehensive as 
well as receiving growing support. The growing support of 
the Assembly is depicted in Tables 8.5 to 8.7. Both the 
Africans and Asians increasingly lent their support to the 
Palestinian cause. Amongst the Third World countries it was 
the Latin Americans that remained reluctant to extend full 
support for the Palestinians as a group. They were 
generally divided with substantial sections of the Latin 
Americans either supporting or maintaining a intermediate 
position. This in many ways is not surprising considering 
that the Latin ｾｭ･ｲｩ｣｡ｮｳ＠ as late as the 26th session were 
prepared to table a resolution supported by Israel. This 
draft resolution if adopted would have called for direct 
negotiations between the Arab governments and Israel.90 
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TABLE 8.5: Distribution of Support by Regional Groupings 
at the 24th Session* 
West Latin Africa Asia East 
European American Europe 
% % % % % 
Highly Pro-Pals. 14 5 35 71 100 
Medium Pro-Pals. 7 
Intermediate 10 26 17 21 
Medium Pro-Isr. 67 21 14 7 
Highly Pro-Isr. 10 47 28 
No. of Countries 21 19 29 14 10 
TABLE 8.6: Distribution of Support by Regional Groupings 
at the 26th Session* 
West Latin Africa Asia East 
European American Europe 
% % % % % 
Highly Pro-Pals. 14 10 23 58 100 
Hedium Pro-Pals. 33 5 23 24 
Intermediate 14 35 31 18 
Medium Pro-Isr. 29 15 15 
Highly Pro-Isr. 10 35 8 
No. of Countries 21 20 26 17 9 
TABLE 8.7: ｄｩｳｴｲｩ｢ｵｴｾｯｮ＠ of Support by Regional Groupings 
at the 28th Session* 
West Latin Africa Asia East 
European American Europe 
% % % % % 
Highly Pro-Pals. 14 39 96 81 100 
Medium Pro-Pals. 14 11 4 Jq. 
Intermediate 68 22 
Medium Pro-Pals. 11 
Highly Pro-Pals. 5 17 
No. of Countries 21 18 25 16 10 
* Percentages are based upon countries meeting the minimum 
attendance levels. 
The Western Europeans, on the other hand, moved away from 
a position whereby a substantial proportion remained 
supportive of the Israelis to one that was slightly 
favourable to the Palestinians. The East Euopeans 
constituted the only non-Arab group that throughout the 
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period maintained a pro-Palestinian position. 
8.5.3 Post 1973 
If the previous period was characterised by a rapid change 
in attitudes towards the nature of the Palestinian problem 
and growth of support for the Palestinian right to self-
determination, the post 1973 period was one during which 
the recognition of the political rights of the Palestinians 
not only became consolidated but also was clearly 
elaborated to include the right to establish a state. The 
'Palestinian Question', as an independent item was 
reintroduced to the plenary level of the Assembly and the 
problem was also taken up the Security Council, ECOSOC and 
the Specialised Agencies. Furthermore, this was the period 
when the PLO became recognised as lithe legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people" and was granted 
the right to participate in the work of practically all the 
bodies making up the UN system. 
8.5.3.1 The Security Council 
The Security Council deliberations following the October 
War had attracted some speeches supporting the need to take 
into consideration the rights of the Palestinians. However, 
the eventual Security Council decision that emerged did not 
mention the political rights of the Palestinians in any 
way. Instead Resolution 338 (1973), 22 October 1973, called 
for a cease fire and the implementation of Resolution 242. 
This in many ways set the limits for future Security 
Council decisions. Although numerous broadly supported 
attempts to expand Resolution 242 to include the political 
rights of the Palestinians were made between 1973 and 1980 
US vetoes ensured that such proposals did not get 
adopted. 91 
Yet, it would be misleading to suggest that the Palestinian 
problem did not receive any recognition at all just because 
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the US prevented the adoption of formal decisions 
recognising the political rights of the Palestinians. 
Although, the political and legal weight of a Council 
resolution can not be denied, the position of the remaining 
members of the Council did play a certain role in relation 
to attitude formation and the mobilisation process. 
The post 1973 period became the one during which the 
Palestinian question entered the agenda of the Security 
Council and most members acknowledged the right of the 
Palestinians to self-determination in one form or the 
other. The Security Council debate in January 1976 is a 
good case in point. On this occasion a variety of 
formulations on the- question of self-determination emerged. 
France held the view that the Palestinian people's right to 
Ian independent home1and ' had to be recognised. The Soviet 
Union took a stronger view and noted that it was "a 
legitimate national right of the Palestinians to create 
their own state", while the UK limited itself to the 
necessity of recognising lithe right of the Palestinian 
people to express their national identity" without 
indicating what form this expression was to take. The East 
Europeans and Non-Aligned countries who participated in the 
debate mostly supported the idea of an independent 
Palestinian State. This became particularly conspicuous 
when Romania and Non-Aligned countries tabled a draft 
resolution which called for, among other things, respect 
for the Palestinian people's 'right to establish a State in 
Palestine'. Nine countries supported the draft resolution 
including France while the US voted against with the other 
West Europeans abstaining. 92 
The obstacle caused by the US vetoes throughout the second 
half of the 1970s finally precipitated the calling of an 
Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly in July 
1980. The Security Council had met in March and April 
during which a large number of delegations had made 
repeated calls for a resolution going beyond the provisions 
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of Resolution 242. 93 However, a Tunisian draft resolution 
reflecting these positions was vetoed by the US. 94 
Subsequently, Senegal called for the convening of an 
Emergency Special Session invoking the 'Uniting for Peace' 
Resolution. The session met in July and adopted Resolution 
ES 7/2 by a vote of 112 in favour to 7 against with 24 
'abstentions which recognised the right of the Palestinian 
people "to exercise their right to self-determination 
including the right to an independent state.,,95 
Beside the fact that the Security Council did become a 
forum where the Palestinian problem was discussed one other 
developmentoccurred with important implications to the 
mobilisation process. The procedural decisions on the 
participation in the Council of states, bodies and persons 
from outside the Council call only for nine votes and are 
not subject to a veto. This enabled the Council to allow 
the PLO to participate in its deliberations. This in itself 
can be regarded as a significant development in respect to 
the Palestinian problem. Firstly, the invitation accorded 
to the PLO can be seen as a recognition of the PLOt s 
centrality to the question. Secondly, it gave the PLO the 
possibility of raising the rights of the Palestinians 
directly in the -most prestigious main organ of the UN. 
Hence, it gained effective status for lobbying and 
mobilising support for the cause it represents. Thirdly, 
to invite a non-state entity to participate in the work of 
the Council as if it was a state can be regarded as 
according a significant degree of prestige to the PLO. 
8.5.3.2 The General Assembly 
It was the General Assembly within the UN family that 
became the major focus of attention. The 29th session of 
the Assembly began with two significant ､ｾｶ･ｬｯｰｭ･ｮｴｳ＠ that 
set a pattern for the post 1973 period. Firstly, the 
ｾｳｳ･ｭ｢ｬｹ＠ at the request of 56 countries asked the Secretary 
General to include an item entitled "Question of Palestine" 
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on the agenda. 96 Secondly, this new agenda item, having 
been allocated directly for debate in the plenary, the 
Assembly was also asked to consider a proposal put forward 
by 72 delegations inviting the PLO as the representative of 
the Palestinian people to participate in the Assembly's 
deliberations concerning the item. 97 The proposal was 
adopted by 105 votes in favour to 4 against with 20 
abstentions as Resolution 3210 (XXIX), on 14 October 1974. 
These developments were significant for three reasons. 
Firstly, the 'Question of Palestine', after having been 
excluded from the formal agenda of the General Assembly 
since the seventh session, was reintroduced. Secondly, the 
high salience of the issue to a large majority in Assembly 
was evident in the allocation of the item to the plenary 
and in' the active participation of a great number of 
delegations in the debate. Thirdly, it culminated in the 
adoption of resolutions recognising the right of the 
Palestinian people to national independence and granting 
the PLO observer status with the Assembly. 
Resolution 3236 (XXIX), of 22 November 1974, affirmed lithe 
inalienable rights of the Palestinian people" including 
their 'right to national independence ' . This ｲｾｳｯｬｵｴｩｯｮ＠
adopted by a vote of 89 in favour to 8 against, with 37 
abstentions took the political rights of the Palestinians 
one significant step further compared to the previous 
session. Although in the previous session Resolution 3089 D 
(XVIII), of 7 December 1973, referring to the political 
rights of the Palestinians had received approximately the 
same level of support in a vote of 87 in favour to 6 
against, with 33 abstentions, the new one was different on 
four substantive points. It recognised; 
i) the right to national independence and sovereignty 
rather than the more general reference to 'the right 
to self-determination I. 
ii) the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people 
are indispensable for the solution of the Question of 
Palestine and that the Palestinian people was a 
principal party in the establishment of a just and 
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lasting peace, previously the 'Palestinian people ' was 
not referred to as 'the principal body'. 
iii) the right of the Palestinian people to regain its 
rights by all means in accordance with-the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
iv) and it appealed to all states and international 
organisations to extend their support to the 
Palestinian people in its struggle to restore their 
rights in accordance with the Charter. 
The first two points expanded and redefined the political 
.rights of the Palestinians while the last two were 
completely new elements. Resolutions on the 'Importance of 
the Universal Realization of the Right to self-
Determination' and 'the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples ' had regularly raised these last two points in 
respect to people under colonial and alien domination. 
However, it was the first time that these points had been 
raised directly within the context of the 'Question of 
Palestine' . 
In the second new development in 1974, the Assembly 
adopted, by a vote of 95 in favour to 17 against with, 19 
abstentions, a resolution which accorded the PLO the status 
of a permanent observer. The PLO, as it was noted earlier 
on, had already been invited to attend a number of UN 
Conferences and had also been participating in the work of 
a number of Third World regional organisations. In the 
context of the UN, this resolution enabled the PLO to 
participate "in the sessions and the work of the General 
Assembly, .•. of all international conferences convened 
under the auspices of the Assembly and of other organs" in 
the capacity of a permanent observer.98 
This development had two consequences. Firstly, it meant 
that the PLO gained access to practically all parts of the 
UN, enabling it to raise various aspects of the Palestinian 
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problem in a variety of forums. 99 Secondly, it has also 
meant that the PLO has had to develop and articulate 
policy on many issues. The first factor ensured that the 
Palestinian issue reached numerous UN agendas and opened 
possibilities for the PLO delegations to develop networks 
of communications and engage in a wide range of lobbying. 
The second consequence meant that the PLO, or at least 
their delegations at the UN, became absorbed in a 
socialisation process that contributed towards the 
development amongst certain Palestinian circles of 
preferences for the achievement of a solution to the 
Palestinian problem by diplomatic rather than violent 
means. 100 
Two further developments occurred during the remaining 
parts of the period under study. Firstly, by Resolution 
3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, the PLO was invited to 
participate in all UN efforts to solve the Middle East 
problem, on an equal footing with other parties. This 
became an endorsement of the centrality of the PLO in 
efforts directed towards the resolution of the Hiddle East 
conflict. The Palestinian problem was not any more a by-
product of Arab-Israeli wars but the main and central 
element in the conflict. Secondly, the Assembly in 
Resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, having declared 
the Palestinian problem a threat to international peace, 
decided to establish the Committee on the Exercise of the 
Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The Committee 
which was composed of 22 members, subsequently enlarged to 
24, was given the dut.y of considering and recommending to 
the General Assembly a programme for the implementation of 
the rights of the Palestinian people. 
The Committee, which was composed mostly of Non-Aligned 
countries, played a crucial role in the further expansion 
of the political rights of the Palestinian people from 'the 
right to national independence' to the clearer and firmer 
expression of 'the right to establish a State'. Over the 
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years during the discussions of the reports prepared by the 
Committee, an increasing number of delegations began to 
refer to an 'independent Palestinian State'. These points 
were eventually taken up by the 7th Emergency Special 
Session resolution in July 1980. Although, this resolution 
was far from receiving unanimous support it nevertheless 
recognised and defined the basis of a future Palestinian 
state that would be established in parts of Palestine 
occupied by Israel in June 1967. 
A further development was the spread of the Palestinian 
problem to other parts of the UN. It did not remain an 
issue limited to the General Assembly in plenary and to the 
Security Council. As Sharif notes the Palestinian issue 
came "to permeate all major UN General Assembly Committees, 
subsidiary committees and commissions as well as 
agencies".lOl The diagram below shows the parts of the UN 
which have dealt with the Palestinian issue. Sharif's 
version of the diagram excludes certain parts of the UN 
that ought to be included to produce a more complete 
ｰｾ｣ｴｵｲ･＠ of the relationship between various parts of the UN 
and the Palestinian problem. 
Firstly, Sharif appears to exclude the Sixth Committee of 
the General Assembly, the Legal Committee, from his 
diagram. However, considering that this committee took up 
the problem of terrorism which led certain delegations to 
bring up the Palestinian problem during the deliberations 
to define terrorism it seems that the figure needs to be 
enlarged to include the Legal Committee as well. Secondly, 
as a result of the implementations of Resolutions 3237 
(XXIX) and 3247 (XXIX) the PLO gained access to practically 
all Specialised Agencies with the exception of GATT, the 
IMF and the World Bank. The fact that the nature of this 
access gave the PLO the possibility of raising the 
Palestinian problem formally as well as informally warrants 
the inclusion of the other Specialised Agencies, which have 
been left out. Finally, Resolution 3237 (XIX) also entitled 
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the PLO to participate in the work of UN Conferences called 
under auspices of the General Assembly. The above additions 
should be made to complete the picture that shows the 
extent to which the Palestinian issue has penetrated the UN 
system. 
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Diagram 8.1: The UN system as it relates to the 
Palestinian probleml02 -
As Table 8.8 shows beside the fact that the Palestinian 
problem became a major issue on the UN agenda and the 
content of Assembly resolutions grew in strength 
throughout the 1970s, the political support expressed in 
votes for the Palestinian cause increased too. The major 
changes occurred amongst the divided 'West Europeans and 
others Group' and the Latin Americans. In the case of the 
Western group substantive numbers of relatively pro-
Israeli countries moved to a 'intermediate' position while 
a group of mostly South Europeans continued to maintain 
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their pro-Palestinian position. It should be noted that 
the group of countries with a intermediate position were 
mostly European Community countries. In their Venice 
Declaration of June 1980 they had formally recognised lithe 
right of the Palestinians to self-determination" but then 
abstained on most General Assembly resolutions because they 
believed these resolutions did not adequately state the 
right of Israel to exist. 
TABLE 8.8: Distribution of support across two sessions* 
West Latin Africa Asia 
Europe America 
1974 1980 1974 1980 1974 1980 1974 1980 
% % % % % % % % 
Highly pro-Pals. 19 22 44 87 96 98 88 91 
Medium pro-Pals. 24 17 19 4 2 12 9 
Intermediate 24 52 19 9 4 
Medium pro-Isr. 29 4 
Highly pro-Isr. 5 4 19 
No. of Countries 21 23 16 23 23 36 17 23 
*Percentages are based upon countries meeting the 
minimum attendance levels. 
The change in Latin American views was of a particularly 
dramatic nature as 87% of Latin American countries had 
become pro-Palestinian by 1980 compared to 44% in 1974. 
Furthermore, many Latin American countries which had been 
pro-Israeli in the previous period and had maintained 
strong diplomatic ties with Israel moved to a intermediate 
position.l03 No doubt in this the influence of the Non-
Aligned Movement, particularly in getting some Latin 
American members of the Movement to recognise the cognitive 
linkage between colonial struggles and the Palestinian 
struggle was central. To this, one also needs to add the 
pressure generated by high support for the Palestinian 
cause amongst the rest of the Third World. This has 
resul ted, on the part of some Latin Americans, in a 
concern about being associated with positions regarded as 
untenable within the anti-colonial stance of the Non-
aligned Movement. 
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8.6 Conclusion 
The Palestinians from the very early days of the UN enjoyed 
either direct or indirect access to the General Assembly. 
However, in a Western and Latin American dominated UN this 
accessibility was not enough to prevent the Palestinian 
problem from loosing its political nature. Third World 
membership to the UN began to increase at a time whep the 
Palestinian problem in the minds of most delegations was 
firmly entrenched as a by-product of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict that required a technical-humanitarian solution. 
Hence, the increase in Third World membership did not 
immediately change the attitudes held towards the 
Palestinian problem. Instead it precipitated a process that 
began to change the structure as well as the concerns of 
the UN. 
Most issues of concern to the North, such as Cold War 
related matters, became overtaken by matters concerning 
decolonisation and economic development. The change in the 
membership precipitated structural changes that led the 
Third World to have a greater say in decision making as 
well as in attitude formation. This brought about a 
conducive environment for a mobilisation process to alter 
the image held of the Palestinian problem to gain ground. 
It was also during the 19605 that a new Palestinian 
national movement began to emerge. The Palestinian 
delegations derived from this movement coupled with radical 
Arab delegations began to project a different image of the 
Palestinian problem. They began to stress the political 
nature of the problem and in the context of the growing 
resistance movement in Palestine described the problem as a 
national liberation against occupation and a struggle for 
self-determination. As these delegations argued the 
similarities between the situation in Palestine and in 
other places experiencing colonial dominations their 
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arguments gradually found a receptive audience prepared to 
use their anti-colonial values in judging the nature of the 
Palestinian problem. 
The establishment of a cognitive linkage between the 
Palestinian problem and other colonial problems became a 
source of support for the Palestinian cause. Naturally, 
this too did not happen overnight. The first signs in the 
form of Assembly decisions appeared in the late 1960s when 
with small majorities the Palestinian Arabs became 
recognised as a people entitled to self-determination as 
guaranteed by the Decolonisation Declaration. First it was 
mostly countries closely associated with the Arabs and in 
the fore front of the anti-colonial struggle that lend 
their support. Through this first basis of support the 
Palestinians gained access to a larger audience that became 
expressed to efforts directed towards achieving some degree 
of cognitive congruence in their perception of problems of 
Southern Africa and the Palestinian problem. 
In this chapter the mobilisation process that changed the 
image of the Palestinian problem held by the Assembly was 
examined with very little attention to the possible impact 
of interactions between mobilisation at different levels. 
It is the purpose of the final chapter to examine this 
interaction and see whether the mobilisation process has 
been one of a linear nature or whether all levels have 
interacted and fed on each other. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
So far, in the second part of the thesis the mobilisation 
process, aimed at changing governmental attitudes towards 
the Palestinian problem and the aggregation of support 
associated with this process, have been examined. This was 
done by applying the mobilisation process model, developed 
in chapter three, to the Palestinian, the regional and the 
UN levels of analysis. Yet during this analysis neither the 
interaction between individual levels of mobilisation nor 
the feedback processes within each level were studied in 
detail. It is the main purpose of this concluding chapter 
to examine these two aspects of the mobilisation process. 
Furthermore, the chapter will also reconsider certain parts 
of the mobilisation model in the light of insights obtained 
from its application to the Palestinian case. This will be 
done in an effort to achieve a better conceptualisation of 
how issues are raised on the political agenda. Finally, to 
complete the general picture of how an item reaches the 
global political agenda the need to expand the analysis 
beyond governmental actors will be noted. 
9.2 Interactive nature of the growth of support 
One striking conclusion that emerges from the application 
of the mobilisation process model to the Palestinian case 
is that the aggregation of support across the different 
levels of analysis was far from heing uniform and perfectly 
hierarchical. During the earlier stages of this research it 
was expected that the mobilisation of support for the 
Palestinian cause would grow in a multi step-wise manner, 
from one level of analysis to another. As depicted in 
diagram 9.1 it was speculated that the Palestinian 
community would be the first group to become mobilised 
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followed by the Arabs then those groups such as the 
Islamic world, the Non-Aligned and then the Third World at 
large. This it was thought would continue until adequate 
global support was mobilised to reflect itself at the UN 
level. 
UN 
Other Groups 
Non-Aligned 
Islamic 
Arab 
Palestinian 
Diagram 9.1 Growth of support across different levels 
represented as multi step-function 
However, the analysis emerging from the preceding chapters 
has to a large extent undermined this line of thought. 
Instead a more complex and fluid picture of the 
mobilisation process has emerged. One that is rather 
difficult to represent by a multi step-function aggregation 
of support. Instead the different levels appear to interact 
with each other in a dynamic manner. That is expressions of 
support at both a lower level as well as at a higher level 
appear to influence each other. It is possible to group 
these interactions into three. Those that occur: 
i) from a lower level. to a higher one, 
ii) between regional levels, 
iii) from a higher level to a lower one. 
9.2.1 From a lower level to a higher one 
The best example of a flow of support from a lower level to 
a higher one is represented by the aggregation of votes to 
change policy in an international organisation. This 
347 
t 
process is quite evident in the workings of the UN General 
Assembly. In organisations where no votes are taken this 
process usually takes the form of consensus building in 
favour of a change in attitudes as reflected in the 
decision-making processes of the OAU and the Non-Aligned 
movement. 
The second type of interaction occurs when an actor 
belonging to a lower level of analysis such as the PLO is 
capable of demonstrating to an actor belonging to higher 
level of analysis such as an Arab government or a regional 
political grouping that it is the recipient of a high level 
of Palestinian support, leading to such an actor expressing 
support in favour of the PLO and/or the Palestinian cause. 
An example of such a process ｾｩｳ＠ the recognition of the 
PLO by the Non-Aligned as 'the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people' at their Algiers summit in September 
1973. This ex?ression of support for the PLO accompanied 
with the granting of Observer status seems to have been 
significantly influenced by the growing strength of the PLO 
amongst the Palestinians, which was conspicously expressed 
during demonstrations precipitated by the deaths of three 
?rominent PLO officials in April 1973 in Beirut. A more 
vivid example of this type of interaction is the Egyptian 
call in May 1976 to grant the PLO full membership of the 
Arab League in the wake of the West Bank mayoral elections 
in April 1976, whose results had been generally interpreted 
as an expression of support for the PLO. l 
9.2.2 Interaction between regional levels 
However, it is interesting to note that this Arab League 
meeting appears, at the same time, to have been influenced 
, 
by an earlier expression of support coming from another 
regional group. The influence that the promotion of the 
PLO, to the status of a full participant at the Non-Aligned 
Foreign Ministers meeting in Lima in August 1975, had on 
the above Arab League decision constitutes an example of 
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the second type of interaction that occurs between two 
groupings at the regional level. 
It is possible to prepare a long list of examples to 
illustrate such a process. Here we shall limit the examples 
to a few significant and more apparent ones. In chapter six 
it was already mentioned that the Non-Aligned Movement 
played an important role in encouraging wide Latin American 
support for the Palestinian cause and the PLO. This type of 
interaction is also evident between Northern regional 
groupings and countries. For example, it seems Soviet 
support and commitment to the Palestinian cause played a 
central role in influencing the US administration to 
recognise in June 1973 that a settlement in the Middle East 
"should take into due account the legitimate interests of 
the Palestinian people". 2 Similarly, according to Golan the 
Soviet Union appears to have actually claimed credit for a 
further favourable shift in the position of the US in 1977 
towards the Palestinians. 3 
The ECls preparedness, as expressed in the Venice 
Declaration of June 1980, to see the PLO associated with 
any negotiations towards the solution of the Palestinian 
problem appears to have been influenced by the decisions of 
the Arab League. This shift in ECls position towards a more 
pro-Palestinian one was also affected by the growing 
prestige of the PLO as well as by pro-Palestinian 
developments at the UN. This last type of interaction 
between expressions of support at the UN and the 
mobilisation of West European support brings us to the 
final type of interaction. 
9.2.3 From a higher to a lower level 
The recognition and support that the PLO and the 
Palestinian cause has received at the UN has influenced 
mobilisation processes at levels below the UN. Primarily, 
it increased the stand ing of the PLO amongst the 
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Palestinian community. Frangi notes that "Yasser Arafat IS 
speech to the United Nations... led to a series of sympathy 
demonstrations for the PLO and protests against Israeli 
occupation" and that growing international recognition 
accorded to the PLO had a direct impact on the results of 
the 1976 mayoral elections in the West Bank. 4 
However, probably the most significant aspect of the role 
of the UN in the mobilisation of support is that the UN in 
the long run legitimises certain issue-positions at the 
expense of others. Claude is one prominent scholar who has 
pointed out this particular role of the UN in world 
politics. S Kirkpatrick, President Reagan's ex-envoy to the 
UN, too notes this aspect of the UN. "The cumulative impact 
of decisions of the U.N. bodies influence opinions allover 
the world about what is legi timate, what is acceptable.,,6 
Jacobsen is another scholar who, in the case of 
colonialism, points out how the decisions of the UN 
together with other organisations have delegitimised 
Western colonialism. 7 
Fisher applies this argument to the role that international 
recognition of the national liberation movements has had 
when he notes that such recognition 
"allows a people officially to become part of the 
international decision-making process and gives a 
sense of illegitimacy to agreements reached without 
them. It enhances the prestige of their representative 
entity, ... Finally, recognistion puts pressure upon 
states which previously had withheld from ､･ｾｬｩｮｧ＠ with 
that entity, to reconsider their positions." 
To support his argument Fisher offers the case of the 
Indian government which in January 1975 less than two 
months after the adoption of Resolutions 3236 (XIX) and 
3237 (XIX) responded to a PLO request, reportedly made 
'some time back I, and recognised the PLO. 9 It is also 
interesting to note that the adoption of Resolution 3210 
(XIX), 14 October 1974, inviting Arafat to address the 
Assembly preceded the Arab summit decision to recognise the 
PLO as 'the sole and legitimate representative of the 
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Palestinian people' by less than two weeks. 
Another less spectacular but nevertheless important example 
of the influence that developments at the UN can have on 
the aggregation of support concerns the US. American 
perceptions of the nature of the Palestinian problem and 
its salience to the settlement of the Middle East conflict 
may well have been influenced by the UN. Both Senator 
Percy, once a member of the US delegation at the UN, in 
1974 and the US envoy to the UN, Yost, in 1975 recognised 
the need to take into account lithe legitimate concerns and 
aspirations of the Palestinians. II This change of attitude 
away from one that was uncritically supportive of Israel is 
attributed by Lillienthal, to the impact that the UN has 
had on their thinking. lO Similarly, to a large extent it 
was again the necessity of fullfilling the expected role of 
the President of the Security Council that induced Young 
another US representative to the UN to have talks with the 
PLO observer at the UN. ll 
But probably the most important impact the UN had on the US 
in general, was the way in which the invitation to Arafat 
to address the General Assembly attracted high media 
attention. This opened up a debate on the Palestinian 
question and put the problem squarely on the public agenda 
in a way that otherwise might have not happened. May be it 
is not surprising that it was in the aftermath of this 
period that the first major US study of the Palestinian 
problem, which came to play an important role in the 
formation of US governmental attitudes, was prepared by a 
prestigious institute with close ties to successive US 
administrations. l2 
This type of interaction is not limited to the ones between 
the UN and lower levels. It can also occur between regional 
and governmental levels. One example of this is the way in 
which the Arab League influenced the position of Jordan on 
the question of PLO's status in relation to the 
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Palestinians residing in the West Bank. It is possible to 
point to a similar process between the EC and some EC 
members such as Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium. These 
countries that had traditionally held pro-Israeli positions 
changed their perceptions of the Palestinian Question to 
some extent as a result of EC influence. The same process, 
on the Palestinian Question, is evident in the relationship 
between the OAU and some conservative African governments 
such as Gabon, Liberia and Ivory Coast. 
So far we have tried to demonstrate how support for the 
Palestinian cause and the PLO at one particular level has 
had an impact on the mobilisation process at some other 
level. The above examples although not exhaustive should be 
enough to point towards the interactive nature of the 
ｭｯ｢ｾｬｩｳ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ of support for the Palestinian cause. 
However, before we proceed to look at the dynamic nature of 
the mobilisation arising from 'positive feedback' processes 
at each level, there remains one other aspect of the 
interactive process that needs to be examined. 
9.3 Convergence of issue positions 
Another weakness of depicting the aggregation of support as 
a multi step-function is that it naturally fails to account 
for the moderating effect that the above interactive 
process has on the demands put forward by initiators. To 
assume that support is simply lent or withheld from 
initiators' demands that remain unchanged throughout the 
mobilisation process is rather simplistic. In chapter three 
it was mentioned that those groups trying to put a new item 
on a political agenda or modify the definition of an 
existing item will frequently find themselves moderating 
their demands in an attempt to broaden their basis of 
support. This process is quite evident in the case of the 
Palestinian problem at all levels of analysis. 
That is the PLO as the main initiator has had to modify its 
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stance on a number of crucial stakes. Two such stakes have 
arisen from the territorial aspects of an eventual 
settlement of the Palestinian problem and the methods to be 
followed in order to achieve this settlement. The position 
held by the PLO in the 1960s had been one that stressed the 
unity of Palestine and the primacy of armed struggle to 
achieve it. However, this position began to change in the 
early 1970s as the PLO interacted with actors from all the 
three levels in its efforts to gain support. These were 
mostly actors that favoured a solution to the Palestinian 
problem that did not jeopardise the existence of Israel 
within some recognised boundaries. 
It is important to point out that most of these actors in 
the 1960s had once seen the Palestinian question as a by-
product of the Arab-Israeli conflict and treated it as a 
refugee problem that basically needed humanitarian and 
technical solutions. Yet by the 1970s many of these 
actors had reconsidered their perceptions of the 
Palestinian problem and had demonstrated a tendency to 
support the political rights of the Palestinian people. 
This seems to point towards a situation whereby as a result 
of the mobilisation process the PLO and the prospective 
supporters of the Palestinian cause have converged towards 
a relatively common new issue position. Below we shall 
offer examples from each level to illustrate this 
particular dimension of the interactive aspect of the 
mobilisation process. 
9.3.1 Convergence at the communal level 
The initial advocacy and use of armed struggle by various 
Palestinian guerrilla groups had played an important role 
ｩｾ＠ puting the Palestinian problem on the political agenda 
and in awakening a Palestinian national consciousness. 
However, it appears that the gradual acceptance by the PLO 
of the idea of a Palestinian state alongside Israel played 
a cruc;al role in expanding its basis of support within the 
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Palestinian community. The acceptance of this idea by the 
PLO constitutes an interesting example of the interaction 
between the PLO and other actors from the Palestinian 
communi ty supporti ve of the idea. The process appears to 
have led to a compromise on the part of the PLO in return 
for broader Palestinian support. 
It is rather difficult to determine where the idea of an 
'independent national authority' or a 'mini-state' first 
originated. But by the early 1970s the debate concerning 
the possibility of replacing the idea of a 'secular 
democratic state' through armed struggle with the idea of 
'mini-state' as the eventual goal of the PLO had already 
gathered some momentum. It seems at the Palestinian 
community level the idea first began to gain some ground in 
the West Bank. ｔｨｩｾＬ＠ for example, is evident in the support 
lent to the idea of a 'mini-state' by the mayor of Hebron 
in July 1973 followed by an official endoresrnent of it by 
the Palestinian National Front soon after the October 1973 
Arab-Israeli war. 13 
The earlier categorical rejections of this idea in PLO 
circles began to change in the face of these developments. 
The PDFLP became the first guerrilla group within the PLO 
to adopt the idea in December 197314 followed by Fatah and 
Saiqal5 and eventually by the Palestinian National Council 
in June 1974. As Coban notes, there was no doubt that the 
PNF 
"had made some contribution to the Twelfth PNC' s 
decision, in June/July 1974, to pursue a political 
option based on the call for establishing a 
'Palestinian national authority' on any parts of 
Palestine evacuated by Israel." l6 
It was not just inputs eminating from the West Bank that 
brought about a moderation in the policies of the PLO. 
Similar clear demands were being made from both Arab 
countries and the Soviet Union. It is possible to argue 
that the PLO was able to receive ｧｲ･｡ｴ･ｾ＠ support from the 
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Arab League and the Soviets as a resul t of the compromise 
arising from its readiness to recognise the possibility of 
achieving the establishment of a 'mini-state ' through 
diplomatic means. Again the mobilisation process brought 
the participants closer to each other than they had 
previous ly been. 
9.3.2 Convergence at the regional levels 
In the aftermath of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Arab 
governments in September 1967 had agreed to a policy of Ino 
negotiation and no recognition ' of Israel. Nevertheless, 
they had remained reluctant to include Shukairy's more 
dramatic calls that would have amounted to a commitment to 
liquidate Israel. 17 This reluctance and hence the gap 
between the PLO and some Arab governments had become more 
evident when Egypt and Jordan accepted Resolution 242 in 
November 1967 joined by Syria in March 1972. The 
preparednes s of Arab governments to enter peace 
negotiations became real in July 1970 when first Egypt then 
Jordan accepted the Rogers Plan announced in June 1970 and 
also later cooperated with Jarring's and the OAU mediation 
missions to the Middle East. Throughout this period 
fundamental differences remained between the PLO and these 
Arab governments. 
Yet, this situation began to change after the October 1973 
war. Resolution 338, of 22 October 1973, had been accepted 
by Egypt and Israel and preparations towards the convening 
of a peace conference in Geneva had also gained the support 
of the Arab summit in Algiers in November 1973. From then 
on the PLO came under increasing pressure to participate in 
peace negotiations as well as to accept the idea of a 
'mini-state'. The Egyptians had already circulated these 
ideas in June 1973 but had then met the opposition of the 
PLO. 18 Although the PLO continued to reject similar 
efforts well into 1974 the combined pressure eminating from 
the West Bank and the major Arab governments coupled with 
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the effect of growing international recognition of the PLO 
as the 'sole representative of the Palestinians', began to 
make inroads into PLO thinking on these matters. A number 
of scholars have attributed the growing Arab governmental 
support for the PLO and the eventual withdrawal of 
Jordanian objections to the status of the PLO as expressed 
in the decisions of the Arab summit in Rabat in October 
1974 to the readiness of the PLO to moderate its 
policies. 19 
The Soviet Union too appears to have put effective demands 
on the PLO for moderation and then extended greater support 
as a consequence of the change in the PLOts overall 
approach. Soviet pressure on the PLO to show a willingness 
to participate in peace talks and to aim for a 'mini-state' 
alongside Israel took a conspicuous form during a visit of 
a PLO delegation to Moscow in November 1973.20 According to 
Golan, the Soviet Union seems to have used its recognition 
of the PLO and the opening of a PLO office in Moscow as a 
lever. 2l This is somewhat supported by the fact that there 
was a marked increase in Soviet· support for the PLO when 
Arafat was received in Moscow by governmental officials 
immediately after the Twelfth PNC. Previously, PLO 
delegations had been invited to Moscow in an 'unofficial 
capacity' by the Soviet Afro-Asian Committee. 22 It was also 
during this vist that the Soviets announced an agreement 
for the opening of a PLO office in Moscow. 23 
It is possible to offer a much longer list of examples that 
pOint towards a growing convergence between positions held 
by the PLO and actors from various regions culminating in a 
growth of support for the Palestinian cause. In this 
respect 1977 was a particularly interesting year. It was 
marked by the 13th PNC decision to redefine the rather 
ambigious term of 'independent national authority' to an 
'independent state,.24 The Soviet Union seems to have 
played a certain role in this by its repeated efforts to 
bring the PLO to make this change. 25 This change was 
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formalised in March 1977 during the 13th PNC session when 
the idea of the establishment of an independent Palestinian 
state by means of a political settlement was endorsed. 26 
One concrete expression of Soviet support resulting from 
this development was an invitation to Arafat to visit 
Moscow in April when he also got to meet Brezhnev for the 
first time. 27 
Many West European governments too were influenced by the 
PLOts growing preparedness to compromise and moderate its 
policies and demands. They moved closer to the PLO and lent 
greater support for the Palestinian cause during this 
period. Prior to the Twelfth PNC meeting the French 
Foreign Minister actually held talks with PNC leaders and 
promised support for a homeland in return for a PLO 
commitment to a political solution. 28 After the PNC 
meeting and Kaddoumi' s declaration expressing a readiness 
to participate in the Geneva peace talks increasing 
contacts between the PLO and Western European governments 
took place. -These contacts increased the prestige of the 
PLO but also encouraged it to adopt conciliatory measures. 
For example, in May 1977 Arafat met the Austrian Chancellor 
Kreisky while Kaddoumi amongst others met the French 
Foreign Minister expressing the possibility of accepting 
Resolution 242 if some amendments were introduced to it. 29 
This moderation also made it possible for the PLO to 
participate in the Euro-Arab dialogue as a part of the 
Arab delegation. Even the US position appears to have been 
influenced by these developments. Various congressmen and 
senators visited Arafat in the Middle East while Carter 
throughout 1977 made statements relatively favourable to 
the Palestinian cause compared to earlier ones. Finally, in 
October 1977 in a US-USSR statement the US government was 
prepared to take another step and recognise the legitimate 
'rights' rather than 'aspirations' of the Palestinians and 
the need to include representatives of the Palestinian 
people in a renewed Geneva Conference. 
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9.3.3 Convergence at the UN level 
Similar forces were also evident at the UN level. It would 
be difficult to imagine that Arafat could have addressed 
the General Assembly if the PLO had continued to maintain 
its earlier goal of liquidating I srael through armed 
struggle. Furthermore, the PLO's participation in the work 
of the UN appears to have had a particularly conspicuous 
impact on its policies. This participation has meant that 
Palestinian representatives have become exposed to an 
institution and a socialisation process that are inherently 
biased in favour of negotiations and conciliation. 
The impact of this is evident in the way in which the PLO 
at the Security Council has found itself participating in 
efforts for the adoption of draft resolutions recognising 
the Palestinian people's right to self-determination 
together with the provisions of Resolution 242. The General 
Assembly too has had its own impact on the PLO. It has 
extended growing support for the Palestinian cause but at 
the same time it has obliged the PLO to articulate its 
objectives and means to achieve it in a way compatible with 
the Assembly's values. This became particularly ･ｾｩ､･ｮｴ＠
after the establishment of the Committee on the Exercise of 
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People in 1975. 
The Committee which was charged with the duty to consider 
and recommend to the General Assembly a programme for the 
implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people 
played a crucial role in getting the PLO to agree and 
contribute towards the drawing up and the eventual adoption 
of a precisely formulated plan. This plan provided for the 
evacuation of the Israeli occupied areas followed by UN 
supervision until the establishment of a Palestinian 
government. Hence as O.Carre notes lithe more the 
Palestinian cause is accepted in the United Nations, the 
more precise, and consequently moderate, does the 
Palestinian' demands become". 30 
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Diagram 9.2 is an attempt, however elementary, to 
illustrate this convergence in issue positions held by the 
PLO and selected regional groupings. The diagram represents 
a field of changing issue positions projected from two 
a xes. Th eve r tic a 1 a xis (A B ) rep res en t s d iff ere n t 
definitions of the Palestinian problem accompanied with 
associated solutions. At one end of the axis (A) the 
problem is defined as a refugee problem, a by-product of 
the Arab-I sraeli war and humani tarian solutions are 
advocated within an overall solution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The other end of the axis (B) defines the problem 
as political one and sees the solution of the problem in 
the creation of a 'secular-democtratic' Palestinian state. 
The horizontal axis, on the other hand, represents the 
types of methods advocated to achieve the envisaged 
solutions. It represents a continuum ranging from the 
advocation of diplomatic means (C) to armed struggle (D). 
Refugee 
Problem 
(A) 
Eretz Israel 
A.L. (1967) 
.* 
(e) (D) 
ｄｩｲＭ･Ｍ｣ｴｾＭＭＭＭｾｾＭＭｾＭＭＭＭＭＭｾｾｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾｖｾＱｾＧｯｬ･ｮ｣･＠
nego. 
* (1980) 
L.A., CAU, 
A.L., PID, 
EC 
Political 
problem 
• mini -state I 
Derroctratic 
Secular Palestine 
(a) 
* (PID 1967) 
Diagram 9.2 convergence of issue positions on the 
Palestinian Question 
Various intermediary positions on both axes can be plotted. 
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For example the idea of a 'mini-state' could be placed 
towards the centre on the AB axis. Similarly, the 
advocation of multi-lateral diplomacy rather than direct 
negotiations could also be placed somewhere similar on the 
CD axis. The position of each actor on the field can then 
be plotted by projecting their place on each axis to a 
point on the field where they meet. The exercise can be 
repeated at specific intervals to see changes that are 
actually occurring. Diagram 9.2 depicts the change that has 
occurred in the position of selected actors in respect to 
positions represented on both axes. It visually displays 
the convergence that has taken place from positions all 
over the field towards positions in the middle of the 
bottom left quadrant. 
So far we have seen how the PLO in its efforts to mobilise 
support for its demands has had to respond to pressures 
from all levels to adopt more realistic goals and policies. 
One major consequence of this has been that the Palestinian 
cause that was once defined by the PLO as the armed 
struggle to achieve a 'secular democratic state' in the 
whole of Palestine became redefined as the establishment of 
a 'mini Palestinian state' on parts of Palestine evacuated 
by Israel. It is to this Palestinian cause that the 
overwhelming majority of world governments have lent their 
support. 
9.4 Dynamic nature of the growth of support, the role of 
feedback processes 
The interactive aspect of the mobilisation process, which 
we examined earlier on, demonstrated the way different 
levels influenced each other. Consideration of the dynamic 
aspect o.f. the mobilisation process is intended to capture 
the feedback through which an already existing level of 
support facilitates further growth of support at the same 
level. Growth can be in the form of an expansion of the 
domain of the support and/or an intensification of the 
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commitment to that support. Here the assumption is that an 
actor trying to expand its basis of support at a particular 
level will benefit from support that has already been 
mobilised. Naturally, the greater the level of existing 
support the greater the urgency for others to join ranks 
will be. Hence, it seems the impact of feedback from a 
previous round of support into a new one will progressively 
increase until it reaches a point where one may begin to 
talk about a 'snowballing' or a 'bandwagon effect'. 
Examples from each level might help to clarify the role of 
feedback in the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian 
cause. 
It was amongst the Palestinians in the refugee camps that 
the PLO began to receive its first support which gradually 
expanded to other sections of the Palestinian community at 
large. This was evidenced in the increasing number of 
enrolments in the various guerrilla groups, in particular 
Al-Fatah. Violence played a central role in raising the 
consciousness of this first group of Palestinians that had 
been displaced by earlier wars. 
While the Palestinians of the refugee camps were beginning 
to show signs of support in favour of the PLO, the 
Palestinians of the West Bank in the immediate aftermath of 
the civil war in Jordan had not yet completely committed 
themselves to the PLO. They had been reluctant to follow 
PLO calls to boycott the 1972 local elections in the West 
Bank which basically saw the reinstatement of the 
traditional pro-Jordanian leadership. However, the growing 
strength of the PLO amongst the Palestinians in the 
Lebanon, which was quite evident in the demonstrations 
following the killing of popular PLO leaders in Beirut, 
triggered similar responses in the West Bank and elsewhere. 
As Amos notes "This nationalist outpouring was repeated in 
May in a march opposing the Israeli military parade in 
Jerusalem, and in June in a general strike on the 
· h J .. 31 ann1versary of t e une war. 
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These events could be interpreted as not only the 
expression of support for the PLO but also its 
intensification considering that previous acts of defiance 
against Israeli rule either did not involve slogans 
supportive of the PLO or were limited to acts of resistance 
mounted by guerrilla groups. But probably the most 
conclusive example of an interlsified support for the PLO, 
at least partially attributable to a feedback from earlier 
levels of Palestinian support, was provided by the results 
of the 1976 West Bank local elections. It was on this 
occassion that the West Bank chose to elect mayors closely 
associated with the PLO and endorsed the desire to see the 
PLO, eventhough indirectly, involved in the administrative 
aspects of their day to day lives. 
The last group of Palestinians to be mobilised were the 
ones who live within Israel. It is in respect to those 
Palestinians that the growing support for the PLO elsewhere 
in the Palestinian community appears to have been an 
essential prerequisite to their mobilisation. The 
Palestinians in Israel remained under the influence of a 
traditional leadership until the early 1970s. It is 
particularly from 1973 onwards that they became 
increasingly pro-PLO. This is evident in their growing 
tendency during Israeli elections since the early 1970s to 
vote in favour of political parties that recognised the PLO 
or were supportive of the Palestinian cause. It is in this 
context that one can argue that growing support from 
previous rounds has fedback into a following round helping 
to expand its domain/range. 
At the Arab regional level, consideration-of the effect of 
positive feedback from Arab governmental support for the 
PLO at the Arab summit in Algiers in 1973 to the one at 
Rabat in 1974 provides a more complete picture of the 
change in the nature and quality of this support from one 
summit to the other. The impact of feedback on this change 
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is particularly conspicuous in the case of the change in 
Jordan's position towards the PLO. The role of the already 
existing support for the PLO amongst the Arab governments 
in influencing Jordan's position on PLOts status is to some 
extent implicitly acknowledged in a statement made by the 
King Hussein that 
"we shall also respect the collective Arab will if it 
is the wish of the Arab countries and their leaders to 
create a new situation in which the Palestine 
Liberation Organization is made fully responsible for 
discussing, striving and working for the recovery of 
the occupied Arab territories, including the West Bank 
and Jerusalem, and the recovery of Palestinian rights 
We shall ... regard it [such a decision] as 
absolving us of our reponsibilities".32 
Subsequently at Rabat Jordan withdrew its objection to the 
PLO being the 'sole representative of the Palestinian 
people' . 
It is interesting to note that at the Rabat summit support 
for the PLO not only expanded with the inclusion of Jordan 
but also grew in intensity. During the previous Arab summit 
the decision to recognise the PLO as 'a sole representative 
of the Palestinian people' had been a secret one. Whereas 
at Rabat this recognition was included in a public 
declaration and was also strengthened by the addition of 
the word 'legitimate' to the provisions determining the 
status of the PLO. 
It is probably only at the UN level that one can begin to 
ponder some possibilities of developing a formal model, 
composed of a set of equations representing each session, 
that could capture the feedback from one session to the 
following one. However, in this case too it would be very 
difficult to separate the effect that support from other 
levels may have on the UN, (which sometimes becomes as 
evident as the actual citing of decisions of other regional 
organisations). Nevertheless at the UN level it is easier 
to find a wide range of examples illustrating the dynamic 
nature of the mobilisation of support from one round to 
another influencing both the range and the intensity of 
363 
fresh support. Some of the evidence for this is actually 
evident in the wording of resolutions as well as the 
speeches of delegations. 
For example, when it granted the PLO the status of a 
permanent observer Resolution 3237 (XIX) cited the 
previous UN decisions inviting the PLO to participate in 
the work of certain UN Conferences held earlier in that 
year. Similarly, the procedural decision of the Security 
Council in November 1975 to invi te the PLO to participate 
in its work, with privileges similar to ones accorded to 
member states being invited under rule 37 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Council, was influenced by the support 
expressed for the PLO in the previous decisions of the 
General Assembly. This was quite evident in some of the 
speeches made during the procedural debate. 
The evidence for the impact of a feedback process becomes 
particularly conspicuous when a delegation actually 
acknowledges in a speech the role of the position of other 
delegations. For example, the UK delegation had voted 
against allowing the PLO to participate in the work of the 
Security Council in December 1975. However, they abstained 
when the matter next came up at the Security Council 
meeting in January 1976. On this occasion the UK 
representative noted that their earlier position was not 
shared by the majority hence "they did not think it right 
to press ... objections to the point of voting against the 
proposal. 1133 
Furthermore, it seems it would not be too unrealistic to 
suggest that the PLO and its allies will, in their attempts 
to persuade potential supporters, point out at the already 
existing level of support during the lobbying that precedes 
most debates and votes at the UN. Unfortunately, UN 
documentation does not provide any information about this 
process. But ｾ｣｣ｯｲ､ｩｮＹ＠ to a Palestinian diplomat it appears 
that those Non-Aligned countries that had been reluctant to 
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support Resolution 3237 on legal grounds found themselves 
revising their position in the face of the sponsors 
arguments pointing out the elready existing support for 
't 34 1 • 
At the General ｾｳｳ･ｭ｢ｬｹＬ＠ even more interesting is the 
steady growth in the number of countries voting in favour 
of resolutions supportive of Palestinian political rights. 
This growth in support together with the usage of stronger 
language in the wording of resolutions seems to be 
indicative of a positive feedback mechanism that lends 
greater legitimacy to the Palestinian cause and to PLOls 
representative status over the years. 
The interactive and dynamic aspects of the aggregation of 
support between various levels were introduced to enhance 
the analysis emerging from the application of the 
mobilisation process model to each level offered in the 
previous chapters. The convergence of issue positions held 
by various actors including the PLO was developed to 
demonstrate an aspect of the mobilisation process that has 
culminated in the growth of support for the Palestinian 
cause going hand in hand with a redefinition of the 
objectives of the PLO along lines more acceptable to most 
governments. It will be the purpose of the following 
section to reconsider certain aspects of the core of the 
mobilisation process model. 
9.5 Reconsidering the mobilisation process model 
When preparing the mobilisation process model we started 
with Mansbach and Vasquez definition of politics as the 
raising of and the authoritative resolution of issues. Of 
particular interest to our research was their and Cobb and 
Elder's contributions to the understanding of how actors 
bring issues of high salience to them to the forefront of a 
political agenda. We noted that Mansbach and Vasquez 
identified two sets of factors as crucial determinants of 
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an agenda setting process. They were 'the nature and 
variety.of access routes' available to actors who want to 
put an issue on the agenda and 'the salience of an issue to 
key actors' in the 'system of interest'. 
In our model these two sets of factors constituted the 
basis for two of the three central variables called 
'accessibility' and 'cognitive linakage'. In the light of 
the contribution made by the mobilisation theory to the 
study of the aggregation of support for social protest 
movements these two variables were supplemented by a 
variable called 'conducive environment'. The purpose of 
this section is to strengthen the core of the mobilisation 
process model by reexamining the nature of this variable 
and also its relationship to the other two variables. 
In someways it is possible to argue that without even 
having to go into the literature on mobilisation theory in 
Mansbach and Vasquez one can find a partial basis for the 
concept of a 'conducive environment'. This is evident in 
their argument which makes allowance for the fact that some 
issues "never reach the global agenda because those who are 
satisfied resist their inclusion".35 They argue that "the 
capacity of elites to keep items off an agenda is primarily 
a function of the nature of formal and informal access 
points, a structural variable".36 In such a situation it 
becomes rather difficult to talk of a 'conducive 
environment' for raising new issues by actors who lack 
access to the agenda. This structural variable, which 
Mansbach and Vasquez do not treat separately, constitutes a 
major aspect of the concept of a 'conducive environment' • 
. 
Hence, it seems certain structural conditions need to be 
present before mobilisation at any level can start. Those 
structural conditions can be determined by the presence or 
absence of certain type of actors, who have a say over the 
composition of a political agenda, as well as the existence 
or absence of communication networks between these actors 
366 
and the initiator. For example, when our system of interest 
is ｾ･ｮｴｲ･､＠ around the UN, a change in the structure of the 
UN precipitated by the growth of Third World membership 
will make the promotion of certain outputs more likely than 
before. Similarly at the Palestinian level the emergence of 
a Palestinian resistance movement was a necessary 
structural change to start the mobilisation of support for 
the Palestinian cause. It opened up, for example, the 
possibility of using violence as an access route to raise 
the salience of the Palestinian problem and also to 
attract the attention of the Palestinian community to their 
approach. 
There is another dimension to the concept of a 'conducive 
environment' beside structural matters that needs to be 
taken into account. This concerns the nature of processes 
that are dominant in the' system of interest'. It is these 
processes that will determine what kind of issues stand a 
better chance of being recognised and admitted to a 
political agenda. These cognitive processes will often be 
dominated by a 'belief system' which will condition how a 
problem is perceived and how it is treated by the 
participants. 
For example again at the UN, since the adoption of 
Resolution 1514, attitudes towards colonialism and related 
issues have dramatically changed. The development of a new 
'belief system' with its separate values, norms and 
expectations based on principles enunciated in this 
resolution generated a different set of criteria for 
determining the salience of an issue to the UN and the 
acceptability of various issue positions compared to the 
ones dominating the UN prior to 1960. This process 
culminated in decolonisation becoming separated from 
processes that used to treat it within Cold War thinking. 
It also enabled issues such as apartheid to be treated as 
problems of international concern and hence not subject to 
the 'domestic jurisdiction' principle at the UN. At the 
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Palestinian level events of high salience to the 
Palestinian community such as the Algerian and Vietnamese 
wars of liberation provided the basis for ideas advocating 
a Palestinian national struggle to develop and gain ground. 
This occurred against the prevailing wisdom which stressed 
Arab unity as the only means to liberating Palestine. 
In the light of the above discussion a 'conducive 
environment' for the actor trying to put items on the 
global political agenda can then be seen as the product of 
changes in the structure and processes characterising our 
'system of interest' hence making the promotion of certain 
outcomes more likely at the systemic as well as the sub-
systemic level. 37 The possibility of a mobilisation process 
starting becomes dependent on the existence of such a 
'conducive environment'. The absence of a 'conducive 
environment' constitutes an obstacle for the mobilisation 
process to commence. Yet the existence of a 'conducive 
environment' does not necessarily culminate in an immediate 
express ion of support wi thin the 'system of interest'. The 
mobilisation of support will only commence when the central 
actor, the initiator, begins to utilise access routes that 
become potentially available to it, as a result of earlier 
structural changes, and to exploi t existing thought 
processes to articulate and legitimise its issue position. 
It is in this light that 'accessibility' and 'cognitive 
linkages' have to be seen. 'Accessibility' becomes the 
variable that accounts for the exploitation of favourable 
structural features of a 'conducive environment' by an 
initiator to promote its cause. 'Cognitive linkage' on the 
other hand accounts for the perceptual similarities drawn 
between existing issues supported by a recognised belief 
system and the problem of concern to an initiator. The 
major purpose behind these linkages is to alter other 
actors' perceptions of the problem in such a way as to 
result in the extension of their support to the new issue. 
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9.6 Some limitations of this ｾｴｵ､ｹ＠
The purpose of this research was to study how the PLO 
raised the Palestinian issue to the global agenda and 
mobilised support for the Palestinian cause across the 
communal, regional and global levels of analysis. At the 
communal level we examined how the PLO gained the support 
of the Palestinian community in favour of the Palestinian 
cause as defined by the decisions of the PNC. At the 
regional and global levels the mobilisation process model 
was employed with a view to understanding how the PLO came 
to modify world governmental perceptions of the nature of 
the Palestinian problem and their attitudes towards the 
Palestinian cause. 
One major limitation of this study is that throughout ,this 
analysis all actors, governments and the PLO alike, were 
treated as though they were unified. This should not be 
seen as the weakening of an earlier determination, as 
expressed in chapter two, to base this analysis on a 
paradigm that did not recognise the Realist assumption that 
states are monolithic units attempting to maximise their 
'national interest ' . Instead it should be seen as the only 
practical solution to dealing with the decisions of more 
than one hundred governments. Hence, it was practical 
rather than theoretical considerations that culminated in 
the black-boxing of governmental decision-making processes. 
This naturally gives the impression that governmental 
decisions were straight forward coherent responses to PLO 
demands and also that these decisions were actually 
representative of the whole country as a whole. This is 
basically the consequence of having chosen a low level of 
resolution for the analysis. 
This level of resolution, however, is a rather crude and 
incomplete representation of the real world. The views of 
governments have also been influenced by the activites of 
certain non-governmental actors, such as trade unions, 
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student groups, political parties and various pressure 
groups, for whom the Palestinian issue became highly 
salient. Some of these actors who became supportive of the 
Palestinian cause went as far as developing direct 
relations with the PLO. Such actors became active 
participants in efforts for the development of attitudes 
supportive of the Palestinian cause at various levels. 
Naturally, to develop a complete picture of the influence 
that non-governmental actors have had on governmental 
attitude formation one also has to assess the impact of 
such actors supportive of the Palestinian cause against 
those who have worked to prevent any changes to the status-
quo. 
Beside the influence that various domestic groups can have 
on the decision of a government there is also the need to 
take into consideration the role that different parts of a 
government can have on an eventual outcome. It is not 
unusual that differences arise between positions taken by 
the government and, for example, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of a country. Such a situation, it seems would call 
for the treatement of an Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a 
separate and important actor that also brings considerable 
influence to bear upon the eventual outcome as well as the 
impact that other ministries such as trade, energy, 
religious affairs may have on issues of salience to them. 
To achieve a more complete understanding of how the world 
at large came to change its perception of the Palestinian 
problem and how the PLO mobilised support for its cause, it 
would be necessary to include in the analysis the role of 
the above actors. It would be interesting to apply the 
mobilisation process model to the world of non-
governmental actors and then examine the interaction 
between the two worlds in respect to attitude formation on 
the Palestinian problem. 
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examine how an actor raises an issue on an agenda then 
the actor might be regarded as the system and the wider 
political process would be occuring in that actors 
environment. Whereas when one is focusing on contention 
over the issue then the environment of the actor 
becomes the system for analysis. 
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APPENDIX-I 
OPERATIONALISING THE CONCEPT OF 'POLITICAL SUPPORT' 
FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE 
The purpose of this section is to introduce a framework for 
operationalising the concept of 'poli tical support for the 
Palestinian cause'. Countries' voting behaviour at the 
Uni ted Nations General Assembly on resolutions pertaining 
to the r1iddle East and Palestine will be used as indicators 
to construct an index of political support. The purpose of 
this index will be to measure the level of support for the 
Palestinian cause through the period under study and answer 
such questions; 
i) Who forms the pool of support for the Palestinian 
cause and what levels? 
ii) How, or in what way, did this pool of support change 
during the period under study? 
AI.I Why UN General Assembly Voting Behaviour 
It was decided that voting at the UN General Assembly would 
be a satisfactory representation of member governments' 
attitudes on the issue under study. Votes on resolutions 
adopted by the General Assembly can be assumed to reflect 
the final position taken by a governmental delegation at 
the end of a political process on an issue. l Bearing in 
mind its limitations voting analysis then can enable the 
analyst to observe and measure the changing perceptions and 
attitudes of member governments on a variety of issues. It 
is with this in mind that Russett notes, "Roll call votes 
in the General Assembly provide a unique set of data 
wherein many national governments commit themselves 
simultaneously and publicly on a wide variety of major 
issues ... Voting behaviour remains one of our best 
sources of replicable information on the polic ies of its ... 
members". 2 
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However, from the start it might be useful to note some of 
the limitations inherent in voting analysis. Firstly, most 
of the methods employed in voting behaviour are not 
explanatory techniques. They do not necessarily explain 
causes and consequences of member countries voting 
behaviour. They can only be descriptive rather than 
explanatory. Methods are not explanatory on their own, they 
need to be led by theory. Voting analysis simply summarises 
a delegation's stand on roll-calls and does not try to 
account for all the various factors that can influence a 
particular vote. Secondly, 
for the differences in 
voting analysis cannot account 
the intensity of a country's 
commitment to a vote and treats every delegation's vote 
equally. Thirdly, UN voting can also be seen as being 
highly symbolic and not necessarily carrying high costs. 3 
Therefore some might argue that it does not necessarily 
reflect the Itrue l attitude of the state voting. However, 
particularly on controversial and salient issues, the fact 
that UN voting is publicly recorded and highly visible can 
have political ramifications, both within and outside the 
UN, inducing the delegation to cast a 'meaningful' vote. 
Al.2 Short Review of Methods for Studying UN Voting 
Behaviour 
There is an abundance of literature that has studied voting 
behaviour at the UN General Assembly. This Ii terature has 
used a variety of methods of varying degrees of complexity-
These methods, whose origins lie in the study of judicial 
and legislative behaviour, particularly in the US, can be 
said to have gone through two stages of development. 
In the first period attention was centred around measuring 
the degree of cohesion existing within pre-determined 
regional or caucusing groups at the General Assembly-
Hovet4 , for example, with the purpose of discovering the 
cohesion of various caucusing groups studied both plenary 
and main committee roll-calls for the first sixteen 
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sessions of the Assembly. Similarly, BallS, too, has used a 
'bloc-voting' framework of analysis limited to only four 
sessions on a number of specific issues. Although Ball by 
studying specific issues produced a more graphic and 
detailed analysis of group behaviour on these issues, it 
lacked Hovet's advantage of an all-encompassing issue 
classification which produced generalisations that allowed 
for trend analysis. 
The second generation of works on the analysis of UN voting 
behaviour followed Lijphart's original contribution on the 
subject in the early 1960s. 6 In place of Hovet's and 
Rigg 1 s7 indices of cohesion in which he found statistical 
inadequacies 8 , Lijphart introduced a methodology derived 
from earlier works of Beyle and Rice 9 . This method of 
cluster bloc analysis was not only statistically sounder, 
but also capable of empirically identifying blocs from 
voting records. Another substantive advantage of this 
methodology was that it also allowed for the study of 
ｾ･ｬ｡ｴｩｯｮｳｨｩｰｳ＠ between groups and between subgroups within a 
larger group. 
Further improvements to the Lijphart's Rice-Boyle method 
were made in the 1970s. Willetts, with the help of improved 
computer facilities, developed a method that made use of 
algorithms which put Lijphart's idea of empirically 
discovering blocs into actual practice for large scale 
data. IO Previously, Lijphart's method relied on the manual 
manipulation of dyadic links generated in a small set of 
data. This used to limit considerably the amount of data 
that could actually be processed. 
Early cohesion indices and cluster bloc analysis are not 
the only methods used for studying voting behaviour at the 
UN General Assembly. Scaling and factor analysis are two 
other, very different, methods that have been used in past 
research. 
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Guttman Scaling, has been widely used in the study of 
legislative and judicial behaviour, and is highly 
recommended by Farris as a method capable of distinguishing 
the causes of similarity in voting behaviour. ll Reiselbach 
was the first to demonstrate the applicability of this 
method to the study of voting behaviour on colonial matters 
at the 11th session of the General Assembly. Having used 
'bloc-analysis' to determine voting groups and indices of 
cohesion and likeness to measure the degree of internal 
unity within and between groups, Reiselbach12 employed 
Guttman Scaling to "measure countries' attitudes on colonial 
matters and placed them on a pro-con continuum. 
Tikhomirov13 , on the otherhand, in his analysis of Pacific 
Nations' voting behaviour during the 33rd, 34th and 3Sth 
sessions of the General Assembly, employed scaling analysis 
on its own. Tikhomorov used this method to measure and 
compare the desirability of resolutions adopted during the 
sessions under study for Pacific Nations and the permanent 
members of the Security Council. 
A final method is the one favoured by Alker and Russett in 
their study of the politics of the General Assembly.14 
Factor Analysis, in their view, has more to offer than just 
identifying blocs, measuring cohesiveness and showing the 
direction of dissent within a group.lS They note that 
factor analysis, unlike the others, is able to summarise 
the main distinctive issues before the UN and also give 
some idea of the importance of the different issues and 
alignments involved. They note that, "the goal of factor 
analysis is to get at the basic issues and alignments 
. 11 t" 16 underlying a wide var1ety of roll-ca vo es · 
Of the four basic methods used in voting analysis, the last 
three are widely employed 
legislative bodies. The 
in studies of behaviour in 
first one, based on the 
construction of simple cohesion indices, appears to have 
been superseded by the others and does not seem to have 
been used in any significant way since the early 1960s. 
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Before proceeding to introduce the preferred method for 
operationalising the phenomenon, 'political support for the 
Palestinian cause', it might be useful to look at some of 
the kinds of methodological problems particular to the 
study of voting behaviour at the United Nations General 
Assembly. 
Al.3 ｾ･ｴｨｯ､ｯｬｯｧｩ｣｡ｬ＠ Problems facing Analysts of Voting 
Behaviour 
Al.3.l Non-Participation and Absence 
General Assembly official records show only three types of 
votes - Yes, No and Abstentions. The difference between the 
total of the votes and the total membership gives the 
number of delegations that were absent from the voting or 
did not cast a vote. It is important to make a distinction 
between the two. 
Participation in the work of a General Assembly can be very 
demanding. Delegates often do not just follow the 
proceedings of the Assembly's main bodies and cast votes. 
Instead, they take part in speech making, drafting of 
resolutions and lobbying before they actually get to the 
point of reaching a final decision on a proposal. Small 
countries, particularly, find it difficult to mobilise 
resources to keep up with such a momentum of work. Harbert, 
in a study of mini-state participation in the work of the 
Assembly, shows that the average mini-state delegation size 
had 8.2 people compared to 18.8 for other states during 
1971-72 17 and notes the inability of some states to spare 
relatively large numbers of qualified personnel to staff 
their delegations. Willetts points at a strong 
relationship between the size of a delegation and the level 
18 
of participation in the work of the General Assembly. 
A distinction must be drawn between members who are unable 
to attend a roll call because they do not have the 
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personnel, and other delegations who deliberately absent 
themselves or do not cast their vote inspite of actually 
being present in the Assembly hall. Lijphart calls such 
absences 'demonstrative non-attendance' and treats them in 
accordance with the previously known attitudes of the 
delegation in question. 19 Willetts, too, notes that some 
states have occasionally announced that they were 'not 
participating' in a particular roll call, and "this implies 
strong opposition to a proposal and a denial that the U.N. 
had any right to be discussing and voting on the issue 
concerned, usually because the issue was alleged to be 
concerned with a state's internal affairs,.20 (e.g. 
Guatemala on Belize, South Africa on Apartheid .... ) In this 
analysis where a state does not participate in the voting 
on a resolution and there is an unambiguous reference to 
its stand against the proposal in the records of the 
proceedings on the item, then such a country will be 
treated as if it had voted 'no'. 
Different views have been expressed on the question of the 
treatment of 'absence'. One position is expressed by 
Reiselbach who asserts that a researcher working with 
Guttman scaling can speculate on the vote of an absent 
delegation. 2l Another view .is that if "available 
information did not suggest that either a 'Yes, 'No' or 
'Abstain" was an appropriate voting estimate, the state was 
given a truly middle position".22 Russett, on the other 
hand, prefers "to equate an absence with abstention. In 
many instances an absence does, in fact, mean 
abstention. ,,23 
For the purpose of this study it seems that it would be 
improper to try to assume how a state would have voted had 
it been present. It would also be distorting the 
information to attempt to classify absences together with 
abstentions. Instead, absence will simply be treated as 
lack of data. 
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Al.3.2 Abstentions 
An abstention in General Assembly voting should be treated 
separately from absence or non-participation. The casting 
of an 'abstain' vote carries a political meaning as much as 
the others do. However, abstentions have created a somewhat 
unique problem for the various methods used in voting 
analysis. 
The earlier indices of cohesion based on Rice's method 
treated abstentions as if they were negative votes. This 
approach, although critised for forcing the data into a 
dichotomy and exaggerating disunity within a group,24 is 
not in complete disagreement with Alker and Russett's 
position that "there are no completely neutral countries. 
Those abstaining against the pressure of a sizeable 
majority come out closer to the scores of those who said 
'no' than they do to those in the affirmative".25 The more 
widely applied solution to the problem of abstention is the 
one originally introduced by Lijphart. Lijphart suggests 
that "it seems reasonable to credit a partial agreement 
with half the weight of a complete agreement".26 Such an 
assumption is not, of course, devoid of its problems, but 
it seems reasonable, as Lijphart says, to treat abstentions 
as a kind of intermediate position between a 'Yes' and a 
'No,.27 That appears to be the most practical or feasible 
solution to this problem, even though there may be 
different motives and forces behind an abstention than just 
a conscious decision to steer a mid-course. 
Alas, the above list is not an exhaustive one. To this, one 
might add two others that seem to have escaped the 
attention of the mainline literature. Both problems have to 
do with the question of whether a vote is a reliable 
reflection of one state's attitude towards the issue. 
Reiselbach, talking about the limitations of the various 
methods studying voting behaviour, pointed out that these 
methods could "provide answers to questions about the 
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intensity of opinion of any single country and ... for log 
rolling. 1I28 The latter situation arises when a 
disinterested country votes along for future support on 
other matters. This is not very unlike the concept of 
bargain linakges discussed i.n the main text. Another 
problem is caused by the inability of these methods to 
account for what is known as the Ibandwagon effect I. This 
occurs when members of a legislative body find themselves 
in a situation where they prefer to go along with the 
majority rather than remain in a conspicuous minority.29 
Although this problem has been studied in respect to the US 
House of Representatives, there is no reason why it may not 
occur in the General Assembly too. 
Both phenomena could be at work, for example, in relation 
to the Palestinian Question. Some non-aligned countries may 
not wish to appear to be voting separately from the group 
of which they are a member, for fear of alienating other 
members (log-rolling), as well as being seen as undermining 
group solidarity on a matter central to the group (the 
nadwagon effect). However, one can always argue that if a 
delegation felt sufficiently strong about the matter it 
could at least abstain if not vote against a proposal, as 
was the case, for example, with the resolution equating 
zionism with racism, hence reducing some of the influence 
of a bandwagon effect .. 
Unfortunately, the techniques that are available for the 
study of voting behaviour are unable to account for such 
ｰｨ･ｮｯｭ･ｾ｡Ｎ＠ These techniques can only measure voting 
outcomes and cannot on its own account for the factors that 
have caused a certain outcome. Here we assume that a vote 
will reflect a government's attitude on the matter, but it 
is important to continue to bear in mind that a vote may 
have been determined by a string of factors such as those 
mentioned above, that is log-rolling and the bandwagon 
effect, and internalised ideological considerations or a 
mixture of them all. It is a theoretical framework that 
381 
will establish the link between voting outcomes and its 
causes. 
Al.4 Constructing an Index of Political Support from UN 
Voting Behaviour 
Al.4.l The Scope of the Analysis and Methodology employed 
During the normal sessions of the General Assembly member 
delegations find themselves voting on a great number of 
draft resolutions covering a wide range of issues. One such 
issue has been the Palestinian problem. The problem in one 
form or the other has been a part of the General Assembly's 
agenda since the early years of the U.N .. During the period 
under study, from 1967 to 1980, various aspects of the 
Palestinian problem have come to the attention of the 
General Assembly. However, in this study three aspects of 
the Palestian problem, the right of the refugees, the 
individual human rights of the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories and the collective political rights of the 
Palestinians, will form the basis for the definition of the 
scope of the 'Palestinian cause'. As it can be seen from 
Table AI.I a 'total of 66 roll-calls during 8 sessions were 
studied in an effort to measure support for the Palestinian 
cause. 3D 
Issues 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 33th 35th Total 
Refugee 1 3 4 2 2 2 2 16 
problems 
Human 1 2 1 3 3 4 2 6 22 
rights 
4 3 5 5 28 POlitical 2 4 3 2 
rights 
Total 3 7 7 9 9 9 9 13 66 
Table AI.I: Distribution of roll-cal1s by sessions and 
by sub-issue 
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The origins of the methodology employed in this study, 
known as cluster-bloc analysis, can be traced to the late 
1950s and early 1960s when scholars such as Reise1bach31 , 
H t 32 d L' . h 33 b . ove an lJP art ecame lnterested in studying voting 
behaviour at the United Nations in a systematic and 
comprehensive manner. It was by employing a modified 
version of Lijphart's Index of Agreement, which measures 
the degree of agreement between pairs of states at the UN 
General Assembly, that an Index of support for the 
Palestinian cause was constructed. Lijphart's Index, in its 
original form, was defined as;34 
I A = (f + (1 / ｾｧ＠ ) * 100 
t 
Where f = is the number of roll calls with identical votes; 
g = is the number of roll calls in which states 
showed 'partial agreement I (yes-abstain or no-
abstain combinations) 
t = is the total number of roll calls in which each 
pair jointly participated. 
This Index treats all roll-calls as being of equal value. 
However, to use the index in this form would not account 
for the differences in the political importance of the 
content of roll-calls being studied. Earlier on it was 
pointed out that the Palestinian problem included an 
amalgamation of roll-calls ranging from ones seeking 
solutions to the problems of the Palestinian refugees, to 
ones calling for the establishment of a Palestinian 
homeland and the recognition of the PLO. It should not be 
difficult to note that the resolutions refering to the 
above matters carry political messages of rather different 
significance. A 'yes' vote cast on a resolution calling for 
an increase in voluntary contributions to the budget of 
UNRWA would have less significance than a 'yes' vote cast 
for a resolution inviting the PLO to participate in the 
work of the UN. 
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To be able to account for the differences in the political 
importance of the content of roll calls being studied this 
above Index was modified to incorporate a weighting scheme. 
Hence, the Index of Agreement was redefined as: 35 
Where W, 1 
WI 
= * 100 
A ｾｴ＠
ｾ＠ w 1, i 
= is the weight of the roll call under study, the 
ith roll call 
fi = is the value of a dummy variable for the ith 
roll call, a value of 1 indicates full 
agreement while 0 means a disagreement or 
partial agreement. 
gi = is the value of a second dummy variable for the 
ith roll call, a value of I indicates 
partial agreement and 0 indicates full 
agreement or disagreement. 
Al.4.2 Weighting roll-calls 
The literature on UN voting behaviour takes a very cautious 
approach on the problem of weighting and in general follows 
the position taken by Turner. Reiselbach36 , Lijphart37 , 
Willetts 38 and Chai 39 all agree with Turner's agrument40 
that it is impossible to weight issues, resolutions or, for 
that matter, votes in a way that is both objective and 
meaningful - mainly because the assignment of weights is 
regarded as a subjective task varying not only from person 
to person but also from time to time. What might be 
important to one may be less important, if not trivial, to 
another. Similarly, what might be regarded as an important 
issue at one point in time may be judged as less important 
at a different period. 
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It may be difficult to weight objectively the importance of 
roll calls, but it may still be possible to make a 
meaningful effort and establish some acceptable degree of 
inter-subjectivty to the weighting process. In the case of 
this study it might be reasonable to introduce a weighting 
scheme to lend the Index of Support a greater degree of 
validity in relation to the concept it is trying to 
measure, (see endnote 41 for a comparison of unweighted and 
weighted results). The purpose of this weighting scheme is 
to capture the different levels of political importance 
that roll calls addressing the three aspects of the 
Palestinian problem carry. In order for the Index of 
Support to reflect these differences, it was decided that 
such resolutions would be weighted according to the level 
of controversy generated by the draft resolution being 
voted. 42 In an effort to reduce the element of 
arbitrariness, in the construction of a scale to 
differentiate between the importance of various sets of 
roll calls, the method outlined below was followed. 
Two empirical factors seemed to call for the separation of 
the period under study into two. Firstly, the agenda of the 
General Assembly between 1952 and 1974 did not have an item 
on the Palestinian Question. Various issues pertaining to 
the Palestinian problem were dealt during deliberations on 
three agenda items, entitled 'Assistance to refugees in the 
Near East', 'The Situation in the Middle East' and 
'Situation regarding Israeli practices Affecting the Human 
. d . . ,43 Rights of the Population of the Occup1e Terr1tor1es. 
Secondly, the situation drastically changed when at the 
29th session a separate agenda item solely looking at 
the political rights of the Palestinians was included in 
the agenda. Furthermore, this item was allocated 
straight to the plenary rather than to one of the 
Main-committees thus reflecting the Assembly's feeling 
of the urgency and importance of this issue. Secondly, 
there was a significant change in the content and nature 
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of both debates and decisions between these two periods. 
While in the first period references to the inalienable 
rights. of the Palestinians and their right to self-
determination became frequent and elaborate it was at the 
29th session and thereafter that the political rights of 
the Palestinians were unambigiously interpreted to mean the 
right to independence. This conspicuous difference in the 
political content of the resolutions was also coupled by an 
authorisation of the PLO to participate in debates as the 
sole representative of the Palestinians. Prior to the 29th 
session only individuals from various Palestinian 
organisations were allowed to put their case to the Special 
Political Committee of the General Assembly with little 
effect. 
Having separated the period into two, the ｾ｢＠ roll calls 
included in the analysis were grouped into three, depending 
on whether they mainly addressed the problems of the 
refugees and their 'right to return', the individual human 
rights of the population in the occupied territories or the 
collective political rights of the Palestinians. Taking the 
first group of roll calls as a reference point of lowest 
importance, the other two group of roll calls were assigned 
separate weights for the first and second periods on the 
basis of the degree of controversy involved. 
The degree of controversy involved on each roll call was 
calculated by the formula: 
where: N = is the number of 'No' votes 
A = is the number of abstentions 
T = is the total number of votes cast 
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Then by employing; 
N 
the average value for each group of roll calls was 
calculated for each of the two periods. Subsequently by 
assigning a value of '1' to the first group of roll calls 
on matters pertaining to the refugees the weights as shown 
in Table Al.2 were obtained for the other two groups of 
roll calls. Thus the individual roll-calls were weighted 
according to 'the time and sUbject matter set in which they 
fell. 
1967-1973 
No. of No. of 
1974-1980 
Issues rlcs W" Weights rlcs Wx Weights 
Refugee matters 10 0.14 1 13 0.04 1 
Human ｲｩｹＮＮｾｾ＠ 10 0.25 1.8 25 0.07 1.8 
Political rights I 10 0.33 2.4 27 0.19 4.8 
Table AI.2: Distribution of weights by period and by issues 
Al.5 Results 
Having determined the type and the number of roll calls to 
be studied, the data for the two periods was processed with 
a computer package, VOTASS,44 that calculates, among other 
statistics, the degree of agreement between pairs of 
members of legislative assemblies. Ideally, it would have 
been preferable to use the degree of agreement between the 
PLO and the other members of the UN. However, the PLO was 
not recognised by the General Assembly as the sole 
representative of the Palestinians until 1974 and even then 
the observer status accorded to the PLO did not entitle it 
to cast a vote, a right solely reserved for member states. 
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At first the possibility of using the Arab Group as a 
reference point for a pro-Palestinian position and 
calculating the Index of Inter-Group Agreement 45 of other 
groups with the Arabs was considered. However, for this to 
be meaningful a 100% cohesion within the Arab Group46 
would have been required. Furthermore only scores for pre-
specified groupings could have been calculated. It would 
have not been possible to measure the Index of Agreement 
between the Arab Group and individual member states. In 
view of these problems, simply agreement scores between 
eligible47 members and Israel were calculated. In this way, 
for example, if a score of IA = 90.0 was obtained for the 
degree of agreement between Israel and the USA, this was 
interpreted as a 90% support for the Israeli position. The 
degree of support for the Palestinian cause was then 
calculated by subtracting the score obtained from 100 
ｷｨ･ｲ･ｾ＠ ISp = Index of support for the Palestinian cause 
lSI = Index of support for the Israeli position. 
Al.S.l Interpreting the Results I_ 
The modified ｌｩｪｰｨ｡ｲｴｾｧｩｶ･ｳ＠ scores ranging from 0.0 to 
100.0 for the degree of agreement between Israel and each 
member of the Assembly. A score of 0.0 indicates complete 
disagreement with the Israeli position while, at the other 
end of the scale, score of 100.0 suggests full agreement 
with Israel. The scores lying between these two extremes 
represent the varying degrees of support that Israel 
receives from each country. 
In view of the large number of scores generated for 
approximately 140 countries per session and the need to 
differentiate between one level of support and another, the 
scale given below was introduced: 
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GE 0.0 and LT 20.0 = Highly pro-Palestinian 
GE 20.0 and LT 40.0 = Medium pro-Palestinian 
GE 40.0 and LE 60.0 = Intermediate 
GT 60.0 and LE 80.0 = Medium pro-Israeli 
GT 80.0 and LE 100.0 = Highly pro-Israeli 
These cut-off points were determined intuitively on the 
basis of their political significance. However, it is 
possible to determine statistically significant levels of 
high agreement. 48 This can be done by employing a test of 
signifance against the null hypothesis of random voting. 
This test establishes the statistically high levels of 
agreement and disagreement between pairs of states. The 
scores lying between the two cut-off points are then 
treated as ones that could have been obtained by random 
voting. Although such a method is statistically very 
rigorous it was felt that for the purpose of this study it 
would be more appropriate to consider politically 
significant levels of agreement. 
Two reasons played a role in this decision. Firstly, it 
seemed that employing intuitively determined categories of 
agreement levels would make a richer use of the information 
particularly for the scores lying between the statistically 
determined cut-off points. Secondly, strictly speaking one 
employs a test of significance to establish whether the 
sample one is using in an analysis to infer about the whole 
is -actually representative of the whole or not. In this 
study all member states and all the roll-calls central to 
the research question were included in the analysis. Hence 
it was felt that in this case a test of significance did 
not appear to be necessary and the validity or 
appropriateness of the cut-off points for the different 
categories of support was left to the test of 
'reasonableness', or in other words, to the judgement of 
the scholars in the field. 
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Western Latin Africa Asia Eastern Assembly 
Bloc America Europe Total 
% % % % % % 
IA WIA IA WIA IA WIA IA WIA IA WIA IA WIA 
Highly pro-Israel 5 5 25 19 6 5 
Medium Israel 5 29 1 6 
Intennediate 33 24 13 19 4 4 - 11 10 
Medium 38 24 25 19 12 12 - 16 11 
Palestinian 
Highly pro- 19 19 38 44 9696 8888 100 100 66 66 
Palestinian 
Mean value in % 40 48 39 41 13 7 . 14 11 11 8 22 24 
No. Comtries 21 16 23 17 11 88 
Table comparing UDweigbted and weigbted versions of ｾ･＠
distribution of support by groups at tbe 29th session 
(The first column for each group gives the unweighted 
values) 
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The average level of support for both Latin American 
and ｗ･ｳｾ･ｲｮ＠ ｅｵｾｯｰ･＠ is higher while the average values 
for ａｦＡｾ｣｡Ｌ＠ ａｳｾ｡Ｎ｡ｮ､＠ East Europe indicate a more pro 
Palest1n1an pos1t1on although the distribution acro 
different levels of support remain the same. ss 
42 With 'degree of controversy(importance)', here, we mean 
the amount of controversy or disagreement that the 
contents (or for that matter controversy over the 
Assembly procedures that govern a roll-call) of a draft 
resolution carry in the eyes of the delega-te. We assume 
that the.m?re a ､ｾ｡ｦｴ＠ resolution refers specifically to 
the pOl1 t1cal r1ghts of the Palestinians the more 
controversial it will be. The advantage of this index 
is that it is dynamic and empirical. That is it 
captures the perception of what delegates regard to be 
controversial and important at one point in time. 
However, establishing the importance of a roll-call 
naturally can not be captured completely by simply 
looking at the distribution of votes on a roll-call. 
[The degree of controversy obtained as defined in p.386 
remains rather crude as it cannot, for example, account 
for the differences in the intensity of a delegation's 
commitment to one position or the other.] This 
commitment will vary by the salience that a particular 
issue has to a delegation. Ideally, one could construct 
an index that could possibly measure this intensity by 
examining the length of speeches made prior and/or 
after a vote, as well as by looking for certain key 
words. However, for the purposes of this analysis it 
was felt that the procedure followed in measuring the 
degree of controversy is adequate. The procedure 
employed, at least, reduces the element of 
arbitrariness in assigning weights to roll-calls by 
introducing a rationale behind the scheme that 'is be 
easily reproducable. 
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Russett too notes the problem of whether every vote is 
of equal importance and has sought to use amounts of 
discussion on the floor as a weighting device, 
(Russett, (1967: 59-93). A similar approach was also 
considered but found rather impractical in the face of 
limited resources. 
Other than these items, the right of the Palestinians 
to self-determination was raised during deliberations 
on the agenda item entitled 'The Implementation of the 
Declaration on Self -Determination '. 
VOTASS is a computer package written by Dr.P.Willetts 
for legislative roll-call analysis. The unit of 
analysis can be member of a legislative assembly such 
as the Senate or a country at the UN General Assembly. 
The Index of Inter-Group Agreement measures the number 
of agreements between the members of two groups as a 
pecentage of the total possible links between the two 
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pecentage of the total possible links between the two 
groups. This Index can be defined as; 
IG = (Number of significant links between the groups) 
*100 
---------------------------------------------
Total fOssible number of links between groups (M * M ) 
1 2 
For a detailed description of this Index see Willetts, 
(1978: 269). 
46 For the Arab Group, as a whole, to be able to represent 
the Palestinian cause they would have had to agree 
amongst themselves on all roll-calls. This was not the 
case particularly during the sessions which adopted 
resolutions critical of the Camp David Accords. 
47 Eligible members for the analysis are those who met the 
required minimum attendance level that normally was set 
at 90%. 
48 For a detailed examination of the role of the test of 
signifance in accounting for the effect of random 
voting in cluster-bloc analysis see Willetts, P. 
"Cluster-Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference", 
American Political Science Review, Vol.66, June 1972, 
pp.569-82 or Willetts, (1978: Appendix 6). 
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APPENDIX II 
ANTICOLONIALISM AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE: 
A quantitative ana1ysis of the linkage between anti-
co1onia1ism and the Pa1estinian issue 
A2.l Introduction 
The purpose of this appendix is to examine whether the 
idea of a linkage between anti-colonialism and the 
Palestinian issue is supported by evidence from voting 
behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly. In the 
chapter presenting the analytical framework and in chapter 
6 it was argued that the Palestinian cause benefited, in 
terms of increased political support, by being associated 
with anti-colonialism. The theoretical argument was that a 
'cognitive linkage' was formed between the two issues by 
establishing similarities between them in respect to 
certain abstract values and symbols such as 'self-
determination'. It was argued that actors by appealing to 
such widely supported and recognised symbols or abstract 
values try to recruit more support for their position and 
try to raise the salience of the issue to other actors. 
In the preceding appendix we tried to measure growth of 
political support for the Palestinian cause. Here we intend 
to examine whether this growth can, partially, be 
attributed to the fact that from the early 1970s onwards 
the Palestinian cause became more and more integrated into 
anti-colonialism. An increasing number of countries appears 
to have drawn similarities between the Palestinian problem 
and the various colonial problems that anti-colonialism 
intends to eradicate. 
One way of testing whether such a relationship does exist 
between the two issues is to examine whether the voting 
behaviour of delegations representing various governments 
at the United Nations General Assembly suggests the 
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existence of a linkage between the two issues. We hope tha t 
in this way we can statistically support the existence of a 
'cognitive linkage' process that can account for the 
increase in the legitimacy of the Palestinian issue in the 
eyes of those who have supported anti-colonialism, hence 
supporting the argument that this has culminated in the 
extent ion of an already existing pool of support to cover 
the Palestinian cause. 
A2.2 Anti colonialism at the UN 
The eventual abolition of the colonial system was an 
inbuilt objective of the UN. Not only did the Charter in 
Article 1(2) refer to the equal rights and self-
determination of peoples but it also set up an 
International Trusteeship System under Chapter XII and 
under Chapter XI expected the cooperation of administering 
powers in overseeing decolonisation. However, the UN 
through the General Assembly was only able to assert itself 
from the early 1960s. 1960 was the year when 17 independent 
countries joined the organisation. These countries 
organised at the time as the Afro-Asian caucus group, 
followed the initiative taken by the Soviets and got the 
General Assembly to adopt Resolution lS14(XV), the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. This declaqration, rather less 
radical in content than the Soviet initiative, proclaimed 
the necessity of bringing colonialism to a speedy and 
unconditional end. 
Throughout the 1960s the Afro-Asian Group and the East 
Europeans continued actively to participate in promoting 
anti-colonialism at the UN. Anti-colonial efforts 
contributed to the process that led a great number of 
countries to achieve their independence during the 1960s. 
However, during the 1970s there continued to be four major 
areas of concern for anti-colonialism (of which one was 
resolved by 1975). These were the problems of the white 
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minority regime in Rhodesia, the Portugese colonies in 
Africa, the independence of Namibia and the system of 
apartheid ｾｮ＠ South Africa. Although, these four issues are 
not the only areas of concern to anti-colonialism, they do 
attract a large propotion of anti-colonialist efforts. 
These efforts are the product of a dynamic poli tical 
process, led by first the Afro-Asians and then by the Non-
Aligned, inside and outside the UN. This dynamic process 
has generated an ideology that guides the position and 
foreign policy outputs of countries on issues that are 
perceived to be covered by this ideology. It is data from 
these four areas which will form the basis of our analysis. 
A2.3 The data and the hypothesis 
Two sets of variables were used in this analysis. The first 
set of data on the Palestinian Question comes from the 
analysis in Appendix I and is composed of agreement scores 
between each country and Israel. The second set of 
variables was obtained by processing 63 roll-calls across 5 
sessions on colonial matters, falling under the four 
problem areas mentioned earlier on. The USSR was chosen as 
the reference point for calculating agreement scores on 
colonial matters. The degree of agreement between the USSR 
delegation and another delegation gives that delegation's 
position on the colonial issue. A country with a score of 
90.0 was treated as 90% of the time in agreement with USSR 
and hence 90% anti-colonial. 
The USSR was chosen as the most suitable reference country 
because, firstly, it pursued a constant and very anti-
colonial policy through out the sessions and, secondly, it 
attended all the roll-calls included in the study. Other 
countries were considered but they failed to meet the above 
two criteria. The US, for example, although it met the 
second criterion, did not follow a constant colonialist or 
anti-colonialist policy. On the other hand, South Africa 
was always very colonialist in its voting behaviour but 
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after the beginning of the 29th session the South African 
delegation was denied the right to participate in the work 
of the General Assembly. 
What we will want to do here is to see whether the General 
Assembly as a whole exhibits a voting behaviour that may 
suggest that in the eyes of the whole assembly the 
Palestinian Question and colonial matters, mostly 
pertaining to Southern Africa, are linked. Furthermore, if 
such a linkage does exist we will want to see whether anti-
colonialist voting goes along with voting in support of the 
Palestinian cause. 
To state it formally our null-hypothesis would point at no 
particularly significant relationship existing between the 
two issues. Statistically speaking, if delegates voting at 
the General Assembly on colonial matters and on the 
Palestinian Question do not see any relationship between 
the two issues, this would be reflected in a very low 
correlation coefficient. l Then, assuming that the Y 
variable represents our dependent variable voting on the 
Palestinian Question and the X variable represents the 
independent variable, voting on colonial matters, we would 
expect under the null hypothesis a near-zero correlation 
coefficient that summarises a scatter without a distinct 
pattern. Such a scatter would tell us that a country voting 
one way on an issue is voting differently or in an 
unrelated manner on the other issue. 
On the other hand, if a relationship between the two issues 
does exist, we would expect, on the basis of our theory, to 
find a high correlation. More importantly we also would 
expect the correlation coefficient for the various sessions 
representing the period under study to increase across 
time. In other words the correlation coefficient would get 
closer and closer to 1, the point where the Assembly votes 
as if the questions fallon a single issue dimension. 
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Having established the strength of the relationship between 
voting on the two issues, we willalso examine what 
percentage of the Assembly has voted both highly ani-
colonial and pro-Palestinian across the . 
seSS10ns under 
study. 
A2.4 Voting behaviour on colonial matters 
The analysis of the relationship between voting on the 
Palestinian question and colonial matters implicitly 
assumes that the independent variable, that is· voting on 
colonial matters remains stable over the period under 
study. The validity of this assumption is supported by 
Table I which gives the correlation between voting on 
colonial matters during the five General Assembly sessions 
included in the study. 
24th 28th 29th 33rd 35th 
24th 1.00 
28th .91 1.00 
29th .77 .89 1.00 
33rd .85 .90 .94 1.00 
35th .83 .86 .92 .98 1.00 
TABLE A2.l: Correlation coefficients for voting on colonial 
matters between General Assembly sessions 
These high correlation coefficients suggest that there has 
been little variation in the pattern of the Assembly's 
members voting on colonial issues from one session to the 
other. 2 An examination of the scattergrams show that in 
all cases the best fit lines run very close to the diagonal 
(the line Y=X) with slopes approaching to 1.00. Whatever 
change there has been is captured by the intercepts, with 
mostly positive values, showing a slight change from one 
session to another by a general tendency to be relatively 
more anti-colonial. The relatively lower coefficient of .77 
for the correlation between the 24th and 29th sessions is 
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caused by two outliers, Portugal and Israel. Portugal had 
voted highly pro-colonial during the 24th session and 
medium anti-colonial at the 29th session after the change 
of regime. Israel, on the other hand, first voted highly 
anti-colonial switching to pro-colonial voting at the 29th 
session. A similar relatively lower correlation coefficient 
for the 28th and 29th session was not obtained because 
Israel was excluded from the analysis for low attendance. 
Table A2.2 to Table A2.4 show the distribution of support 
for anti-colonialism for the 24th, 29th and 35th sessions. 
The cut-off points used in classifying the scores into the 
five categories of support are similar to the one presented 
in Appendix I. 
GE 0.0 and LT 20.0 = pro-colonial 
GE 20.0 and LT 40.0 = medium pro-colonial 
GE 40.0 and LE 60.0 = intermediate 
GT 60.0 and LE 80.0 = medium anti-colonial 
GT 80.0 and LE 100.0 = anti-colonial 
As the three Tables below indicate the average level of 
support by the whole Assembly has changed very little over 
the years. The average agreement score was 88.7%, in other 
words strongly anti-colonial, at the 24th session rising 
to 89.8 and 91.0 for the 29th and 35th sessions. Most of 
the scores, particularly for the five non-Western United 
Nations regional groups and the Non-Aligned fell in the 
anti-colonial category. The anti-colonial category 
encompased 77% of the members of the Assembly at the 24th 
session and 80% and 84% respectively for the other two 
sessions. This gradual increase can mostly be attributed to 
the fact that over the years the number of countries 
belonging to non-Western groups increased in proportion to 
the Western bloc. 
From this and the earlier bivariate analysis we can 
conclude that on the colonial matters the behaviour of the 
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Israel Western Latin Africaa Asiaa Non-b AssemblyC 
Bloc American Aligned Total 
% % % % % % % 
Highly rol. 
Medium col. 
Intermediate -
Medium a.c. 
Anti rol. 100 
Average 92.9 
5rore 
No. of 1 
CO\IDtries 
10 
40 
40 15 
10 85 
56.0 90.1 
20 13 
4 
4 6 
92 94 
95.8 98.4 
24 18 
100 
100.0 
47 
2 
9 
'1. 
77 
88.7 
101 
Table A2.2: Distriboticn of support by graJpS at the 24th sessicn3 
Israel Western Latin Africaa Asiaa Non-b AssemblyC 
Bloc Arrerican Aligned Total 
% % % % % % % 
Highly col. 
Medium col. 100 17 4 
Intermediate - 44 3 10 
Medium a.c. 26 6 5 6 
Anti-col. 13 94 97 95 100 80 
Average 33.3 59.0 94.3 97.7 98.0 99.0 89.8 
Score 
No. of 1 23 18 29 21 66 120 
countries 
Table A2.3: Distribution of support by groups at 29th session3 
Western Latin Africaa Asiaa Non-b AssemblyC 
Bloc America Aligned Total 
% % % % % % 
Highly col. 13 2 
Medium rol. 17 3 
Internediate 13 ＨｾＱ｡ｬ｡ｷｩＩ＠ (Malawi) 3 
Medium a.c. 50 4 8 
Anti-col. 9 100 97 96 99 84 
Average 53 98.4 98.0 98.0 99.0 91.0 
Score 
No. of 23 25 39 25 87 144 
countries 
Table A2.4: Distribution of support by groups at 35th session
3 
a Excluding menbers of the Arab League, 
b Including Arabs and countries fran the preceding 3 colUltllS 
C Excluding fran the tables those with lOtI attendance at 
these ｾｬｬ＠ calls 
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Assembly has been quite stable over the years. That is 
those parts of the Assembly that were anti-colonial and 
formed the overwhelming majority continued to exhibit anti-
colonial behaviour while the Western bloc remained 
relatively disunited with its behaviour spread across 
mostly the first four categories of support. Establishing 
this continui ty in the Assembly's behaviour is crucial to 
the analysis of the relationship between colonial matters 
and the Palestinian Question, as our theoretical framework 
takes voting on colonial matters and partic·ularly the anti-
colonial element within it as the frame of reference to see 
whether the hypothesis is substantiated. 
A2.S The relationship between the two issues 
The bivariate statistic we intend to use to measure the 
relationship between our dependent and independent 
variables is Pearson's correlation coefficient. Unlike 
Spearman's rho and Kendall's tau the Pearson product-moment 
correlation assumes the two variables in the analysis meet 
at least the criteria for interval level measurement. Even 
though in social research it is very difficult to find true 
interval measures in our case the scales on which the two 
variables are based meet the properties of interval-level 
measurement. 
The bivariate analysis employed here assumes that there is 
a linear relationship represented by a best-fitting 
straight line. It seems for most variables of interest 
social scientists in general assume pairs of variables to 
be related in a straight line. This is done because linear 
regression gives a simple summary of the relationship, 
although not necessarily the best. However, sometimes the 
scattergram for two variables may suggest a distribution 
that might best be summarised by fiting a curve. To find 
whether a curve or a straight line 'best' represents a 
relationship can be tested by transforming one of the axes 
and repeating the analysis to compare the results. 
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A logarithmic transformation was attempted on our variables 
to see whether a curve would better fit the data than a 
straight line. The comparision of the correlation 
coefficients suggested for all it s weaknesses linear 
regression in this analysis offered a better 'fit' for the 
data. It should be stressed that this straight 'best line' 
still does not necessarily mean that this line is the 
absolutely 'best' representation of the data. 
One further point to make before proceeding to the 
analysis, concerns the size of the samples across the 
period under study. Ideally, one would have liked to 
compare results across sessions that are based on the same 
sample size. However, in this analysis sample size varied 
in relation to the growing membership at the United 
Nations. We chose this approach firstly, because, we are 
interested in the behaviour of the Assembly as a whole and 
the UN groupings within it rather than every single member. 
Secondly, to limit the size of all the sessions to the 
first session would have excluded a large amount of 
information generated by the new membership. 
A2.6 Results 
Table A2.5 gives us the results for the first part of our 
analysis that tries to establish whether there is a 
relationship between voting on the two issues. 
Session no. 
24th 
28th 
29th 
33th 
35th 
correlation 
0.53 
0.83 
0.86 
0.80 
0.82 
Number of 
countries 
92 
101 
98 
121 
134 
Table A2.S: Relationship between voting on colonial matters 
and on the Palestinian Question 
Other than for the first session Pearson's correlation 
coefficient is reporting a strong relationship between 
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voting on colonial matters and voting on the Palestinian 
question. It seems, compared to the 24th, in the following 
sessions the Assembly voted in away that suggests that 
delegations saw a relationship between the two issues. The 
breakthrough, from a medium to a strong relationship, seems 
to have come at the 28th session in 1973. This session was 
preceded by a number of events that must have influenced 
the attitudes, particularly of the Non-Aligned countries. 
The efforts of the Africans to mediate in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict by then had reached a dead-lock and most 
importantly the Non-Aligned Algiers summit in 1973 was 
marked by its pro-Palestinian stand and by the way in which 
the Palestinian struggle was explicitly likened to the 
anti-colonial struggle in Southern Africa. 
These developments seem to have moved some Non-Aligned 
countries away from a situation where they had high scores 
on colonial matters and relatively lower scores on the 
Palestinian issue. A high correlation also suggests that 
some countries, particularly from the Western Group voted 
on the two issues in a similar way although at a level 
characterised by lower scores. This could well be the 
outcome of some countries in the Western Group reacting 
negatively to the increasing tendency of the Assembly to 
see a relationship between the Palestinian question and 
anti-colonial struggles in Southern Africa. 
The slight drop in the correlation coefficients for the 
33rd and 35th sessions might be accounted for by the 
influence of outliers such as Guatemala, Dominican 
Republic, France and an increase in the number of 
countries with high scores on both issues resulting in 
there being less variability to be explained. 
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A comparison of the scattergrams (Figures A2.l and A2.2) 
presented in the next two pages and the regression lines 
for the 24th and 35th sessions represented by the 
equations; 
Y(PQ)24=-18.6 + .94X(CM)24 and Y(PQ)35= 33.0 + .65X(CM)35 
suggest that two simultaneous changes occurred. The first, 
as mentioned earlier on, is caused by delegations (in the 
bottom right hand quadrant of Figure A2.l) with lower 
Palestinian scores compared to their anti-colonial scores 
moving to more pro-Palestinian positions although some at 
the very top of the scale still remaining marginally more 
anti-colonial than pro-Palestinian. The second change is 
caused by those countries whose scores were less than 50% 
on the colonialism scale becoming more pro-Palestinian. 
That is moving away from an exclusively high to medium pro-
Israeli position to a more balanced position. In certain 
cases the move on the Palestinian issue was also 
accompanied by a more pro-colonial stance.4 
So far we have seen that throughout the 1970s a strong 
relationship has existed between voting behaviour on 
colonial matters and the Palestinian Question. Now we want 
to see whether the growing strength of the relationship 
between the two issues can be attributed to those anti-
colonial delegations that also became pro-Palestinian. This 
would support our thesis that the Palestinian cause has 
benefited from support accruing to anti-colonialism as 
more and more supporters of anti-colonialism voted in a way 
indicating an attitude on their part that saw a strong 
connection between the struggle in Southern Africa and the 
struggle of the Palestinians. What we will want to do here 
is to see the frequency distribution for delegations that 
fall into different combinations of categories of support. 
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Pigure A2.3: Frequency distribution of countries voting 
the same way 
(Percent figures based on the whole Assembly excluding 
countries with low attendance) 
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Figure A2.3 shows the total number of delegations that have 
voted in a similar way both on the Palestinian and colonial 
issues. In other words it includes those delegations that 
have agreement scores that fall in the same levels of 
support on both issues. On the other hand 'rable A2.6 shows 
what percentage of each group, included in the analysis, 
has voted anti-colonial and pro-Palestinian across three 
sessions under study. From figure A2.3 we can see that the 
number of countries that have exhibited both an anti-
colonial and pro-Palestinian voting has increased in both 
absolute and relative terms. 
While, at the 24th session less than half of the Assembly 
supported the Palestinian cause as much as anti-colonialism 
this figure rose to 81.3% of the Assembly by the 35th 
session. Outside the Arabs and the East Europeans the other 
delegations were mostly Non-Aligned. However, it must be 
noted at the 24th session they did not behave in this way. 
As Table A2.6 suggests only 50% of the Non-Aligned fell in 
this category. But once the linkage between the colonial 
problems and the Palestinian cause solidified in the early 
1970s this percentage increased to 94.4% for the 29th 
session and to almost 100.0% at the 35th session. 
From Table A2.6 below we can see that a similar si tuation 
existed for the African group too. At the 29th session 
while 91.3 % of the Africans were fully anti-colonial only 
34.8 % of them supported the Palestinian cause, lagging 
behind the average for the Assembly. The situation changed 
drastically when the Palestinian cause started to receive 
as much support as anti-colonialism at the 29th and 35th 
session. 
The behaviour of the countries belonging to the Asian Group 
was slightly different from the African Group and the Non-
Aligned as a whole.'The change in their attitudes towards 
the relationship between the two issues was not as 
drammatic. Most non-Arab Asian countries with the added 
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influence of a common religion, familiarity with the issue 
from the Bandung Conference in 1955 and closer geographical 
proximity with the Arabs had already been voting nearer to 
a pro-Palestinian position. In the case of the Asian Group 
the change has come in the form of the gap between their 
anti-colonial voting and their voting on the Palestinian 
cause becoming even smaller than it used to be at the 24th 
session. 
Western Latin Africaa Asiaa Non-b AssemblyC 
Bloc Arrerica Aligned Total 
% % % % % % 
10.5 81.8 91.3 92.3 91.7 
24th Session 
15.8 0.0 34.8 69.2 50.0 
10.0 91.7 95.5 93.8 97.2 
29th Session 
10.0 58.3 95.5 87.5 94.4 
8.7 100.0 100.0 95.7 100.0 
35th Session 
21.7 95.2 97.1 91.3 98.4 
Table A2.6: Propotion of anti-colonial (first rows) 
and pro-Palestinian (second rows) ｾ･ｳ＠ in each 
group across three sessicms. 
a Excluding members of the Arab League 
76.1 
48.9 
77.6 
74.5 
83.6 
83.6 
b Including Arabs and countries in the preceding three 
columns 
c Excluding those with low attendance at these roll calls. 
The Latin American attitude, however, was very different 
from that of the other Third World groups. Although the 
Latin Americans were very anti-colonial throughout the 
period this did not condition their voting on the 
Palestinian question. That is they remained reluctant to 
see a linkage between the Palestinian problem and colonial 
matters. This is well supported by Table A2.6. None of the 
Latin Americans included in the analysis at the 24th 
session and 41.7% of them at the 29th session voted in a 
. 11· nk 
way which suggests that they did not perce1ve a 
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between the two issues. Instead their scores were 
systematically higher on the scale for colonial matters. It 
was not until the 35th session that the Latin Americans 
with the exception of the Dominican Republic combined their 
anti-colonial voting with pro-Palestinian voting. 
'The Western bloc exhibited a unique behaviour in respect to 
the rest of the Assembly. Only two countries, Turkey and 
Greece, from the Western bloc were supportive of anti-
colonialism and the Palestinian cause at the same time. 
However, the Western bloc was the only group with a larger 
number of countries higher on the Palestinian scale than on 
the colonial scale. 
A2.7 Conclusion 
The preceding analysis based on voting behaviour in the 
General Assembly points to the growing convergence between 
the two issues. Figure A2.3 shows this convergence 
graphically. And as Figures A2.l and A2.2 suggest While 
during the 24th session of the Assembly the patterns in the 
sdattergrams emerging from voting on these two issues bore 
little ｲ･ｳ･ｭ｢ｬ｡ｮ｣ｾＬ＠ this situation was transformed 
drastically by the 35th session. 
These ,results are also corroborated by the matrices in the 
following pages. The first two matricies compare the 
cluster blocs on the Palestinian Question and on colonial 
matters at the 24th session while the subsequent two do the 
same for the 35th session. Each matrix is symmetrical and 
+1 indicates high agreement while -1 is for high 
disagreement and 0 is used for medium scores with pairs of 
countries meeting the minimum attendance levels.5 
A comparison of the two matrices on colonial matters 
(Figures A2.5 and A2.7) does indicate, allowing for the 
change in the size of the Assembly, that the Assembly on 
both occasions was divided into one very large anti-
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colonial cluster and smaller clusters that were 
progressively less anti-colonial. The change across the two 
sessions, in terms of the number and shape of the clusters, 
was small particularly compared to voting on the 
Palestinian Question. In the case of the Palestinian 
question the Assembly at the 24th session was divided into 
completely separate blocs covering various positions 
ranging from pro-Israeli to pro-Palestinian. The situation 
by the 35th session changed dramatically when a large 
majority of the Assembly became pro-Palestinian with a very 
small pro-Israeli group and a number of overlaping clusters 
mostly composed of countries from the Western Group 
covering the area between the two extremes. From the point 
of the argument presented in this appendix what is 
interesting to note is the overlap/similarity between the 
two large clusters in the last two matrices compared with 
the lack of such overlap in the first two. 
The empirical observations obtained by two separate 
ｭ･ｴｨｯ､ｯｬｯｧｩｾｳ＠ suggest that our hypothesis fails to be 
falsified. The 'cognitive linkage' that came to be 
established between the two issues benefited the 
mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause. This 
behaviour is also supported by the speeches made by members 
of various delegations and also by the decisions of 
political bodies representing Third World groupings. These 
have been examined in chapter 6. 
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Figure A2.4: Cluster-Blocs on the Palestinian Question at 
the 24th session p.41S. 
Figure A2.5: Cluster-Blocs on colonial matters at the 
24th session p.4l6. 
Figure A2.6: Cluter-Blocs on the Palestinian Question at 
the 35th session p.4l7. 
Figure A2.7: Cluster-Blocs on colonial matters at the 
35th session p.418. 
Due to lack of space the countries below are missing from 
the bottom of Figures A2.4 to A2.6 
Figure A2.5: 
Figure A2.6: 
Figure A2.7: 
Barbados, Guyana, Poland. 
Trinidad and Tobago, Czechoslovakia. 
Malaysia, Bulgaria, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Surinam, Romania, Ecuador, Fiji, U.S.S.R. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 The correlation coefficient refers to the degree to 
which the data approaches a straight line of best fit 
and may suggest whether some relationship exists within 
the data. 
2 A certain degree of stability is crucial in respect to 
our theoretical framework which suggests that a 
political movement can benefit from the support 
accruing to an already established political movement. 
The fact that a movement is established suggests a kind 
of continuity and stability in behaviour towards it. 
3 The results for the Non-Aligned Group are not 
included in the aggregate results in the last column. 
The East Europeans and the Arabs were 100% anti-
colonial. Although they are not in the table the 
Assembly total includes them. This is the case for all 
3 tables. 
4 For example; 
Scores on 
Palestinian Question 
Canada 64.3 
UK 
US 
to 30.0 
to 
to 
41.7 
66.2 
50.0 
10.0 
Scores on 
colonial matters 
13.6 in 1969 
43.3 in 1980 
31.8 
10.0 
13.6 
19.4 
in 1969 
in 1980 
in 1969 
in 1980 
This may well be due to the resolutions on colonial 
matters becoming more and more critical of the 
countries singled out. 
S For an explanation of the full ｲｮ･ｴｨｯ､ｯｬｯｧｾ＠ see 
Willetts, P. The Non-Aligned Movement, (Frances P1nter, 
London, 1978), Chapter 3 and Appendices V and VI. 
419 
APPENDIX III 
LIST OF MEMBERSHIP OF REGIONAL AND POLITICAL GROUPS 
This appendix provides a list of countries in the various 
regional and political groupings used in the construction 
of the index of support as discussed in Appendix I. The 
basis of regional group membership is the same as the 
membership of geographical groupings used for the purposes 
of elections within the United Nations, with two 
exceptions. Firstly, Arab countries are taken out of the 
African and Asian groups to form a separate Arab Group 
based on Arab League membership. Secondly, the Western 
European Group which within the UN is formally known as the 
"Western European and Others' Group was enlarged to include 
the US, too. 1 
The list below also includes two major political groupings. 
The two groupings are listed separately because unlike the 
Latin Americans and African political groupings their 
membership does not coincide with anyone regional group. 
The Non-Aligned and the Islamic Group both overlap with 
several of the regional groups. The membership of the Non-
Aligned group, for the General Assembly sessions studied, 
was determined. by whether a country had attended a Non-
Aligned summi t in the year of or preceding a General 
Assembly session. 2 In the case of the Islamic group, which 
did not come into existence until March 1971, the 1980 
membership of the Islamic Conference Organisation was used 
as a .basis for all the General Asssembly sessions included 
in the study. The Arab countries have been included in both 
the Non-Aligned and Islamic groups. Afghanistan and Egypt 
were included in the Islamic Group throughout in spite of 
their suspension from membership in 1980 and 1979 
respectively. Egypt was readmitted to the ICO in January 
1984. 
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The Arab Group includes all members of the Arab League, 
including in the statistics in this study Egypt after its 
suspension in March 1979. Even though Hauritania and 
Somalia were not admitted to the Arab League until 1973 and 
1974 respectively they were included in the Arab Group for 
the sessions preceding these dates because of their close 
ties with the Arab world. 
REGIONAL3 POLITICAL GROUPINGS 
GROUPS 
AFRICA NAM64 NAM70 NAM73 NAM76 NAM79 ICO 
Angola M M 
Botswana M H M M 
Burundi M M M ｾＱ＠
Cameroon M M M M M M 
Cape Verde M 
C.A.R M r.1 M M M 
Chad M M M M ｾＱ＠
Comoros M M M 
Congo M M M M M 
Dahomey M M M M 
Eq. Guinea M M M M 
Ethiopia M M M M M 
Gabon M t-1 M M 
Gambia M M M M 
Ghana M t1 M M M 
Guinea M M M M M M 
G.Bissau M M M 
I. Coast ｾＱ＠ M M 
Kenya M M M M M 
Lesotho M M M r1 
Liberia M M M M M 
Madagascar t-1 M M 
M Malawi r·1 
M M Mali M M M M 
Mauritius M M M 
Mozambique M M 
M M M M Niger 
M M r1 Nigeria r1 M 
Rwanda M M M M 
M M Sao T.&.P 
M M M Senegal M M M 
M M Seychelles 
M r1 M M M S. Leone M t-t Swaziland M M M 
Tanzania M M M M M M Togo t1 M M M 
M M M M Uganda M M 
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u. Volta M M M M Zaire M M M M 
Zambia M M M M M Zimbabwe 
(N=4l) 
ASIA 
Afghanistan M M M M M M 
Bangladesh M M M M 
Bhutan M M M 
Burma H M M M 
Cambodia M M M 
China 
Cyprus M M M M M 
Fiji 
India M M M M M 
Indonesia M M M M M H 
Iran M M 
Japan 
Laos M M M M M 
Malaysia M M M M H 
Maldives ｾＱ＠ M 
ｾＱｯｮｧｯｬｩ｡＠
Nepal M M M M M 
Pakistan M ｾＱ＠
Papua N.G. 
Phillipines G 0 
Samoa 
Singapore M M M M 
Solomons 
Sri Lanka M M M M M 
Thailand 
Vietnam t1 M 
(N=26) 
LATIN AMERICA 
Argentina 0 0 M M M 
Bahamas 
Barbados 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 M 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 M 
Colombia 0 
C. Rica 0 
Cuba ｾＱ＠ M M M M 
Dominica 0 
Dominican R 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 
El Salvo 0 0 
Greneda 0 M 
Guatemala 
Guyana M M M M 
Haiti 
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Honduras 
Jamaica 0 M M M M Mexico 0 0 0 0 Nicaragua M 
Panama 0 M M 
Paraguay 
Peru 0 M M M Saint Lucia 0 
Surinam M 
Tri.&To. 0 M M M M 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 
(N=29) 
WESTERN GROUP 
Australia 
Austria G G G G 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 0 G G G G 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Malta M M M 
New Zealand 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal G G 
Sp'ain G 
Sweden G G G 
Turkey M 
U.K. 
U.S.A. 
(N=23) 
EASTERN EUROPE 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
E. Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania G G 
U.S.S.R. 
Yugoslavia ｾＱ＠ M M to! H 
(N=9) 
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ARABS 
Algeria M M H M M Bahrain M M M M Djibouti H M M Egypt M M H M H Jordan M M M M 
Kuwait M M M M M M M M Lebanon M M M M M M Libya M M M M M r.1 M Iraq M M M M M M Mauritania M M M M M M Morocco M M M M M M Oman M M M M Qatar M M M M P.D.R.Y. M M M M M M Saudi A. M M M M M Somalia M M M M M M Sudan M M M M r.1 M Syria M M M M M M Tunisia M M M M M M Y.A.Rep. M M U.A.E. r1 M M M 
(N=2l) 
Key 
M Member o Observer G Guest - Not Member 
ENDNOTES 
1 For a discussion of the membership of the formal UN 
geographical groupings as it stood in 1960 see Bailey, 
s. The General Assemb1y (Stevens and Sons Limited, 
London, 1960) pp.29-4l. 
2 For the complete list see Willetts, P. The Non-A1igned 
in Havana, (Frances Pinter, London, 1981) pp.65-67. 
3 The Table includes 149 countries, the 153 UN members in 
1980 except for Byelorussia, Ukraine, Israel and South 
Africa. 
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Column* 
(I) 1-8 
(I) 9-13 
(I) 14-16 
(1) 17-18 
(I) 19-23 
(1) 24-26 
(1) 27-28 
(1) 29-33 
(1) 34-36 
(1) 37-38" 
(1) 39-43 
APPENDIX VI 
CODE BOOK FOR FILE ON AGREEMENT SCORES 
Contents of the Variable 
Name of the country 
Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-
calls U.N. 24th session, 1969. 
Percentage agreement with Israel to one 
decimal place (Lijphart Index), Minimum 
value 0, maximum value 100.0 
No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by 
a member state at the U.N. 24th session, 
(Maximum 3). 
Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 
24th session 
The variable is the result of a test of 
significance, applied to data on columns 9-
13, against the null hypothesis of random 
voting. 
1 High agreement with Israel 
o Hedium 
-1 High disagreement with Israel 
Voting on the Question of Palestine, ro1l-
calls U.N. 25th session 1970 
Coded as in columns 9-13 
No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by 
a member state at the U.N. 25th session, 
(Maximum 7) 
Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 
25th session, Significance test for 
columns 19-23, coded as in column 17-18. 
Votingon the Question of Palestine, ro1l-
calls, U.N. 26th session, 1971. 
Coded as in columns 9-13. 
No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by 
a member state at the U.N. 26th session, 
ＨｾＱ｡ｸｩｭｵｭ＠ 7). 
Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 
26th session, Significance test for 
columns 29-33, coded as in columns 17-18. 
Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-
calls U.N. 27th session, 1972. 
425 
(1) 44-46 
(1) 47-48 
(1) 49-53 
(1) 54-56 
(1) 57-58 
(1) 59-63 
(1) 64-66 
(1) 67-68 
(1) 69-73 
(1) 74-76 
(1) 76-78 
(1) 79 
Coded as in column 9-13. 
No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by 
a member state at the U.N. 27th session (Maximum 9) , 
Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 
27th session. Significance test for 
columns 39-43, coded as in columns 17-18. 
Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-
calls U.N. 28th session, 1973. 
Coded as in columns 9-13. 
No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by 
a member state at the U.N. 28th session, 
(Haximum 9) 
Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 
28th session. 
Significance test for columns 49-53, coded 
as in columns 17-18. 
Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-
calls U.N. 29th session, 1974. 
Coded as in columns 9-13. 
No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by 
a member 'state at the U.N. 29th session, 
(Maximum 9). 
Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 
29th session. 
Significance test for columns 59-63, coded 
as in columns 17-18. 
Voting on the Question of Palestine, ro11-
calls U.N. 33th session, 1978. 
Coded as in column 9-13 
No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by 
a member state at the U.N. 33rd session, 
(Maximum 9) 
Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 
33rd session. 
Significance test for columns 69-73, coded 
as in columns 17-18. 
Group membership 
1 Israel 
2 Western European and Others 
3 Latin America 
4 Africa (excluding Arabs) 
5 Asia (excluding Arabs) 
6 Eastern Europe 
7 Arab 
426 
(1) 80 
(2) 1-5 
(2) 6-8 
(2) 9-10 
(2) 11-15 
(2) 16-18 
(2) 19-20 
(2) 21-25 
(2) 26-28 
(2) 29-30 
(2) 31-35 
Membership to the Islamic Conference 
Organisation 
o Non-member 
1 Member 
Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-
calls U.N. 35th session, 1980. 
Coded as in columns (1) 9-13. 
No. of roll-calls on Palestine, attended 
by a member state at the U.N. 35th 
ses s ion, (Maximum 11). 
Significance of voting on Palestine, 35th 
U.N. session. 
Significance test for columns (2) 1-5, 
coded as in (1) 17-18 
Voting on the Question of Palestine, 
including roll-calls on Camp David 
agreements, U.N. 35th session, 1980. 
Coded as in columns (1) 9-13 
No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by 
a member state at the U.N. 35th session, 
(Maximum 13). 
Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 
35th session 
Significance test for columns (2) 11-15 
coded as in (1) 17-18. 
Voting on selected roll-calls on 
colonialism, U.N. 21st session, 1966. 
Percentage agreement with USSR to one 
decimal place (Lijphart Index) Minimum 
value 0, Maximum value 100.0. 
No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended 
by a member state at the U.N. 21st 
ses sion, (Haximum 7). 
Significance of voting on colonialism, 
U.N. 21st session. 
The variable is the result of a test of 
significance applied to data on ｣ｯＱｵｭｾｳ＠ (2) 
21-25, against the null ｨｹｰｯｴｨ･ｳｾｳ＠ of 
random voting. 
1 High agreement with the USSR 
o Medium 
-1 High disagreement with USSR 
Voting on selected ｲｾＱＱＭ｣｡ＱＱｳ＠
colonialism, U.N. 24th seSS1on, 1969. 
Coded as in columns (2) 21-25 
427 
on 
(2) 36-38 
(2) 39-40 
(2) 41-45 
(2) 46-48 
(2) 49-50 
(2) 51-55 
(2) 56-58 
(2) 59-60 
(2) 61-65 
(2) 66-68 
(2) 69-70 
(2) 71-75 
(2) 76-78 
(2) 78-80 
No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended 
by a member state at the U.N. 24th 
session, (Maximum 7). 
Significance of voting on cOlonialism 
U.N. 24th session. ' 
Significance test for columns (2) 31-35, 
coded as in colomun (2) 29-30 
Voting on selected roll-calls 
colonialism, U.N. 28th session, 1972. 
Coded as in column (2) 21-25 
on 
No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended 
by a member state at the U.N. 28th 
ses s ion, (Maximum 17). 
Significance of voting on colonialism, 
U.N. 28th session. 
Significance test for columns (2) 41-45, 
coded as in column (2) 29-30 
Voting on selected roll-calls on 
colonialism, U.N. 29th session, 1974. 
Coded as in columns (2) 21-25. 
No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended 
by a member state at the U.N. 29th 
session, (Maximum 10). 
Significance of voting on coloniaiism, 
U.N. 29th session. 
Significance test for columns (2) 51-55, 
coded as in columns (2) 29-30. 
Voting on 
colonialism, 
selected roll-calls on 
U.N. 33rd session, 1978. 
No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended 
by a member state at the U.N. 33rd 
session, (Maximum 14). 
Significance of voting on colonialism, 
U.N. 33rd session. 
Significance test for columns (2) 61-65, 
coded as in columns (2) 29-30. 
Voting on selected roll-calls on 
colonialism, U.N. 35th session, 1980. 
Coded as in columns (2) 21-25. 
No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended 
by a member state at the U.N. 35th 
session, (Maximum 15). 
Significance of voting on colonialism, 
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(3) 1 
(3) 2 
(3) 3 
(3) 4 
(3) 5 
U.N. 35th session. 
Significance test for columns (2) 71-75, 
coded as in columns (2) 29-30. 
Attendance at the second Non-Aligned 
summit, 1964. Coded 1 attended and 0 did 
not. 
Attendance at the third Non-Aligned summit, 
1970. Coded 1 attended and 0 did not. 
Attendance at the fourth Non-Aligned 
summit, 1973. Coded 1 attended and 0 did 
not. 
Attendance at the fifth Non-Aligned 
summit, 1976. Coded 1 attended and 0 did 
not. 
Attendance at the sixth Non-Aligned summit, 
1979. Coded 1 attended and 0 did not. 
* In brackets is the record (card) number. 
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APPENDIX VI 
LIST OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETINGS 
This appendix provides a list of PNC meetings including the 
location, the dates as well as decisions and debates 
characterising each meeting. The list was primarily 
prepared from the entries in Arab Records and Report. 
Lieu Dates Major decions/debates 
1st Jerusalem 1964 28 May Establishment of the PLO. 
- 2 June Endorsement of 
Shukairy's Chairmanship and 
the first Charter. 
2nd Cairo 
3rd Gaza 
4th Cairo 
5th Cairo 
6th Cairo 
7th Cairo 
1965 31 ｾＱ｡ｹ＠
- 4 June 
1966 20 -
24 May 
1968 10 -
17 July 
1969 1 -
4 Feb. 
1969 1 -
6 Sept. 
1970 30 -
4 June 
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Tha main task on the agenda was 
the definition of ways of 
organising the Palestinians. 
Priority was given to unity. 
Very similar to the preceding 
session. 
Major guerrilla groups gain 
access to the PNC. Procedural 
changes; Executive committee to 
be elected by the PNC, 
previously it had been by 
appointment. Change of 
Leadership. Palestinian 
National Charter revised. 
Al-Fatah dominates proceedings. 
Arafat elected to Chairmanship 
of the PLO. Future of 
Palestinian people to be 
decided by the Palestinians 
themselves. Armed struggle to 
be intensified. 
Deba te over 'a democra tic 
state'. Some saw such a state 
as a threat to Arab unity ,and 
the Arab nature of Palest1ne. 
Commission set up to study the 
idea of a 'democratic state'. 
First time attendance by PFLP. 
Unified armed struggle. Central 
Extraordinary 1970 27-
28 Aug. 
8th Cairo 
9th Cairo 
10th Cairo 
11th Cairo 
12th Cairo 
1971 28 Feb. 
- 5 March 
1971 7 -
13 July 
1972 11 -
12 April 
1973 6 -
1974 1 -
9 June 
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Committee formed. Res. 242 
［･ｪ･｣ｴ･ｾＮ＠ The idea of unity of 
Jordanlan and Palestinian 
theatre' introduced by PFLP. 
Crisis in Jordan dominates 
debates. 
Roger Plan rejected. PNC 
session recognised as sole 
representative of the 
Palestinian people. Reassets 
the idea of a unified East and 
West Bank. 
Debate on future Palestinian 
state. The idea of a unified 
East and West Bank begins to 
loose favour. 'Democtratic 
state' endorsed while the idea 
of a 'mini state' or 'any 
truncated Palestinian entity' 
rejected. 
The idea of a unified East and 
West Bank regains favour in 
some circles. The question of a 
'mini-state' debated at length 
at the initiative of PDFLP as 
well as the position of the 
Palestinian movement toward 
Jordan. No specific decisions 
taken on the future form of a 
Palestinian state other than 
condemning the idea of a 'mini-
state' . 
Membership increased by 50 %. 
Problems of uni ty dominates 
discussions. Importance of 
assistance to the occupied 
territories to increase 
awareness of national identity 
raised. The idea of a unified 
East and West Bank finally 
shelved. A palestinian identity 
separate from Jordan begins to 
gain strength. 
Membership enlerged to 175. PNF 
12 Jan. set up. Problems of 
unification discussed. 
Adopts 10 point programme 
endorsing the idea of a 'mini 
state'. AFL, PFLP and PFLP-GC 
enter reservations. 
13th Cairo 1977 12 -
20 March 
14th Damascus 1979 15 -
23 Jan. 
15th Damascus 1981 15-
19 April 
16th Algiers 1983 14 -
22 Feb. 
Question of Geneva Conference 
discussed. 15 point plan 
endorsing the creation of an 
independent national state. 
PFLP objects. Overall the role 
of political settlement in 
aChieving a Palestinian state 
strengthened. Relations wi th 
'democratic' circles in Israel 
and reconciliation with King 
Hussain debated. 
First PNC in Damascus. Camp 
David unanimously condemned. 
Relations with Jordan 
constituted a major source of 
debate. 
No changes from previous 
positions. Camp David 
denounced. European Community 
initiative welcomed. Brezhnev 
call for an all-party 
conference supported. 
Rejects the 'ReaganPlan'. 
Endorses the 'Fez Plan' as the 
minimum basis and expresses 
support for the Brezhnev plan. 
The need to complement the 'Fez 
plan' with military action was 
noted. 
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APPENDIX VII 
THE STATUS AND LIST OF PLO REPRESENTATION ABROAD 
The question of the PLOt s status in the international 
system is extremely confused. Firstly, the status of the 
PLO vis-a-vis international law is a source of controversy 
and debate in itself. Secondly, the information on PLO 
representation abroad and their status is not easily 
available and what there is seems to be fraught with 
problems of interpretation. 
There seem to be two approaches to the status of non-state 
actors in international law. The first is basically the 
traditional one which sees the state as the sole SUbject of 
international law. l In respect to the status of the PLO 
two conflicting positions appear to have emerged from this 
approach. The first follows a very strict and narrow 
interpretation of the criteria laid down by the Montevideo 
Convention2 to determine whether a public body is a state 
or not. The second position is less clear one. It tries to 
strike a balance between the need to acknowledge the 
centrality of states in international law and the idea that 
states are not the only subjects of international law.3 
Kassim takes the latter position.4 He develops the concept 
of the PLO as a 'non-territorial public body' and 
simultaneously tries to draw similarities between the PLO 
and a state. The implicit reliance on the traditional 
approach is evident in the way in which a central role is 
attributed to the state in the formation of a 'non 
territorial public body,6 and also in the way in which the 
attributes of the PLO are continously compared and related 
to the traditional characteristics of states. Citing 
attributes of the PLO, such as varying degrees and types of 
governmental authority over the Palestinians, its 
membership of international organisations and diplomatic 
recognition, Kassim concludes that "[ f]rom the juridical 
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point of view, the PLO is a terri torial public body".7 
This, he argues, "confers upon it the status of a 
participant in International Law. Its claim to represent 
the Palestinian people is one of its undisputed rights". 
Kassim's analysis appears to have triggered a debate. 9 One 
of his opponents, sighting in his case the fact that the 
PLO lacks "control over territory and effective 
government ... (and that there) is also considerable 
controversy as to whether the PLO could establish a 
sufficent connection to a permanent population"IO, 
concludes that lithe PLO is not an international body and 
has no status according to contemporary international 
law".ll This leads him to dispute and challenge Kassim's 
conclusion that the PLO has in international law an 
"undisputed right" to be recognised as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people. 12 Another 
opponent reaches a similar conclusion and even challenges 
the idea that the PLO can receive diplomatic recognition 
because "despite claims to the contrary the PLO does not 
constitute a state".13 
The second approach to non-state actors is one that takes a 
less rigid and narrow position on who may be participants 
in international law. The basis of this approach is best 
captured by a leading scholar, Lauterpacht, "in each 
particular case the question whether a person or a body is 
a subject of international law must be answered in a 
pragmatic manner by reference to actual experience and to 
.. 
the reason of the law as distinguished from a preconceived 
. t· 1 1 II 14 notion as to who can be subjects of 1nterna 10na aw. 
This approach hence appears to give greater importance to 
the principle of 'common consent' which can be described in 
international terms as the 'assent of the community of 
states'. Very central to this approach is the idea that the 
decisions of the UN can be regarded as a manifestation of 
this 'common consent'. 
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This pos i tion is best expressed by Higg ins, "[ t ]he Uni ted 
Nations is a very appropriate body to look for indications 
of developments in international law, for international 
custom is to be deduced from the practice of states, which 
includes their international dealings as manifested by 
their diplomatic actions and public pronouncements. With 
the development of international organizations, the votes 
and views of states have come to have legal significance as 
evidence of customary law .... Collective acts of states, 
repeated by and acquiesced in by sufficient numbers with 
sufficient frequency, eventually attain the status of law. 
The existence of the United Nations-and especially its 
accelerated trend towards universality of membership since 
19S5-now provides a very clear, very concentrated, focal 
point for state practice. illS 
Travers follows this second approach when he argues that 
the numerous resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly 
concerning national liberation movements and their 
struggles "enunciate the concept which underlies the 
principles that the national liberation movements of Africa 
are the 'legitimate representatives' of the oppresed people 
of their territories in the international community, even 
though they do not claim to be the governments of 
independent states". l6 However, although he notes that 
resolutions about the PLO's status are very similar in 
content to those concerning the African liberation 
movements, he concludes that, because the "principles 
enunciated in United Nations measures in support of the PLO 
have .•• not been consistently applied over a sufficient 
period of time to demonstrate their general applicability 
to the Middle East situation" and because the resolutions 
supporting, the PLO have not received majorities lias large 
as those in favour of support for the African liberation 
movements .. l7 the PLO can not claim a status similar to the 
African liberation movements. 
On the other hand, Freudenschluss does not make such a 
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distinction between the PLO and African liberation 
movements and argues that collective recognition accorded 
to the liberation movements, including the PLO, through UN 
resolutions confers to them "a limited legal 
Personali ty" .18 He argue th t th' s a 1S collective recognition 
is a an important basis for establishing the movement's 
acceptability. Fisher is another scholar who takes a rather 
similar position in respect to the decisions of an 
international organisation to recognise "a public body as 
the principal, if not exclusive, agent of the people in 
question. The effect is analogous to that of diplomatic 
recognition-an ascertainment of the fact that a people 
exists as a subject of international law and that the 
entity representing them is a public body which now has a 
legal standing. 1I19 
The second source of confusion over the PLO's status arises 
from the fact that, in complete contradistinction to the 
information concerning the position of various regional 
organisations and the UN in respect to the status of the 
PLO, the information on individual government's position on 
this matter is fraught with problems. It is possible to 
group these problems into two. Firstly there is the lack of 
complete and reliable information on individual 
governmental positions. Secondly, where the information is 
available, often it is not detailed enough to determine the 
exact nature and level of the status being accorded at the 
bi-lateral level. 
The information in the literature on the status of the PLO 
in the eyes of individual governments is alarmingly 
inconsistent. First on the matter of the number of 
countries recognising the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people, the numbers in the 1970s vary from 103 
to 115. The first number quoted in Kassim is attributed to 
a statement by Arafat made in March 1974 well before the UN 
vote to invite the PLO to the UN. 20 Silverburg notes that 
Arafat has claimed "a total of 105 countries have 
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recognised the PLO" and adds that "this claim is probably a 
reference to the 105 UN member states who voted to invite 
the PLO to participate in the General Assembly as an 
observer".2l Frangi, a PLO representative, claims 110 
recognitions 22 while Friedlander quotes a more recent 
Arafat claim in October 1979 of 115. 23 
The situation gets even worse when it comes to the number 
and level of PLO offices abroad. Kassim writing in 1980 
puts the number of diplomatic missions at 60. 24 Silverburg, 
writing in 1977, on his part lists 56 countries including 
Arab states and countries such as Zanzibar, North and South 
Vietnam, that have allowed PLO 'information offices,.25 The 
largest claim for diplomatic offices comes from another PLO 
official, Terzi, who put the number between 80 to 90. 26 
Becker, on the other hand, does not attempt to list all PLO 
offices but only Latin American ones. 27 Even this short 
list is problematic as it includes Jamaica which appears to 
be the only documented country that has formally rejected a 
PLO a request for an office. 28 As this short review 
indicates the information is far from being consistent and 
accurate. Furthermore, the above sources do not appear to 
make a conscious attempt to distinguish between PLO 
information offices and those offices that are treated as 
diplomatic missions. 
The purpose of the remaining part of this appendix is 
twofold. Firstly, in the face of the above two ｰｾｯ｢ｬ･ｭｳ＠
relating to information on PLO offices abroad, the list 
give below has been compiled in such a way as to ameliorate 
the problem as much as possible. It has already been noted 
that attempts to obtain complete and accurate information 
through the circulation of questionnaires was a failure. 29 
Instead a list obtained from the research department of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office was combined with 
information gathered from entries in the Arab Report and 
Record on PLO offices abroad. This list is well short of a 
complete one. However, it is a systematic attempt to put 
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together all the available information. 
The list firstly provides information on each country's 
position on the PLO's status at the bi-lateral level. This 
information has been broken into four: firstly those 
countries that extend the PLO some form of diplomatic 
status: 30 secondly: those countries that allow only 
information offices without formally recognising the PLO: 
thirdly: those countries who appear to have consented to an 
office, but about which there is inadequate information to 
determine whether it is a diplomatic mission such 
occurences have been labeled as 'unclear'; finally there 
are those countries for which no information was 
available, (this however should not be automatically taken 
to mean a refusal to allow the PL03l ). 
The second purpose of the appendix is to bring some 
clarification to the representative status of the PLO at 
the multi-lateral level. In the face of the lack of 
agreement amongst those who study international law as to 
whether the PLO is a sub jet of international law and hence 
entitled to recognition, it will be assumed that votes on 
resolutions concerning the PLO will be indicative of 
whether a country recognises the PLO or not. It seems such 
a position would not be very different from the one held by 
Fisher and also by Green who notes that "[i]f ... a member 
state votes for the admission of another country, it would 
appear that such a vote is tantamount to an act of 
recognition".32 Hence, the list below also includes the 
votes cast by members of the UN on roll-calls that are 
generally regarded to be relevant to the discussion on the 
PLO' s status. These roll-calls are the ones taken on 
Resolutions 3210 (XXIX), 3237 (XXIX), 3375 (XXX) and ES-
7/2 .• 
However, a word of caution needs to be stated. These 
resolutions should not be seen as pure indicators of member 
countries positions on the status of the PLO at the multi-
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lateral level. Although the representative status of the 
PLO is often quite explicit in the content of these 
resolutions they do also address themselves to other issues 
and indirectly invoke matters that are not necessarily part 
of the text itself. Hence, in the case of some members 
their votes may have been cast with such maters in mind. 
For example, in the case of Resolution 3210 a number of 
European countries voted in favour not necessarily because 
they recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the 
Palestinians but because they were favourable to the idea 
that important leaders should be able to express the views 
of a people. In such cases it would be misleading to use 
their votes as a measure of their attitude towards the 
status of the PLO. It might be better to assess the 
position of individual members by taking into consideration 
the aggregate of their votes. But even then one needs to 
bear in mind the earlier point that these selected roll-
calls do not solely address themselves to the status of the 
PLO. 
Furthermore, the first three resolutions only relate to 
1974 and 1975. Such a relatively static reference point 
will not accomodate change in the positions held by 
individual countries. During the second half of the 1970s a 
number of countries have conspicuously changed positions. 
This was usually brought about by changes in governments, 
as was the case with Nicaragua and Bolivia, as well as by 
the mobilisation process within and/or outside the UN. To 
be able to account for this change resolution ES-7/2 from 
the Emergency Special session in July 1980 was added. 
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THE STATUS OF THE PLO BY 1980 
COUNTRY STATUS OF OFFICE 
AFRICA (N=4l) 
Angola 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
C.A.R 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Dahomey 
Eq. Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
G.Bissau 
I. Coast 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Sao T.&.P 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
S. Leone 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
U. Volta 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
ASIA (N=28) 
Afganistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Diplomatic 
non diplomatic 
unclear 
non diplomatic 
non diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
non diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
unclear 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
unclear 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
Diplomatic 
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VOTE ON RESOLUTIONS 
3210 3237 3375 ES-7/2 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
NP 
Y 
Y 
NP 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
NP(Y) 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
y 
y 
y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
y 
y 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
Y 
Y 
NP 
Y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
NP 
Y 
y 
y 
NP 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
A 
Y 
NP 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
NP 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
y 
y 
y 
Burma unclear A y Y A Cambodia y y y y 
China Diplomatic y y NP Y Cyprus Diplomatic y y y y 
Fiji Y Y Y A 
India Diplomatic y y y y 
Indonesia unclear y y y y 
Iran Diplomatic y y y y 
Japan non diplomatic y A A A 
Laos Diplomatic y y y y 
ｾＱ｡ｬ｡ｹｳｩ｡＠ Diplomatic y y y y 
Maldives Diplomatic NP NP Y Y 
Mongolia Diplomatic y y y y 
North Korea Diplomatic 
Nepal y y y y 
Papua N.G. 
Pakistan Diplomatic Y y Y Y 
Phillipines y y y y 
Samoa y 
Singapore Y Y Y Y 
Solomons 
South Korea 
Sri Lanka Diplomatic Y Y Y Y 
Thailand Y A Y Y 
Vietnam Diplomatic Y 
LATIN AMERICA (N=29) 
Argentina y NP Y Y 
Bahamas NP A A A 
Barbados A y A Y 
Bolivia Diplomatic N N A Y 
Brazil Diplomatic y y NP Y 
Chile NP N Y Y 
Colombia A A Y Y 
C. Rica A N N Y 
Cuba Diplomatic y y y y 
Dominica 
Dominican R N Y A N 
Ecuador non diplomatic A NP Y Y 
El Salvo y NP A Y 
Greneda NP y Y Y 
Guatemala A NP A N 
Guyana y y y y 
Haiti A A A A 
Honduras NP A N A 
Jamaica y A Y Y 
Mexico Diplomatic y y y 
y 
Nicaragua Diplomatic A N N Y 
Panaca y A Y Y 
Paraguay A A A A 
Diplomatic y y y 
y 
Peru y 
Saint Lucia y 
Suriname y y y 
Tri.&To. y y y A Y Uruguay 
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Venezuela unclear y y y y 
WESTERN BLOC (N=24) 
Australia A A A N 
Austria Diplomatic y A A A 
Belgium non diplomatic A N A A 
Canada non diplomatic A N A N 
Denmark non diplomatic A N A A 
Finland non diplomatic y y y A 
France y A A A 
Germany non diplomatic A N N A 
Greece Diplomatic Y A Y Y 
Iceland A N A A 
Ireland Y N A A 
Italy non diplomatic Y N A A 
Luxembourg non diplomatic A N A A 
Malta Diplomatic Y y Y Y 
New Zealand Y A A A 
Netherlands A N N A 
Norway Y N A N 
Portugal non diplomatic Y Y Y A 
Spain Diplomatic Y Y Y Y 
Sweden non diplomatic Y A A A 
Switzerland non diplomatic 
Turkey Diplomatic Y Y Y Y 
U.K. non diplomatic A N N A 
U.S.A. non diplomatic N N N N 
EASTERN EUROPE (N=9) 
Albania y y NP Y 
Bulgaria Diplomatic y y y y 
Czechoslov. Diplomatic y y y y 
E. Germant Diplomatic y y y y 
Hungary Diplomat.ic y y y y 
Poland Diplomatic y y y y 
Romania Diplomatic y y y y 
U.S.S.R. Diplomatic y y y y 
Yugoslavia Diplomatic y y y y 
Distribution of votes on the above roll-calls were: 
Yes No Abstention Absent 
Resolution 3210 (XXIX) 105 4 20 9 
Resolution 3237 (XXIX) 95 17 19 7 
Resolution 3375 (XXX) 101 8 25 7 
Resolution ES-7/2 112 7 24 9 
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According to the table below the PLO appears to have 71 
offices of which 47 have some form of d' 1 . 
. . a ｾｰ＠ ｯｭ｡ｴｾ｣＠ status. 
It 1S 1nteresting to note that 35 of th 47 . e ｣ｯｵｮｴｲｾ･ｳ＠ who 
have granted the PLO a diplomatic status h 1 a ve a so voted in 
favour of all the selected roll-calls Th th . 
. e 0 ers ｷｾｴｨ＠ the 
exception of Greece and Austria have not d . one so ｳｾｭｰｬｹ＠
because they were either not members of the UN or not 
present. In the case of Nicaragua and B l' . . o ｾｶｾ｡＠ ｾｴ＠ was not 
until the last session included ｾｮ＠ the 
.... study that 
significant changes in their foreign ｰｯｬｾ｣ｾ･ｳ＠
........ occured as a 
result of changes in the ruling elite. 
East West Latin Total 
Europe Europe America Asia 
Diplomatic 8 
Non-Dipl. 
Unclear 
Missing data 1 
N of countries 9 
5 
12 
7 
6 
1 
1 
21 
29 
14 
1 
2 
11 
Africa 
14 
4 
3 
20 
41 
Table AB.I: Distribution of PLO offices by regions 
a Includes Switzerland 
b Includes North and South Korea 
47 
18 
6 
60 
c Excludes Arab countries. All Arab governments have 
allowed diplomatic offices for the PLO except Oman. 
There are in total 61 countries who were present at all 
roll calls and voted in favour of them. This number 
increases to 77 when 100 % attendance is reduced to 75 ,. 
The discrepancy between the number of diplomatic offices 
and the number of countries that voted in a manner 
suggesting a recognition of the PLO is too large to draw 
any conclusions about a relationship between 'individual' 
and 'collective' recognition. 33 However, this may merely be 
a consequence of the conspicuous lack of precise and 
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complete information on PLO representation abroad. 
The question of whether the PLO has a recognised status 
vis-a-vis international law is a much more complicated one 
to answer. Literature in international law does not appear 
to give any specific guidance on what constitutes 'common 
consent'. Hence, the question of how many countries have to 
vote in support of a position and how many times this 
support would have to be repreated, for it to be recognised 
as common consent remains difficult to answer. It has 
already been noted that some scholars using the principle 
of common consent have reached conflicting conclusions. 
Although it may be difficult to define the status of the 
PLO in international law with some degree of confidence, it 
might be easier to establish the PLO's political standing. 
Given that the PLO is the only non-state actor with so many 
diplomatic missions, combined with the significant 
majorities, it should be possible that the PLO enjoys a 
near to universal political recognition. This is further 
strengthened by the fact that, outside the UN, regional 
organisations such as the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, 
the Islamic Conference Organisation and the Arab League 
have recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the 
Palestinian peopl'e and the last three have admitted the PLO 
as a full member. 
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One problem with the information on offices with 
diplomatic status is that the information is not 
detailed enough to determined the actual level of the 
mission. So it becomes rather difficult to tell whether 
one particular PLO diplomatic mission ｢･ｮｾｦｩＺｳ＠ from a 
status similar to an embassy or whether 1.t 1.S set at 
some other lower status. ' 
The nature of diplomacy is such that in most cases 
there would not be a formal and public PLO .request to 
open an office until the matter has been 1.nformally 
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taken up and a 'gentleman's agreement I been reached. 
However, there have been occasions when the issue has 
become public and precipitated public debate, 
culminating in a widely publicised formal decision. 
32 Quoted in Silverburg, (1977: 389), Green, L. 
"Representation Versus Hembership: The Chinese 
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International Law Vol.10 (1972), p.104. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
This appendix provides a list of specialised agencies and 
UN institutions that have extended to the PLO observership 
and/ or maintain regular and formal contacts wi th PLO 
representations in New York, Geneva and Vienna. Two UN 
sources were used in preparation of this appendix. The 
first source are the yearly reports prepared by the 
Secretary General of the UN in accordance with Resolution 
3300 (XXIX) of December 1974 adopted in relation to the 
agenda item entitled 'Implementation of the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples by the Specialized Agencies and the International 
Ins tit uti 0 n s ass 0 cia ted wit h the Un i ted Nat ion s • . Th e 
second source are reports prepared in accordance ECOSOC 
Resolution 2100 (LXIII) of 3 August 1977 and Resolution 
34/133 of 14 December 1979 specifically urging specialised 
agencies to consult and cooperate with the PLO. 
SPECIALISED AGENCIES 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO) 
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANISATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
(FAO) 
UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL 
ORGANISATION (UNESCO) 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION (WHO) 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION (ICAO) 
UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION (UPU) 
INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION (ITU) 
WORLD HETEOROLOGICAL ORGANISATION (WMO) 
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ｾＱａｒｉｔｉｍｅ＠ CONSULTATIVE ORGANISATION 
(IMCO) 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION (WIPO) 
INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (IFAD) 
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OTHER UN INSTITUTIONS and PROGRAMMES 
UNITED NATION CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND ｄｅｖｅｌｏｐｾＱｅｎｔ＠
UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION 
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME 
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME 
UN document numbers for the reports used, 
A/l0080 and Add. 1-4, A/31/65, A/31/238, A/32/87 and Add. 
1-3, A/32/286, A/33/109 and Add. l-A, A/34/208 and Add. 1-
3, A/35/178 and Addl-4, E/1978/55, A/35/227 and A/36/305. 
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